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Abstract 
Existing water service concepts and practice within the Sub Sahara 
African region, including Tanzania, Kenya, Uganda, Zambia, Somalia, Ghana, 
Senegal, Malawi, Gambia and Cote d' Ivoire, has demonstrated that, the absence 
of Sustainable capital funds and appropriate water management models are the 
major obstacles for water development in this region. 
This thesis has critically evaluated a number of different capital funding 
methods, including loans from the World Bank, to formulate an ideal theoretical 
solution for water services in Tanzania. The concept of establishing capital funds 
from local financial institutions, proposals for the control of capital funds, and the 
provision of special training before and during implementation are key aspects of a 
new approach. The research has successfully developed a new water 
management model, which is sustainable and appropriate for water problems in 
Tanzania (sub-Sahara African countries) 
The model newly established methods for generating capital funds from 
local sources including tariffs review and mass contribution has been critically 
evaluated for assurance of its sustainability in practice, to protect the affordability to 
all water users and assessing the value of willingness to pay when the model is 
adopted. 
However, the localisation through structured systematic participation and 
greater recognition of water users in the model has been evaluated and identified 
as a new Significant bond for making collective and effective decisions in water 
services. 
Furthermore, based on the designed research objectives, this research 
has evaluated the differences and contributions of the new developed model in 
comparison with previous practiced models (privatisation and public services) in 
Tanzania to develop conclusions and recommendations for future studies. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION. 
1.1 Overview 
'The Earth is a unique planet in our solar system; no other planet has liquid water 
and that is why there is no life on Mars' [1]. 
According to the report published by the Population Reference Bureau [2] and the 
work of Lenntech [3], the whole of the earth's surface is surrounded by 70% of 
water, whilst the total volume of water is 1.4 billion km3• However, only 35 million 
km3- equivalent to 2.5% of the whole water volume-is fresh water. Coleridge [4] 
adds that the greatest percentage (68.7%) of fresh water is in the form of ice and 
permanent snow, whilst the remaining 29.9% exists as ground water, with only 
0.26% surface water in the form of rivers, lakes, streams and others. This evidence 
suggests that the natural geographical reserve of available fresh water is an 
obstacle, which therefore reflects the reality and the necessity for technological 
advancements and funds investment-especially for poor developing countries. 
Notably, however, the development of the Water sector has been widely hindered 
or impaired by three major factors:' the unequal distribution of various water 
sources, including (surface water, underground water and others), the inability to 
establish sustainable water and sewerage projects owing to capital problems 
(funds) and technology limitations, and the inability to sustain and develop the 
limited existing water and sewerage services. 
The rise in water consumption and waste water discharge also poses a threat; 
the quantity of water used for all purposes exceeds 3,700 km3 per year. Agriculture 
is the largest user, consuming almost two-thirds of all water drawn from rivers, 
lakes, and groundwater. Whilst irrigation has undoubtedly remarkably contributed 
to world agricultural production, it is nevertheless extremely water intensive. Since 
1960, water use for crop irrigation has risen by 60-70%. Moreover, industry uses 
approximately 20% of available water, and the municipal sector uses approximately 
10%. The increased water consumption owing to population growth-especially in 
urban areas and due to industrialisation-has considerably affected the natural use 
of water by opening other extra water needs for both domestic use as well as 
surrounding development, whilst the available small amount (2.5%) of the world's 
fresh water is decreasing [4] [5]. 
The African Medical Research Foundation (AM REF) [6] argues that the most 
affected areas are developing countries, specifically Sub-Sahara African countries, 
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where almost 1.1 billion people have inadequate access to proper drinking water 
and sanitation. Moreover, other regions, such as North America and Europe, have 
a high standard of best water and sanitation services; however, Oceania, Latin 
America and the Caribbean are situated in problematic locations in terms of 
providing urban water services in comparison to Africa and Asia. Table 1.1 below 
provides a comparison of satisfaction. 
Table 1.1: Global Picture on lacking Improved Water Supply and Sanitation 
Source: WHO/UNICEF (2000) 
Lacking Improved Water Lacking Improved Sanitation 
REGION Supply 
SN 
RURAL URBAN RURAL URBAN 
1 North America 0% 0% 0% 0% 
2 European 13% 0% 26% 1% 
3 Oceania 37% 2% 19% 1% 
Latin America 
4 and Caribbean 38% 7% 51% 13% 
5 Asia 25% 7% 69% 22% 
6 Africa 29% 6% 62% 14% 
Gadgil [7] notes that poverty in developing Africa countries is a huge obstacle for 
water services improvement, and that the available poor water services has a direct 
impact on the spread of water-borne diseases, with increases average death cases 
of approximately 1.8 million people per annum. UNHCR [8] states that, 'It was 
estimated that 88% of that burden is attributable to unsafe water supply, sanitation 
and mostly affects children's hygiene. UNICEF [9] further argues that the situation 
is critical to the 2.5 billion people who are still lacking access to improved 
sanitation, including 1.2 billion who have no facility at all. The message is clear that 
'we need to greatly accelerate progress in drinking water and sanitation particularly 
in Sub-Saharan African countries and Southern Asia' [9]. 
According to African Medical Research Foundation, the current water 
situation in Sub-Sahara African countries is the worst to the extent that almost 2 in 
every 5 people have some degree of domestic safe water shortage. In comparison 
with Europe, babies in the Sub-Saharan region are 520 times more likely to die 
from water-borne diseases than those born in Europe. This is further emphasised 
- 3 -
by the statement, 'Oeveloping more sustainable water supply services in this region 
will help reduce almost all water-borne diseases and reduce by up to 25% 
diarrhoea related deaths, and improved sanitation reduces death rates by 32%' [6]. 
1.2 Tanzania 
Tanzania is a developing country currently struggling to reach the goal of 
quality, quantity, affordable and environmentally sustainable water. Being an 
equatorial country, with a population of approximately 40 million people, Tanzania 
has a total area of 94.5 million hectares. Moreover, almost 5.2% (5.5 million 
hectares) of the total area is covered by surface fresh water. The country has a 
reserve of 40 million km3 of underground fresh water; unfortunately, however, the 
country has managed to supply clear and safe water to only 55.7% of the total rural 
population and only 78% of its urban citizens [10]. 
The first president of Tanzania, Julius K. Nyerere, advocated and always 
insisted that, 'MAJI NI UHAI' water is life, and it is therefore the government's 
responsibility to ensure that every Tanzanian enjoys clean and safe water. Since 
Tanzania gained independence in 1961, the government has been struggling to 
develop a water sector with the motto of MAJI NI UHAI. Unfortunately, funds and 
technology, affordability and poverty problems have all been the major obstacles 
when striving to deliver the best water services to all of Tanzania [11]. 
Oar-es-salaam-the commercial and former capital city-has a population of 
approximately 4.5 million people with approximately 32.5% of the current population 
not supplied with safe domestic water. The city supply from Dar-es-salaam Water 
Supply and Sewerage Authority (OAWASA) is only 70% of its total production of 63 
million m3 per annum. The increase in Unaccounted for Water (UFW) is caused by 
existing old-aged water supply networks and a city population increase of 
approximately 4% annually. Such issues form the major causes of water 
unavailability in Dar-es-salaam (Tanzania). There is a serious water shortage in 
other areas, such as the poorest district of Mkuranga, which is located 50km south 
of Oar-es-salaam and which had a population of approximately 175,000 people in 
the 1990s, with only 25% of all households enjoying access to safe domestic water 
and less than 5% of rural households able to use latrines. According to AMREF 
[12], during this time, most of the Mkuranga households used unsafe water with a 
high risk of contamination by wild animals sharing such sources. As a result, 
diarrhoea and water-related diseases, such as eye infections and malaria, were 
permanently a threat. 
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Essentially, this existing problem concerning water supply and sanitation 
services in Tanzania has acted as the driving force for this research; therefore, it is 
hoped that this thesis may devise an appropriate (in the context of reliability, 
quality, quantity and affordability) solution for Tanzania water services, which 
ultimately acts as the motivation of this research. With this in mind, it is considered 
that the following questions need to be asked: 
1. How can Tanzanians be provided with the best quality but affordable water 
supply and sewerage services? 
2. How can water supply and sanitation services in Tanzania be self-
sustainable? 
3. How can Tanzanians participate fully for their own betterment in water 
sector development? 
1.3 Aim and Objectives 
This thesis comprises the aim of 'developing a sustainable financial and operational 
model for water and sewerage services in Tanzania'. With this in mind, the 
objectives are set as follows: 
1. To review the delivery of the service provided by DAWASA and the 
privatisation of DAWASA; 
2. To review and identify the problems of water and sewerage services in 
Tanzania; 
3. To critically review how water and sewerage services are delivered in 
developing countries; 
4. To evaluate the funding methods in water projects and assessing the 
potential value of existing commercialisation in water services; 
5. To review the existing water services model for developing new framework 
suitable for Tanzania; 
6. To develop a theoretical water services model and Testing; and 
7. To develop an appropriate funding and management model for Tanzania 
water services. 
1.4 Scope and Limitations of the Research 
The research scope is no more than a critical study of the existing water problems 
in Tanzania with the overriding aim of establishing an appropriate and sustainable 
solution for the current Tanzania water services issue. Secondly, within the 
country's available and limited local resources, the research scope is concerned 
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with developing sustainable capital funds for the Tanzanian water supply and 
sewerage services; thus, the study focuses mainly on experiences from Sub-
Sahara African countries. 
1.5 Original Contribution of the Research 
The original practical and theoretical contributions of this study can be summarised 
as follows: 
i. The research introduced a new locally developed water management style that 
is recognised as efficient and reliable for water services in Tanzania; 
ii. The increase of water production and supply-owing to the adaptation of a 
newly developed model-will act as a catalyst for social and economic 
development owing to the fact that water will be used for other economic 
development, i.e. crop production (agriculture) and industrial development, 
within the country; 
iii. The availability of water will increase land value and attract more investors; 
iv. The researched local capital funding model will fasten the expansion of water 
supply and sanitation services in Tanzania; therefore, funds will be available 
under local management within local conditions; 
v. The application of a newly developed model will improve sewerage services in 
the country, and so the existing poor sanitation and pollution in the city will 
therefore be no more., which will keep the city (Dar-es-salaam) cleaner, more 
attractive, and environmentally friendly; 
vi. The new model introduces commercial types of services, all of which have 
greater focus on the sustainability of the delivery of services and not the 
maximisation of profit-a vision which has a greater benefit in terms of the 
affordability of water services; and 
vii. The successful application of this new model in relation to the eradication of 
water supply and sewerage services in Tanzania will bring about new 
challenges for other Sub-Sahara African countries aiming to create and adopt 
their own style of best water management within their respective countries, 
which therefore means that this induces other challenges and questions so as 
to facilitate opportunities of investigation in similar areas, i.e. water supply" and 
sanitation, for future betterment. 
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1.6 The Thesis Structure 
The structure and arrangement of the chapters in this thesis have been designed 
systematically in order to fulfil the aim and objectives of this research. 
1.6.1 Chapter One: Introduction 
This chapter provides the general introduction of the study, its aim, objectives, 
scope and limitations, and further describes the source, research questions and 
original contribution of the thesis. Furthermore, this chapter also provides the 
structure and composition of the entire thesis. 
1.6.2 Chapter Two: DAWASA and Privatisation 
Chapter Two discusses the provision of water supply and sewerage services in 
Tanzania. It is structured so. as to provide practical experience of water 
management history in the country. The areas covered include a critical discussion 
on public water services in Tanzania, the privatisation of DAWASA, the driving 
forces for privatisation, private water management, and the failure of private water 
services and the effects. 
1.6.3 Chapter Three: Water Services in Developing Countries 
This chapter is structured so as to provide different knowledge of experiences in 
water services from other African developing countries. Water services experiences 
are acquired sourced of learnt from countries, such as Uganda, Kenya Senegal, 
Somali, Zambia, Guinea, Ghana, and Cote de Ivore. Moreover, issues of the 
change of water management style, process, adaptation and effects are widely 
covered. With this in mind, the adopted concepts are compared with the 
conclusions drawn from Chapter Two for the purpose of scrutinising a step towards 
drawing answers to the research questions. 
1.6.4 Chapter Four: Methods for Funding Water Projects 
This chapter provides a discussion on the different methods of funding water 
projects development and loans (as a source for capital funds) from financial 
institutions, whilst the conditions for loans are also critically assessed. The 
difficulties and rationale surrounding the loans are also covered, in addition to the 
effects of the World Bank procurement procedures for country borrowers. However, 
other methods-including capital from property value and equity-based methods-
are also scrutinised. Generally, the chapter focuses on the generation of capital for 
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water projects, which is noted as being a major obstacle to achieving better water 
services in Sub-Sahara African countries. 
1.6.5 Chapter Five: Management of Water Services 
This chapter is formulated so as to discuss common methods for water services 
management, including public water services, private water services, and THE 
commercial services of public entities. The role and functions of regulatory 
authorities in water services, and willingness to pay, has also been discussed; this 
is based on an analysis of evidence from Sub-Sahara African countries in 
comparison with various local evidences captured in the field. The adopted 
concepts are compared with actual experiences of Tanzanian water services 
before, during and after the DAWASA privatisation. The proportional services, 
costs and efficiency are also measured. Furthermore, the differences between 
commercialisation and privatisation are widely discussed. 
1.6.6 Chapter Six: Evaluation of Water Services and Model Formulation 
The chapter is structured to evaluate, link, and accordingly consolidate 
various water management models adopted from the (discussion covered in 
chapters 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5) Sub-Sahara African countries. A framework for the 
research question and the formulation of the basic format of required data to be 
collected from the field are provided. The discussed areas include definition of 
privatisation, evaluation of different water services model within Sub-Sahara African 
countries, combined discussion on case studies, funding sources and effects, 
World Bank loans, the role and functions of private water services providers and 
regulatory authorities, and the setting of water charges. However, thE! detailed 
procedure for ideal water management model (framework) has been critically 
discussed. 
1.6.7 Chapter Seven: Research Methodology 
The research methodology chapter of this thesis discusses the way in which this 
study has been designed and implemented, i.e. data collection and analysis, and 
the way in which the research answers were achieved. In relation to the aim and 
objectives of the study, the chapter critically examines the research methods in 
terms of selecting the best method to be adopted for this research. The chapter 
also covers evidences associated discussions concerning how the study was 
carried out, its results, the method utilised, the procedure of data analysis, and also 
how the process of validation was executed. 
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1.6.8 Chapter Eight: Field Results and Model Development 
The field work chapter in this thesis is dominated by a discussion on the process, 
approach, and the results of field work implementation-particularly during the 
period of data collection, gathering, conceptualisation, and analysis. The 
interpretation of data collected in relation to the actual noted problems of water 
services in Tanzania and the development of a proposed solution according to the 
need are discussed. The reasons for field ground data collected in Tanzania and a· 
detailed discussion of the sources for data collection is also carried out. The 
advantages and disadvantages of development-originality and potentialities of the 
model (POCO)-are also discussed in this chapter. 
1.6.9 Chapter Nine: Validation of the New Model (POCO) 
This chapter provides detailed information as feedback of the model (POCO) test, 
which has garnered criticism several comments from the field discussed, and has 
further encountered a number of challenges. The model testing (validation) was 
executed according to the study needs in seven different water authorities: 
MWAUWASA, IRUWASA, Mbeya UWASA, MORUWASA, MUWASA, ARUWASA 
and Tanga UWASA. Moreover, the method adopted for the validation and process 
of implementation and the adaptation of the concept from the given comments for 
strengthening the model (POCO) are discussed. In addition, financial models 
evidence how the tariff review and mass contribution methods are realistic, 
opportunistic and practical as substitutes for loans, with financiers' tough conditions 
also covered. 
1.7.0 Chapter Ten: Conclusion and Recommendations 
This chapter draws the conclusion of the research findings, and subsequently 
opens new challenges of the possible areas for future. The conclusions, 
contributions and recommendations are critically presented based on the captured 
developed research evidences. The reasons for supporting the research 
conclusions are widely described as having the capacity to give opportunities for 
general adaptation and good practice, and as well challenges for future research 
development. The conclusions presented are from the summarised analysis of the 
concepts, there are detailed systematically guided by the research objectives. The 
detail provided discussion on the model analysis was a strategy guiding to provide 
a strong conclusive research vision. Furthermore, strong reasons justifying POCO 
being the only choice for Tanzanian water problems were also discussed. 
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CHAPTER TWO: DAWASA AND PRIVATISATION 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter is structured to provide the experiences of water services in 
Tanzania. 
Notably, Tanzania is amongst the Sub-Sahara African countries that has a 
poor economy and critical water problems. The country is taking keen steps to 
improve its economy for the betterment of Tanzanians; however, water supply and 
sewerage services are seen as a major source of social and economic 
development in the country. With this in mind, this chapter provides a critical 
examination of water services in Tanzania in an attempt to identify problems as well 
as the causes. 
In this chapter, focus is placed on Dar-es-salaam Water and Sewerage 
Authority (DAWASA), which is the largest water service provider operating in the 
city of Dar-es-salaam and coastal region. It is from an examination of DAWASA's 
performance that the research aims are developed. In this chapter, various 
issues-including the establishment of DAWASA, its role and functions, and its 
performance during the periods both before and after privatisation, organisation 
structure, effects of privatising water services, driving forces for DAWASA 
privatisation, the aim and objectives of DAWASA privatisation, the source of funds 
for privatisation and the implementation of Dar-es-salaam Water Supply and 
Sanitation Projects (DWSSP)-are all critically discussed. 
2.2 Privatisation in Tanzania 
Both prior to and following the independence of Tanzania in 1961, almost all 
enterprises in the country were managed privately by individuals and organised 
groups. For the purpose of widening and maintaining job opportunities for local 
Tanzanians, the government nationalised and placed all enterprises under state 
ownership and management up to the mid-1980s. Accordingly, water services were 
owned and managed by the government. Up to 1990, almost 400 state-owned 
enterprises had accumulated commercial losses of US$100 million, as well as 
US$352 million as loans, all of which were guaranteed by the government. This 
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was a significant burden upon the government and, as a result, the government 
made a deliberate withdrawal from direct involvement in the business as a way of 
devoting its scarce resources to its core responsibilities, including governance, 
policy issues, taxations, security issues and capital investments [34]. 
According to Mapunda [35], the government embarked on economic reforms 
in the form of privatisation as a way of enabling parastatals to attract strategic 
investors who would inject requisite capital for the purpose of rehabilitation and 
expansion, thereby introducing new and cost-effective production and service 
technologies, sound management, marketing expertise, and subsequently produce 
quality goods and better services. In an attempt to ensure commitment, in 
November, 1993, the government of Tanzania amended the existing Public 
Corporations Act so as to define the institutional framework and procedures for 
divestiture. As a result, the privatisation in the country was deliberately focused on 
transferring the ownership, operational and investment obligations in the 
parastatals from the government to the private sector. 
2.2.1 DAWASA Background 
Kawambwa [39] argues that, following the independence of Tanzania in 1961, 
water and sewerage services under the Ministry of Works was managed by the 
department of Public works (PWD). Subsequently, during the early 1970s, Dar-es-
salaam-being the capital city of Tanzania and the fastest developing business 
centre in the country-was separated from the government's central water 
management system. An independent water corporation (Dar-es-salaam Water 
Corporation Sole) was formed in an attempt to deal with water supply services only 
within the region. At this time, the population of Dar-es-salaam was less than 3 
million people, and there was only one source of water the Mtoni treatment plant. 
As a result, in 1981, the rapid population increase caused the government to 
establish the National Urban Water Authority (NUWA) and charged it with the 
responsibility to develop and manage the urban water supply on the mainland of 
Tanzania. However, the major objective of the new authority was to address the 
deteriorated state of water supply systems. NUWA subsequently became 
operational in 1984 with -the objective to take over and reform the water supply 
services in all urban areas. NUWA failed to achieve its target [37]. 
In 1997, the Government reorganised NUWA by amalgamating the National 
Urban Water Authority [NUWA] and the Dar-es-Salaam Sewerage and Sanitation 
Department [DSSD] to form the Dar-es-Salaam Water and Sewerage Authority 
(DAWASA) [4). DAWASA was officially established in April, 1997, by Act No.8 by 
merging the water supply operations of the defunct National Urban Water Authority 
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(NUWA) and the sewerage activities of the defunct Dar-es-Salaam Sewerage and 
Sanitation Department. Subsequent amendments were made to the Act in 1999 to 
allow for the privatisation of DAWASA, and further amendments in 2000 allowed for 
the creation of the Regulatory Authority EWURA. All amendments to the Act were 
amalgamated into the main Act, thereby resulting in the Dar-es-Salaam Water and 
Sewerage Authority Act 2001. At this time, DAWASA was operating as a service 
provider, and did so up until 2003, privatising its operational duties to City Water 
Services owing to a lack of funds for services maintenance and development. 
However, DAWASA continued to shoulder specific duties, such as the supervision 
of capital development projects and acted as an asset holder. In 2004, however, 
the government of Tanzania terminated its ten-year City Water Services lease 
contract owing to poor performance, which automatically led to material breach of 
contract. The government formulated a local company, DAWASCO, with the aim of 
conducting all responsibilities left by the private operator City Water Services. 
Notably, DAWASA is still in place as an asset holder and capital project 
implementer on behalf of the Tanzanian government [42]. 
2.2.2 DAWASA Existence and its Functions 
The Dar-es-salaam Water and Sewerage Authority (DAWASA) is licensed in 
accordance with the Energy and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority (EWURA) to 
carry out all responsibilities for providing, planning, developing, and managing 
water supply and sewerage services in the city of Dar-es-salaam, Urban Coast 
region areas, and all areas along transmission from upper Ruvu, lower Ruvu and 
Mtoni treatment plants to Dar-es-salaam water reservoirs located at Kimara, Chuo 
cha Ardhi and Mtoni. 
The efforts of DAWASA to fulfil the city's water demands with a population of more 
than 4.5 million are limited to a maximum water production of 272,000 m3/day from 
three water production facilities, two of which are on the Ruvu river, Upper Ruvu 
WTP (81,000 m3/day) and Lower Ruvu WTP (182,000 m3/day). The third smallest 
water production facility, Mtoni WTP (9,000 m3/day), is located on the Kizinga river, 
which is situated only 7km south of the city. Kizinga River, with its poor water 
quality owing to high contamination from residential encroachment, has been 
proposed for abandonment. Moreover, the Ruvu River, which is located 
approximately 80 km north-west of the city of Dar-es-salaam, is the main source of 
water, but has one major problem: the high pumping energy costs. 
From 1997, DAWASA developed a number of boreholes in an attempt to 
alleviate the impact of droughts; the ground water was developed as a 
supplementary source on an emergency basis during the drought years. However, 
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owing to a short supply, it has continued to be used during normal years. Ground 
water quality is generally good and within acceptable standards, although various 
boreholes are showing signs of becoming saline, and there is also an increasing 
incidence of elevated values of nitrates and faecal bacteria in some areas. 
Nevertheless, the total production capacity from all three surface facilities is 
272,OOOm3/day and approximately 36,OOOm3/day from ground water, which is 
barely sufficient for current and short-term demands [36; 37]. 
Irrespective of such efforts, however, Dar-es-salaam's citizens are only 
supplied with 30% less than the actual demand, with a permanent timetable for 
water rationing. As a result, some areas, such as Kimara, Kamanyola, Temboni 
and Mbezi, are supplied only once a week, whilst Tabata, Ukonga and Pugu are 
now removed altogether from the DAWASA water supply. Essentially, the 4% 
population increase on each year poses further evidence in terms of the urgency of 
implementing a sustainable water solution [42]. 
2.2.3 DAWASA Privatisation 
By the late 1990s, it became evident that DAWASA was unable to respond 
quickly enough to meet increasing customer demands for water, and it was also 
unable to raise finance for network repair and to replace its aging assets. In 1995, 
through Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Japanese government 
assisted the Tanzania government in carrying out the study for the improvement of 
water services in Dar-es-salaam city and various coastal regions. The same 
exercise was carried out again by the German Company Gauff Ingenieure with the 
aim of rehabilitating DAWASA water infrastructures, and carrying out the expansion 
and repair of the water supply network, meter installation, improvement of the 
database and billing system, and the establishment of extra water sources in order 
to sustain the fluctuating water demand in the city. 
Subsequently, the Tanzanian government acted to establish solutions for the 
urgent repair and rehabilitation of the existing aged water infrastructure. As a 
result, all aged water networks and other technical problematic areas were 
combined in order to formulate Dar-es-salaam Water Supply and Sanitation Project 
(DWSSP). In this regard, the problem was from where funds could be garnered for 
the DWSSP implementation. The Tanzanian government was unable to fund the 
development due to economic problems, and so they subsequently went to the 
World Bank for assistance. 
In August, 1997, the African Development Bank (AfDB) proposed that the 
Dar-es-salaam Water Supply and Sanitation Project should focus on rehabilitating 
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and improving operations and facilities, with DAWASA acting as the service 
provider and operator. AfDB put on hold project processing pending the outcome of 
the consultations of 1997/98 between private operators and the Government of 
Tanzania (GoT) for a long-term 'concession'. Under the proposed arrangements, 
the concessionaire was to be responsible for financing the investment programme, 
as well as for the operation and maintenance activities estimated to cost 
approximately US$250 million. 
Later the following year, in November, 1998, it became clear that this 
approach was not going to succeed: private investors were unwilling to finance 
such a venture in Dar-es-salaam given the state of the water supply and sewerage 
(WSS) operations and the overall infrastructure. This situation necessitated 
Tanzania remaining with the World Bank option. The World Bank loan was 
available with the condition that private operations and public financing would be 
combined. With no choice, Tanzania accepted the loan with the attached 
privatisation condition, and the process for implementation was subsequently 
initiated [42]. 
2.2.4 Process of DAWASA Privatisation 
In 2000, the DAWASA Act was amended so as to allow the operation and 
maintenance functions to be undertaken under contract by a private operator and 
to thereby allow for service regulation by an independent entity. Thereafter, the 
GoT, through the Presidential Parastatal Sector Reform Commission [PPSRC], 
began the process to establish new arrangements for the delivery of services 
involving private sector participation. The bidding process began; unfortunately, 
however, the only bidder was Bi Water, an English company. In 1999, the World 
Bank lodged no objection for the lease contract. The City Water Services Ltd., a 
joint venture company between Bi Water International, Gauff Inginieure and local 
. 
company Supper Doll Ltd., officially signed the lease contract in February, 2003. In 
March, 2003, DAWASA completed the preparation of the Dar-es-salaam Water 
Supply & Sanitation Project (DWSSP) in keeping with the suggested scope defined 
by the World Bank. The World Bank, African Development Bank, and the European 
Investment Bank appraised the project and commenced negotiations for financing. 
DAWASA and City Water Services Ltd. met all the required conditions for external 
financing by IDA, AfDB, and EIB by the end of July, 2003, and the project and 
lease contracts came into effect, subsequently commencing on August 1, 2003. 
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2.2.5 Sources of Funds for DAWASA Privatisation 
The need for DAWASA privatisation originated from the deteriorated Dar-es-
salaam water infrastructure, which urgently required special attention for both 
rehabilitation and repair. This was recommended by the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA) in Dar-es-salaam water improvement report of 1995. 
The study was carried out by a German company, Gauff Inginieure, which also 
recommended the repair and rehabilitation of the existing aged DAWASA water 
infrastructure. The two studies concluded that the formulation of Dar-es-salaam 
Water Supply and Sanitation Project (DWSSP) could provide a solution for water 
problems in the city. However, the implementation required capital funds, which the 
government could not afford, and as a result, the government requested loans from 
various international institutions the World Bank being one. Initially, the estimated 
total project costs were approximately $149 million-equivalent to 138 million 
Euros-which were to be financed from the following international institutions (as a 
loan to the GoT), all of whom notably agreed to fund the project (see Table 2.1). 
Table 2.1: Total donor contribution for DWSSP 
Amount in 
SN Financier EUR Millions 
1 
International Development Association 50 
(IDA) 
2 
African Development Bank (AtoB) 32 
3 
Government of Tanzania (GoT) 15 
4 
Private Operator Equity (CWSC) 5 
5 SUB-TOTAL 103 
In order to ensure the total estimated fund required for the project was 
achieved, the Tanzania government (the borrower) requested that the World Bank 
subsidise a loan from the bank's risk capital for an amount equivalent to 35 million 
Euros. Finally, the amount concluded as an estimate for the total project (DWSSP) 
was 138 million Euros. 
On January 23, 2003, the Tanzanian government borrowed close to US$160 
million for a credit period of 5 years, disbursed in up to 15 instalments of not less 
than 2 million Euros each, for the DWSSP; this comprised the condition of 
privatising DAWASA. The loan had an applicable annual interest rate of 11.5%, 
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with the interest capitalised during a grace period of 25 years, according to the 
condition of the loan (see Appendix S in the CD). 
The credit was available at the request of DAWASA from November 15, 
2003. Upon receipt of the bank's written request, no disbursement was to be made 
after September 15, 2008 [43; 45]. Therefore, as indicated in Table 2.1, the 
DWSSP funds were raised by the bilateral institutions, including IDA, AfDB and 
EIB. Notably, Tanzania as the borrower, contributed Tsh. 750 million as a 
counterpart contribution in order to fulfil conditions for project funding. 
2.2.6 Contractual Obligations on Rental and Equity Payments 
According to the DAWASAlCity Water lease contract, page 77, Section 39.4, 
the private operator, City Water Services Ltd., was obligated to pay DAWASA 
monthly rental fee in advance, stipulated in three different categories on the basis 
of monthly payments: Contract Year 1 was Tsh. 50 million; Contract Year 2 was 
Tsh. 75 million; Contract Year 3 to 10 was Tsh.100 million. However, in the same 
section, it was clearly stated that, 'the operator City water shall be liable for the 
payment of a financial penalty in the event of failure to pay the monthly instalments 
of the rental fee'. Another payment obligation in the DAWASAJCity Water lease 
contract was equity, whereby City Water services Company Limited (CWSL) was 
contracted to operate water supply and sewerage services in the city for a period of 
ten years, with an equity contribution of $8 million per annum. Notably, the CWSL 
equity contribution was a part of the capital funds for development and 
sustainability of the DAWASA infrastructures; therefore, this equity contribution was 
clearly described in the lease contract. Equity contribution was a part of the 
contract conditions, which brought greater worries to bidders; this situation may 
have therefore limited the number of bidders during the contract procurement, 
simply owing to the fact that it had higher investment costs. This occurred during 
the DAWASA privatisation procurement procedure. Notably, during the second 
round of bidding, only one contender (CWSL) was made apparent. 
2.2.6 DAWASA Privatisation Structure 
According to a lease contract [41], the new arrangement for the delivery of 
water supply and sewerage services comprised DAWASA as a Public Granting 
Authority [PGA] and the private operator, City Water Services Ltd., as the main 
actors. As a result of the legislation passed in April, 2002, a third group, Energy 
and Water Utilities Regulatory Authority [EWURA], was assigned with the authority 
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and power to regulate the activities of DAWASA and City Water Services Ltd. 
These arrangements enabled proper separation of the roles of Regulator, Assets 
Manager and Service Provider, which provided greater efficiency, transparency and 
accountability for water supply and sewerage services in Dar-es-salaam. Markedly, 
what has been executed thus far in terms of implementing privatisation in the 
country can be summarised and presented in the figure form as follows (see Figure 
2.1 ). 
I FINANCIERS (IDA, EIB & AfDB) I 
~ REGULATOR (EWURA & NEMC) 
GOVERNMENT of TANZANIA 
• 
Water charges, quality and 
Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Water Environmental control 
.. 
LICENCE 
Operation monitoring and control 
, 
, , 
DAWASA-PGA Lease Contract I DAWASCO J , I The operator 
I Contracts J Consultancy ~ , Contracts , , 
I Contractors J Business Consumer Agreement Contracts , t 
Construction Financial & Technical 
Supervisor Advisors 
, , 
CWSSP Environmental 
(NGOs) Monitoring 
Figure 2.1: DAWASA structure during the privatisation period 
2.3 Change in the Roles and Functions of DAWASA (DAWASA PGA) 
The privatisation of DAWASA aimed to deliver quality water to all Dar-es-
salaam and the coastal region citizens. In order to fulfil this objective, the 
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organisation structure was changed, subsequently affecting the duties and 
responsibilities of each distinct organ. Therefore, DAWASA PGA, City Water and 
EWURA-the key organs of the privatisation-were each structured to perform 
specific duties (roles and functions), as detailed in the following sections. 
2.3.1 DAWASA PGA 
According to the DAWASA Act [3; 4], which was amended in 2001, the roles 
and functions of DAWASA were changed to DAWASA Public Grant Authority 
(DAWASA PGA). Restructuring was implemented in order to ensure the following 
four major functions could be performed. Firstly, on behalf of the Tanzanian 
government, DAWASA PGA was the owner and manager of the water supply and 
sewerage services assets, and was making the assets available to the operator. 
Secondly, DAWASA PGA was the implementer and manager of the projects 
funded by the World Bank, including the Dar-es-salaam Water Supply and 
Sanitation Projects (DWSSP) and Community Water Supply and Sanitation 
Projects (CWSSP). Importantly, the projects involve the rehabilitation and 
upgrading of old existing infrastructures, including water networks, waste water 
networks, oxidation ponds, sewers, the rehabilitation of the ocean outfall screening 
chamber plants, and water storages. The cost for this component totalled 
US$18.20 million. The entire World Bank loan was structured for the 
implementation of DWSSP only: for example, the total sum of US$86.99 million-
which is almost 51 % of the total World Bank loan-was invested into just one 
component (Water Supply Rehabilitation & Extension) of the DWSSP. The on-
going DWSSP will provide the much-needed improvements to the water supply and 
sewerage services in Dar-es-salaam. Such improvements are designed so as to be 
completed within the five-year period by a strategy involving elements, including 
replacement and/or repair of water supply and sewerage assets; however, the 
implementation of a commercial policy that ultimately favours connection to the 
water supply system and the reduction of physical and commercial Unaccounted 
for Water (UfW) will increase the correction of water bills, and will base bills on 
actual rather than assessed water use [48]. 
Thirdly, DAWASA PGA is the supervisor of the Private Operator's operations, 
and the main duties therefore include co-operating with the operator (City Water 
Services) in all appropriate and necessary respects so as to procure the execution 
of any capital works for which the operator may be responsible, and to enter into 
any such funding agreement as that, which includes the responsibility to assist the 
operator in obtaining from the government, local government or statutory bodies, 
- 18 -
and subsequently securing all necessary contents and permits, as required by the 
law, in order to enable the operator to perform his/her obligations under the 
contract [40]. Finally, there is the Community Water Supply and Sanitation 
Programme which, according to Mutalemwa [49], required a total of US$3.20 
million to be invested in a community water supply and sanitation (CWSS) 
programme. This component was required to include the construction of 
approximately 50 CWSS sub projects, and has been implemented by DAWASA 
with the assistance of Specialist International NGOs. Moreover, under technical 
studies for the medium-term investment programme, a total amount of US$5.50 
million will be invested in order to undertake four studies so as to prepare for a 
medium-term water supply as well as sanitation extension programme. The studies 
include the selection of a future raw water source for Dar-es-salaam, strategic plan, 
and feasibility studies for the expansion of water supply services and sewerage 
services in Dar-es-salaam. Moreover, national urban water supply and sanitation 
strategy will be considered for improving water supply and sanitation (WSS) 
services in urban areas, which are the tasks to be performed by DAWASA under 
WSS and DWSSP (long-term investment programme). Therefore, in order to 
facilitate DAWASA PGA, and to also ensure that all the responsibilities are 
implemented, the new organisational structure was formulated and kept in 
operation [45]. However, the function and composition of the new management 
organisation structure can be summarised and presented as follows (see Figure 
2.3). 
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Chief Executive Officer 
Legal Affairs Director of Quality 
Manager Assurance 
Procurement Community 
Manaaer Liaison Manaaer 
~ , I 
Director of r Director of Technical Services Director of Finance Administration 
• 
~ 
I Financial Advisor I r Engineering Advisor I 
I 
.. .. .. .. 
Planning r.. Services Delivery Performance Environmental Manager Mana~er Mana~er Mana~er Mana~er 
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Contracts Accounting Finance Training Personal Administration 
Manager Manager Manager Manager Manager Manager 
Figure 2.2: DAWASA PGA Management organisation structure 
2.4 City Water Services (The Operator) 
City Water Services Ltd. (CWS) is a private limited company established 
under the law of Tanzania, the company shareholders of which are Bi water, Gauff 
Ingenieure and Super Doll (Tanzania) Limited. A Tanzanian joint-venture company 
was set up by Bi water International Ltd. UK and H. P. Gauff Ingenieure GmbH, 
which together hold 80% and 20% of its share capital respectively. Moreover, as 
49% was held by Super Doll Trailer Manufacturing Company Ltd. with the exception 
of the operational duties, there are capital works to be implemented by the operator 
(The City Water Services), which were directly delegated to, and c~rried out under, 
the responsibility of CWS (the delegated works). Therefore, under this project, the 
private operator was responsible for the operations and maintenance duties, as 
well as the delegated capital works [38]. 
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2.4.1 Role and Duties of City Water Services (CWSL) 
The duties performed by the operator CWSL can be categorised into three 
types of duty: technical, commercial, and administrative. 
2.4.2 Operator's (CWSL) Technical Responsibilities 
According to the lease contract, the defined operators (CWSL) technical 
duties included the operation and maintenance of networks, equipment and plants, 
the procurement and supply of chemicals and energy, and customers' water supply 
connections, including water meters. Other duties comprised surveying and 
quantifying of the assets in order to prepare and implement a maintenance plan 
which was updated on an annual basis, leakage detection and control, the 
implementation of a capital investment programme, and the planning and covering 
of the rehabilitation and renewal of assets. Moreover, the management of the 
implementation of delegated capital works and the implementation of priority works 
were also to be carried out. However, according to the DAWASA VIS City Water 
Ltd. contract [41], the technical role and duties performed by the private operator, 
were as follows: 
1. To provide the services required in accordance with the contract in an 
efficient, effective and economical manner; to ensure quality control 
according to the International Standards Organisation so as to ensure the 
quality of the provision of services, and to maintain and repair assets [44]; 
and 
2. To meet and fulfil the performance targets as set in this contract (Appendix 
N). In the event of the operator not meeting such key performance targets, 
they shall be held liable for the penalties, as set out in this contract 
(Appendix N in the CD). 
2.4.3 Commercial Management Duties 
1. The company also had to deliver the management of the customers' 
accounts, including billing and the reading of customer meters, in addition to 
revenue collection, the management of customers' complaints, and the 
timely updating of a list of all services supplied by the operator to 
government institutions; 
2. The establishment of various mechanisms for the promotion of customer 
relations, including the development of contracts with customers, and the 
publication of such customer contracts. In the opinion of the operator, this 
would secure adequate publicity for customers; and 
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3. To provide all necessary and adequate working capital and other finances at 
all times during the period of the contract in order to facilitate the fulfilment 
of all its obligations, and to provide the services in the operators' area. 
2.4.4 Administrative and Financial Management 
The operator's responsibilities in relation to the administration and financial 
management include the following considerations: 
1. To sustain all existing employees, training and the development of 
personnel, as well as to create a sustainable Information Technology 
system and database, establish account procedures, prepare and submit 
reports to DAWASA (the Lessor) and prepare the Codes of Practice and 
final budgets, strategic plan and business plan; 
2. To develop and manage the programmes for the advancement of the skills 
and competencies of persons employed within the water and sewerage 
sector within the areas; and 
3. To ensure that all the operators' personnel remain employees of the 
operator or an affiliated company for all salary and benefit purposes, and 
that such staff are compensated in accordance with the normal policies of 
the operator, as may be amended from time to time. 
2.4.5 The Power and Rights of City Water Services (the Operator) 
The operator is required to perform all the water service functions within the 
DAWASA operating area according to the contract, and for the sole purpose of 
carrying out and implementing the provisions of the contract include specific 
powers conferred on the operator elsewhere, as described in DWSSP financial 
contract [43]. In order to reinforce the operator's performance, the following rights 
were granted: 
• Rights of disconnection of services to properties for non-payment of 
charges for water and sewerages; 
• Rights of entry to premises and properties, the right of control, and the right 
to discharge to sewers, the right to manage, use and operate the assets; 
• The right to take legal action for the breach of obligations by customers, and 
the operator's obligations to obtain and keep in force all necessary and 
appropriate licenses, permits and warranties for the provision of services 
and the carrying out of works; and 
• For the first five years, the operator is required to provide a Managing 
Director from the staff or officers of its majority shareholder. 
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2.5 The Energy Water Utilities Regulatory Authority (EWURA) 
The authority was established under the EWURA Act 2001 in order to 
maintain the balance between utilities services providers and consumers. 
According to the presidential sector reform commission report [38], quality water for 
all is the government's primary objective; however, Water Act No. 20 of 2001 
details targets associated with the supply of quality water to more than 75% of all 
villagers by 2025, which is also an evidence of the government's focus on 
affordability. Establishing EWURA in order to balance and control water charges is 
another way of ensuring affordable water services to all; such a service will 
ultimately ensure the use of safe water by all, and will therefore accelerate social 
and economic developments within the country [51]. The main duties of the 
authority were: 
1. To promote effective competition and the economy; 
2. To protect the interest of all costumers and the service providers; 
3. To promote the availability of regulated services to all customers, including 
low-income, rural and disadvantaged consumers; 
4. To enhance public knowledge and awareness of the regulated sector, 
including the right and obligations of consumers and regulated suppliers, 
and the ways in which complaints and disputes may be initiated and 
resolved; and 
5. To ensure the protection of the environment. 
Furthermore, the most important function of the Authority is legislation: 
1. To issue, renew and cancel licenses; 
2. To establish standards for goods and services; 
3. To establish standards for the terms and conditions of the supply of goods 
and services; 
4. To regulate rates and charges; and 
5. To form rules and policies. 
Moreover, there was also the requirement to monitor the performance of the 
regulated sector in relation with level of investment, availability, quality and 
standard of services, cost of services, efficiency of production and distribution of 
services. In the case of the DAWASA privatisation, EWURA was directly 
responsible for the legislation issues of DAWASA PGA and City Water Services' 
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duties, as well as for the monitoring of the performance in relation to the level of 
investment status, quality and standard of services, costs and general services 
performance [50; 51]; however, during the process of privatisation, EWURA was 
not in place; EWURA was established when City Water Services was 
approximately 5 months into its operations. This has a greater risk in the entire set 
up of DAWASA and City Water Services, whereby rules and control for the fair 
operation of each organ against water users were not in place at the right time. 
2.6 Privatisation Implementation, Performance and Monitoring 
The assessment in terms of performance has been monitored periodically 
according to the agreed and contractual performance set indicators of every 
specific job in a fixed particular time. With this in mind, according to Mutalemwa 
[49], an on-going and annual monitoring programme was carried by DAWASA (the 
lesser) based on routine returns made by the operator in key performance. The set 
targets for performance in accordance with the contract were independently 
checked and audited by DAWASA PGA. The monitoring programme-which 
includes the agreed performance indicators-identified all the failures made by the 
operator in terms of failing to achieve key perfor"!1ance targets. However, it was a 
contract obligation that the operator should make use of Good Industry Practice so 
as to comply with all performance targets in order to obtain the required standards. 
When not achieving the targets, financial penalties were set. In practice, DAWASA-
PGA used two major methods, including periodic reports submitted by the private 
operator and the auditing of both technical and financing issues. 
According to DAWASA City Water Lease Contract, Good Industry Practice 
(GIP) means the exercise of the degree of skill, diligence, prudence, and foresight 
that could be reasonably expected from a skilled, experienced and prudent person 
engaged in the provision of services, and the carrying out of operations, 
maintenance and administration pursuant to the lease contract from time to time. 
However, all the performance target indicators of each described work were set 
referring to the volume of work carried out (Volume and Quality) against its 
completion time. Therefore, the conclusion from this comparison (work performed 
against time) was analysed and adopted as an operator's performance. 
The key performance targeted areas were drinking water, effluent quality, 
customer water meter installation, new domestic water supply connection, 
transmission main losses, water distribution losse.s, revenue collection, repair time 
of burst water pipes, repair time of background losses of supply pipes, data 
collection, percentage of customers receiving less than 5m pressure at the tap, and 
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. those receiving less than 10m pressure at the tap (see attached table in Appendix 
N in the CD). The other performance targets were not subject to financial penalties. 
2.6.1 Comparison on Performance 
The comparison discussed in this section is focused on revenue collection during 
all the three different periods, including DAWASA prior to privatisation, the City 
Water Services period, and the period following the termination of the private 
services. However, a comparison in other areas of services, including water 
production, connection for new customers, water meter installation and quality in 
services, were not covered owing to a comparison in revenue collection being 
decided as the benchmark of all services performance. Other areas of services 
performance can be indirectly reflected in total revenue gain. Essentially, the 
revenue collection prior to the privatisation amounted to Tsh.14, 087.00 million per 
annum, which was higher by almost 9% when compared with the revenue collected 
during the private water services period (City Water Services), including the tariff 
increase, which occurred just after the privatisation had started. DAWASCO were 
collecting almost 10% more than the City Water Services collected. The 
expenditure during the City Water Services period was not available and therefore 
induced difficulties in terms of comparing others expenditures incurred during 
DAWASA and DAWASCO periods. The expenditure comparison was set in order 
to provide level of efficiency in finance management within all three (CWS, 
DAWASA and qAWASCO) periods, which .intended to open up a discussion on the 
possibility of fund-serving. The summary of the total revenue collected in the three 
different periods can be presented in a table format, as clearly shown below 
concerning what amount of revenue was collected during .each period (see Table 
2.2). 
Institution 
Table 2.2: Comparison on revenue collection 
COMPARISON OF FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
Description Financial 
Year 
Revenue 
Collection 
TZS'Million 
DAWASCO 2005 Lease ·2005/2006 
Expenditure 
TZS 'Million 
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2.6.2 Outcomes and Failure of Privatisation of Water Services in Tanzania 
i. The Failure and Termination of Lease Contract 
The poor performance of the private water services under the operator City 
Water Services included the major cause of financial losses. The loss of almost 
Tsh. 1,697.47 million per annum was evidenced in Table 2.2, which therefore 
provides a clear indication of the operator's failures and poor performance in 
revenue collection. This was considered to be a Material Breach of Contract. 
According to the DAWASA City Water Lease contract, 'a material breach of 
contract may lead to the termination of the contract'. Material breach of contract 
means when there is a serious material breach like non-compliance with 
obligations, or the violation of rights established in the lease contract occurring in 
serious and repeated forms which subsequently cause financial losses. Moreover, 
the material breach of contracts occurs when the operator or leaser commits 
material breach of the lease contract and does not take responsibility for the 
breach, or otherwise fails to correct or take substantial steps to correct a situation 
of non-compliance or defective compliance with its obligations, within a maximum 
period of 30 days. The injured party deserves the right to terminate the contract; 
therefore, having this contract power, with clear evidences of financial losses owing 
to the operator's poor performance, the government of Tanzania terminated the 
DAWASA City Water lease contract. 
ii. Unpaid Equity Contribution 
According to the DAWASA City Water lease contract, the operator CWS was 
to pay an equity contribution of a minimum of twenty-five% (25%) of the total 
subscribed share capital, and that the total subscribed share capital shall was not 
less than ten million US dollars (US$10,000,000.00). Notably, as of May, 2005, the 
amount had not been paid in full [41]. 
iii. Unpaid Rental Fee 
According to the lease contract agreement, a rental fee shall be paid by the 
operator to the leaser monthly in advance, and the amount of the rental fee payable 
to the leaser was Tsh. 50 million per calendar month; however, up to May, 2005, 
the amount was not fully paid, although by how much has not been disclosed. 
Markedly, the payment of electricity bills was problematic, and sometimes was not 
possible owing to lessor's revenue collection. 
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Such facts amounted to, were concluded and grouped together as 
performance failure by the private operator; therefore, the appropriate action was to 
terminate of the lease contract. 
iv. Reporting Modality 
Table 2.3: City Water Contact Schedule of Reports 
Title Timing 
Annual Operating Budget, Annual Three (3) months prior to the 
Detailed Investment Plan, Strategic commencement of the Operator's 
business Plan, and Five Years Financial Year 
Rolling Investment Budget 
Three(3) months after the end of the 
Annual Reports Operator's Financial Years 
Collection and cost summary tables Quarterly 
Financial Statements Quarterly 
According to the lessor contract [41], the· private operator should perform all 
described duties and report to leaser in a timely fashion (see Table 2.3). 
Furthermore, in the view of Nyamajeje [50], Table 2.3 was a part of the 
contract agreement on the lease contract, which the operator CWS was to follow. 
The detailed components to be reported include the quantity of leakage control, 
new connections and water meter installations, water production, services and 
repair of the water pipes, detecting illegal connection, revenue collection, billing, 
and waste water services in areas of leakage control. In reality, this reporting 
timetable was not followed. City Water Services expenditure was not reported at all, 
which is why the comparison for the total annual expenditure of the figures from 
City Water was not available (see Table 2.2). Notably, this was amongst the 
difficulties experienced during the privatisation period, which may be one of the 
driving forces for the contract termination [50]. With this in mind, the Minister for 
Water and Irrigation, Lowassa [52], stated that, 'In May, 2005, DAWASA acting on 
behalf of the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania terminated the lease 
contract with CWS for non-performance and material breach of contract'. 
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2.7 Summary 
The experiences on water services in Tanzania has been widely discussed in 
this chapter, along with the failure of public water services, driving forces for 
privatisation, and their effects, which together provided the major focused areas of 
the discussion. Considering the contents in the covered discussion, a number of 
conclusions were drawn as follows. 
i. Driving Forces for DAWASA Privatisation 
It was concluded that the privatisation of water services in the country was not 
the government's choice; rather, Tanzania urgently needed capital funds 
(approximately US$149 million) for the rehabilitation, repair and development of the 
deteriorating Dar-es-salaam water infrastructures, with such investment considered 
able to improve and provide better water supply and sewerage services to Dar-es-
salaam and coastal region citizens. The urgently needed amount was vast, and 
Tanzania was not able to raise such amount. The government approached the 
World Bank for a loan, which was available to provide a loan with the condition that, 
under international competitive tender bidding, DAWASA should be privatised. 
Tanzania, with no other viable option, accepted the loan with the privatisation 
condition. With limited knowledge and a lack of experience in water privatisation, 
Tanzania implemented the World Bank condition quickly in order to qualify for the 
loan. The loans came with many other conditions, including highly paid experts 
from the World Bank, no objection, and other World Bank procurement procedures. 
Such conditions have direct effects on the actual loaned sum, as well as the 
implementation procedure, which together all reflect in the form of higher water 
charges. Therefore, getting out of these conditions, the developing countries 
should come up with an alternative local capital funding method. 
ii. Private Operation of Water Services 
The discussion evidenced that the need for capital funds was the cause of 
private water services in the country. However, private water services, which took 
over from public management, could not deliver as well. The failure of private water 
services in the country left behind a number of unanswered questions, including: 
What is next step for Tanzania water services? And which water management 
model would work in country? Moreover, how could it be developed? This research 
adopted such questions as a challenge for the way forward, and therefore drew the 
conclusion for a takeover for developing the appropriate solution concerned with 
- 28-
solving the existing water problems in the country; therefore, the need for an 
appropriate water management model in the country was concluded from the 
effects left behind as a result of the failure of private and public water services. 
Therefore, if the idea of establishing local capital funding method was from 
the effects of unfavourable loan conditions from international institutions, and the 
idea of developing appropriate water management model was from the failure of 
both public and private water services in the country, then the appropriate solution 
for Tanzania water services is to develop a model with the ability to solve both of 
the two aforementioned problems (the appropriate management model for services 
and operations, and, at the same time, a model able to generate funds for 
sustainability and capital development). However, the knowledge of experiences 
from neighbouring regions and Sub-Sahara African countries will add value in 
terms of the entire exercise concerning comparing local Tanzanian experience, 
which may then possibly result in a realistic water services model for Tanzania 
(Sub-Sahara African Countries). 
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CHAPTER THREE: WATER SUPPLY AND SEWERAGE SERVICES IN 
AFRICAN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
3.1 Introduction 
Kerf [24] notes that, in developing and developed countries, there are 
continuous problems to solve. Essentially, the magnitude of struggle and the nature 
of the problems are different, as developing countries face the worst conditions with 
approximately 884 million people in the region experiencing inadequate access to 
safe drinking water, whilst only approximately 2.5 billion people in the same region 
have inadequate access to water for sanitation and waste disposal. Poverty, poor 
economy, unstable political governance and the rapid growth of population are all 
factors for consideration. This chapter focuses on experiences concerning water 
services from a number of Sub-Saharan African countries. The focus is on the 
process that has led to success and failure in various operations of water and 
sewerage services within the region. The Sub-Sahara Africa countries have 
involved geographical, cultural, social, traditional and economical similarities with 
Tanzania. Sustainable water services have similarities in terms of problems in most 
of the Sub-Saharan countries. 
Tatlock [211] argues that, 'while water stress occurs throughout the world, no 
region has been more afflicted than Sub-Sahara Africa', and further adds that, 
'water stress refers to economic, social or environmental problems caused by 
unmet water demand'. Essentially, water services in Sub-Sahara African countries 
including Kenya, Uganda, Senegal, Gambia, and Cote d Ivoire and Ghana have 
been critically discussed. Issues including the type of management and the effects, 
funding for water projects, and overall affordability of services have been examined 
in-depth. The captured concepts will be compared with the experiences learnt from 
Chapter Two (Tanzania) for a further step towards reaching the best solution for 
Tanzania's water problems. 
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3.2 Water Supply and Sewerage Services in Uganda 
3.2.1 Background 
The struggle for water services improvement in Uganda began from the time 
of the country's independence in 1962. Water services in the country have been 
managed and controlled by the government. A step-by-step restructuring of water 
policies, as well as management organisation, have been implemented. 
Nevertheless, success and failures were all part of the process. Initially, water 
services were managed under the Ministry of the Local Government. During this 
period, Ggabba was the only water production plant in Uganda with a maximum 
production capacity of 50,OOOm3/day. Water produced from the Ggabba water 
treatment plant was supplied to Kiruba Island, Central Kampala industrial areas, 
and colonial residential areas (Muzungu). In the 1970s, Uganda water services 
were transferred to the Ministry of Mineral and Water Resources. In 1976, National 
Water and Sewerage Services (NWSC) were in place, with only three areas of 
operation: Kampala, Entebbe and Jinja. Under the World Bank funding project, in 
1989, the Ggabba water treatment plant was successfully rehabilitated, with its 
capacity of water production upgraded to 80,OOOm3/day [13]. 
Sekayizzi [13] adds that the expansion of Ggabba " Water Treatment Plant 
went together with upgrading other water sources and the expansion of the water 
distribution network in Kampala and other areas. The improvement resulted in the 
necessary change of the NWSC structure to accommodate new larger operational 
areas, such as Barara, Masaka, Tororo and Mbara. However, following the 
commissioning of the Ggabba " expansion water works project, the Kampala 
operation area was divided into five service zones: City centre, Uwaise, Najja, 
Ntinda and Kansagwa. This change was adopted in order to enhance the water 
management system in Kampala for services improvement in an attempt to meet 
the new designed targets. According to Kaggwa [14], during the period 1980-1997, 
the Uganda water sector was under the management of many different ministries, 
including Ministry of Natural Resources, Ministry of Water, Ministry of Energy, 
Ministry of Environment, and Ministry of Metrology, etc. Water services were still in 
a poor state. Notably, the current time, the management water and sanitation 
sector is under the Ministry of Water and Environment, and the operations of 
services were contracted to a parastatal organisation (NWSC). 
Subsequently, in the late 1990s, the operation and performance of NWSC 
was deteriorating owing to over-employment, which was approximately 3 to 1 (1 
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employee serving 3 customers only). However, a lack of commitment from 
employees resulted in a bureaucratic system of performance. As a result, water 
services performance declined, and there were subsequently low operational and 
financial efficiencies, poor quality of services, with general performance extremely 
bad to the extent that NWSC could not meet its debt services obligation. 
Furthermore, the debt stock of NWSC went up to Ushs.100 billion, thereby 
requiring an annual service obligation of about Ushs. 23 billion. The situation was 
so severe that even striving to meet the day-to-day operational expenses was 
tremendously difficult, and the entire urban area subsequently had a very low 
coverage of water supply and sanitation services [15]. As a result, this situation 
. forced the Uganda government to take necessary measures for water betterment in 
the country. 
In 1997, the Cabinet, under minute 139 (CT 1997), directed the Ministry of 
Water and Environment to develop a comprehensive policy framework for water 
resources management plan. Part of this task was to prepare a development plan 
and to accordingly reform the water sector. A team of officers from the Ministry of 
Water were provided assistance from consultants Ms Thelma Triche and Price 
Water House Coopers, which managed to review the organisational structure of 
National Water Supply and Sewerage Corporation. An outcome of the government 
(Cabinet) directives and consultancies contribution in 1998 witnessed the new 
board and management team for NWSC installed. A change of organisational 
structure and management team [16]. 
3.3.2 Management of Water Services for Kampala Water 
In relation to the Kampala Water Improvement Project (KWIP), Kaggwa [14] 
argues that, since 1998, the management and operation of Kampala water services 
was officially under Gauff Inginieure Consultancy for two years in the form of an 
operational contract, by which time the entire Kampala City was divided into five 
water services zones. The German company completed the first term of the 
contract period in March, 2000; unfortunately, however, they could not qualify for 
the second term for reasons associated with general performance and difficulties 
relating to poor revenue collection. The National Water Policy under minute 131 
(CT1999) was aimed towards strengthening the reform in the water sector in order 
to ensure that the services were provided with increased performance and cost-
effectiveness with the expansion of coverage. In 2000, the Uganda government 
intervened in NWSC operations by freezing the debt service obligation and 
maintaining the corporation under its performance contract for the first time (PC1), 
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which was to act as a transitional measure to improve the performance of the 
corporation and as a part of executing institutional reforms. 
Following this, the German company (Gauff Inginieure Consultancy) ended its 
first term of the contract in March, 2000. In April, 2000, the new French company 
(ONDED) was selected and awarded with a new two-year contract as a substitute 
to Gauff Ing. The company, with top executive French management staff, was 
unable to improve the revenue collection in such a way to reach the target of 85% 
of the total water supplied. According to the contract, water leakages were to be 
reduced up to or less than 20%, with new customer connections down by up to two 
connections per week. Importantly, there was no significant expansion of the water 
supply network, and water meter installation was less than almost 70% of the total 
water supply connections, therefore being 10% less than the target. The rising 
water demand, owing to commercial development and population growth in 
Kampala City, also posed a problem. The operator ONDEO could not manage the 
situation, which subsequently resulted in poor performance in terms of revenue 
collection, poor water leakage control, and poor water pressure in the network 
when the network was not expanding. 
Internal pressure was increasing from the government to the private operator 
owing to underperformance. In February, 2002, the French company pulled out and 
left the Kampala City without management, claiming that performance targets were 
unfairly raised. This was the end of the foreign private company providing services 
in Kampala City, and was actually the end of private water services in Uganda. 
According to Muhairwe [17], NWSC took over the operational duties by 
nominating local staff to take control of Kampala water duties. In February, 2004, 
the government reformed NWSC activities and officially transformed the entity into 
an Asset Holding Authority, and all other technical, regulation responsibilities were 
sent to Department of Water Development (DWD) under the Ministry of Water and 
Environment. The summary of the structure and division of responsibilities are as 
shown in Figure 3.1 below. 
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Figure 3.1: Structure of water management in Uganda 
3.3.3 Duties and Responsibilities 
The division of labour within water sector management was one of the 
proposals made by consultancies Triche and Price Water House Coopers in 1997 
during the review of water master plan, as directed by cabinet under minute 139. 
The objective was to create quality management, which would enhance the entire 
performance. However, understanding the boundaries of responsibilities, i.e. where 
responsibilities lay for certain tasks, would ensure accountability. Therefore, the 
duties and responsibilities in the Uganda water sector were divided as follows: 
• Ministry of Water and Environment (MWE): The Ministry of Water and 
Environment has an overall responsibility of water services and environment 
in the country, mainly dealing with policy issues (formulating and 
supervising during the implementation), issuing national standards, ensuring 
regulation regarding tariffs, and performance contract management 
especially with Kampala Water. 
• Directorate of Water Development: The directorate of water development 
in the Ministry of Water and Environment is working under the Ministry's 
permanent secretary, and therefore the directorate main responsibilities are 
Managing Water resources, Policy Guidance, Coordination between the 
Ministry and NWSC and other external and internal organisations, Technical 
Regulation and service support to local government authorities, and other 
services providers. 
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• National Water and Sewerage Corporation (NWSC): The National Water 
and Sewerage Corporation, as an autonomous public corporation, is a 
water services provider responsible for all large urban centres in Uganda. 
The company's duties and responsibilities are to supply water for domestic 
use and other purposes, and sewerage management in 21 large urban 
areas and big national institutions throughout the country. Notably, an 
asset-holding authority, setting the internal management contract, and the 
performance of monitoring internal local delegated areas, and setting the 
incentive for local internal delegated areas. 
This new sector structure and dividing the responsibilities of performance to each 
organ in sector is a strategy to encourage efficiency and good services 
performance. This is one solution for water services improvement, which is actually 
without expense. In fact, the most encouraging factor in such a change is the 
openness for building trust and increasing commitment. These are the core 
functions necessary for performance improvement and accountability-especially 
when the system of division of labour goes to each individual employee. 
3.3.4 Current Situation of Water Services in Uganda 
The capital city Kampala is the biggest populated area in the country. The 
largest part of water supply and sanitation services are provided by NWSC; 
however, 75% of the total NWSC revenue collection is contributed by Kampala 
water. The successful performance of NWSC depends on the performance of 
Kampala area of service. The improvement of NWSC services is presented as 
summary of water services in Kampala City (Table 3.1) [17]. 
Table 3.1: Summary of performance of Kampala water for about five years up to 
2006 
2002 to 2003 to 2004 to 2005 to 2006 to 
Years 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Percentage 
New 6,821 8,720 12,174 19,908 13,087 192% 
Connection 
Sold Water 
Million m3 20.3 21.3 24.4 26.5 6.2 30.5% 
Water 
Production 36.5 38.5 41.2 41.2 4.7 12.5% 
Million m3 
Installation of 
water meters 48,952 59,022 72,231 93,305 44,353 90.6% 
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Moreover, NWSC water services coverage has expanded to cover almost 
90% of all large urban areas in the country within the period of five years from 
2002. Annual turnover has increased from 37,140 in 2003 to 58,540 in 2006. 
Moreover, water production has increased from million 51.4m3 to million 58.1 m3, 
water transmission mains has been extended from 2,170km to 2,868km length 
within the same period of three years (2003-2006), water sales have increased 
from million 31.2m3 to million 40.8m3, and new water connections have increased 
from 700 to 2,256 per month. These are a few additional evidences which show 
that NWSC performance has improved, and that the current management system 
is performing better than Gaff Ingo. and DNDED. However, Muhailwa [17] notes 
that, for the development and protection of water sources for the benefit of all, the 
best and affordable water and sewerage services must be provided to all NWSC 
operational areas in order to build a stable and good relationship with other sector 
members. The current NWSC system requires necessary improvements in terms of 
capacity building, the decentralisation of administrative power, and bid evaluation in 
order to provide more power to structure operating zones [18]. 
The current water operating system in Uganda is contract-based, whereby the 
management of NWSC has to sign a performance operational contract of no more 
than a two-year period to run NWSC based on the agreed performance indicators, 
and terms of conditions. At the end of the contract period, the Ministry of Water and 
Environment examines the NWSC management performance. Depending on the 
performance against agreed performance targets, operational contracts mayor 
may not be renewed. The internal performance operation contract is also executed 
between NWSC management and the branches management team, whereby 
branch managers are bound to comply with all the contract terms of performance 
as well as other conditions. At the end of the contract period, the performance of 
branch management is examined against the agreed terms for necessary action. 
This system can be defined as an operational under-performance monitoring 
contract [13]. 
3.3.5 Appraisal for Uganda Water Supply and Sewerage Services 
During the period following the Uganda independence, i.e. 1962-1998, water 
supply and sewerage services were provided by the government. The service 
situation was limited and very poor. In 1998, the government decided to contract 
the services to a private company Gauff Inginieure. Importantly, the private 
company did not perform well, and water services in Kampala city deteriorated with 
a limited water services network. In 2000, the operation of water supply and 
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sewerage services in Kampala was contracted to another foreign private company, 
ONDED, which did not improve the situation, claiming that the performance targets 
set to them by the owner, NWSC, were not practical (see Section 3.3.2). Under the 
same performance targets, the Uganda government went for an internal 
performance contract with a local parastatal organisation under the periodic 
management contract. The outcome was good and encouraging, which provides 
evidence for the belief that private water services were not able to work in Uganda, 
predominantly owing to the government change of organisation and management 
structure which has introduced various differences. However, the strategy of the 
approach of the division of labour normally has a greater contribution in terms of 
accountability, especially when considering the set-up includes each individual 
person in the system. Furthermore, the performance contract between the 
individuals and the service provider is a motivation in nature, with targets set as a 
catalyst to service improvement. This, however, depends on the nature of the 
contract and the set targets. Nevertheless, it is considered that contract target-
setting and indicators should be more realistic so as to encourage contract· 
performance. 
i. Engaging contract performance in water services can be one of the 
catalysts for the performance improvement in the sector; however, the 
system should allow for the measuring of the performance of each 
individual. Restructuring the organisation and changing the management 
team can impose new ideas which are necessary for development and 
services improvement. 
ii. We have also witnessed that the German company Gauff Inginieure and the 
French company DNDED took operations for the private water service in 
Kampala, but the private water supply and sewerage services failed to work. 
Therefore, neither private nor public water management are considered an 
appropriate approach for water services in Uganda. Importantly, this 
necessitated the government to restructure NWSC to perform commercial 
water services style under performance contract. 
iii. The local parastatal management style under special performance contract 
was the only solution for Uganda to achieve better water services. As we 
have seen, there was improvement under the management of NWSC (see 
Section.3.3.2). 
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3.4 Water Supply and Sewerage Services in Kenya 
3.4.1 Background 
One of the practical examples of non-public water supply and sewerage 
services is the two towns of Kenya (Nyeri and Eldoret). The 1998 Kenyan water 
policy declared that it would increase the community and private sector 
participation. The emphasis is placed on enabling a government institutional 
framework, which will automatically encourage the autonomy of local authorities in 
the management of water resources. The government initially provided water 
services through municipalities. The trend of new policy of local authorities on water 
supply and sewerage services-a more commercial approach-was implemented. 
Water services have subsequently followed commercial services principals, 
focusing on sustainability and managing the available water resources. 
According to K'akumu [19], initially, the government aimed to privatise the 
services, but the ceding of water supply services to private enterprises has been 
opposed by various perturbed groups claiming that poor' people or those people 
with low incomes would not be able to settle their water bills, and would therefore 
remain without this basic service. However, local authorities are convinced that 
privatisation will ensure the efficient provision of water at an affordable price [19]. 
Sammy [20] argues that there is the need for building a good and stable 
government and economy, and that the benefits of privatisation were considered as 
the major objectives for the adoption of the reform to public water entities in Kenya. 
However, other factors, such as the phenomena of population growth and 
environmental degradation, have markedly challenged concepts of water services 
being owned and provided by the government (as has been proven that water 
services are no longer being better managed under a public system). Water is an 
expensive commodity-especially in capital investment (plants and networks); 
therefore, this should be operated with focus on cost in order to ensure the balance 
between sustainability and affordability [20]. 
3.4.2 Management of Water Services in Kenya 
In 1996, the Nyeri Municipal Council in Kenya, together with other Kenyan 
towns, Kericho and Eldoret, requested that the German Agency for Technical 
Cooperation (GTZ) consult and support its mission of adopting a non-governmental 
programme in setting up water supply and sewerage services. Through the 
assistance of GTZ's technical expertise and the commitment of Nyeri Municipality, 
the Nyeri Water Supply Corporation (Nyewasco) was established and began to 
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operate in 1998. Nyewasco took over all water responsibilities in the Nyeri region. 
Moreover, in order to empower Nyewasco with these new responsibilities, Nyeri 
municipal transferred all water infrastructures with a value of almost Ksh, 
716,093.00 to Nyewasco-including the working force from municipal water 
department. No capital funds were invested for the establishment of Nyewasco. 
However, following the formulation of the executive management team of 
(Nyewasco) on behalf of the Kenya government, Nyeri Municipal remains with the 
power of policy issues only [20]. Therefore, the operation issues were handled by 
the management of Nyewasco whilst the policy issues were executed by the 
government; this provides evidence of the division of labour for better services, and 
also to show that it was not necessary for the government to provide water services 
to Nyeri municipal. This means that water services could be provided independently 
from government interference, although the government should remain as 
overseers and policy makers. 
3.4.3 The Current Situation of Water and Sewerage Services in Nyeri 
(Kenya) 
Since Nyewasco began its operations in 1998, the new management has 
been successful and has shown good performance in various areas. For example, 
the production capacity of Kamakwa Water treatment plant has improved from 
6000m3/day to 9000m3/day, water turbidity problems have been eliminated, 
reported water pipe problems are attended to promptly 24 hours a day, connections 
for new customers have increased from 6,596 in 1999 to 8,318 in 2003. metered 
connections have increased, retail water kiosks for poor people have been 
established (but in areas where tariffs were introduced), new jobs were created 
owing to the expansion. stable and fair water rates were guaranteed for public 
institutions, and the company pursued need-driven commercial policies. The 
company has cut down water losses from 55% to 36--40%, with Nyewasco 
subsequently pumping a surplus of 1000m3• Revenue collection is approximately 
Ksh. 8 million per month. which is earned from serving 50.000-60.000 people. and 
Nyewasco has expanded to parts of Nyeri town not previously served. thereby 
replacing submersible pumps by giving people of this area normal pumped surface 
water from the Kamakwa water treatment plant. This shows that more people of 
Nyeri municipal are now supplied from the Kamakwa source. Markedly. 
submersible pumps are not used. 
The company management set-up and the Board are now directly responsible 
to Nyeri citizens. with the majority of Board members local citizens from Nyeri town. 
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with a guiding policy stating that revenues collected are to be re-invested into 
improving water and sewerage services. This system is functioning well because 
the Nyewasco management is achieving full support from their customers, which 
results from the fact that customers have a feeling of owning the company, They 
form the Board of the company, and customers' ideas can be immediately taken 
and implemented; therefore, customers are closer to the service. This type of water 
supply management of forming an agency under the municipal council with full 
power of planning and operation has proven to be a very successful method in 
Kenyan towns [9]. 
3.4.4 Appraisal for water services in Nyeri (Kenya) 
If the assessment of success is based on the differences between the 
previous situation (as detailed in Section 3.4.3) of water services in Nyeri and 
current performance, Nyeri water services has witnessed a real improvement in 
relation to water services. Therefore, the poor water services situation of limited 
quantity of water, which had a high turbidity problem with dilapidated water network 
owing to the government lacking capital funds, for repair and rehabilitation prior to 
the establishment of Nyewasco, was the driving force for change. 
The restructuring of the water system in Nyeri was initiated, designed and 
implemented locally without cost. The local citizens being members of the 
Nyewasco Board is a sound strategy for building good relations between the 
company and its customers. The management model was developed locally in 
order to solve local water problems, and has a greater acceptance as customers 
are considered important stakeholders. Therefore, the communication between the 
service provider and consumers is easier, which has a greater contribution in terms 
of performance. The government role is restricted to policy issues, which is done 
independently-especially if customers are a part of the management team of the 
entity. This type of organisation structure can work better, not only in Kenya but 
also anywhere in Sub-Sahara Africa countries, provided they are similar conditions. 
However, when considering the focus on performance contract between Nyewasco 
and government, the author concludes that the performance contract system 
guarantees quality and a period of work performance; therefore, it can be adopted 
in the research process for developing sustainable solution for Tanzania. 
Another lesson to be learned here is that it is not always the case that good 
structured change should come from a foreign country or from a foreign private 
company; in actual fact, structures developed locally have proven to be acceptable 
and more efficient (for example, Nyewasco). The municipality of Nyeri enabled the 
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agency Nyewasco to be formulated with its own capacity and with the use of all 
local workers from the municipal council's water department. The local agency 
brought in better water services; therefore, local changes, plus empowerment, can 
be one of the solutions for better water services. This approach should be adopted 
as a concept and platform for building the ideal solution for Tanzania water 
problems, but also as a new challenge for devising or developing appropriate 
solutions considered suitable for each country. 
3.5 Water Supply and Sewerage Services in Cote d'ivoire 
3.5.1 Background 
Since independence in 1960, water services in Code d'ivoire have been under 
public management. From the early 1980s, the government of Code d'ivoire began 
the process of the water services reform. The driving forces for reform were 
serious, with public financial crisis experienced throughout the whole water sector. 
The government water development plan for investment (extension of services, 
maintenance and repairs) was critically affected by a lack of funds. Ambitious 
projects which were designed in 1980 also failed to anticipate the extent to which 
they would be affected by the crisis. Kerf [24] added that various factors, such as 
the increase of water tariffs implemented in 1981 and 1984, depressed the larger 
cOl)sumers' demand. As a result, many opted for other alternatives of water supply, 
including the drilling of private bore holes and shallow wells. Subsequently, large 
water consumers, paying the highest rates, sharply reduced their water 
consumption, and the water network and rate of connection progressively fell to 
approximately 70% in 1987. 
During this year, the government of the Cote d'ivoire began to implement 
investment for water services improvement, as designed by the directorate of water 
in 1980. In order to ensure that investment would be self-financed, the government 
decided to transfer the planning functions from the water directorate to a private 
. . 
company SODECI (formed by French company SAUR in 1974). The Cote d'ivoire 
government agreed to transfer the whole operation of water services under a lease 
contract to SODECI, although comprising the condition that the government would 
commit its own resources to implementing the investment programme and to cover 
debt services charges. Therefore, on behalf of the Cote d'ivoire government, the 
Fonds de Development de l'Eau (FDE) was responsible for the funding of water 
investment expenditures, whilst Funds National de I' Eau (FNE) was funding the 
debt services. However, the funds for the investment and debt services were 
sourced from different consumer tariffs and SODECI lease fees. 
- 41 -
Officially in 1987, SODECI was leased to operate and maintain the water 
supply and sewerage services in Cote d'ivoire. The lease contract ensured that any 
new extension in relation to water supply services made by SODECI will be 
compensated, as well as if the amount of water consumed fell below the capacity of 
the network. All water service operational responsibilities were contracted to 
SODECI. The water directorate, on behalf of the Cote d'ivoire government, 
remained responsible for monitoring SODECl's contract and policy issues, and also 
for supervising the execution of new investments [24]. 
However, the condition surrounding the compensation in the contract terms 
was a heavy and a burden to the government if the operator underperforms owing 
to lack of full commitment to solving all field water problems. On the other hand, the 
maximum freedom given to the operator SODECI may also ultimately encourage 
the performance; however, the independence is one of the motivations for 
performance but ensures objectives are met; the clear targets for accountability 
should be in place. 
3.5.2 Current Water Supply and Sanitation Services in Cote d' Ivories 
The change in the management style of water services (by the government of 
Cote d'ivoire in 1987 with the privatisation of the company SODECI) was generally 
successful. The quality of water improved and remained high, with all types of 
water losses low and labour productivity improving, with 3.8 employees per 
thousand connections (in 1996). However, since 1987, owing to the increase in the 
stability of water supply, there has been the constant flow of water as well as the 
successful expansion of the water supply network-both of which have caused 
water tariffs to increase more slowly than stipulated in the lease contract. However, 
this may also be one of the contract terms whereby tariff increases depend on the 
successful expansion of new connections; hence, the increase of the number of 
consumers, the bigger the revenue collection. The operator SODECI was in a 
difficult position owing to the fact that some of the public sectors had not paid their 
water bills, but SODECI were reluctant to disconnect them but rather withholds 
payments to FDE and FNE, which accordingly meant that funds transferred to such 
parties were insufficient to cover future investment and debt service needs owing to 
there being less unpaid public bills. However according to Baylist [181], 'the 
approval of regulation and tariffs adjustment which is under council ministers 
remain highly political and has therefore been more erratic and ad-hoc than might 
have been' [26]. 
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3.5.3 Appraisal for Water Services in Cote d' Ivories 
The discussion of this case necessitates the conclusion that a lack of 
government finance for water development projects has been a driving force for 
system change in water supply and sewerage services in Cote d'ivoire. Other 
sources for funding water development projects can be established from the 
balance of customer tariffs and operator leaser fees; however, this should be 
researched so as to prevent customer burdens and affordability form higher water 
charges. 
The changes from public to private operational water services by the 
government of Cote d'ivoire acted as the solution for water problems in the country; 
private water operation services can work in various Sub-Sahara African countries. 
The approach adopted change with two steps: the first involved contracting 
SODECI as a consultant for planning water services development; the second 
comprised contracting the same company (SODECI) with a lease contract for 
maintaining and operating water services. It provided successful outcomes (as 
discussed in Section 3.5.1) for water sector performance as there was a good 
knowledge background and sound planning, which could therefore lead to better 
implementation performance. 
In order to impress the operator SODECI, the government of Cote d'ivoire 
took the responsibility of providing compensation for a new water supply extension 
if the amount of water consumed fell below the capacity of the network. This can be 
adopted as special gear for any good approach for best services delivery; however, 
on the other hand, this can be a good hiding place of less commitment in terms of 
dealing with field water problems on the operator's side, especially considering that 
the operator SODECI did not commit its own resources to implementing the 
investment programme or to covering debt service charges. In this case, the 
government of Cote d'ivoire is at a higher risk of paying more to the operator, with 
such funds possibly coming from water customers-all of whom have worries 
concerning affordability. 
3.7 Water Supply and Sewerage Services in Gambia 
3.7.1 Background 
In Gambia, since independence in 1965, water services were under public 
provision, AND the public management water services were not performing well. As 
such, in order to improve sewerage and water supply services in the country, in 
1972, the government established a public water enterprise known as The Gambia 
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. Utility Corporation (GUC). The GUC was formed in order to provide water supply 
and electricity distribution services to the capital city Banjul, as well as other 
provincial cities. The performance of GUC became extremely poor owing to a 
number of reasons, including water tariffs being set below cost, and the corporation 
management being. extremely weak, with constant government interference in 
relation to day-to-day corporation activities. GUC was grossly over-staffed with 
more than 1,000 employees in charge of very small water and electricity systems 
(approximately 7,000 water connections and 12,000 electricity connections in 
1986). GUC staffs were extremely low-skilled, with illiteracy rates of 50% amongst 
supervisory staff and 90% amongst lower level staff [12]. The corporation's weak 
management, owing to government interferen~e, as well as the low skills in the 
majority of staff, caused the GUC to fail in performance. Water demand was 
increasing rapidly, supported by population growth and urbanisation, and the 
quality of the network deteriorated, with UFW levels su~sequently reaching at least 
40%, water quality being poor and uncollected bills increasing to reach an 
estimated 40% of receipts toward the end of the decade. In an attempt to solve the 
problem, the government decided on a contract performance regime with GUC in 
1988, and moved to restructure the GUC's board in 1990. 
Following considerable intervention, the GUC was still unable to perform, and 
subsequently completely failed to change the situation; water services were still in a 
poorer state than prior to restructuring. In 1992, the government of Gambia 
contracted its water supply, sewerage services and electricity sector to foreign 
private operator Management Services Company (MSC) owned by the French 
enterprises SOGEA. However, the financial responsibility for capital investment and 
debt services all belonged to the government of Gambia [24]. 
3.7.2 Outcomes and Situation of Water Services in Gambia 
The commitment of the Gambia government to improve water supply services. 
from 12 years of public water services since independence was executed as 
follows. Firstly, the government system was changed to parastatal management 
services under GUC for approximately 16 years from 1972, followed by the 
restructuring of the GUC organisation and the management team in 1990, which 
also failed. From 1993, the Gambian government introduced private services under 
Management Services Global (MSG) under a lease contract. Unfortunately, the 
lease contract between the Government of Gambia and MSG was terminated after 
three years of services in 1996 owing to poor performance. The public took over 
again, and accordingly formulated public enterprise (NAWEC), which has remained 
in place to date. Since NAWEC took over the situation, water services in Gambia 
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have improved and become even more stable. As a result, at the present time, total 
water production has increased by 20% to 6201lsec. NAWEC has also now secured 
a potential project funded by the Dutch Government under the Development-
Related Export Programme grant for constructing 19 boreholes and a new 
treatment plant in Brakeman with a total capacity of 3501lsec. This means the total 
water production will be boosted to 970llsec and will cover actual water demand up 
to 2015. 
3.7.3 Appraisal of Gambia for Water Services in Gambia 
The covered discussion evidences that the Gambian government was 
committed to improving its water services by changing the public management style 
to first parastatal organisation GUC, and accordingly restructuring the GUC 
organisation and management team, subsequently going to private water services 
under MSG. However, the private management in terms of water services was also 
not successful, and was therefore terminated in 1996. The government again 
formulated the public enterprise NAWEC in order to provide water services in 
Gambia. From this evidence, we can possibly conclude the following: 
As evidenced in Section 3.7.1, with the exception of government experience 
in water services, for a 12-year period there has been no training for employees, 
and no study has been executed in an attempt to establish the real cause of water 
problems in the country, which is why the solution to the problem necessitated the 
government to go a long way before reaching the NAWEC. The private water 
services failed to work in Gambia, although this does not mean that it cannot work 
elsewhere. Nevertheless, the failure in Gambia has proved that privatisation is not 
a universal standard solution that can work everywhere in any water industry in the 
world. 
NAWEC was developed and formulated locally by the Gambian government 
following a great deal of experience in different water management practices in the 
country; these provided good experience in terms of establishing better solutions 
for water services in Gambia. NAWEC improved the water services in Gambia; this 
is further evidence that the local developed model works better within the 
developing country than any foreign imported style. Moreover, learning from this 
experience may lead to new experiences, which may show that it is not necessary 
to adopt the methods of the Gambians. 
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3.8 Water Supply and Sewerage Services in Senegal 
3.8.1 Background 
In Senegal, the provision of urban water services was privately managed 
since before independence. Soon after independence, in 1972, the service was 
nationalised, and was directly controlled by the government. During the 1980s, the 
government of Senegal invested substantially in order to improve the services in 
the water sector, but the quality of services nevertheless remained unchanged 
(low) owing to poor planning and excessive sophistication of various installations, 
which subsequently could not be maintained as required. However, in an attempt to 
stop direct government influence in relation to the management of the sector, all 
assets and related debt service obligations to the public enterprise were transferred 
to the Societe Nationale d' Exploitation des Eaux du Senegal (SONEES). SONEES 
concluded a contract-plan with the government in 1988, which was modified in 
1990 in an attempt to take account of the experiences of the first two years. Under 
the terms of the contract, SONEES was granted primary responsibility for the 
operation, maintenance, and rehabilitation of the urban water supply sector, whilst 
the government undertook to review tariff price [12]. 
However, the Senegal government failed to manage non-payments by public 
authorities. As a result, SONEES's operations became more successful, and whilst 
labour productivity was high (rising to approximately 7 employees per 1,000 
connections in 1994), revenue to cover the costs for the network were sustainability 
inadequate. Unaccounted for water (UfW) was approximately 30% in 1994, whilst 
water quality was inconsistent. This situation pushed and facilitated the government 
of Senegal to introduce private sector participation in water supply and sewerage 
services. In the mid-1990s, the private participation in the urban water sector was 
introduced. Notably, financial self-sufficiency was the major objective of the sector, 
and it was concluded that a private operator would be able to reap efficiency gains, 
which would accordingly limit the extent of the tariff increases required to meet the 
objectives. 
In 1996, through the international bidding process, the water services in 
Senegal were leased to the Senegalaise des Eaux (SDE)-a private company 
originating in SAUR (a French company). The government also decided to form a 
100% state-owned company. The Societe Nationale des Eaux du Senegal 
(SONEES)-which received the difference before total consumer tariffs and SDE's 
remuneration-would be responsible for owning infrastructure assets, planning, 
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and financing asset replacements and network expansion, regulating the activities 
of the private operator, and promoting the private sector in the provision of 
infrastructure services [28]. The lease contract type of private water services was to 
be adopted in Senegal, with the addition that the private operator was required to 
undertake various investments each year. This operator's investment tasks 
included the renewal of pipelines over a pre-specified distance, which varied 
depending upon the diameter of the pipes that the private operator chose to renew. 
3.8.2 Current Situation in Senegal 
In comparison with the situation of 1995, during which time more than half of 
the Senegal population lived in the capital city Dakar, water shortage was chronic, 
with leaks persistent, and only 58% of the population having acces~ to safe pipe 
water. According to Afd Senegal [212], approximately 1.6 million people currently 
live in cities with access to safe water, which is part of 140;000 new connections at 
subsidised rates for low-income families and 400 public stand pipes. Individual 
water house connections increased to 76% in 1996, whilst total water leakages 
were controlled from approximately 32% from 20% in 1996, and tariffs increase for 
consumers but were kept at an annual average of 5%. However, according to 
Pambazuka [25], the private water services in Senegal has not solved the problem 
of water quality: 'The Aide Transparency report shows that consumers often 
complain about reduction of water quality and, from time to time consumers 
campaign for improving services. This shows that consumers do not have 
confidence in the quality of the water and services in general. Indeed, the use of 
bottled mineral water has never before been so common and widespread in 
Senegal. This indicates that privatisation improved the water services situation in 
Senegal, but it hasn't solved the entire problem; therefore, more efforts need to be 
directed towards coming up with a permanent and sustainable solution. 
3.8.3 Appraisal for Water Supply and Sewerage Services in Senegal 
According to the covered discussion, in the 1980s, the government of 
Senegal made a substantial investment in the water sector. Unfortunately, 
however, owing to improper planning, the poor situation of water services didn't 
change; this alone teaches the lesson that study and analysiS should first be 
executed before any form of investment is implemented. Furthermore, the evidence 
from the covered discussion shows that the government's decision of engaging 
private services in the water sector provided substantial improvements in relation to 
water services. Notably, however, consumers complained regarding the reduction 
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of water quality, and the increasing usage of bottled mineral water provided an 
indicator that the water problem had not been completely solved. As a result, there 
was the need to consider a permanent and appropriate solution, with privatisation 
having solved only part of the issue, and more efforts are therefore needed. 
However, it is noteworthy to state that consideration should be assigned to 
ensuring affordability for all-especially to those people with low incomes; 
therefore, the study should devise a solution not only concerned with solving water 
problems but also to cover price manageable to low income people. 
3.9 Water Supply and Sewerage Services in Ghana 
3.9.1 Background 
Since 1965, water supply and sewerage services in Ghana have been 
provided by Ghana Water and Sewerage Corporation (GWSC), 100% of which was 
the government-owned. Under GWSC, water services were considered bad, with 
almost half of the population having difficulties securing a continuous supply of safe 
and reliable water. Most of the affected people were those living in the countryside, 
where two-thirds regularly took risks with unclean water. In the study carried out 
jointly by GWSC and UNDP in 1993, it was established that urban water supply 
coverage had dropped from 93% to 76%, whilst rural water supply had increased to 
cover needs of 46% of the total rural population owing to the interventions of NGOs 
in all ten regions of Ghana [214]. This situation obligated the government to 
consider a more appropriate solution-one of which was the possibility of adopting 
private water services. This idea was first introduced in the late 1990s. The 
privatisation of urban water services was been supported by the World Bank. As a 
result, since 1988, the World Bank has pushing decentralisation in Ghana; 
however, in 1999, the Ghana government restructured GWSC to form Ghana 
Water Company Limited (GWCL), which was a strategy towards privatisation. 
Furthermore, the study carried out by UK consultant Halcrow was commissioned 
and paid for by the World Bank, which subsequently concluded in favour of private 
water services for the country. Notably, the report insisted that the solution for the 
best water services in Ghana was private operations. The justification for this was 
that it would bring new money in to renew or expand services. Moreover, Ghana's 
privatisation would include no obligations for the company to invest, although it 
remained that the objectives of privatising Ghana water services were aimed 
towards increasing the access of water supply in the urban areas, with specific 
emphasis on the urban poor, and the restoration of a permanent, sustainable, 
financial operational system for GWCL. 
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In 2000, a ten-year lease contract between GWCL and the US Company 
Azurix failed owing to the accusation of corruption and public opposition, which 
consequently led to the formulation of the coalition against water privatisation. 
Local campaigners estimated that water price increases of 30-40% were 
necessary to repay the debts from the World Bank, whilst the private company 
would take its profits out of the country. 
According to Mutumi [182], water would become unaffordable for many of the 
poor in Ghana, and subsequently insisted that, 'even before the privatisation taps 
were being turned off because a growing number of families cannot afford to pay'. 
Essentially, the privatisation of urban water services is divided between the 
profitable urban areas and the unprofitable poor rural areas, whereby urban water 
services have been subsidising the rural water services, and privatisation therefore 
means no more water subsidies for poor rural people. However, urban areas would 
ultimately face tariff increases until cost recovery had been achieved, whilst the 
number of employees at the GWCL would be reduced in order to make the 
company profitable. Furthermore, in typical local areas of Accra city-such as the 
Madina area, for example-it would cost a family 3,000 Cedies for 10 buckets of 
water per day, whilst the minimum wage per day is 7000 Cedies [182]. 
In May, 2001, a broad cross-section of Ghanaian civil society-including 
women's groups, teachers, trade unions, public health workers, environmental 
groups, disabled organisations and students-gathered under the banner of the 
Ghana National Coalition against Privatisation of Water (National CAP of Water) to 
oppose the World Bank's idea for water privatisation. The'surge of resistance that 
subsequently developed led the government of Ghana to suspend privatisation in 
2003 [29]. Following the resistance, the water services situations in Ghana 
worsened. According to Nyarko [213], since 2002, GWCL was more or less 
bankrupt, estimated as having debts of $400 million and approximately 50% of 
water production unaccounted for. In 2003, losses in operations were of the order 
of US$34 million. The company needed approximately US$1.8 billion for extension, 
rehabilitation and system renewal. The World Bank was still backing the proposal 
to privatise the Ghana urban water supply, with the main objective being to 
privatise GWCL. 
In 2004, the World Bank approved a credit of US$103 million for an urban 
water project in Ghana with the condition of privatisation; however, the credit was 
turned to a grant. The other contribution of US$5 million was from Nordic 
Development Fund, and the Ghana government contributed US$12 million to form 
a total project sum of US $120 million. Subsequently, in October, 2006, water 
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services in Ghana were officially provided privately under the management contract 
by joint venture Dutch company Vitens Rand water services BV and Aqua Vitra 
Ltd., which formulated Aqua Viten Rand Limited (AVRL) and was, contracted to 
manage GWCL for a period of five years. As a result, the roles of GWCL remained 
as a public grant authority and general state affairs of the sector whilst AVRL took 
over the operation duties. 
Following the decision to privatise water in Accra, by 2008, water tariffs shot 
up by 67%. However, in March, 2008, severe water shortages faced the capital city 
Accra, and the situation forced the Minister for Water Resources in Ghana to 
review whether AVRL was working in compliance with the agreed contract. 
However, the reason for the water shortage was actually owing to outages at two 
water treatment plants in Weija and Kpong. Coincidentally, during the same period, 
the National Coalition against the Privatisation of Water (NCAP) called for the 
management contract termination due to low performance with a 'lack of 
performance' related to 'service standard', with reference to the contract. However, 
up to February 8, 2010, AVRL was in its third year of its management contract 
operating water services in Ghana [27; 28]. 
3.9.2 Appraisal for Water Supply and Sewerage Services in Ghana 
The government's decision to suspend privatisation owing to demonstrations 
due to allegations of corruptions, and the water situation becoming worse, posed a 
greater weakness to the government. However, the entire preparation for the 
adoption of private water services in the country was not planned well enough so 
as to provide full participation to a" stakeholders. Moreover, it was possibly carried 
out confidentially, which is why the allegations of corruption erupted. Widening 
participation to all stakeholders and ensuring transparency are foundational factors 
in the case of project preparation. With this in mind, on and off decisions in terms 
of privatisation evidenced that privatisation was not accepted by the people of 
Ghana. 
The government decided to opt for privatisation, which was initially rejected by 
Ghanaians through the 2001 demonstrations; however, later in 2006, privatisation 
under the management contract for five years under the Dutch company 'Vitea and 
Aqua' was granted. The effects of privatisation can be measured by considering 
customers' complaints on low performance and higher water charges set by the 
private operator in 2008 only after one and half years of services; this is an 
indicator that the permanent solution for Ghana water services is not yet in place. 
Nevertheless, the government's decision for the privatisation was pushed by the 
- 50-
unaffordable and poor situation of water services in the country, which needed 
capital that the government simply couldn't afford. However, there were 
improvements in water quality and the extension of service, which reached 50% of 
the Ghana population. The World Bank assisted Ghana with various conditions, 
including private services engagement in Ghana Urban areas; this provides 
evidence that Ghanaians adopted privatisation owing to the World Bank's 
assistance. With this iri mind, the base problem for Ghana is its lack of capital 
funds for water development and a good management model. 
3.9.3 Conclusion for Chapter Three 
The sustainability of water supply and sewerage services is a globally-
challenging issue, and each and every individual country has its own duty to 
perform for the world in order to eradicate water problems. Each country is looking 
to add value through providing conveniences, quality and quantity, and affordable 
services to all. Each authority, agency or company providing water and sewerage 
services has its own challenges for better performance; however, from the 
discussion covered in this chapter, it can be concluded that there are several main 
obstacles when seeking to achieve good water services in most of the Sub-Sahara 
African countries. Public water services have demonstrated failure in all the 
discussed countries, whilst privatisation has been not successfu'l in many Sub-
Sahara African countries. Thus, the following conclusions were made. 
i. Lack of capital funds for sustainability and development of water services 
Most Sub-Sahara African countries are struggling to achieve economic 
development, and therefore do not have enough funds for capital development 
projects. Notably, most are suffering with the water sector. A lack of funding for 
capital investment in water development project has necessitated that poor African 
countries have no other option than to go to private water services owing to lack of 
funds for investing in water development projects, which subsequently forces Sub-
Sahara African countries' water charges to rise. Moreover, a lack of funds for water 
project developments forces the increased use of bottled water by private individual 
companies in the region; this has been evidenced in the discussion, which shows 
that various countries-including Ghana, Gambia, Senegal, Guinea and others-
opted for privatisation owing to not having enough of their own capital for funding 
water capital projects, including the improvement of water quality, the expansion of 
water networks, and the maintenance of other water infrastructures. In addition, the 
consequence of lacking capital funds resulted to private water services with 
unaffordable water charges in the region. Therefore, it has been concluded that 
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capital funds for water development project is a common problem for almost all 
Sub-Sahara African countries, and there is an obligatory need to establish a 
solution for capital funds. 
ii. Appropriate management style for water services 
The unavailability of an appropriate management style is a problem for almost 
all developing countries, which is evidenced in the fact that all public water 
management systems failed and were unable to create good, stable financial 
operations, had no commercially driven services, showed lesser accountability, and 
experienced a great deal of interference from political decisions. Moreover, public 
institutions were not paying their water bills. In Ghana, interference from public 
organisations caused the water privatisation process to stop; however, the collapse 
of the public water service style was mainly caused by a lack of necessary skill. In. 
addition, a poor organisational structure is enemy number one, although a poor 
contract that may originate from corruption is an obstacle for water development. 
Furthermore, any change to the control of water tariffs should be well monitored, 
and so the conclusion is drawn that developing a local appropriate and sustainable 
model for managing water services is to be carried out now for the best of the 
future water services in Sub-Sahara countries 
iii. Unreliable water sources 
The availability of capital funds for water projects and sustainable 
management model is not adequate if water sources are not reliable. Notably, most 
poor and developing countries have no reliable water sources; however, the 
problem may fundamentally relate to financial resources. Notably, there are various 
factors to be addressed before this problem can be solved, namely geographical 
physical location, professional knowledge on how to use few available resources 
for balancing against the reliability of supply, agriculture, domestic and industrial 
needs, and the control of environmental destruction. Therefore, the study on the 
ways in which the available few resources can be controlled for balancing good use 
for all needs is obligatory. 
Furthermore, the concepts adopted from the critical discussion covered in 
Section 3.9 emphasise that, in Sub-Sahara African countries, many different ways 
of managing water services exist, although establishing sustainable local sources 
for funding water development is the major problem, which was the cause of 
privatisation in the region. This has obligated the need for this study to devise a 
more sustainable water management style, which could potentially sustain and 
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facilitate its operations within a local capacity, i.e. commercial type of water 
services. Nevertheless, such evidences advocate that the appropriate way for 
improved management of water services in Tanzania would be self-sustainable, i.e. 
neither private management nor public services, but should be under the public 
ownership-Public Ownership under Commercial Operation (POCO). 
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CHAPTER FOUR: SOURCES FOR FUNDING WATER DEVELOPMENT 
PROJECT 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter has been developed to discuss the different ways of establishing 
funds for water development. Thirquest [56] argues that, The continent and its 
people lack technical knowledge and financial resources needed to access their 
water supply'. Therefore, the discussion covered in this chapter is focused on the 
critical examination of various capital fund models, including a special water-
funding project established by the Ministry of Water, whereby the country's friends, 
and international and local institutions are committed to contributing a certain 
amount every period (Le. basket funding), loans from international financial 
institutions, local contributions, property value and tariff review methods. These 
methods can then be examined for their suitability in relation to the water services 
in Tanzania. 
4.1.1 Sources for Funding Capital Water Projects 
The common three major sources for establishing water capital funds in 
Tanzania and for other Sub-Sahara African countries are loans from financial 
institutions, property value method, and water tariff review methods. These will be 
discussed in the following sections. 
4.2 Methods of Property Value in the Market 
The method involves organising capital for funding water projects by selling 
asset shares through a competitive open (auction) or closed (individual closed 
bidding) market approach. In the case of the water industry, the evaluation of 
assets includes the value of infrastructures, plants, distribution networks and other 
registered company properties. The actual total property value is determined thus 
(total investment value plus services - estimated depreciation value per annum for 
x operated period - years) and changed into 100% shares. An agreed amount of 
shares are sold in the market (closed or open), with the sales going to the capital 
investment of the particular company (equity). However, in relation to public 
assets--especially in water industries-it is sometimes difficult to sell shares for 
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equity generation. Notably, this depends on the situation of the structure: if they are 
too old, they normally do not attract the market. Moreover, most of the investors are 
not interested in long-term returns-especially in Sub-Sahara Africa where political 
and economic situations are not stable. However, the objectives of the different 
approaches is to facilitate selling (full or part) of the property shares according to 
the market value, aiming to raise enough funds for rebuilding, maintaining or 
restructuring part or the whole operational functions of the property, and aiming to 
provide better, affordable and quality services [72]. However, the process should be 
profitable, meaning it accommodates the interests of all stakeholders [60]. With this 
in mind, the method of property value in the market is ideal for establishing the 
capital for water development funds; however, the disadvantage of the method is 
the price for sale, which is dictated by the market. Notably, the owner's challenge is 
focused on whether or not the decision should be made to sell but the price cannot 
be set; therefore, the price of sale is not predictable. However, there are other 
methods related to property value in the market, as elaborated below. 
4.2.1 Equity-based Methods 
i. Definition 
The equity-based method is a process of t~ading company shares through 
exchanges or an over-the-counter market, which gives companies access to capital 
and investors a part of ownership with the potential to realise gains based on the 
company's future performance. As discussed in Chapter Two, Section 2.4.1, in 
some cases, equity can be a special amount of contribution under a special 
agreement, but the contributed amount is directed towards forming a capital for that 
particular company. In this situation, equity contribution as capital can be an 
agreement between the property owner and the contractor or the company . 
operator (especially in the case of the water sector). This occurs when the 
privatisation of water services is taking place. Normally, an appointed contractor or 
operator is obligated to contribute to an agreed amount annually, and the 
contribution goes to the capital investment of the entity 
However, equity conditions in contracts do not encourage bidders as they are 
viewed as a burden to them owing to the increase in the total initial and operational 
costs for project investment; therefore, the concern is on returns. The investment in 
the water sector takes a long period of time to mature, and the amount to invest is 
larger whilst political stability is questionable. Importantly, this may also limit the 
- 55-
number of bidders, which may cause less competition and may subsequently result 
in the selection of an operator or contractor who is not competent. 
4.2.2 Method of Debt/Equity Swap 
This process involves selling enterprise debts for equity. Normally, creditors 
of the enterprise offer a viable option, especially when they use agencies. The 
selected agency is empowered with certain control over the process, as it evaluates 
a submitted transformation plan, converting the entity to a different system of 
management. This method can be applied to any water parastatal organisation in a 
difficult situation concerning debt, or any other financial and economic problems. 
Cook [59] argues that the process applied for large enterprises is similar to the 
process applied to medium entities, with only slight differences, such as the amount 
of down payment or the value of shares. In this process the transformation of any 
larger enterprise, reconstitution of a transformation Board is required. Importantly, 
the Board will be formed by the representatives from the agency and the 
enterprise, whereby the Board's function is to control and monitor the 
transformation process in the enterprise [60]. However, the down payment will be 
taken straight as capital for the development and sustainability of the enterprise; in 
other words, the risk is greater and depends mainly on the situation of the 
organisation, as normal cash flow recovery may take longer than the expected 
time. In addition, the state of assets may also be too old for normal operation and 
production. All of these factors may ultimately lead to greater risk in terms of 
recovery time. 
4.2.3 Privatisation Methods for Capital Funds Development 
The privatisation method for capital development involves selling a part or full 
shares of a public entity to private individuals or organised groups with the aim of 
raising enough capital funds for the sustainability and development of the services 
provided by the entity. However, this involves a change of ownership from a public 
to private system. Nevertheless, in some cases, a public entity can be contracted to 
a private operator whereby the operator is obligated to pay a specified sum as a 
contribution to the capital of the public contracted company. The methods 
(approaches) for raising capital funds through privatisation are many, although the 
few covered in this section are described below. 
i. Voucher privatisation method for capital funds 
The voucher privatisation approach can be adopted as one of the funding 
methods for equity contribution. This is when the situation of the entity is bad, and 
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is therefore unable to support itself by generating enough funds for sustainability 
and development. As a result, the owner decides to change the ownership or 
management style with the intension of raising equity for capital development. In 
this instance, the property is transferred from the public management system to a 
private ownership, operation or management. The public-owned entity is evaluated, 
and the actual value or worth of the property is transferred to 100% shares. The 
equal value of each share voucher is determined; however, before the voucher 
books are prepared, the calculations are executed so as to precisely establish the 
number or units in order to identify how many vouchers are equal to one share. 
Subsequently, the owner (government) has to decide how many shares to be 
exposed with the intention of earning a specific amount as equity for the 
sustainability of the particular property. The objective is to raise capital funds for 
property sustainability and self-development. 
The voucher privatisation method is a reliable, capital fund-generating method 
[55]. However, the method is easy to apply as a political platform in political 
campaigns; it requires early preparation as the selling process takes too long in 
comparison with other privatisation methods in raising capital funds. 
Another way is to purchase shares through closed and open market, whereby 
ordinary and legal persons are able to purchase state property for cash. State 
property is sold through the open and closed subscription of shares, open and 
closed auctions, restitution, 'best business-plan' tenders, and also via other 
methods [76]. It is when governments realised the parastatal water services 
required capital for services sustainability that the government stated lack of funds. 
Therefore, the owner (government) decided to sell the parastatal water services 
through the open and closed voucher method, whereby vouchers are sold in open 
and closed market with condition that the buyers should keep, sustain and develop 
the normal services of the property (the buyer should have a good business plan 
for the property development); however, this ensures the owner has the capital 
funds from sales. The sold property is in good hands for future development; 
therefore, the government gains funds for capital investment and assurance of 
sustainable water services. 
ii. Outright privatisation approach 
The outright privatisation method is one of the common ways of creating 
equity for capital development; in this case, fixed equity contribution is part and 
parcel of the privatisation agreement. During such an instance, the original owner 
(public) sets a certain amount to be paid by the bidder as an equity contribution, 
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and this amount will be a part of the capital development funds; however, this is not 
necessarily the capital of the same company. The new private owner is required to 
pay a certain amount or the full amount at the beginning, and even systematically 
each year depending on the agreement. However, this method was adopted in the 
private sector participation of infrastructure provision, and was very common in the 
area of water supply, power generation, and telecommunication industries. 
However, from a financial standpoint, outright privatisation-with a total lack of 
reference on any public sector investment-is plainly the most desirable option for 
those governments embracing free market economics [71]. 
The outright privatisation method is the most successful way of self-capital 
generation in various industries, such as water companies, telecommunications 
and power companies, in which the service is provided at a comparatively low cost 
to a large number of consumers, and also where the market can be easily opened 
up to a large number of potential competitors [54]. The establishment of industrial 
regulations is concerned with protecting consumers, which is therefore still needed. 
The commercial nature of the outright privatisation model may limit the 
government's freedom in terms of influencing the way in which the industry 
develops and the extent to which services are made available to those sections of 
society where the social need and demand for service cannot be fulfilled at an 
economic price. However, the outright privatisation method has a much greater 
influence in terms of product market competition, which subsequently has a direct 
effect on higher product prices, which may accordingly lead to affordability 
problems. The increase of unemployment is also another factor; therefore, 
privatisation through such a method signals special requirements regarding the 
preservation of jobs and duration of investment. This situation notably occurred in 
Lithuania [71]. 
iii. Capital funds through a mass privatisation approach 
Mass privatisation is the selling of the shares or part of works to individual 
employees or organised groups to provide managerial skills and capital for a long 
time. It is a process of organising sustainable property economy or building a stable 
capital funds for sustainability and development of a property. In this case, 
individual workers or a small team of workers conduct their own specific work, but 
out of what their earn they contribute a certain sum for the sustainability and 
development of the organisation [216]. 
Mass privatisation is the transfer of assets, carried out as quickly as possible, 
to private owners through' open, fair and transparent methods. However, Handley 
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[65] argues that differences in process are between the owner and the agent/seller; 
however, the effects in relation to the mass privatisation method have been 
somehow overlooked in recent economic literature and the country economic 
policies of the countries in transition (country economy transition period). The 
originally mass privatisation model was adopted in those countries as being 
politically acceptable and practical solutions to justify privatisation of the entire 
enterprise sector. Nevertheless, Baldassari [55] notes that this method is 
considered successful in that temporary owners sell quickly and easily for capital 
collection, and successfully to the owners-primarily to strategic investors. The 
positive effects of mass privatisation are therefore not shown by companies 
remaining under the control of initial owners in comparison with the companies that 
have already gone through secondary transaction. The method was practiced much 
in Slovenia in the early 1990s following the disintegration of the former Soviet 
Union; however, mass privatisation forced the socially owned companies to either 
choose government restructuring before privatisation or a direct mass privatisation 
programme. Regardless, the government's restructuring plans were limited in the 
short-term owing to financiers' inadequacy. Moreover, over-employment issues and 
company debts was specifically supported by external financials; thus, mass 
privatisation had the effect of increasing unemployment and changing property-
management styles to a private system, which has greater effects in terms of 
product affordability. Nevertheless, mass privatisation is considered to be one of 
the best ways of generating capital funds [55]. 
iv. Management-Employee Buyout Method (MEBO) 
This approach is where the change of ownership or the management system 
is executed. Property assets are evaluated and the total actual value is changed 
into 100% shares. The value of each single share is then declared, and an amount 
of shares are agreed for sale to the current employers with the objective to earn a 
specific sum as a capital entity. Therefore, the employees retain ownership by 
holding the majority of shares whilst simultaneously gaining funds for capital. This 
method can be applied anywhere, specifically when establishing capital for 
development in the water sector. It is a method of transferring power and control to 
employees; however, the capital gained depends on the size and the current value 
of the shares in the market. It is only where employees cannot afford to acquire the 
shares that the remaining shares are exposed for open auction. It is important to 
note that, shareholding attractions may lead to restructuring which might contribute 
to potential positive effects necessary for the firm/entity performance [67; 73]. 
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Workers becoming owners is a motivation for performance improvement, although 
in some cases management power is limited, owing to the fact that management 
teams may be formed from the election of general worker meetings. 
v. Management Buy-out by Public Tender Method (MBPTM) 
The company value is transferred to 100% shares. The company is 
subsequently organised in order to offer the shares through the open-tender 
bidding method for company management employees. The procedure involves all 
bids being collected and evaluated under the administration of the agency through 
the special committee formed for this particular purpose. According to Macedonia 
Privatisation Agency [57], the bidder that offers the most attractive programme may 
take control of the enterprise by providing a down payment of only 20% of its 
appraised value, but ultimately has the obligation to purchase at least 51 % stake 
over a period of no more than an agreed number of years. There is the possibility 
of payment in five annual instalments with no interest charges. Furthermore, the 
bidder may be either an individual or a group, and once the tender is won, they, as 
a management team, are required to sign an agreement with the agency that gives 
them the right to control the enterprise as if they had 51%. In the meantime,· 
however, the agency holds the shares that have to be paid by the management 
team, and they are treated as preferred, non-voting shares. However, if payment is 
not made or other agreed obligations are not fulfilled, the agreement may be 
terminated, with such automatically converted into common shares [57; 58]. 
Meanwhile, the payments from selling shares are returned to the entity as new 
capital. 
Importantly, however, according to Cook [59], for larger enterprises in the 
case of management buy-out, the required down payment is 10% of the appraised 
value, or 15% if there is the need to raise additional equity. Nevertheless, if a large 
enterprise is raising additional capital, the value of the new issue must be at least 
15% of the appraisal value. 
Essentially, MESO and MSPTM are similar owing to the fact that both 
originated from selling assets or property shares but ultimately comprise 
differences in procedure; however, the important common element is that all are 
applied for the generation of capital funds for water development [57]. These 
methods have more advantages as they involve a competitive bidding process for 
shares, with prices potentially becoming higher; the only disadvantage is that 
bidders with enough money, i.e. owners and management, will go to those with 
larger amounts of money; however, this is not the focus of this study. 
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vi. Sale by public auction 
According to Targett [62], sale by the public auction method is mainly found in 
Western European countries: for example, in France the privatisation of water 
services, electricity, railways, television and telecommunications were sold through 
auction. The owner (government) can auction under open competition either a 
certain percentage of shares or 100%. Bidding is organised and the purchaser will 
be the highest bidder. The aim of the auction is to earn capital for development but 
not necessarily to that particular property, i.e. the auction can involve only a part of 
a company or service. The only advantage or disadvantage to this method is that 
the buyer can be anybody from anywhere. 
vii. Direct negotiation approach 
This method involves selling the water services entity through direct 
negotiation between the owner and respective buyer. The owner's objective is to 
raise funds for capital development, whilst the buyer looks for investment in the 
hope of securing a good for the future business. However, in order to participate in 
direct negotiations, a potential investor must fulfil special requirements (terms of 
contract) depending on the nature of terms prescribed by the state, such as being a 
citizen or resident. The negotiations are subsequently divided into two stages: 
during the first stage, the commission on direct negotiations lists the potential 
investors according to their proposed purchase price and amount of investments; 
during the second stage, on the other hand, the commission negotiates with these 
potential investors to amend their proposals. If, after the first stage, there are more 
than two potential buyers, the commission has the right to then select the two best 
offers and to thereby hold negotiations with these investors. The contract goes to 
the bidder who has offered the highest price and best service. It can be seen that 
this method is very simple in its application, and can also be adopted anywhere if 
the objective is to establish funds-whether to sustain the same property or earn 
funds for another project. However, the method can be easily adopted for 
establishing capital for water projects, but can also be applied to any entity 
provided the unique round table negotiation exists transparently and fairly for 
establishing a fair conclusion between a buyer and seller on purchasing price. It is 
a target based on much capital being available for water services investment. The 
potential danger of this method is that it opens direct negotiation and is attractive 
and conducive to corruption. 
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4.2.4 Appraisal on Capital Funds from Property Value and Equity Methods 
The evidences from the discussion covered on generating capital funds 
through the property value and equity methods show that the methods do have 
potential but have greater challenges. Naturally, water infrastructures are very 
expensive and funds are therefore generated through the adaptation of either one 
of them or altogether. In many cases, this would not be sufficient in terms of 
covering the actual sum required for the sustainability and development of the 
services; moreover, it is even worse if the method adopted for capital-raising is the 
selling of assets or shares through action market. In this case, the prices are 
controlled by the market situation at that particular time; the low price may still 
command the market. In this instance, the available market and share sales may 
not cover the amount needed for service sustainability and project development. In 
some cases, the open competitive method has the possibility of raising a higher 
sum, which is more direct; in this instance, the open competitive method eliminates 
the possibility of corruption interference. However, the condition of asset, age, and 
the physical situation of the operation has greater contribution in attracting 
investors. Many investors are not attracted to old assets, and accordingly generate 
low prices. DAWASA infrastructures, for example, were very old and were therefore 
not considered to be attractive to investors. This forced the government to go to the 
World Bank for a loan, although one of the major conditions for loans is 
privatisation. 
Markedly, privatisation has the risk of losing power of control or property 
ownership. Therefore, for the government-or other bodies that do not want to lose 
ownership of their entity-this method is not necessarily beneficial. Furthermore, 
capital funds for water development projects can be established by selling 
enterprise debt for equity (dept-selling method), as evidenced in (Section 4.3.5). 
Practicing the debt-selling method in the water services sector is highly 
recommended as a best solution for stubborn customers who fail to pay their 
consumed water charges. 
However, the method is primarily a good source for generating capital funds, 
but it remains that such an approach should be supplemented with another 
method. The challenge is concerned with their being a little amount gain and the 
loss of ownership. Accordingly, there should be other ways of establishing enough 
capital funds from local sources, which will supplement the sum required by the 
project. 
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4.4 Part 2: Establishing Capital from Tariffs Review 
4.4.1 Water Tariffs 
According to the World Bank [80]. 'Tariffs related to the costs for provision of 
services such as potable water and sanitation which intend to cover the operational 
and maintenance costs of such services and to provide aneconomic return to the 
invested capital while charges do not always relate to services or investments'. 
The structure of realistic water tariffs has three major components: volumetric 
consumed water, actual cost, and other factors (sustainability and development). 
Tariffs can be structured with zero consideration of those factors: for example, 
water charges can be estimated based on property location within the water supply 
network in terms of each specific area, zone or block; if this method is applied, 
water charges will then have no relationship with volumetric consumed water. 
Water charges can also be set by multiplying the volume of consumed water in a 
certain period by a fixed price per unit; in this case, other factors (sustainability and 
development) are not considered. Tariffs are a flexible way of water charges, as 
these can be formulated or designed in different approaches. Marcelo [83] argues 
that, 'official policies often support tariffs covering operation and maintenance costs 
plus depreciation costs or debt serving (interest and capital repayment) and 
contribution to a new capital investment'. 
Stieglitz [69] states that a good practical tariff structure should consider 
sustainability, including full-cost recovery (operational, investment and 
development). The billed price or water charges should reflect the set unit cost per 
cubic meter or gallon against the actual water consumed in the household, as 
shown by the water meter reading. The charges should be structured in order to 
cover all economic costs associated with the provision and additional supply for 
service improvement; importantly, this is a sustainable type of tariff. The tariff 
should ultimately accommodate the provision for additional future services whilst 
the required funds are collected automatically through daily water charges. In 
addition, the estimated additional amount from water charges will be accumulated 
as capital for sustainability and development. However, in normal cases, charges 
relate to the use or the rights of natural resources could also provide an economic 
return to natural capital; therefore, it is an incentive to rational use [82). 
4.4.2 Formulating (Designing) Water Tariffs 
Water tariffs can be formulated or designed from either inherited previous or 
existing periods if they are not controversial or no influence exists from the outside. 
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The tariff designers may decide to deal with existing needs and accordingly devise 
the lowest charges in the current structure. Moreover, tariffs can also be structured 
according to the regulations administered by the existing national legislations or 
national regulatory Board [70]. In Tanzania, for example, water tariffs are designed 
an? proposed by regional water authorities, whereby each region has the power to 
propose tariffs according to their needs. All proposals should be approved and 
administered by Energy & Water Utilities Regulatory Authority (EWURA). 
Therefore, it is very common that, in one country, different water regions have 
different water tariffs. The tariff designs in Tanzania mainly deal with existing 
needs, understanding and categorising water customers' consumption, and the 
cost associated with production and transportation. Industries in specific areas 
consume X amount of water, and knowing the production and transportation costs, 
a water unit tariff for the area is calculated. Moreover, the structure components of 
setting water tariffs is the unit cost of water production and transportation and the 
volume of water consumed in the categorised area or group in water supply 
services. However, the major two groups of tariffs are Sustainable and Social 
Tariffs. 
4.4.3 Sustainability Tariff 
In this type of tariff, water utilities have all sorts of capital costs to meet; these 
can be, and are, implemented on an annual basis. To these annual capital costs, 
all operational costs are added, including material costs, labour, and other 
expenses. These results are a key focus for future estimations in order to cover all 
necessary aspects, i.e. economic, environmental, and development. Therefore, the 
rule concerning water charges for sustainability can be easily defined as the total 
water operational costs incurred in the water utilities production activities and the 
payment by customers through their periodic water bills [72]. It is under the 
principal of full-cost recovery. With this in mind, subsides or loans are therefore not 
provided by the government or any financial institution. The sustainable tariff can 
also be decided and set according to the project objectives, and subsequently 
implemented on a stage-by-stage basis. This is only appropriate if a gradual 
approach to sustainability has been adopted, and if, at the outset, customers' 
demand responses can be predicted in relation to the price increase [71; 73]. 
4.4.4 Social Tariffs 
Social tariffs are existing water tariffs with special application for domestic 
water supply services to individual water costumers. It is the fixed price tariff that 
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keeps costs the same for the entire year once the consumer signs up. However, 
the social tariffs exist in two major ways: passport tariffs and one size fit all tariffs 
[75; 77]. 
i. Passport tariffs 
Passport tariffs are a special method established for water bills payment 
schemes, which may include amendments or refunds, discount or corrections, on 
the payment for water charges of a set existing scheme. The scheme was 
designed with specific objectives in mind in order to assist low-income people and 
perhaps other vulnerable households. The aim was concerned with significantly 
reducing the bills paid by such a group for a given water supply and sewerage 
services. For this reason, eligibility would have to be established for the scheme; 
therefore, the term 'passport tariff' is adopted to describe this type of social tariff. 
Negotiating with costumers regarding how much to be paid has the danger of 
losing entity revenue; however, the method can also be the source of corruption. 
ii. One size fits all tariffs 
The 'one size fits all' tariffs is 'a general tariff for households which, through 
its structure (normally referred to as an increasing block tariff) and through the 
actual tariff rates levied, the tariff has the effect of resolving, to a significant degree, 
affordability issues', whereby its success is measured by the reductions in the 
charging burdens of low-income and other vulnerable households. Importantly, it 
does not undermine the low-income water consumers, and there are no problems 
relating to the non-take-up from eligible households. Thus. social tariffs in 
developed countries, such as the UK. have almost invariably involved means-
testing. whilst the 'one size fits all' tariff provides a universal approach, with charges 
rarely reviewed to meet the circumstantial needs of the material price rise [76]. 
4.4.5 Objectives of Water Tariffs 
According to EIB [81], water tariffs are a focal point of water services costs 
(value for water) and as a measuring unit for economical checks on sustainability 
and expansion in providing water supply and sewerage services. Tariffs should be 
formulated with practical-based objectives; however, the fundamental focus of 
setting water tariff objectives is on sustainability, economics, affordability, and 
actual product value, with the basic objectives applied to all categories, as 
described below. 
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4.4.6 Sustaining of Revenue Sufficiency 
From the service operator and service owner, the primary objective of setting 
water tariffs is to recover the total services costs and extra estimated amount for 
services development. The focus and decision is based on how much. revenue is 
aimed to be collected from the set proposed tariffs. This process is a combination 
of bringing together the various costs and charges of the particular service to come 
up with a tariff at a level to meet the purpose (target). However, the driving force of 
this objective is, 'how much money is to be collected?' [73]. Accordingly, the tariff 
set should be fair to the operator, services owner and customers, which is a 
'balance of consideration with positive effect on affordability' which is one major 
focus to the answer of the research question. 
J 
i. Economic efficiency 
Herrington [75] insists that the structured and efficient water tariffs are 
automatically a catalyst to ensure that the available service costs for the customers 
have comparable benefit with good value (value for money). However, 'generations 
of economists have insisted on the importance of this objective and noted that, it 
can be achieved by setting all prices equal to their relevant marginal costs'. 
Therefore, customers benefit owing to the fact that the amount they have to pay is 
equal to the services provided, and is therefore a motivation to water consumers. 
ii. Equity and fairness 
Equity means treating stakeholders with balance and equal consideration. 
Normally, in public utilities, tariffs designs are focused on ensuring greater 
consideration to users paying a fair amount proportional to the provided service. 
Fairness is a general consideration of various opinions during the tariffs review. In 
Tanzania, for example, the condition for tariff review and approval involves a 
greater aspect of consumer opinion (Association of Water Consumers). In this 
regard, prior to EWURA approving implementation, there should be agreement that 
the water tariffs review is publicly acceptable. The political acceptance of water 
tariffs has its contribution; hence, the objections of a political leader may lead to 
losing political support, which may therefore cause political interference during 
implementation. 
iii. Creation of revenue stability 
Flat charges for all water users-without considering actual individual 
consumptions-may ultimately cause complaints for unfair charges from some 
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consumers; it may also lead to an instability situation, which may subsequently 
cause difficulties in performance and low revenues with poor cash flow and 
financing. Whilst the collection and implementation of the set tariffs will pose no 
barriers with fewer complaints after the approval by legal authorities, competence in 
supervision and processing of water bills nevertheless needs consideration. 
4.4.7 Part 2: Appraisal for Tariffs Review Methods 
The discussion indicates that the tariff review methods are practical and 
easier to adopt, aiming to generate capit~1 funds for water service projects in any 
service system (private or public). The methods are reflected in the fact that each 
unit volume of water sold is the base of unit capital fund generation; however, the 
differences in terms of structure and the establishing of the tariff review method 
exist. This critically depends on the purpose of adaptation (influence of lending or 
local capital development), areas of application (industrial or domestic with low 
income people) and adopted design of originality (inherited from previous or 
existing actual need). The conclusion on the structured design of water tariffs is 
based mainly on such purposes; therefore, there is consideration regarding how 
much is expected to be generated from the new tariffs and for how long, as well as 
the overall affordability and fairness for all stakeholders. Essentially, the entire 
process of water tariff design and review requires close supervision and 
combination of various ideas from all stakeholders for the tariffs to be easily 
acceptable during practice. 
The application of water tariffs review method necessitates the availability of 
the regulating authority to ensure the balance of price for both sides: one side to 
protect water customers from overcharging (affordability), and another to protect 
the service provider (undercharging). With a stable political system providing no 
opportunity for interference of the operation process, the approach can be 
practically adopted by both private service providers and also public service 
providers. The positive aspect of this method is the greater percentage of 
generated profit, which is distributed for the benefit of all customers (the profit is 
converted to a capital). The stability of water rates is guaranteed owing to the fact 
that, in most cases, all possible risks in terms of operation and production are 
considered during the restructuring or tariff-setting; therefore, it is a naturally 
convenient method [73; 60]. 
As a means of generating capital funds, the tariff review method is reliable 
and universal, and has proven to be a common practice in water service industries. 
However, the way in which it is defined, adopted and applied differs from one place 
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to another. The method is sustainable as it allows a constant defined amount per 
period; however, flexibility regarding how much is to be collected as capital 
ultimately depends on the size of the services (number of customers) and the 
calculated amount to be saved. This is the best local method for establishing 
capital funds for water development projects as a reviewed amount of money is 
collected from daily water services, and the collected amount constitutes capital 
which reinvested to sustain similar services. 
The discussion in Section 4.4.6 concludes the basis for setting water tariffs, 
emphasising that water tariffs should be set fairly to a" (the service provider, owner 
and water consumers). and only through this consideration wi" water services be 
affordable and sustainable. This has a greater impact on payment' for the water 
charges owing to the fact that affordable water charges are a motivation for people 
to pay. In other words, affordable water charges drive willingness to pay. 
4.5 Part 3: Loans as funds for Water Development 
4.5.1 Introduction 
Loans are the leading capital for the funding of water development in a" 
developing countries; however, most water development projects in the Sub-
Sahara African region depend on loans from international financiers. Within the 
region, there are very limited potential sources of capital funds for water projects 
apart from loans. The discussion on loans from international financiers is never 
complete without focusing on the World Bank which. along with other international 
funding institutions (including UNIDO, European Investment Bank, African 
Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, Islamic Development Bank and 
many others), are the significant donors for funding existing, on-going and new 
developing water projects in the region of Sub-Sahara African developing 
countries. 
Almost a" Sub-Sahara African countries depend on loans from the world's 
largest financial institutions. Such institutions have become very active in terms of 
funding water projects in the entire world. With this noted, the World Bank is 
currently the most popular international institution in terms of funding a number of 
water development projects in the region, with countries including Tanzania, Kenya, 
Uganda. Burundi, Congo, Egypt. Ethiopia. Ghana. Lesotho, Malawi, Morocco. and 
Mozambique all having benefited from various water. development projects loans 
[86]. Thus. this section (capital funds from loans) critically reviews the World Bank 
Loan procedures and functions. conditions. methods. profit. loan interests, and 
advantages and disadvantages; importantly, however, other common international 
- 68-
funding institutions-including UNIDO, EIB, AfDB, lOB and ADB-have also been 
discussed critically with the aim of giving a give wider picture of comparison in 
regard to loans and their effects (see Appendix P in the CD). 
4.6 The World Bank 
4.6.1 Background 
The World Bank is the world's largest international financier for funding water 
supply and sanitation (WSS) projects in Tanzania (Sub-Sahara African country). It 
is recognised as being a leading agency in terms of its operational coverage and 
the total amount of expenditure (lending) in the water sector. The World Bank has 
approved an average of US$1.6 billion in new lending to client countries for the 
WSS sector each year. Lending projections show an upward trend of new 
commitments for the coming years [87]. According to the 2006 World Financial 
Report ending 2006, the International Development Association (IDA) lent to 167 
projects worldwide in the year 2006, with gross disbursements of US$8,910 million 
and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) lent to 
approximately 112 projects in the year 2006 with gross disbursements of 
US$11,833 million [88]. 
Moreover, the World Bank Loans Development Policy provides quick-
disbursing external financing to support policy and institutional reforms, typically 
running for 1-3 years. Originally designed to provide support for macroeconomic 
policy reforms, including trade policy and agriculture, development policy loans 
have evolved in such a way so as to focus more on the structural, financial sector 
and social policy reformS, and also on improving the public sector resource 
management. All projects financed by the World Bank are conceived and 
supervised according to a well-documented project cycle. Below is a step-by-step 
guide to the project cycle, the documents produced as part of the process, and how 
these are accessed. However, it should be noted that the World Bank, as per any 
other financial institution, has various policies and procurement procedures 
applicable in all bank financing projects, thus giving guidance and instructions on 
carrying out all the procurement and consulting works. 
4.6.2 IBRD loans and IDA Credits Conditions 
According to the World Bank regulations [82], the loan agreement governs 
the legal relationship between the borrower and the bank, whilst the guidelines are 
made for the procurement of goods and implementation for all projects funded by 
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the IBRD and IDA (World Bank). The World Bank procedures and guidelines are 
compulsory and strictly for World Bank loans. However, the bank's interest is 
focused on giving all eligible bidders from developed and developing countries 
equal opportunity to compete for loans. 
Furthermore, one of the major World Bank principal conditions in any 
approach of procurement is the adoption of International Competitive Bidding 
(ICB}-unless otherwise stated. For all works under prescribed conditions, the ICB 
method is the most appropriate method, and the bank requires its borrowers to 
obtain goods, works and services through ICB, all of which are open to eligible 
suppliers and contractors. 
However, in practice, the bank's procurement rules and procedures-
especially during the implementation process-depend on the circumstances of a 
particular case. In practice, the entire bank's largely funded project experts are 
provided by the bank as condition, whilst wages and working facilities for these 
experts are paid by the country borrowers deducted from loan, and in adherence 
with World Bank standards. 
4.6.3 The World Bank Lending Instruments 
According to the World Bank toolkit [89], the World Bank has two basic types 
of lending instruments: Investment Loans and Development Policy. The former 
provides financing for a wide range of activities aimed towards creating physical 
and social infrastructure considered necessary for poverty alleviation and 
sustainable development. Over the past two decades, investment lending has, on 
average, accounted for 75-80% of all bank-associated lending. The nature of 
investment lending has evolved over time. Originally focused on hardware, 
engineering services, and bricks and mortar, investment lending has come to focus 
more keenly on institution-building, social development, and building the public 
policy infrastructure required in order to facilitate private sector activity. Projects 
include water and sanitation (improving the efficiency of water utilities), and natural 
resource management (providing training in sustainable forestry and farming), with 
the World Bank development policy at a national level focused on the development 
of required approaches, access and mobility, the economy, and social and 
environmental sustainability. 
Therefore, with the above taken into consideration, according to the World 
Bank structure, investment loans are available to the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and International Development 
Association (IDA) borrowers not in arrears with the banking group. 
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4.6.4 The World Bank Operational Model 
The World Bank operation procedures are set according the bank-lending 
and loaning policy [83]. In regard to World Bank Operation policy [83], whereby the 
country borrowers are obligated to submit a detailed request loan plan, which is 
concerned with evaluating and being reviewed before approval, the bank evaluation 
procedure is arranged strategically to ensure quality and funds security operations. 
Thus, the bank comprises powered operating tools for loans control and 
monitoring, namely IBRD and IDA. 
4.6.5 Business Objectives in the Loans 
The business objectives can be covered in many different ways, provided the 
end results are earning profits for the benefit of owners (World Bank). The World 
Bank policy for loans is concerned with gaining no less than 15% interest for any 
loan [82]. However, IBRD and IDA are the tools of the bank for delivering loans to 
governments and public enterprises, with a government (or sovereign) guarantee of 
payment. Funds for lending come from the issuance of World Bank bonds on the 
global capital markets. Notably, IBRD can lend to countries with interest plus 1% 
for administration overheads. Markedly, the Word Bank operates as any 
commercial institution; therefore, all loans are provided with interest. 
4.6.6 Policy for Lending Development 
The appropriateness of providing development policy lending to a country is 
determined in the context of the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS). The bank's 
decision to extend development policy lending is based on an assessment of the 
country's policy and institutional framework-including the country's economic 
situation, governance, environmental/natural resource management, and poverty 
and social aspects. The bank considers the strength of the programme and the 
country's overall commitment to and ownership of the programme in comparison 
with its track record. It also assesses the country's institutional capacity and ability 
to effectively implement the programme to be supported, and thus describes the 
country's capacity-building efforts [82]. 
4.6.7 Implementation Structure 
The IBRD and IDA are the only tools associated with the bank's operations, 
• 
with all bank strategic and implementation procedures accommodated and 
executed within the capacity of these two organs, as explained in Section 4.8.2. 
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IBRD and IDA exist with the objective to implement the World Bank procurement 
procedures and business banking policy. The current operating development policy 
has been strategically structured so as to promote competitive market structures 
(for example, legal and regulatory reform), correct distortions in incentive regimes 
(taxation and trade reform), to establish appropriate monitoring and safeguards 
(financial sector reform), to create environment conducive to private sector 
investment Uudicial reform, adoption of a modern investment code), and 
subsequently to encourage private sector activity (privatisation and public-private 
partnerships) [90]. 
4.6.8 The Bank Loans with the Condition of Privatisation 
Privatisation is strongly supported by the World Bank policy for lending its policy 
aims to improving the public sector resource management by developing and 
promoting the competitive market structure so as to create conducive environment 
for the private sector, and good governance (civil service reform). One of the World 
Bank's preferred methods in privatisation are lease support. The World Bank toolkit 
for loaning water supply sector clearly considers privatisation as the best way of 
achieving water services provision. The aim is to promote privatisation in the water 
sector in the hope that privatisation can develop better water services in developing 
countries 
According to ICIJ [217], the World Bank serves its interest through its regular loan 
programme to governments, which often comes with conditions that explicitly 
require the privatisation of water provision. Furthermore, through this sector, the 
World Bank has been the principle financer of privatisation; however, according 
DOH [89], 'the toolkit focuses on the specific choices governments face when 
designing arrangements for private participation'. The World Bank's' preferred 
methods for privatisation are contract management, leases, and concessions. The 
methods are well covered in the World Bank toolkit. Loans taken from the World 
Bank for the water supply and sewerage services are accompanied by conditions of 
privatisation. 
4.6.9 Management Contracts Method 
The management contract method of privatisation is also amongst the World 
Bank's preferences, with specific choices concerned with governments requesting 
loans for water projects. The method covers the total transfer of management 
responsibilities of a public utility property to a private operator for a certain period 
time, often from 3-5 years. The simplest management contracts pay a private 
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operator a fixed fee for performing managerial tasks. Other management contracts 
offer greater incentives for efficiency by defining performance targets and basing 
the fee, in part, on their fulfilment. One challenge in the design of management 
contracts is determining which targets are measurable and under the control of the 
operator, as well as how relative the operator's remuneration should be in relation 
to the achievement of such targets. Another challenge is determining what powers 
the operator should have over, for example, employment. Under many 
management contracts, the utility employs the staff except for a few top managers. 
In management contracts, the operator's remuneration commonly does not 
depend on the customer tariff, and the government does not have to design an 
arrangement which protects the operator from tariff-related policy risk. This has low 
encourage"ment in relation to contractor performance as such income does not 
come direct from consumer charges. Conversely, management contracts do not 
offer the same potential as other arrangements to address the problem of paying 
for services: the government is not required to commit to a cost-covering 
combination of tariffs and external subsidies. Accordingly, less risk is transferred to 
the operator, and so large improvements in operating and investment performance 
are less likely than under other arrangements. Nonetheless, if the management 
contractor has the flexibility to change the way in which the business is run and has 
incentives to improve performance, it may improve operating performance. 
However, management contracts mainly have the advantage of transfer of 
management knowledge from the private operator to public local management 
team. A management contract can also serve as a transitional arrangement, during 
which the government can prepare for a more effective form of private participation 
[88]. 
4.7.0 Affermage-Ieases 
Affermage is another type of privatisation, which is also considered in the 
World Bank toolkit in regard to water sector privatisation. Under this method, the 
operator is responsible for operating and maintaining the business, but not for 
financing investment. However, the difference between affermage and leases is 
technical: under a lease, the operator retains revenue collected from customers 
and makes a specified lease payment to the contracting authority, which the 
authority can then use to pay for investment; under an affermage, on the other 
hand, the operator and contracting authority share revenue from customers, and 
the operator pays the contracting authority an affermage fee, which varies 
according to demand and customer tariffs, and retains the remaining revenue. 
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Under both affermages and leases, the operator's profits depend on the 
utility's sales and costs, which typically give the operator an incentive to improve 
operating efficiency and increase sales. The contracting authority is usually 
responsible for financing investment in infrastructure assets under an affermage-
lease; it must raise the finance and coordinate its investment programme with the 
operator. In some cases, the operator designs and manages the investment 
programme; on others, the contracting authority has this role. The distinction 
between investment and maintenance is not always clear: for instance, affermage-
leases often place some degree of responsibility for investment on the operator (for 
example, for rehabilitation) [89]. Affermage-Ieases are usually more difficult to 
implement than management contracts, simply owing to the fact that the operator 
usually bears more risk. Under a lease, the operator's remuneration depends 
directly on customer tariff, and so the government is obliged to design an 
arrangement that protects the operator from tariff-related policy risk, and which is 
similarly considered legitimate. Under an affermage, the risk is lower as the 
operator tariff is different from the customer tariff. The operator will be more 
comfortable with an arrangement in which customer tariffs cover, on average, the 
operator's costs. Although they are more challenging, affermage-Ieases offer 
greater benefits. For example, they commonly require commitment and the 
contribution of government participation in all differing degrees during the 
implementation in order to confront the problems of customer tariffs, and usually 
give the operator incentives to improve operating performance. This has a great 
impact, as is reflected in the case of higher water charges. 
4.7.1 Concessions and Divestitures 
Another preferred method of the World Bank in regard to privati~ing water 
services is that of concession, which are typically used for introducing private 
participation in infrastructure. This type of privatisation provides all responsibility to 
the private operator. In this method, the nominated operator will not only be 
responsible for the operation and maintenance of assets, but also for the financing 
and managing of investment. In concessions, the asset ownership is under the 
government from a legal perspective; however, the rights of operating, using and 
managing remain with the operator. In addition, all the assets-including those 
created by the operator-typically revert to the government when the arrangement 
ends, often after a 25- or 3D-year period. 
Moreover, concession is a tool that can be used to induce competition for a 
market, when competition in the market is not operating. According to Klein [228], if 
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a water concession is awarded to the bidder offering to supply water at very low 
price to consumers, this encourages efficiency in two ways that parallel the effects 
of competition in the market. First, it leads the operating company to offer to sell 
water at a price that covers their costs but not much more. Pressures keep prices 
down and limit profits. In this situation, the government does not need to estimate 
the lowest profitable water price or regulate in order to prevent the monopoly 
supplied from changing higher price. Through competitive bidding, the bidders 
reveal the prices themselves. Furthermore, concession encourages bidders to 
produce water at very cheap prices as inefficient bidders cannot win the bidding 
and remain profitable. This is the most prominent advantage associated with the 
concession method. Depending on environmental circumstances and project 
objectives, any of the outlined methods of privatisation can be applied so as to 
sustain the World Bank loan's condition for project funding. 
4.7.2 Loans with Privatisation 
Owing to conditions set by the World Bank to its borrowers, some of the 
developing countries have been forced to adopt the alternative methods in order to 
qualify for assistance or loans. According to ICIJ [217], the analysis of 276 loans 
awarded by the World Bank between 1990-2002 shows that approximately one-
third of the loan projects the World Bank required the countries to privatise its water 
operations before it received funds. The report added that between1990 and 1995 
there were 21 World Bank loans with privatisation as a condition. Furthermore, 
Senegal, Ghana (Ghana Water Corporation) and Tanzania (DAWASA) are cases 
of the World Bank loans with privatisation and other conditions, as detailed in 
Appendix Q in the CD. 
However, aside from privatisation being a condition for a loan, loans have 
extra conditions, such as that a" World Bank-funded projects are bound by World 
Bank procurement procedures. and there are also special guiding conditions for the 
selection of a contractor or an operator under the international competitive bidding 
(ICB). The World Bank loans with the condition of privatisation have a number for 
advantages and disadvantages. 
4.8 Advantages and Disadvantages of World Bank Loans 
4.8.1 Advantages 
I. One of the remarkable advantages of the World Bank loans is that. in 
developing countries. tough loan conditions and strict procurement procedures 
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have not only helped to improve the quality for implementation, but also were the 
sources and catalytic for developing an alternative suitable ways for raising capital 
funds from local sources. 
ii. The condition for international competitive bidding (ICB) is part and parcel 
of the World Bank loans whereby the country borrower should execute the loan 
within the World Bank procurement procedures. The condition requires all large 
projects funded by the World Bank to procure the contractor, operator or services 
provider through the International Competitive Bidding (ICD) method. Via ICB 
methods, world-class companies from all over the world are invited to bid on the 
tender. The competition is higher, and the most competent contractor or operator 
that promises the best performance with the highest skills and modern technology 
is then awarded the contract. The new contractor from foreign country brings in 
new technology, equipment, culture, and new management style, and sometimes 
capital. These are noted as World Bank loans advantages and benefits to 
developing African countries. The process is referred to as 'transfer of technology'. 
According to DOH [42], the transfer of knowledge from a new successful 
contract or operator to the privatised company, with objectives of maximising the 
profit in the contractor's daily operational activities, means the new contractors 
usually conduct some degree of management restructuring, as well as the 
introduction of new equipment and training. 
iii. The World Bank condition for ICB provides transparency and volume of 
work, procedure, and costs for the project implementation. 
Iv. In regard to stimulation for culture and economic development, World 
Bank loans for developing countries are considered stimulants and motivation 
which develop and facilitate the proper planning and implementation of the water 
development projects. The approach provides a positive contribution and 
challenges towards the necessary change for a better life and safe water, which 
has economiC, political and social impacts for the country. The World Bank's 
existing tough conditions for loans are positive challenges for country borrowers to 
devise alternative ways of establishing capital funds from their own local sources 
for water development projects; hence, these are the only ways of achieving 
independent economies. 
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v. Concerning the process of replenishing loan, it is stated that the World Bank's 
stage-by-stage restricted process for replenishing loans to the country borrower 
has greater advantage for checking and control on good use of the loan, review of 
performed tasks and giving the clear picture of the project implementation. This is 
an advantage to both (borrower and donor). 
4.8.2 Disadvantages of the World Bank Loan Conditions to Developing 
Countries 
i. In comparison with its advantages the International Competitive Bidding 
method (ICB), there are also a number of disadvantages recognised throughout the 
process of adaptation, as well during implementation time. The adaptation of the 
method (ICB) requires compromise with local official procurement procedures, 
which, in most cases, is not similar to the World Bank procurement procedure. 
In regard to implementation, the open international competition tender invites 
various large, world-class companies with different experience, equipment, 
expertise, technology and capital; this limits local indigenous poor contractors and 
businessmen in terms of competing equally. This results in all large water service 
projects funded by the World Bank being contracted to foreign companies from 
European or American countries. The situation of local companies being unable to 
win and execute large contracts within their own countries diminishes the true 
development of local business companies, which subsequently poses a further 
barrier to economic development. 
ii. The World Bank condition of providing experts (financial and technical) in 
any large funding project is a significant unnecessary burden for country borrowers. 
The salaries and other needs for these World Bank-appointed experts are all paid 
by the countries from loaned funds. This has a greater impact on the total sum of 
the loan amount, as the difference between the loan figures and actual amount for 
project implementation is all paid to experts who sometimes are not needed. The 
salaries paid to these experts are, according to the World Bank standards, are 10% 
of the loan and this is burden to developing countries. 
iii. According to The World Bank procurement procedure that, 'The Bank 
does not finance expenditures for goods and works which have not been 
procured in accordance with the agreed provisions in the Loan Agreement 
and as further elaborated in the Procurement Plan', The World Bank conditions 
of project periodic review and approval at every stage of project implementation 
called approval for no objection is a part of project procedure that causes 
unnecessary complications in total project implementation. 
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iv. The World Bank loans with privatisation conditions have many 
disadvantages including, according to Public citizen [91], turning state enterprises 
from loss to profit by trimming the payroll, and failing to focus on overall efficiency. 
There is often minimum job protection, as employers can dismiss workers with little 
or no costs, and employees and customers are sometimes forced to adopt 
privatisation without enough knowledge or preparation. 
4.8.3 Criticisms against the World Bank and Other Financial Institutions 
Methods 
According to Stieglitz [69], the World Bank and International Monitory Fund 
(IMF) imposes a number of unnecessary privatisation conditions as opposed to 
providing immediate assistance. 
Private services mostly impose higher services costs, which are not 
affordable to low-income people. For example, in the 1980s, Latin America was in 
difficulties with large economic deficit in the continent. Electricity and water supply 
services were in poor condition. The IFM imposed fiscal austerity (balanced 
budget) and tighter monetary policies, demanding that governments pursue 
privatisation policies as a precondition for receiving aid. 
The World Bank, IFM and other financial institutions frequently encourage 
developing countries to privatise the public assets, such as forestland and 
government utilities, including water services, telephone, and electrical companies. 
In most cases, public property is sold off to foreign investors at rock-bottom prices. 
As a result, many effects are witnessed as a consequence of changes, which 
subsequently burden the country adopting such changes. One of these is growing 
unemployment owing to the restructuring and resizing of various services, assets 
and companies, which are transferred to the private sector. Another is the increase 
in the prices of services owing to changes in tariffs. Sometimes, supply becomes 
unaffordable to low-income people in a country owing to management change. As 
a result, those who cannot manage to pay will remain without basic service, such 
as water and electricity [69]. 
Brettonwoods [218] states that the World Bank needs to change its formerly 
dogmatic approach of forcing privatisation in water sector, and suggests that the 
World Bank may not be learning quickly enough when considering that the 
privatisation of water services is not a real solution for water service improvement, 
and further stating that, with the adoption of such an approach, the poor may be left 
both without any change to water supply and sewerage services improvement, and 
may ultimately be paying for botched privatisation. 
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Billegeya [219] adds that the failure of water privatisation in Tanzania should 
be a lesson to the World Bank's aid donors and governments, stating that the 
privatisation of water services is not a solution to problems in developing countries. 
In actual fact, the failure of DAWASA privatisation has added a burden to a country 
that is already struggling to reach its international poverty target in relation to 
access to water. 
Another criticism of the World Bank privatisation condition relates to the water 
services in Latin America. The Bolivian Cochabamba Water Supply Projects, as 
funded by the World Bank, have a long and problematic record. The country's 
largest water system was forced by the World Bank to opt for a loan with 
privatisation conditions. When the private Cochabamba water supply was operated 
by US-based Bechtel Corporation, household bills rose by 200%, which 
subsequently sparked a civil uprising that forced the company to leave the country. 
The water system was put under public control. After the failure of the 
Cochabamba, the World Bank no longer used the word 'privatisation', but instead 
replaced it with terms such as 'concessions', 'decentralisation' and 'public 
participation'. However, the critics state that, whatever the euphemism, the end 
result is the same: higher rates, lower quality and less access [220]. 
4.9.4 Appraisal on World Bank Loans 
The discussion on World Bank loans indicates that the institution gives loans 
and sometimes accompanies these with small grants under tough conditions of 
privatisation. This is particularly true in respect of capital for sustainability and 
development in water services. The World Bank loaned Tanzania US$86.96 for the 
implementation of DWSSP under the condition of privatising DAWASA (see 
Chapter Two, Section 2.3.1). However, the effects of this condition are directly 
reflected in a number of areas, including water price rise, ownership, cultural 
change, and an increase in unemployment. The World Bank condition for 
privatisation has positive effects on improvement of efficiency in services, economy 
stimulants, and the overall availability of new technology. Nevertheless, the World 
Bank is a commercial and business-operating institution existing with the aim of 
implementing bank objectives, including profit-making, much like any other 
commercial institution. 
The World Bank ideology, 'Privatisation can bring SUbstantial gains, and more 
effectively than the public sector', is not always true owing to the fact that it is not 
provide an appropriate solution in every case; in particular are examples of 
Tanzania, Ghana, Zambia and Uganda's water privatisation. The World Bank's 
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behaviours in the use of a loan to drive and make a business profit from poor 
developing countries, and by imposing difficult conditions, should not be accepted. 
However, this should be taken as a positive challenge for poor developing countries 
to research the alternative capital funding solution for water development projects 
[40]. 
If World Bank loans are truly concerned with poverty eradication in poor 
developing countries, the conditions for loans should be flexible and negotiable in 
order to balance the interest of donor (World Bank), as well as the interest of the 
borrower. With this in mind, there should be no one-sided conditions. 
ii. The effects of applying the International Competitive Method 
World Bank loans comprising the privatisation condition has a component of 
International Competitive Bidding (ICB), which necessitates all bidding for the 
privatisation tender and all other procurements to be open for local and 
international bidders, incorporating equal grounds of competition. This process is 
obligatory for all projects funded by the World Bank (big financial institutions). The 
method has advantages, such as allowing fair competition to all . local and 
international bidders. The objective of ICB is to select the most competent and 
quality service-provider or contractor. However, with this condition, large foreign 
contractors or services providers may take advantage of the fact that they have 
capital, technology and equipment that local companies do not have; however, this 
method has the potential for technology transfer, but again, the method limits the 
development of local private companies. 
With this in mind, it is true that the bank is concerned with competent service 
providers, and so a special upgrading programme for local contractors should be in 
place, as well as capital for tools and equipment. 
4.9.5 Summary 
From the discussion covered in this chapter, we can conclude that public 
water entities (water services companies) can possibly generate capital funds for 
sustainability and development if the asset shares are valued and sold, auctioned, 
leased, privatised or contracted, as critically examined in Section 4.3.1 through to 
Section 4.4 of this chapter. Furthermore, as can be seen from developing an 
understanding of the application of each discussed method, there are advantages 
and disadvantages to all methods. With this in mind, the study may therefore 
conclude a number of things. From the critical analysis on the advantages and 
disadvantages of the World Bank conditions to countries borrowers the concept of 
I 
establishing the alternative source for water projects capital funding is obligatory; 
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however, establishing capital funds from local sources will make Tanzania and 
other Sub-Sahara African countries self-sustainable and free from external 
conditions. As a result, the project can be implemented and managed locally under 
local conditions, and flexibility is possible 
With the aforementioned in consideration, the concept to be adopted from the 
discussion of various methods covered in this chapter is that, through a number of 
different equity methods, property can generate enough capital funds for water 
development; however, the governing authorities has a greater role in deciding 
which method should be adopted. Methods like enterprise debt sale for equity and 
tariffs review methods can be an alternative solution. 
The tariff review method has been evidenced as an appropriate, sustainable, 
and reliable local source for establishing capital funds in water industries, simply 
because the income is constant and flexible according to the need, with the only 
consideration needing to be assigned attention is that of affordability; therefore, this 
will be the appropriate measure for Tanzania to get out of tough loan conditions. As 
a result, it can be justified that loans from international financiers are not for poverty 
reduction in developing countries in the long-term but rather seem to induce 
poverty acceleration, which is therefore an obstacle for development and should 
not be accepted unless the conditions are fairly set. However, this can be adopted 
as a challenge and the motivation for developing our own capital funds from our 
own local resources. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: MANAGEMENT OF WATER SERVICES 
5.1 Introduction 
Water has immeasurable value for our life; its unique contribution on both 
economy and social development necessitates higher investment in relation to 
research for better management of the available few resources and better water 
services. Water is needed for many uses, such as drinking, cooking, washing, 
cooling, watering lawns, fire protection, commercial use, and sanitation. Therefore, 
proper planning for good use in order to maximise water contribution value 
obligates an in-depth discussion on the ways in which better management can be 
achieved for the benefit of social and economic use. However, the complicity of 
discussing water services management necessitates greater focus in its usage, 
costs, demands and supply, and the differences. The rate of consumption per 
person per day differs from one country to another, as well as from one area to 
another. According to Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(DECO) [267] ranking some developed countries-including USA, Canada, 
Germany and the UK-have average water consumption per person per day 
ranging between 154 litres and 515 litres, whilst in developing countries, the 
average water consumption ranges from 30 litres and 220 litres per person per day. 
This difference creates a number of challenging questions, such as why the rates 
of water consumption per person per day in developed countries are higher, and 
why the rates are so low in developing countries [268]. 
. Bennell [107] argues that the reality today means that 'water scarcity is 
becoming more common in many parts of the world because of increase in usage 
and also partly due to climate change. This is a potential conflict we need to 
manage our water more carefully'. Duff [127] further comments that it is a direct 
challenge to the whole world. This situation therefore necessitates a high 
investment of a combination of efforts to ensure that enough water of a good 
quality is available for all our needs. More attention need to be directed towards 
developing countries where there is not enough water-even for domestic use. 
The British South West Water Company (SWWC) [125] comments that, 'it's 
quite fundamental on how you view water and sewerage service. If you view it as 
an essential public service it makes very good sense to stick to public management 
system, but if you see privatisation as fundamental shift, with industry not so much 
public service as a commodity, you would argue for change'. This chapter therefore 
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discusses different water management styles as platforms that can be developed 
so as to build the appropriate management style for water and sewerage services 
in Tanzania/Sub-Sahara African Countries. This chapter covers areas including the 
provision of water services under public management, private water services, and 
the commercialisation of public services. 
The public ownership and management of water supply and sewerage 
services has been a traditional way for all Sub-Sahara African countries. However, 
public management in water services has proven to be unsuccessful in all sub-
Sahara African countries, where failure has necessitated the adoption of private 
water services in the region. However, private water services are also not an ideal 
solution. 
Therefore, the discussion on public water services in this chapter is carried 
out in an attempt to open up and allow the adaptation of concepts from the failure 
and successes of good use in developing the appropriate solutions for Tanzania 
water problems. Furthermore, willingness to pay for sustainability of water services 
and the regulatory position for supporting water sector has been also critically 
discussed in Chapter Four, Section 4.4.7: 
Importantly, the commercialisation of public services has also been discussed 
in terms of facilitating how services can be better managed. However, the concepts 
adopted from all five covered areas, including willingness to pay (WTP), regulatory 
authority, Commercialisation, Public and Privatisation, will be compared with the 
local Tanzania existing water and sewerage governing system for the development 
of an appropriate model. 
5.2 Section 1: Water Services under Public Management 
5.2.1 Introduction 
Medalye [126] argues that, 'Water governance can be defined as the range of 
political, social, economic, and administrative systems that are in place to regulate 
the development and management of water resources and provision of water 
services at different levels of society. Countries facing different social-economic, 
political, and historical contexts which affect the way in which water resources and 
services are managed'. Furthermore, according to Free Media [92], 'public services 
is a term usually used to mean services provided by governments to its citizens, 
either directly (through the public sector) or by financing private provision of 
services'. It is further stated that the term is associated with a social consensus 
(usually expressed through democratic elections) that certain services should be 
available to all, regardless of income. Even where public services are neither 
- 83 -
publicly provided nor publicly financed, for social and political reasons, they are 
usually subject to regulations spanning beyond that which applies to most 
economic sectors. 
Moreover, Cook [221] argues that, at the end of the 1970s, African public 
enterprise sectors were experiencing poor performance, especially in relation to the 
water services sector. The situation was due to the existing complex political setting 
in which public water services were forced to operate without a good base of capital 
and technical planning. In terms of economic performance and operational 
services, public industries, for a long time, have existed with difficulties, and have 
accordingly mainly underperformed. In many cases, political ambitions have been a 
guardian for performance. The insufficiency of skilled labour, political interference 
and the over-employment of low-level staff were concluded to be reasons behind 
failure. 
Furthermore, owing to the traditional autonomous nature of the public water 
sector, other public enterprises were sometimes heavily encumbered by 
bureaucratic control. The political interference extended from the regulation of 
prices, the sitting of facilities, awards of contracts and staff management to even 
general water services operational routine decisions, whilst the existing financial 
operation were very hard to monitor [221]. 
Generally, public enterprises have greater influence on political decisions 
owing to the government being formed politically, and therefore management 
decisions, especially in social service areas, such as water services, 
communication services, power supply services, economics of scale and costs, 
managing of resources, community empowerment, and accountability, were 
affected. Therefore, the efficiency in service performance was the area most 
affected. Public services were in difficulties, and thus could not control well the 
financing operations from their own local resources, which forced borrowing and 
that added to domestic inflationary pressures, external debt and balance of 
payment problems [221]. 
According to Kraemer [93], 'water and sanitation issues in many cases are 
related to decentralisation policy and environmental rights'. The process of the 
water sector reform involves many social and economic considerations, including 
economic efficiency, services development, resources preservation as well as 
sustainability issues, all of which commonly appear to be very complicated These 
factors necessitate the emphasis on economic and financial aspects of good 
governance as the only way of ensuring water services which are developable, 
sustainable, of a high quality and affordable [93]. 
- 84-
The discussion covered in Section 3.9.3 (point iii) noted that most of the cities 
in developing countries have problems with water supply and sewerage services. 
The problems are generally caused by either an increase of population or economic 
problems; however, the factor of uncontrolled population increase is a major cause, 
which accelerates the actual water demand for domestic and other development 
usages. This subsequently results in a lack of balance with available maximum 
water production and distribution-even in the case of services being provided by 
private companies. Nevertheless, a poor economic situation (poverty) in African 
developing countries has been another major factor that fundamentally limits the 
ability of capital water investment. Thus, poverty becomes an obstacle. IWA [94] 
advocates that, in order to sustain human, economic development, and the 
assurance of a safe life for future generations, water resources control under good 
effective management should be in place. According to the discussion covered in 
Chapter One, Section 1.1, the existing situation of approximately 1.8 billion people 
in the world having no access to water and sanitation services is evidence of the 
big challenges in water sector. Therefore, it is everybody's responsibility to ensure 
that world is safe a place with enough water for domestic and commercial usage. 
5.2.2 Public Water Management Style (Public Water Services) 
Public water provision system is widely applied in Sub-Sahara African 
countries. It is structured in a manner whereby the government takes all 
responsibilities and challenges of the water and wastewater services. The provision 
of water and sewerage services, for a long period of time, has been considered 
basic and essential for every human being-regardless of the classes (rich or 
poor). It was mandated as a core government responsibility. Globally, 85% of all 
drinking water provision lies in public hands. Under any public service the 
governance, structure decisions and the management of infrastructure, capital 
investment, commercial risk, and operations and maintenance are made by public 
entity. However, the definition of a fully public managed water sector often refers to 
when water services are controlled or provided through either national or 
municipal/district government agencies in a designated area. Public managers 
make decisions, and public funds may be provided from general government 
revenues, including taxation, loans and other charges. Therefore, governments are 
responsible for overseeing, setting standards, and facilitating public communication 
participation and general supervision [126]. 
In this case, public management in water services performance is not driven 
by profit; rather, the motivation is affordable water for all. Therefore, for most Sub-
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Sahara African governments, the fiduciary elements of the public sector include the 
need to push for market competition as a stepping stone to quality water services. 
The public sector regards itself, to a greater or lesser extent, as a neutral layer 
between the government and the governed. Administrators see themselves not as 
the unfeeling implementers of executive orders, but rather as an essential check 
upon arbitrary rule. This leads to bureaucratic services provision. In most cases, 
the conflicts in water supply and sewerage services are caused by conflicts of 
interests between administrations of the service providers in relation to government 
powerful political interference. Such a conflict may subsequently lead to inefficiency 
in relation to service provision as a cost of compromising the conflicting members. 
In most cases, politicians are favoured; hence, according to the government 
system, politicians are the decision-makers and, as a result of such, water services 
end on a political platform and are therefore not independent service providers [96]. 
5.2.3 Public Water Services in Developing Countries 
In Chapter Three, it was established that most developing countries struggle 
to implement public water management styles. Although privatisation has a number 
of challenges in developing countries, Section 5.2.1 indicated that the public style 
of managing water services is also not successful. Accordingly, the researcher 
adopted the challenge for developing an appropriate solution for sustainable capital 
funds and the Ideal model managing water services suitable· for developing 
countries. This was also the consequences of loans accompanied with tough 
conditions from international financial institutions to Sub-Sahara African countries. 
This has resulted in greater discouragement on the struggle for developing 
the required water capital from our own sources. Most of the public water bodies 
have proven to be incapable of meeting the development needs of their regions. A 
number of factors, namely population increase, over-employment, inadequacy in 
technology, and economic reasons, are all major obstacles for water development. 
Moreover, most of the public entities are not commercially operated in order to 
sustain their operations and development needs, especially in this globalised 
market; however, the World Bank [133] indicates that old infrastructures, social and 
political problems, environmental, health, and financial constraints, as well as 
proper governance, can be highlighted as the major problems facing most 
countries practicing public water services. 
Figur~ 5.2 below presents an explanation concerning the major effects of 
water services under public management. In the case of a normal public water 
service, service organisation structure and political decisions have a greater 
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influence on water services operations. NAP [266] argues that the discouragement 
with public water services comes from poor water supply resulting worries in public 
health, over employment, political interference, environmental issues and relations 
to other city services. This is due to the fact that a registered entity providing water 
services is publicly owned under the government, and so the public entity 
management is nominated by the government to fulfil government interest whilst 
government leaders are politicians. Water services are very much like political tools 
that back government political interests. This necessitates public entity leaders to 
fulfil government interest first, which is political interests, and which are therefore 
considered contrary to professional decisions for better water services. Importantly, 
this may result in conflicts of service provision, with the outcome inducing 
unnecessary delays on actions and decisions (bureaucratic) within the system. 
Kishimoto [265] adds that, 'poor services by cumbersome public authorities, 
corruption and high rates of water loss are also found in public companies'. As a 
result, services are sometimes not systematic and reliable with the application of 
poor technology owing to political interference. However, in the case of public water 
services, water rates are generally not set to accommodate future capital for 
services development. In actual fact, water services are provided with affordable 
rates and are sometimes subsidised. The capital for water development is sourced 
by the government either from the government's central budget or otherwise from 
loans and grants. These together conclude that the provision of water service 
under public management is politically motivated. 
Public water manaaement and their maior effects 
Political Operated and Bureaucratic Composition 
Services, Technology and Capital not reliable 
Low Costs services (Affordable). Subsidised 
Provision of services politically 
motivated (Services to all) 
Figure 5.1: Effects on public water management 
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5.2.4 Criticism of Public Water Services 
The covered discussion in Chapter Three, Section 3.9.3 justifies the belief 
that public water services systems in most Sub-Sahara African countries have 
proven to be poor in relation to solutions for water problems in the region. The 
following criticisms can be made: 
• As discussed in Section 5.2.1, public water services are exposed to political 
interference owing to the fact that the property providing services are owned 
by the government. Accordingly, the management team is selected by the 
government to fulfil government objectives, whilst government management 
system politicians are the decision makers; and 
• In public water services, capital funds for water projects are governed and 
sourced by the government, and in mind of the fact that the decision-
makers are politicians, the possibility of budget (funds) for water 
development being politicised is higher, which may sometimes limit the 
professional project implementation for the benefit of politics. 
5.2.5 Appraisal for Public Water Management Style 
The discussion covered in Sections 5.2.2 and Section 5.2.3 evidences that 
public water services have had greater focus on services to all (social basis in 
water services). The service style has more consideration in expansion to cover 
water needs to al/, and categorically has greater focus on affordability; however, 
the structure of administration for the services has been neutralised with a 
traditionally long process of decision-making owing to greater elements of political 
inflates. The outcome can be clearly measured as integral to bureaucracy; this is 
because the service provision is owned by the government, and government 
leaders are politicians-and therefore even the management steam or supervisors 
for water operations-are nominated by politicians to fulfil political objectives. 
Professional decisions are mainly not favoured, whilst political decisions have more 
and greater power. Focusing on the structure of management and the political 
power of decisions, the research is obligated to conclude that the failure of public 
water services in most Sub-Sahara African countries-Tanzania being the true 
example-is due to the complexity of the bureaucratic style on service provision. 
Therefore, the method focuses on affordable water services to all, which is a 
special positive challenge to be undertaken during the development of the 
appropriate model for water services in Tanzania. 
- 88 -
5.3 Section 2: The Private Management of Water Services (Privatisation). 
5.3.1 Overview 
Nebery [98] argues that the private method of managing water supply 
services has become very popular in most developed countries. The privatisation of 
water services has been expanding very fast globally, and has subsequently 
become the most dominating method in the world of water services. Private 
services are a catalyst in the market, which aim to promote service performance, 
productivity and profitability through quality management. This research has 
adopted the definition whereby privatisation is a process that covers the transfer 
from the public to the private sector, involving a change of style in management, 
control, and sometimes ownership of productive assets. 
The private management of assets is basically concerned with describing 
quality management as an array of actions designed to broaden the scope of 
private sector activity, with keen focus on quality, efficiency, quantity, productivity, 
profitability, customer care, and transparency in terms of market competition. 
Generally, private services are guided by professional decisions, whereby decisions 
are made from the analyses of various evidences under set conditions. Moreover, 
discipline is well maintained in all processes of services, with a good economic 
model structure of the organisation. However, the major difference in terms of 
public water services concerns private services capital funds for project 
development, which are mainly developed with the service provision system. The 
private provision of water services is free from government political interference. In 
practice, however, professional assimilation by the public sector in relation to 
efficiency-enhancing techniques is generally employed by the private sector [99]. 
Private services description results in private management often being viewed 
as a goal rather than Simply as a means to an end, which can therefore lead to 
confusion. Markedly, private management focuses on the ownership and/or control 
of productive assets, their allocation and pricing, and the entitlement to the residual 
profit flows which generated by them' [100]. 
However, Sawyer [223] argues that a privately managed entity has one 
ultimate objective-that of profit; however, in order to pursue this objective, there 
may be the involvement of other goals, including ensuring the entity's survival, 
acting as a 'good employer'. and paying attention to environmental consideration in 
addition to other elements; however, the single basic objective is profit [223]. 
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Jackson [225] states that the necessity of discussing private management in 
water services cannot be avoided as experiences in private water management 
style are useful. The private water services are an engine-driver for efficiency to 
any services provision model, simply owing to its structure being commercially 
oriented. Importantly, the private management of water services imposes the 
transfer of technology from one side to another, which has greater contribution on 
work performance. All of this is combined together to provide new ideas as a 
challenge to existing models in the water management sector. 
Essentially, it can be stated that private services is a tool for screening public 
water services, but also a source of contribution for developing sustainable water 
services for Tanzania. Notably, however, although private water services has 
greater focus on high profit-making, in the case of Tanzania, operating private 
companies do not have the same attitude to government taxes. This is a negative 
sign to private companies in the country. 
5.3.2 Structure of Private Management in the Water Sector 
The private management of water services has a long history in developed 
countries, such as the UK, USA, France, and others. The entire character 
associated with the private management exists in the form of operational efficiency 
and effectiveness, as well as profit-making. Cook [224] states that Western 
experience suggests that the most successful restructuring strategies of private 
management in water services include 'significant changes in both organisation 
structures and the operational process'. A change to partial or complete private 
ownership brings in new management structure which is more effective, more 
economical, and more commercially oriented. 
In general, the private water services approach of introducing new working 
technology and training necessary for market competition increases motivation in 
the working place with greater effect in actual work performance. Service 
performance is increasing owing to the introduction of new techniques necessary 
for market competition; this is a catalyst for production increase in quality and 
quantity, whereby the service vision and objectives are changing to new style with 
more competitive targets. Therefore, the existing and overly complex networks of 
dysfunctional bureaucracy will be reduced, and the likelihood of arbitrary 
'interference' in operating decisions will also be reduced. Each of these changes is 
expected to contribute improvements in relation to productive efficiency. The key 
factor is ultimately concerned with determining efficiency in the water sector 
(enterprises), which will be improved as a result of private management influences. 
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The change in ownership to private management will improve employees' 
incentives, which is a catalyst of efficiency in productivity. Importantly, if private 
management merely converts a public monopoly into a private monopoly, the 
sector will then not be compelled by competitive pressures to improve its productive 
efficiency; rather, the private management, if imposed in water services provision, 
will improve the discipline of work and private capital markets [222]. 
5.3.3 Effectiveness of Private Management Water Services 
In any action, there are negative and positive impacts; however, the outcome 
and the effectiveness of private water management can be measured in terms of 
accessing the impacts of change. However, the evaluation on differences between 
the services provided by private system and the style before the adaptation of 
private services, should give the reality of private services and its effects. However, 
focusing on other factors, such as governing policy, the method adopted, and the 
process of adaptation, has special contribution in terms of measuring the effectives 
of the method. There is no question that, in principal, private management has 
impacts in both positive and negative lights. Nevertheless, good business 
management practice remains a significant determinant of the enterprise 
performance. The measure of effectiveness in the provision and management of 
private water services has been customised by evaluating the successful and 
unsuccessful facts (outcomes) of different cases of water service experiences-
mainly from Sub-Sahara Africa countries (see Chapter Three). Markedly, this leads 
to suggestions that the overall effectiveness of the private water management 
depends on motivations against the expected set goals of performance, the size of 
the operating area, the political environment, and the physical structure of the water 
customer classes in the area of operation [225]. 
In a private managing system under 'ow"nership' by shareholders or 
entrepreneurs, the provision of water services is funded the customers, with the 
sector normally controlled by market forces. The restructuring to private 
management has a greater focus on business market characteristics, which is what 
makes private management different compared with other methods. The private 
operator working on day-to-day management, operations and maintenance duties 
in a water services on a contract basis for a certain period has little opportunity to 
change the system because the power, control and influence on major policy 
decisions remains in the hands of the property owner. Basically, major characters 
of the private water services include services being automatically promoted, 
asserting that private water management can provide modern management and 
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expertise, which is otherwise unavailable or inaccessible in the public sector, and 
also that privately owned organisations have full power and control without any 
public interference. 
5.3.4 Worries of Private Services in Water sector . 
The private water services are fully commercialised, and its operation 
procedures are therefore strategically based on focusing on high profit making. If 
private water services are adopted, the major concerns remain as higher water 
charges and an increase in joblessness whilst the generated profit is taken into 
individuals' pockets. This is due to the fact that water prices include actual 
production costs, calculated amounts for services and development, as well as a 
certain percentage as profit for the services provider. NAP [266] cautioned that the 
decision as to whether or not ownership or operations of a public water utility 
should be transferred to a private firm is complex. Immediately, economic 
questions arise, such as 'Will privatisation reduces customer's monthly water bills? 
The emphasis on high water charges (billing) carries a greater worry of the whole 
private water services; it is a battle between quality services and affordability to all. 
Furthermore, operations under private management in the public water services 
mean the decision-making structure imposed upon the water services is private 
interest-based and, in most cases, unresponsive to community wishes and needs. 
It is frightening that, when considering private management, the ability of local 
residents to effect change in water services or to resist it will be diluted-and the 
power of staff management will also be linked directly to the ability to run the 
organisation efficiently with retrenchment. 
In relation to operational conditions, the concern for general welfare and the 
overall well-being of the customer and his family means that costly services which 
are not paid in full by the customer or third-party payers be simply eliminated, with 
the prices increased unreasonably to ensure financial viability. Furthermore, Kikeri 
[97] notes that, in Sub-Sahara African countries, private management in water 
services have been the most acceptable as a popular approach for economy 
reform. Within the last 20 years, for example, there has been privatisation in 
developing countries, which has become a modern way for water services 
management. However, the region is not well prepared, and the current picture 
surrounding the potential for private management in the water sector under the 
competitive market mechanism gives the mandate of being the only solution in the 
water services sector in Sub-Sahara African countries. Nevertheless, it is 
considered that the failures of the methods should also be published for the best 
through a comparison of efficiency of the method. Public services and commercial 
- 92-
service methods should also be published for imposing new challenges in the water 
management sector. However, the scarcity of information and evidence concerning 
the impacts or failures of practicing private management in the water sector are not 
widely open owing to the market competitiveness of the private contracting 
companies [97]. 
5.3.5 Benefits of Private Management in Water Services 
According to Ramanadham [118], Eldean [106] and Kraemer [93], the 
following benefits can be taken as the positive effects associated with private 
management. In developing countries, the practice of private management on 
water services will benefit customers, employees, and the entire nation in a number 
of different ways. 
Firstly, the authorities will be more responsible and much freer from 
government intervention in relation to the day-to-day operation activities, and will be 
further protected from fluctuating political pressures and financial constraints. The 
access to the capital market will mean that authorities will find it easier to pursue 
the effective investment strategies for cutting costs and improving the standards of 
service. 
Moreover, authorities will be better able to compare the performance of 
individual water authorities against each other and against other sectors of the 
economy, which will improve the financial spur to improved performance, whereby 
a system of economic regulation will be designed to ensure that the benefits of 
greater efficiency are systematically passed on to customers in the form of lower 
prices and better service than would otherwise have occurred. 
Thirdly, the private sector introduces measures to provide a clearer strategic 
framework for protection of water sources and environment. 
Furthermore, and finally, private water authorities will have greater incentives 
to ascertain the needs and preferences of customers, and to tailor their service and 
tariff accordingly. However, the private managed authorities will also be able to 
attract high-quality managers and other professionals from other parts of the 
private sector; thus, the opportunity will arise for the wide ownership of shares, both 
amongst employees and local customers. Moreover, the majority of staff will be 
more closely involved with their business through their ownership of shares, and 
will be motivated to ensure its success, thereby increasing performance efficiency 
and productivity [119]. 
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5.3.6 Disadvantages of Private Management (Negative Effects) 
On the other hand, the private management in water services has its own 
disadvantages, which can also be taken as negative effects to the government, 
employees and customers. Importantly, the disadvantages may be focused and 
classified as weaknesses to private management, as shown below. 
i. Increase of Unemployment 
The increase of unemployment owing to the adoption of private services 
management has been noted as one of the major negative effects associated with 
private services. The fact is that private management style is a business-oriented 
method, and business focus is therefore placed on the efficiency of productivity in 
an economical manner, the introduction of new technology, and modern working 
equipment with the advantage that the adaptation of. private services 
accommodates changing of organisation structure to fulfil the private services for 
market needs. This covers the objective of maximising profit through minimising 
expenditures. Therefore, the focus is placed on minimum workers with maximum 
productivity, given the advantage for new management styles to go for the 
termination (retrenchment) of workers. Schiller [47] argues that, 'the review of 
various methods of private operating sectors and finds that, public entities changed 
to private management (sales and auctions) have more negative effects on 
workers', due to the introduction of new private organisations, which favour the 
operation under private objectives. Law [139] adds that, during the change from 
public to private management of public utilities, large-scale retrenchments were 
practiced, which originated from elements of overstaffing and limitations of 
vacancies caused by the new structure. However, the interest of incoming private 
management is efficiency on training when seeking to achieve a reasonable 
number of quality staff, which therefore results in significant job redundancies in 
sectors including communication, power and water services [139]. 
ii. Risk of Increasing Loans 
In the case that private management provides a loan from any financial 
institution, the borrowed amount will not be equal to that which is paid back: the 
total pay back will equate to that which is borrowed plus profit, although this could 
be even greater due to penalties, depending on the contract and the circumstances 
concerning how the project was implemented. This all reflects the greater impacts 
associated with water charges. 
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iii. Social Changes 
Under private management, all activities are carried out on a profit basis, 
some of which are social a~tivities that are not profitable for the company, and so 
are usually dropped. However, the new organisation structure comes with new 
rules and conditions, and as the new organisation structure is concerned with 
fulfilling the private management objectives, it has to focus on efficiency, quality, 
productivity and the maximisation of profit [142]. 
iv. Conditions of Capital Funds for Privatisation 
Depending on the donor, if capital funds have been borrowed from the World 
Bank, then all procurement procedures and project implementation should be 
according to the World Bank procurement and implementation procedures. This 
includes various final and operation decisions to be made or mandated by the 
Bank. Notably, the power of no objection is executed by the Bank throughout every 
stage of project implementation. Nevertheless, during the project preparation 
period, the bank has the final say concerning the nomination of the contractor or 
the private operator; this is what happened during the DAWASA privatisation [141]. 
v. Increase of Commodity Price 
Water charges are always on the higher side under a private services 
provision. In the private services, government subsidies are not provided; therefore, 
costumers are required to pay the actual cost of the services provided. Moreover, 
in private water services, prices are calculated from the actual production costs, 
services and profit for the service provider, as well as other finance charges. This 
situation is more experienced in the privatisation of water supply and sanitation 
services [122]. However, all the discussed disadvantages have indirect or direct 
effects on willingness to pay, as well as social behaviour changes in water services: 
for example, the stealing of water through illegal connections. In Dar-es-salaam, for 
instance, 70% of the uncounted for water is trusted to be illegal connections, 
whereby the remaining small percentage is leakage. "legal connection for water 
supply or the cutting of the water supply pipes is greatly influenced by unaffordable 
higher water changes. Furthermore, the effects of higher water charge (increase in 
commodity price) has accelerated the unaffordability to the poor who cannot afford 
paying the required service costs. Regardless, the situation forces the poor people 
to use cheap, unsafe water, thus resulting in the increase of water-borne diseases 
in Dar-es-salaam city. 
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5.3.8 Appraisal for Private Water Services 
The private style of water services has originated in developed countries, 
which have been practicing such methods for a long time. In Sub-Sahara African 
countries, the style was predominantly introduced in the early 1990s (see Chapter 
Two). Notably, depending on the process of adaptation, the method of 
implementation (full or lease contract), and the conditions for capital loans, private 
I 
water services in some areas have been successful; however, in countries such as 
Uganda, Ghana and Tanzania, private water services have not worked thus far. 
Furthermore, even those areas considered to be successful in terms of private 
water services have created greater gaps between poor and rich people owing to 
the acceleration of water charges. Essentially, higher water charges means the 
majority of low-income people cannot afford the services; however, better services 
remain available for those who can afford them. Nevertheless, the quality and 
efficiency are motivations of private services. From this angle, it may be stated that 
the private water services do not provide a solution for Tanzania water services, 
simply because the majority of Tanzanians are low-income people. Nonetheless, 
private water services have good aspects to be considered, such as efficiency and 
quality in product and services, discipline of work, performance monitoring 
(performance contracts), motivations and incentives, and ideas concerning market 
competition. The underlined positive aspects can possibly be adopted as a 
contribution for devising appropriate water services systems in Tanzania. 
5.3.9 Summary 
The experiments and analyses on private management in the water sector 
concern successful approaches and failures, both of which have been critically 
discussed in order to establish the causes of failure and secrets of success. 
However, the discussion has been necessary as a challenge for creating 
constructive ideas, which is important for the development of acceptable water 
services for Tanzanians. Notably, private water services have been executed nicely 
in some countries, although there is the problem of high water charges owing to ttie 
commercial style of operation, which ultimately places a greater deal more focus on 
profit-making. Ultimately, it is best for those who can afford to pay. 
Other noted disadvantages of the private water services include the private 
structure of organisations, which is concerned with productivity and efficiency, and 
there is always a minimum number of staff, which subsequently increases 
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unemployment. Therefore, countries with higher level of unemployment show that, 
private water management creates an increasing amount of jobless people. 
Social change owing to the introduction of private water services is an issue, 
as private management places greater focus on profit; thus, any social activity 
executed by private companies is implemented in mind of making profit for the 
company. As a result, this should be compared with the ?ldvantages-including 
efficiency in services, productivity, quality and private sustainability-so as to 
achieve the best conclusion. However, every outcome has its contribution to 
society, whether positive or negative, depending on outcome. Nevertheless, all 
effects have challenges for a better future, which also acts as both indicators and 
motivators of successful privatisation implementation. This evidences that the 
conflict between the private and public provision of water services will never end, 
and will never be solved owing to the fact that there are some good aspects 
(success) resulting from both good practices as well failures (disadvantages), as 
has been evidenced in Section 5.29a and Section 5.29b. 
The discussion covered in Section 5.12 shows that most developing countries 
have the fundamental concern that the adoption of fully private services in the 
water sector means a loss of power of control in terms of management, with 
numerous political reasons relating to the loss of ownership owing to traditional 
water issues being used for campaigns. This is a social issue that carries special 
weight in terms of politics. A second critical concern is that of increasing water 
prices during the course of privatisation, as there are no government funds, which 
therefore mean the price of water, will need to increase in order to cover all 
expenses, as discussed in Section 29b.7. This may cause people to take actions, 
including complaining and carrying out demonstrations, which could cause the 
government to lose its popularity. 
Moreover, experiences from Western European countries-Great Britain, 
France and Germany, for example-that have a long history in privatisation, with 
similarities in practices of private management style, particularly in the arena of the 
water sector, are more efficient and reliable. However, the capital for privatisation is 
better if it is generated internally, which will accordingly reduce the water price to 
consumers. 
As discussed and evaluated in Table 5.1, each method has its negative and 
positive effects, each of which has something to contribute to the betterment; 
therefore, equal consideration to each effect has been the focus of establishing 
better contribution to future water management style. Furthermore, in comparison 
with local Tanzanian water service experience, the concept for the Ideal framework 
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was developed; thus, the developed water management style focuses on the actual 
needs and benefit for Tanzania. It is not easy to conclude which of these methods 
is best owing to the various advantages and disadvantages associated with all 
methods. However, I believe that the best method of practice should originate from 
the two methods (public and private services). 
5.4 The Commercialisation of Water Services 
5.4.1 Introduction 
Commercialisation is adopted as a water management model where 
operations are more independent and competitive, and the product(s) (water) is 
sold into the open market. The product water is available according to the 
requirements (quality and quantity); thus, water is s~ld in order to cover actual total 
production costs so as to ensure sustainability and services development. In this 
section, the discussion on commercialisation has been structured in an attempt to 
examine the contribution from the subject towards developing the appropriate 
model for the management of water and sewerage services in Tanzania [92]. 
5.4.2 The Process of Commercialisation, and Reasons for Adoption 
The commercialisation process involves the strategy of producing greater 
quality and quantity water (product) for domestic and other needs for the benefit of 
actual commercial market demand. Essentially, the focus is placed on the product 
value of the market, whereby water is sold in order to generate enough funds to 
cover operation costs, sustainability, and capital development. The process is 
concerned with establishing operational activities by switching to adopting market 
characteristics aimed at improving the provision of services. The actual costs are 
designed to be covered from customer charges within the balance between 
affordability and services sustainability. Normally, profit is generated in order to 
cover its capital development. 
The change to commercialisation involves the restructuring of public services 
to form a new organisational structure, whereby civil servants are trained to provide 
a new focus on market competition. The change has a direct effect on employees 
through some being relocated or transferred; essentially, this depends on the new 
organisational structure. If the new structure comprises the formulation of semi-
autonomies executive agencies/organ, then it has been designed in order to affect 
a further cultural shift for better performance, which will improve economy through 
efficiency, effectiveness and accountability i.n policy implementation [92]. Markedly, 
there are various reasons for the commercialisation of public services, although all 
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are generally related with service improvement, expansion, and the economy 
sustainability of the particular public entity. However, forces for adopting 
commercial services are basically economic and market-oriented in consideration 
of promoting quality and efficiencies in services. As such, it may be recognised that 
the commercialisation of public water services is engaging a new commercial 
knowledge which predominantly boosts water service improvement, whilst 
establishing the economic potential of the particular service. Importantly, there is 
the need for commercial services, which will ensure a positive effect on the 
technology development and economic delivery. Importantly thing is, 'efficiency is a 
keyword and concept in a system of accountability' [93]. 
Commercialisation is the lifeblood of the economy, and creates competency 
and prosperity, boosts productivity, and builds sustainable services. Service reform 
policies vary significantly, and are broadly inspired by an intellectual movement in 
public administration called New Public Management (NPM). Markedly, NPM 
mainly covers the public economy and areas in which the government services 
have proved to fail (management and funds for sustainability). This highlights a lack 
of independent structure in terms of service provision and higher interferences in 
both political and power decision, which are the major causes of failure. 
Importantly, the influence of politics in decisions and the neglect of professional 
decisions, depending on governing systems, are critical. In addition, it is sometimes 
more fundamental to consider what is said rather than what is done in terms of 
helping development; however, all of these are contributing factors of failure. 
Moreover, commercialisation has been discussed critically in an attempt to 
capture the concept so as to establish the correct solution for water services in 
Tanzania. Commercialisation exists with greater enforcement in product value 
(quality of water) and service sustainably, with the advantage that the commercial 
style of services can be organised and applied under the public style of 
management with minimum effects on restructuring, which may not affect water 
charges. However, the preparation for adoption necessitates a good background of 
commercial knowledge, which is a key factor in setting performance indicators and 
general monitoring during implementation. The entire process of looking for 
adopting a commercial way in water services has been derived from the capital for 
self-sustainability and the need for expansion. Furthermore, the need to consider 
the possibility of adopting commercial operation in water service has been 
necessitated by the existing gap concerning how to find capital funds for water 
development in Sub-Sahara Africa countries. The commercialisation of public 
services means that they become more accountable and efficient when run 
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according to the market principles. The service providers respond to market 
incentives. 
5.4.3 Advantages of the Commercialisation of Public Services 
The principles of a commercialised entity depend on flexibility according to the 
market of service. Kikeri [6] comments that, 'public provision is less productive than 
commercial'. Normally, commercial operations are commanded by the 
requirements of the existing markets; therefore, the plant, equipment, water 
production, labour and materials are all made commercially flexible in an attempt to 
facilitate market requirements. The greater advantage of commercial services is 
that there is the mechanism of being exposed to open market for competition, 
which alone results in good-quality production. The rate of good prices includes an 
estimated amount for service extension; in good practice, an entity under 
commercial services management does not depend significantly on government 
subsidies or any second source for its capital funds. Its commercial operation 
allows the self-generation of capital funds for entity development owing to being 
guided by commercial plans, whilst quality, efficiency, productivity, and marketing 
skills are the major driving factors. However, this means that, under commercial 
practices, the product costs in terms of basic operations, sustainability, and the 
depreciation of asset costs are covered by sufficient revenue generated from the 
product. 
With the above taken into account, it should be noted that commercialisation 
induces technological development owing to the fact that market competition forces 
quality improvement with cost reductions; therefore, the adoption of new 
technology with good tools and equipment is required in order to achieve this 
stage. In specific regard to water services, this commercial practice has the wide 
meaning that definition includes the capital layouts for expanding and upgrading 
network connections to all water customers and the construction of new facilities. 
As a further point to consider, commercialisation often signals an effort to cut 
fiscal deficits or to otherwise generate more financial resources for the service. 
Finance ministries often promote commercialisation in an attempt to slash 
subsidies. In addition, fiscal pressure can be so strong that financially viable and 
well-performing utilities are sold off to produce larger 'one time' increases in 
government revenue. However, this may have implications in increasing the 
product price, although the focus still remains on affordability, which is covered due 
to the fact that the market competition includes value for money [104]. 
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5.5 Experiences of Commercialisation from Various Projects 
Commercialisation is monopolised by external attempts considered necessary 
for adopting change, which has been done so transparently with reference towards 
effectiveness and efficiencies in the context of services and production. Essentially, 
this can be described as the best service and quality products for the market. 
Markedly, the experience from commercial services in relation to the concept 
of non-profitable goals meant that the assumption was made that commercial non-
profitable firms do not make profit; rather, their aim is to simplify the operational 
process, subsequently leading to lower product-related costs. In such a situation, 
the introduction of commercial service acts as be the catalyst of service 
improvement through good equipment management, business planning, and 
personal management-all of which are major problems in water services in the 
context of Sub-Sahara African countries. 
5.5.1 Commercialisation of Water Services in Zambia 
The world move towards water services restructuring could not afford leaving 
behind Zambia water services. According to Phiri [229] water sector reform in 
Zambia started slowly from the early 1970s. The government's full attention was 
directed towards the water sector reform, which continued into the 1990s with the 
major reform executed. Up until 1993, the Zambian government culminated its 
general water operation strategy into the National Water Policy (NWP), with only 
43% of urban population benefitting from access to safe water and appropriate 
sanitation at that time. In rural areas, only 30% of the population were in this 
position. In order to overcome this serious water problem, from 1994, the change of 
management structure in water services was executed. 
Inadequate water for domestic and commercial uses necessitated the structure of 
management in water supply and poor sanitation services to be changed. A normal 
institutional and legal framework to protect water sources and a campaign to 
encourage community participation in the water sector were introduced. 
The problems of funds for capital investment and narrow allocation from the central 
budget were considered as the major obstacles for water development in the 
country; therefore, the adaptation of international trends in commercialising water 
services as a solution for water management in Zambia was considered to be an 
appropriate solution for Zambia. Accordingly, the commercialisation of water 
services in Zambia can be seen as a strategy aiming to improve water and 
sanitation services in the country [229]. 
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It is recognised that such commercialisation has also been a product of conflict in 
regard to water service provision between two different government authorities 
(Ministry of Water, and Ministry of Local Government). According to the National 
Water Act 1949, the responsibilities and role of providing water supply and 
sanitation services has been under the government-either through the local 
government or central government through a particular ministry. However, the 
major contradiction was the ministry duties for water services were delegated to the 
Ministry of Local Government through local authorities or municipality. The set-up 
of the existing water service structure was not performing well, which comprises a 
great deal of contradiction. It was two different ministries doing the same job, which 
resulted in unnecessary conflicts-and sometimes jurisdiction challenges for local 
authorities, owing to a lack of capacity to provide water supply and sewerage 
services. At the beginning of 1993, this contradiction necessitated the formulation 
of a government special commission to study and reorganise the set-up of the 
water sector, and from here the idea of commercialisation for water services was 
born [330]. 
i. Driving Forces to Commercialisation of Water Services in Zambia 
Zambia is amongst the poorest developing countries. In 1994, it was 
established that the water supply and sanitation urgently required reform for 
creating better and more affordable services to all Zambians. It was for the purpose 
of increasing the responsibility and freedom to improve efficiency in social services 
and encouraging innovation, creativity and reducing politicisation in public services. 
The Zambian government, which did not have enough capital funds for water 
development, concluded that the commercial style of water services would be 
adopted as the way of achieving improved water services in the country. In this 
vein, Pirie [103] argues that commercialisation is a direct way of 'relieving some of 
the government financial pressures and describe a solution. The adaptation of the 
commercial system for Zambian water services was forced by the need to get out 
of inadequacy and poor water services in the country, and a set-up of sustainable, 
affordable, stable water supply, and sanitation services was the goal through the 
adaptation of commercial services 
The government agencies were permitted to change the old public 
procedures for the provision of goods and services to adopt future of commercial 
environment, which is one of the major differences concerning the way in which 
commercialisation was adopted. However, the conflict of management in water 
services between the Ministry of Water and the Ministry of Local Government, as 
- 102 -
discussed in Section 5.5.1, was one of the major obstacles to country commercial 
water services. 
Importantly, the commercialisation of water services in Zambia was significantly 
influenced by changes in the world style in managing water services owing to 
economy problems, the environment, and industrialisation. According to 
Dagdeviren [45], many first world countries showed emerging trends in relation to 
the global water management style (corporatisation), and from the early 1980s, the 
world revolution on water management were started. This idea subsequently led 
not only to commercialisation, but progressed further to the privatisation of various 
public utilities, including water, gas, electricity, communication, and even 
transportation in some parts of the first world. Therefore, like many other Sub-
Sahara African countries, the commercialisation of water services in Zambia was 
adopted as a strategy for water service improvement, which was forced by 
globalisation change in water management style and the need for sustainable, 
developable, affordable and self-dependent Zambian water system. 
ii. Zambians Process to Commercialisation 
The process of reform towards commercialisation in Zambia began in 1982 with the 
corporatisation of water services in the capital city of Lusaka, followed by a period 
of 'tariffs rationalisation', which went together with legislative and institutional 
reform from 1992 onwards. The process become more effective after 2000 when 
the regulatory board-the National Water Supply and Sanitation Council 
(NWASCO)-was formed, with nine more commercial entities subsequently 
established as independent commercial operational units to serve almost 40% of 
the Zambian population; 86% of which was peril-urban population. 
In Zambia, nine commercial, independent operating utilities provide water and 
sewerage services in urban and suburban areas; there are additional plans in place 
to establish new commercial entities in the country. According to the Water Act 28 
of 1997, local authorities are empowered to establish water supply and sewerage 
utilities in Zambia. In this case, the commercialisation exercise has meant that the 
local authorities still own the utility and, in the same vein, local authorities are 
owners alongside other private investors in other commercial utilities 
iii. Effects of Commercialisation in Zambia 
The adaptation of commercial water services in Zambia has created a problem of 
price increase owing to water tariffs being reviewed to cover the actual services 
costs. The commercialisation of water services under the private operator has 
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affected water tariff increases in many countries in Sub-Sahara African Senegal, 
Gambia, Cote de Ivoire, and Guinea, which are amongst those affected. Phiri [229] 
notes that the major effects of commercialisation in Zambia include tariff increases, 
which cause water to be unaffordable. According to Dagdeviren [231], Zambian 
water tariffs are established according to the category of housing, comprising three 
major classes: low, medium, and high. Since 1990, water tariffs have been 
increased by between twofold and eightfold in real terms. The existing policy of the 
total cost recovery has affected some areas; the low-cost category has increased 
more than the higher-cost category in some provinces. Moreover, tariff increases 
and the reduction of government subsidies to the sector water charges remain 
above the ability to pay of many poor Zambians. These two policy goals of ensuring 
commercial existence, and sometimes meeting social objectives, has proved 
contradictory, simply because the increase of water tariffs has caused the neglect 
of various social objectives especially the right of providing affordable quality water 
to all Zambians. 
iv. Appraisal for the Commercialisation of Water Services in Zambia 
The discussion on the commercialisation of water services in Zambia has 
evidenced that the adoption of commercialisation is the most reliable and 
appropriate; although not very successful due to unaffordable higher water charges 
caused by the tariffs review. The absence of water tariffs control, balance, and fair 
play to all (water users, services providers, and government) have made water 
services unaffordable for low-income Zambians. The regulating authority should be 
in place to ensure fair affordable water charges are implemented. 
The process of the government policy and process of adoption concerning the 
commercialisation of water services has proven to be a solution in a situation where 
a public operating entity cannot fund itself for service sustainability and 
development, whilst its services are diminishing. Therefore, a change of operational 
system-from public to commercial-is recognised as a practical solution for 
increasing product quality, quantity, sustainability, and service development 
flexibility, in direct consideration to market needs. Commercial services attract a 
quick generation or adoption of new technology simply owing to its existence in 
regard to open competition. Moreover, good water services makes customers 
satisfied, with customer satisfaction recognised as having greater impact on 
boosting revenue collection (income) from daily water sales. However, in 
commercial services, prices of water per unit covers actual product costs plus extra 
estimated affordable amounts for services sustainability and development (tariffs 
review). In this case, affordability should be critically accessed, especially if goals 
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are water services to all, and the government wants to be free from loans with 
conditions. 
5.5.2 Commercialisation Process in Somalia 
According to Parker [13], 'commercialisation is one of the ways of reinventing 
public sectors to make them more effective and in market'. Somalis water services 
were initially provided under the control and management of central government 
agencies. The situation has changed, and now water supply and sewerage 
services are provided under the control of local public entities reporting to 
municipalities or direct to central government (state level). The hope of a stable 
state of Somali is now possible in some parts of the country and this is resulting in 
unprecedented growth of urban populations into some towns. However, the 
existence of unclear institutional framework and lack of proper control owing to 
political instability have together left public services infrastructures with no hope of 
matching the current water demand. Therefore, reform in regard to adopting a 
commercial system of services was considered the only alternative for Somalia in 
the water sector. 
i. The Necessity to Discuss the Process of Commercialisation in Somalia 
Somalia's experience of water services management provides an 
understanding of their adoption of commercialisation. The uniqueness of the 
Somalian process is focused on political instability with the atmosphere of civil war 
in the region. The Somali water supply distribution coverage is lower than in any 
developing African country. The commercialisation of Somali has different 
experiences in comparison with other developing countries. 
The process towards commercialisation was implemented immediately after 
the conclusion of a study carried by a number of international agencies, including 
UNICEF, Somali, European Commission and other agencies, all of which were 
involved in reconstruction of Somali. All parts worked together under set objectives 
with focus on commercialising the water services provision as follows. 
ii. Objectives 
The focus of working areas was towns that have enough security to facilitate 
the progress of urban water services commercialisation, with the following 
objectives: 
1. To evaluate the actual need for commercialising or partnership in providing 
public services. 
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2. To understand and assess the existing performance limits and weaknesses 
encountered by the existing private operator. 
3. To evaluate entities' positions in consideration of commercialisation or 
private sector participation of the existing legal weaknesses, and the 
political willingness to devise reform according to need. 
4. To relate other examples from Africa developing countries to advocate the 
need for change. 
5. To prepare recommendations to facilitate the change to commercialisation 
or public private partnership in the visited areas 
iii. Process of Implementation 
Commercialisation in Somalia was executed in a very special way due to political 
instability in the region. Adam [9] argues that, in the move to a commercialised 
system, there is 'need for rationale to restructure the existing bureaucratic 
organisation and formal determination to set relationships of quality products, cost, 
quantity and affordability'. Furthermore, water and electricity services were already 
outsourced to autonomous independent bodies not in municipal budgets and which 
were pushing towards cost-effective services (value for services); therefore, the 
issue was regulation of the sector. The actual services costs of the little available 
was not affordable to all. The Somalia study for infrastructure development was 
carried and, after a long debate on the ways in which the process of 
implementation would be carried out, the six big towns in the country, including 
Borama, Berbera, Burao, Hargeisa from Somali land and two other from Puntland, 
were transferred to commercial water services. However, the decision to 
commercia lise water services and electricity was accepted with the majority of 
stakeholders including municipal mayors of the six big towns, civil servants, and 
common consumers in the region. It was a democratic water commercialisation and 
this was obligatory according political situation in the region. 
iv. Benefits from Somali Process to Commercialisation 
The water commercialisation process adopted by Somali was very different in 
comparison to Zambia. The Somalia commercialisation procedure was designed 
and implemented systematically with three major factors, including planning, in-
depth field study, and analysis of awareness and acceptability within the local 
environment. This commercial adoption process has greater benefit on 
implementation as it has been formulated with awareness and acceptability from all 
necessary stakeholders in the region. Therefore, this approach can be accepted 
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easily across the Sub-Sahara African region owing to the fact that the preparation 
for adoption has involved the participation of all stakeholders. The participants 
(stakeholders) are in a position of understanding the source, cause, and 
advantages of changes, as well as what should be done; this will make it easy for 
the stakeholders to adopt change. However, the participation issue has its own 
importance for transferring the knowledge and technology. Various stakeholders 
participated in the field study and therefore their views were collected and analysed 
during the planning for implementation [11]. 
In comparison with the process adopted during the privatisation of water 
services in Tanzania, Somali water commercialisation organised and executed very 
professionally owing to sound planning and also because, 'at the very beginning (at 
preparation stage), all stakeholders were involved with full contribution. This is a 
democratic style of water services commercialisation. 
The benefit of Somali water commercialisation process is that the government 
will have the opportunity to learn what its people need. The changing policy allows 
various changes-the commercialisation of public properties, installation of 
regulators, new taxation system, and other changes-to be implemented. With this 
noted, Ramanadham [10] argues that the implementation of public-sector 
commercialisation begins with adopting practicing commercial principles. A study 
before implementation is one of the commercial prinCiples adopted during the water 
commercialisation in Somalia. Moreover, a study conducted after democratic 
agreement on implementation is a unique style of approach that has good promise 
of success. However, the actual situation in the field suggests this model of 
approach; therefore, the lesson should be that the best approach for any project 
development should start with preparation, and ideas for implementation should 
originate from the place wherein the project is to be implemented [47]. 
v. Appraisal for Water Commercialisation in Somalia 
Somalia has executed a special democratic approach for change to a 
commercial management system, which has successfully adopted greater changes 
in water services sector. The impact on the successful upgrading of the dilapidated 
water supply and sewerage services, in a situation whereby the existing political 
system is not stable has shown greater success of commercialisation in water 
service. 
The Somalia democratic method of commercialising water services is one of 
best strategic approaches with guarantee in acceptability to all kind of 
stakeholders. This has greater assurance towards building sustainable and 
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affordable water services. The lesson here is that the Somalian strategic approach 
for commercialisation of water services is a practical model that can be adopted in 
other countries within the Sub-Sahara African region. 
The second major lesson from Somali commercialisation is regarding the 
process and adoption of a proper study, and the participation of all stakeholders. 
These two important steps form the foundation for formal change assurance and 
acceptability, which Somalia commercialisation process had to go through. 
Furthermore, from the discussed benefits of commercialisation in the case of 
Somalia, the base of successful implementation depends on government 
acceptance and commitment to change 
5.5.3 Summary 
The public management of water services has tradition of bureaucratic 
practices owing to its existing structure being established and controlled by 
politicians. Therefore, day-to-day operational activities are highly interfered with 
political decisions. With this in mind, it should be noted: if the country is not stable 
politically, like Somalia at present, it is very difficult for infrastructure and other 
services to be in a good operating condition according to the need; however, the 
development of services is also not reliable owing to a lack of funds; therefore, the 
evidences from the discussion coved in Section 5.6.3 and Section 5.6.4 approved 
the solution of commercialisation that is strategic for real development. Private 
management of water services has built up with a higher level of discipline based 
on commercial ideals based on a number of factors including motivation, 
recognition, appreciation and many others. In the context of private operations, 
there are excuses for bureaucracy, which makes for higher efficiency and good 
productivity. However, the objectives of the system aim to maximise profit-
generation, and may cause unnecessarily higher water charges that may not be 
affordable to many poor people in developing countries. 
Commercialisation under public management has a major focus on the 
sustainability of services, efficiency, and development. Undoubtedly, these are 
major tools for operating commercial systems, and so under this system, the 
generation of capital funds for sustainability and services development is 
guaranteed. Public services have a nature of considering more affordability to 
cover low class people; however, such low-cost services have a lot of 
incontinences due to flexibility caused by interference of political decision. As 
shown in Somalia water commercialisation (Section 5.6.3), commercialisation within 
the government is a more balanced system of managing water services because it 
covers sustainability, as well as directing greater consideration on affordability to 
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all. Commercialisation has been in practice for many centuries, although the 
approach has been improved from one place of adaptation to another, depending 
on the circumstances of the implementation (for example, the Somalia approach). 
The approach for the adaptation of the commercial style of management should be 
developed to fit the particular situation. The purposes of commercialising public 
services are for developing good management practices, efficiency in social 
services, or producing quality products according to market demand with the aim of 
producing value for money. Therefore, public commercial services can provide one 
of the solution models for Sub-Sahara African countries. Moreover, the experience 
from the discussion evidenced in sections 5.32 and 5.36 shows that most of the 
public projects or services that are changed to commercial systems were 
successful by implemented with a good degree of achievement. 
The commercial operating entity under public ownership has a wide range of 
sources for capital funds than the private operating entity, hence commercial 
services under government ownership are entitled for government funding, either 
from the central government budget or government loan. Furthermore, the 
responsibility for securing capital for water development remains a government 
task, and in the case of where the government subsidy is injected, the total water 
charges could be affecting, thus leading to low water rates. Whilst private water 
services have very limited sources for capital funds, either loans with interest or 
adjustment of water charges, they all have negative impacts in regard to the total 
water charges; therefore, higher water rates may be established, with the likelihood 
of unaffordability for the poor majority. 
In principle, water services provided by the government aimed to cover all 
citizens, including people with higher and lower incomes, with all customers 
enjoying water free of charge or with very highly subsidised services. However, 
practically peri-urban residents and other rural areas without formal water services 
do not benefit from the government subsides, meaning those who are provided with 
services (including sustainability and services development), hence the value of 
unit product (volumetric prices) is served commercially [4]. Therefore, commercial 
water services are fairer in terms of providing services as its structure for water 
charges is covered with maximum consideration to actual services costs, 
sustainability, and affordability, which is not much focused on profit gain. 
According to the discussion, the differences between commercial and private 
operations are in the change for set-up and adoption, ownership, and traditional 
focus on objectives. Basically, private operations are devised of commercial bases. 
Nevertheless, private and public services exist differently owing to the private 
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sector having natural commercial contents. Commercial services can be adopted 
by pUblic-management or public-owned entities. The notable and significant 
difference is that private services are business-oriented in nature, with greater 
focus on interests. Commercial services under public management are services-
focused with consideration on sustainability and services development, rather than 
profit making. Furthermore, in real practice, commercialisation addresses and 
emphasises value structure of services, product, and sustainability, more so than 
other areas. In some cases, privatisation may be adopted as an instrument to 
facilitate commercialisation, aiming to eliminate the existence of depending on 
government subsides. Moreover, the objectives of adopting commercialisation in 
public services is and will remain concerned with improving effectiveness and 
competency, and achieving stable services, which may result in improving value for 
money. They also deliver improvements that broadly relate to improving 
regulations, tackling restrictive staff working conditions; adopting more flexible 
financial management, and focusing on areas besides profit. The question of which 
method is better between commercialisation and privatisation is a difficult one to 
answer, as each method has advantages and weaknesses; however, according to 
the discussions covered in Chapter Four and Chapter 5, this study concludes that 
commercialisation under public ownership is the best solution for Sub-Sahara 
African countries. 
In an attempt to improve water supply and sewerage services, appropriate 
management style and stable capital funds for sustainability and services 
development are required. Making water charges affordable and realistic for 
sustainability and as a source for establishing capital funds necessitates in-depth 
analysis of the existing different water management experiences, with 
consideration to actual local factors (political, economic and social), where changes 
are to be implemented. However, the successful implementation of commercial 
services will reduce the government's tasks of chasing loans and slicing a small 
government budget for water projects development. The commercial role will 
control the diversity-including formulation of the new organisation structure, 
operation plans, performance monitoring and decision-making-which will 
automatically motivate the total performance in services improvement and create 
the right environment for business to raise productivity within water sector. 
5.6 Regulatory Authority in Water Services 
The regulatory water authority is a public constitutional authoritative body set 
and empowered to monitor, coordinate, supervise, and referee fairness on water 
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charges against quality and standard of the provided services for the benefit of 
service providers and water users according to governing policy. The regulator may 
exist in all (public, private and commercial) types of water services. The 
complexities of the regulatory process in the water sector involve setting the water 
price level and water tariff structures. Water charges may not end up being 
equitably distributed amongst income groups; however, the capacity and level of 
functions, powers and roles of regulatory authorities varies from one country to 
another depending on the nature of establishment and the governing policy of the 
individual country. Nevertheless, the universal common goal of all regulatory 
authorities is to control the quality of services, thereby creating smooth coordination 
amongst stakeholders and ensuring the fairness of water charges between service 
providers and service beneficiaries. 
In principal, governing policy and guiding Acts are different from one country 
to another, and so existence, formulation, roles and function of each individual 
regulatory authority differ from one to another. In each country, the local governing 
policy describes the existence and power of its regulatory authority. Within the 
same justification, the functions, roles and power of each regulatory authority are 
different from another. 
5.6.1 Evidences of Differences in Structure, Function and Power 
According to Oman Info [244] In Oman, the Electricity and Related Water 
Regulatory Authority is responsible for regulating the electricity and related water 
sectors. Basically, it seeks to ensure the provision of electricity and related water 
services throughout the country, and protects the interests of consumers-
particularly those of limited incomes, the sick, and the elderly. The authority is 
charged with implementing the sector's general policy and preparing plans and 
programmes for its development. 
The Water Services Regulatory Board (WAS REB) of Kenya is the only 
institution in the country mandated to oversee the implementation of policies and 
strategies related to the provision of water and sewerage services. Notably: 
'WASREB sets rules and enforces standards that guide the sector towards 
ensuring that consumers are protected and have access to efficient, adequate, 
affordable and sustainable services' [247]. In Gambia, the Public Utility Regulatory 
Authority (PURA) was established under Act. 2001. PURA was established to 
control and perform various activities in sectors, including water and sewerage 
services, electricity, and communication. The authority was structured to regulate 
public activities including energy services (gas, oil and electricity), communication, 
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poster, water and sewerage services, transport, and the environment. This multi-
sector complication necessitates the formulation of a special organisation structure 
capable of complying with this nature of multi-sector composition within one 
authority. This situation necessitates wide coverage of not only professional 
knowledge, but also the composition of different technicalities in regard to 
supervision and regulation matters-especially in regard to those issues 
surrounding performance-monitoring, standard-setting and licensing. 
According to Gambian Water Policy, water and sewerage services 
programmes were set on millennium water development goals, with special target 
aimed at measuring the progress and development of the service provider, National 
Water and Electricity Company (NAWEC), which is required to have a water 
service licence from the regulator PURA. In other words, one of the PURA duties is 
to licence water services providers in Gambia, along with receiving and working on 
complaints, request, comments, and suggestions from both services providers and 
water users; reviewing the regulations for better performance and providing better 
performance conditions for the services provider; setting and supervising explicitly 
format for water tariffs review and approval of water tariffs change; and ensuring 
coordination between services providers and benefiters (especially the participation 
of all water stakeholders in the process of tariffs review). For example, on 
December 27, 2010, PURA received an NAWEC request for tariffs increase of 
approximately 31 % for electricity and cost recovery for water and sewerage 
services in the city of Banjul. According to PURA [269], in Gambia, the procedure 
for water bills changed according to the PURA Act 2001, which was structured to 
accommodate a wide range of participation and consultancy of all kind of 
stakeholders or discussion, critical analysis, and the contribution for compromise 
before any approval for change. 
In Gambia, the review of water tariffs has to systematically go through a 
number of stages, with wide involvement of all stakeholders for the accommodation 
of different opinions for fair decisions and for the interest of both parties, i.e. 
services provider and water users. This is the key role of PURA in Gambia . 
. 5.6.2 Appraisal for Gambia Regulatory Authority 
PURA has evidenced the existence of multi a sector-structure formulation in 
regulatory authoritie,s; multi-task composition in its structure opens up the potential 
for the wide participation of various experts, which is necessary not only in terms of 
supervision and monitoring, but also for regulatory matters (standard-setting and 
licensing). PURA was established with the aim of regulating energy services, 
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communication, transport, environment, Posta, water and sewerage services. 
Importantly, this has its complicity with greater challenges in standards-setting and 
performance-monitoring, although the composition may easily give quick results in 
coordination issues. PURA has been formulated with 9 systematic steps prior to the 
approval of tariffs change. Notably, the process opens up a greater opportunity with 
higher consideration to all water stakeholders, who participate equally to introduce 
new ideas and provide constructive criticism; however, a" the contributions are 
considered equally in mind of decision. 
In comparison with Oman, the Oman regulatory authority is responsible for 
regulating the electricity and related water sector only, which means the functions 
of the regulator in Oman, is less than in Gambia; therefore, operations are also 
different. This means that the organisational structure is also different. The Kenyan 
regulatory authority (WASREB) also has a very different structure with the specific 
function of ruling and enforcing standards that guide the water sector in ensuring 
consumers' protection in regard to water rights, quality water services, and water 
charges. This provides conclusive evidence that each regulating authority has been 
established differently in order to sustain its local needs. Therefore, the governing 
policy is the determinant factor on establishment of the nature, power, structure 
and functions of the regulatory authority. 
5.6.3 Water Regulatory Authority in South Africa 
According to Mu"er [243], the South Africa water regulatory authority was 
established by the Water Service Act 1997, and has authority with clear rules in the 
area, including the provision of water services, water-pricing, and governing the 
contracts for the provision of water services. The regulatory authority is powerful in 
terms of the provision of water supply services, and specifically monitors the 
standard of services provided by municipal water authorities. Municipal water 
authorities are service providers, and are fully responsible for daily water services 
operations. According to the Water Services Act, in South Africa, regulating water 
authority provides a comprehensive framework for overseeing and regulating water 
boards' establishment as a family of regional public utilities under the Authority of 
Ministry of Water. The authority is responsible for the collection and publication of 
information concerning water services. This is a powerful regulatory tool available 
to the nation. In South Africa, the framework for water development plan covers 
water tariffs regulations, and addresses the legislation governing municipal 
finances and coherent interface between inherited municipal and sector regulation. 
In principal, the South African water regulatory authority is specifically focused on 
regulating water services provided by the municipals [243]. 
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5.6.4 Critical Appraisal for South Africa Water Regulator Authority 
Evaluating the operating functions and the organisational structure of South 
African Water Regulator Authority is extremely difficult. The difficult water set-up 
structure in the country-which notably gives much diversity, especially in the 
boundaries of power and collaboration with municipal governments-gives no 
opportunity to provide a simple description. However, the operations and functions 
of South Africa regulating authority are to monitor provision of water services, water 
pricing, governing the contracts for provision of water services and overseeing and 
regulation of water board. 
Water services are provided by the municipal water authority under the 
regional water boards. In this case, the regulator provides a comprehensive 
framework for the overview of a" municipal boards. In the South African 
management style, the power of regulatory authority extended more to regional 
municipal water boards. The effectiveness of the system and the function of the 
regulatory authority can be measured at both municipal and local levels. This 
regulation style provides additional opportunities in the participation of local water 
service users. The regulator structure of operation, which has been more keenly 
powered towards regional municipal water boards, has proved a greater success in 
water services. This style of regulating through regional municipals is a 
constitutional structure of the South African government, which justifies the 
regulation model having many styles of existence, and therefore structure power, 
duties, responsibilities, and limitations, a" of which depend on governing 
constitutions. The South African regulating structure is successful in the South 
African territory. The lesson here is that countries with a similar structure should 
take the challenges from South Africa regulating structure. 
5.6.5 Water Regulations in Egypt 
In Egypt, the policy concerning water supply and sanitation is mandated by 
two government ministries (the Ministry of Water, Resources and Irrigation, and the 
Ministry of Housing, Utilities and Urban Communities) In this model, the Ministry of 
Housing, Utilities and Urban Communities is responsible for monitoring and 
supervising three different water services institutions (Holding Company for Water 
and Wastewater; Cairo and Alexandria Portable Water Organisation; and The 
National Organisation for Portable Water and Sanitation), which operate in urban 
areas. 
According to Pirard [245], the outcome of the national water sector reform of 
2004 was THE formulation of the National Water Holding Company. The company 
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began with 23 branches of independent water and sewerage operating companies. 
The largest cities, including Cairo and Alexandria, were governed with four 
separate water supply and sanitation companies, whilst the remaining 19 cities 
each had joint water and Sewer Company for sustainability and the provision of 
better services. However, Cairo and Alexandria Potable Water Organisation 
Company (CAPWO) executes a water plan investment and the procurement of 
works for two major cities Cairo and Alexandria. The function and role of the 
National Organisation for Portable Water and Sanitation Drainage (NOPWASD) 
Company is to execute water plan investment and the procurement of works in the 
whole of Egypt, with the exceptions of Cairo and Alexandria. This Egyptian water 
services operational structure is functioning with one objective to provide the best 
and most affordable water services to all Egyptians. Water services operation in the 
country is regulated centrally under water regulatory authority of Egypt. 
The Egyptian Water and sanitation sector has been under great support of 
USAID since the early 1980s, with successful cooperation leading to services 
improvement with the establishment of the water regulatory authority of Egypt. 
According to Sharabas [244], the driving force for the water sector reform, which 
resulted in the establishment of Egypt Water Regulatory Authority (EWRA), was 
major institutional and technical problems, including duplication of administrative 
entities, low-cost recovery ratios, and a lack of qualified and modern management 
systems. However, the main objective was to create an inter-ministerial policy 
coordination committee, and water and waste water regulatory agencies. 
According to OECD [246], the establishment of EWRA operational framework 
and its existence is not fully autonomous. It is an organ under the Ministry of 
Housing, Utilities and New Communities, shouldering the major function of linking 
the government, society, and the water/waste water holding company to ensure 
that national policies and regulations are followed. The governing board head is the 
Minister for Housing. Moreover, the ministries of finance, health and population and 
environment are also Board members of the Agency. However, the EWRA goals 
are to ensure that national water policy is implemented, the institutions in the sector 
are performing well, and the fair balance between service costs and tariffs are well 
protecting, including the promotion of private partnerships in the country. In order to 
make this pOSSible, EWRA has installed and implemented a water quality 
programme with realistic performance indicators, and a benchmarking plan for 
utilities, and designed a water balance action plan [246]. 
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5.6.6 Critical Appraisal for Egypt Water Regulatory Authority 
The driving forces and objectives for establishing water regulatory authority in 
Egypt depended on local needs. The Egypt Water Regulatory Authority (EWRA) 
has been formed to solve major institutional and technical problems, such as low-
cost recovery ratios and A lack of qualified management. This is different from 
other countries, such as South Africa, Kenya and Gambia. EWRA is unique due to 
the fact that it is controlled and managed by two different ministries; therefore, this 
creates multi-sector responsibility. This shows that water regulatory authority is not 
necessarily based and controlled under the water sector only. The structure and 
nature of functions are formulated by the actual need and according to the 
governing policy. The unique structure of the operation of EWRA is under two 
different ministries based under Egyptian constitution, which gives flexibility in the 
ways in which the regulating authority should be formed, alongside its reporting 
mechanism. Driving forces for establishing regulating authorities are different: 
Egypt went for water-regulating authority for solving duplication administrative 
entities problems, low-cost recovery ratio, and a lack of qualified and modern 
management. The authority is successful working in Egypt. The lesson here is that 
the regulating authority can be established not only for water quality and prices 
control but also as a solution to the aforementioned problems. However, the good 
performance of EWRA in Egypt does not mean it will provide a solution for all 
African countries. Furthermore, the administrative order to EWRA, with the fact that 
the regulator is under two different ministries implementing different policies with 
two differences in reporting mechanisms, means the situation is complicated, and 
, 
the conflict of interest between the two ministries may actually accelerate 
unnecessary difficulties. 
5.6.6 Summary 
The discussion shows that the driving forces for establishing regulator 
authority in Egypt were concerned with solving administrative problems and the 
adaptation of modern management system. This justifies that an regulatory 
authority can be established not only as body to provide adequate control, quality 
monitoring, and affordable and sustainable services to public in water sector, but 
also to solve some administrative problems. The uniqueness of EWRA in its 
reporting mechanism can also be adopted as a challenge to study and analyse the 
profitability of regulatory authority being governed under two different ministries. 
The advantage of ministerial coordination, as justified by EWRA, has extended the 
activities and role of regulator in water sector. These new challenges will increase 
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the contribution and value of regulatory authority in water services, as well as in 
water resources protection. Therefore, for any water services set-up, regulatory 
authority is a tool for services development, and thus the need of regulator is 
mandatory. 
However, the discussion on EWRA, SAWRA, PURA, WASREB and 
OERWRA evidences that the regulatory operational power, functions, structure and 
establishment are different from one regulatory authority to another. The challenge 
is that the model for regulatory authority has no standard structure; it can exist in 
any form provided it performs the policy defined duties. Each country has its own 
objectives and priorities, but the organ being in place is mandatory. This indicates 
that setting a standard structure of function (model) for the regulatory authority is 
extremely difficult. There are some common functions to be adopted in every 
model, including regulating water tariffs, refereeing fairness, quality of services 
against charges, setting standards for service providers, coordinating amongst 
stakeholders, and licensing the services-all of which are mandatory to each and 
every model. Therefore, a practical sample model of the regulatory organ can be 
principally developed based on these factors. Due to policy differences from one 
country to another, the power and extension concerning performances are 
different, and will remain different from one regulator to another. Therefore, each 
regulating authority model should be developed according to local needs. 
Importantly, the need to assess the local environmental needs and the existing 
governing policy should be the first step if the objective is to come up with 
sustainable regulatory authority model. 
5.8 Willingness and Ability to Pay for Water Services 
5.8.1 Overview 
According to Naing [262], willingness to pay is the maximum amount of 
money that may be contributed by an individual to equalise a utility change. The 
definition advocated being that 'WTP is the maximum amount of money an 
individual is willing to pay for a commodity is an indicator of the value to her/him of 
that commodity'. The economic theory value, according to ECO [263] saying that, 
'If something is worth having, then it is worth paying for' this is principle idea of 
WTP. However, it has been widely emphasised that assessing WTP is for the 
economical sustainability for the services to be provided. Therefore, the 
affordability for services to be provided is an obligatory stage for proper project 
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planning. Several surveying methods, including questionnaires and interview 
approaches, have been developed to measure the acceptability and ability of 
consumers' willingness to pay for water supply services [263]. 
5.B.2 Assessing of the Willingness to Pay in Developing Countries 
WTP can be easily established by focusing on and scrutinising the ability and 
character of water users if terms of whether or not they are ready to pay for new 
water charges. During the project planning phase-and even the period of review 
for improvement-assessment for WTP is obligatory. The sustainability of water 
services depends on the effectiveness of water user payments to sustain the water 
services. WTP shows the picture of how new water charges will be accepted, and 
gives project economical sustainability assessment necessary for planning. 
Wedgwood [251] says that, under the survey method, WTP can be estimated 
through major three approaches: by asking people directly; by analysing individual 
expenditures of money, time, labour, and other factors; and through observing the 
price that people may pay for product in various markets. 
Lauraine et al. [249] argue that, 'the willingness to pay studies have been 
widely reviewed for their potential applicability in evaluating government regulations 
involving changes in (small) risks across a given population group'. Moreover, 
Guha [254] argues that consumer willingness to pay is mainly for getting benefits 
translated in money terms as a central concept framework. It is a situation whereby 
water consumers are offered theoretical market in which they are asked about their 
willingness to pay as accessed for a certain service in a condition which sometimes 
does not reflect the real market. Studies for willingness to pay have been carried 
out in a number of places around the world and in particular in developing 
countries. 
In developing countries, WTP can be advocated directly by assessing a 
number of physical indicators, including water users' ability to pay (income) against 
the actual water services cost, limitation of quality and quantity on services, social 
and culture effects, and knowledge of understanding the importance of payment of 
water charges for sustainability. 
According to Shirima [256], the old Tanzanian tradition of understanding that 
water is a free gift from God and the political mentality established during the 
struggle for independence, whereby, after independence, water would be free of 
charge to every person, are factors that have affected the willingness to pay for the 
majority of peri-urban and rural residences in the whole country. This has resulted 
in a greater discouragement towards the water payment, which is therefore a 
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significant burden on water services companies in the country. People are not 
willing to pay for water services because of their belief that water is a free gift. The 
willingness to pay is not only related to tradition and politics, but also to the attitude 
that higher water charges has significantly impacted the whole picture-especially 
the causes for willingness to pay. 
In India, for example, more than 230 households from residential and slum 
areas were involved during the willingness to pay assessment. The outcomes 
varied across the sample. The majority of the water users expressed their WTP 
according to their income for drinking water. The greater part of decision on water 
treatment (purification) method depended on and was governed by the household's 
ability to pay. Nevertheless, with perception on the benefit that may accrue from the 
change, the natural dislike to pay behaviour was also noted amongst householders. 
It was also noted that a lack of education or knowledge in the family or community 
is a barrier for acceSSing relevant information especially on water services 
sustainability this also has greater impact in WTP [252]. 
The India summary on WTP shows that low-income people are less willing to 
pay because of affordability. This shows that the willingness to pay can be driven 
by the income factor. The solution is that setting water charges should include 
consideration to minimum income so as to suit low-income people of a particular 
area. This consideration of low-income people will be a catalyst for raising the 
motivation concerning willingness to pay. Knowledge of understanding the 
sustainable value of the provided service is a great challenge concerned with 
pushing out less willingness to pay for provided services. 
Carter et al. [248] state that, 'underlying socio-economic and cultural reasons 
are the major contribution to the sustainability challenges of the willingness and 
. ability to pay for water'. According to Vandemoorthele [250] in Zimbabwe, women 
were found to be willing to pay 40% more than men for improvements in domestic 
water supply. In the country, women carry the burden and hardship for searching 
for and collecting water for domestic use. Although women are more willing to pay 
than men, their ability to pay is lower than men's because of their low income. 
Importantly, men have a higher income generally, whilst women are more 
concerned with family duties, especially in rural areas. The low-cost recovery for 
water services has also affected the Western parts of Kenya, despite seemingly 
high average household incomes, and yet willingness to pay was very low because 
of the fact that men with high incomes were not willing to pay, women were willing 
to pay but there income was low. The responsibility for this expense remains with 
women. In fact, it was noted that, in actual spending priorities, water bills payment 
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was near the bottom of the list. The value placed on other household items was 
very high. There was greater variation between people's priority and their 
willingness to pay due to high water charges. In these circumstances, of women 
under such difficult surroundings, to be responsible for family water payment 
makes water services unsustainable because women income is not stable. 
Culture also has a greater impact on willingness to pay for water services. 
According to Mgeyekwa [205], in the eastern part of Tanzania (Tanga), the majority 
of the population is Muslim, and according to the religion, not paying for consumed 
water is a great sin. The fear of committing a sin makes believers pay their bills. In 
addition, the traditional culture of the Tanga people-to allow women to go out for 
any difficult jobs (searching for water and even food shopping)-forces men to pay 
water bills timely to ensure service is available at home. 
Men keep their wives indoors not only because of culture, but also as they 
feel ashamed and discriminated if their women go outside with buckets to look for 
water; therefore, the situation forces men to make water permanently available in 
their homes. This practise is a catalyst for willingness to pay, and is a real practical 
example of how tradition and culture could be the driving force for willingness to 
pay. Tanzanians used to fetch water freely and directly from rivers, which is where 
the idea of water being a free gift originated. 
In relation to service reliability and availability, WTP is driven by physical-need 
circumstances, where the greater service reliability, the more water consumers are 
encouraged to pay. In a situation whereby water services or tap water are in higher 
demand, water users become desperate and inpatient, looking for water necessary 
for survival. Regardless of how much cost is involved, the individual need for water 
demand dictates the power and altitude of readiness to pay. This happened in 
Tanzania where more than 4 million Dar-es-salaam inhabitants were supplied with 
less than 35% of the actual tap water demand. The situation forced middle-class 
people to be ready to pay any fixed water charges provided they get more tap 
water. Importantly, the difference in demand and supply circumstances influences 
the willingness to pay. 
5.8.4 Motivation for Willingness to Pay 
The concepts from the discussion indicate that the motivation for WTP is 
complex. The design of a special mechanism to ensure the sustainable for 
motivation is obligatory. The motivation for willingness to pay has a greater 
contribution in the whole process of water development. Water charges being paid 
timely will allow for good services planning and development However, the question 
is what to do and how to make water users willing to pay for water charges on time. 
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This is a great and endless concern. According to Epstein [69], the challenge is 
communication, which is necessary for understanding and sharing water service 
ideas between water users and services providers for the benefit of both parts. 
Being closer to the problems facing water users (customer care) may be an ideal 
stimulating willingness to pay, which has motivation in nature. Improvement of 
water services (quality and quantity) for water users has in it a special motivation 
for WTP. Also, willingness to pay can be motivated through special means of 
creating an easy way for bills payment (paying online), and other means. 
Importantly, the enforcement of law can be one of the WTP motivations. 
Implementation strategies should consider areas that create difficulties for 
WTP. However, practice of quality management in water services-and especially 
good customer care-can be one of the major tools for motivation to accelerate 
WTP. Increase of water pressure and network expansion under good supervision, 
good customer care, and well-organised billing system. 
Simplifying the mode of payment and having a wide range of payment 
methods, including direct debit, online payments, and any other flexible methods, 
are also a catalyst to WTP. These are useful tools to enhance willingness to pay for 
water users. 
WTP can also be stimulated by consumers with low income by setting them 
very affordable tariffs. This will encourage people of this group to pay their water 
charges. However, for those who cannot afford payments, they still deserve to get 
enough water for the necessary domestic use. Therefore, the top-up to cover the 
difference between actual water costs and low-income people's tariffs is to be 
compensated by tariff on water users across the spectrum. 
5.8.5 Appraisal for Willingness to Pay for Water 
Affordability and customers' attitude on water charges can be identified 
through analysing causes and sources for willingness to pay. The results have 
special contributions in terms of devising good sustainable water development plan. 
In the discussion of Section 5.8.1 and Section, 5.8.2, there was the critical 
scrutinisation of various factors, which indicated that the core drivers of willingness 
to pay include effects due to actual water charges, effects of people's income, 
social effects, attitude surrounding the beliefs of free water, and traditional and 
environmental culture. The ideas on WTP practices have been analysed from 
various regions, including India, Zimbabwe and Tanzania, which have obligated the 
researcher to categorise primary indicators for WTP as follows. 
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One of the major indicators of water customers' willingness to pay can be 
directly reflected from the group of water users with higher income. Water users of 
this category can manage and are motivated to pay water charges at any cost. To 
them, the need is reliable water supply; therefore, in this case, the availability of 
good water services is a motivation for willingness to pay. In the case where 
willingness to pay is available but there is no sustainable water services, people 
from this group can easily go for independent water supply system (individual 
boreholes). This means individual sources for water supply originated from 
willingness to pay with unreliable water services being not in place. In the same 
group of category, there are some not ready to pay-even if services are provided 
to the required standard. Tools, such as extra motivation to increase willingness to 
pay is mandatory, depending on the circumstances, but education, legal action or 
services termination can be motivation. 
Water users with low income who cannot afford to pay the full amount of 
water charges (Section 5.8.2) indicate that women from Kenya and Zimbabwe are 
more willing to pay than men. Although women's incomes were lower than those of 
the men, the traditional distribution of labour obligates women to be responsible for 
looking for domestic water. Unavailability of domestic water for daily use forces 
women to be more willing to pay. In this case, knowledge of sharing responsibilities 
will motivate the whole issue of willingness to pay from the men as well. Therefore, 
education on equal responsibility sharing in the family can be another stimulant tool 
for willingness to pay. 
5.8.6 Summary 
Willingness to pay for water charges is a wide area of discussion owing to its 
association with a wide range of aspects, including water management style, water 
charges system, overall revenue collection, and the water billing system. The 
importance of WTP is immeasurable owing to the sustainability of water supply 
services depending on funds from costumers' water charges, which are noted from 
WTP; therefore, the causes and effects, should be detailed and analysed in order 
to motivate water uses, which is necessary for stimulating the willingness to pay. 
However, the discussion covered in Section 5.8.3 reveals that the 
assessment of the willingness to pay is a primary tool for any sustainable water 
supply project. Moreover, willingness to pay gives the actual picture of the project 
life. Therefore, project preparation stage should cover the willingness to pay for 
better planning. 
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In Section 5.8.2, a number of stimulations have been discussed, with 
motivation for willingness to pay recognised as an endless process. High water 
charges have been evidenced as one of the major obstacles for WTP. In Section 
5.8.3, it was also revealed that various factors, including education, good customer 
care, quality water services, flexibility on methods for payments, and a good mode 
of water bills, are major stimulants for WTP. 
The ideal water services management model is a stimulant and catalyst to 
WTP as it comprises a significant element of good services and customer services. 
However, the governing policy is the major guardian of the implementation strategy 
that will ensure the provision required water services standard. The enforcement of 
tough rules, including penalties and disconnections for non-paying water users, 
also has a special push to encourage people for payment. It is true that tough roles 
and penalties have no direct relation with WTP, but that fear of penalty is a 
stimulant and driver to commitment, which accelerates the willingness to pay for 
water services. Accordingly, education and tough conditions for water non-payers 
should go together and be respected; hence it is a facilitator for addressing the true 
meaning of willingness to pay. 
Since the close communication between service providers and water users 
under the umbrella of regulatory authority has a greater advantage for willingness 
to pay, water users are involved in direct discussion, especially in setting water 
charges, which makes water users feel that they are more responsible and services 
partners with a power of ownership, which has motivation in WTP. 
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CHAPTER SIX: EVALUATION AND MODEL FORMULATION 
6.1 Overview 
This chapter has been structured to evaluate and link the substantive 
contributions covered from the discussion on water services in Sub-Sahara African 
countries. The chapter was developed to reinforce the study objectives as a 
stepping stone for establishing an ideal solution. The concepts will be scrutinised 
for improvement of structure for field work and development of sample model. 
Therefore, it is a strategic approach for formulating a primary ideal model for a field 
test. The discussion focus was to evaluate the water services experience from Sub-
Sahara African countries. Therefore, the areas covered include definitions of 
privatisation, private and public sector organisation, contracting, sources for 
funding water projects, and commercialisation of water services. Furthermore, 
capital funds from the World Bank loans and their effects in funding water 
development projects were also critically analysed 
6.2 Privatisation 
6.2.1 Definitions of Privatisation 
There are number of definitions regarding privatisation, some of which are 
detailed below: 
i. The term 'privatisation' .has been used to describe an array of actions 
designed to broaden the scope of private sector activity, or the assimilation 
by the public sector for efficiency-enhancing techniques generally employed 
by the private sector. This loose description-which results in privatisation 
often being viewed as a goal rather than simply as a means to an end-can 
lead to confusion. With this in mind, it is stated that: 'Essential privatisation 
is only a process therefore, analytical correct definition of privatisation which 
covers the transfer from the public to the private sector of the ownership 
and/or control of productive assets, However an alternative way of 
expressing this definition and one which moves away from the emphasis on 
ownership it focus simply on the change in the supply of a service from the 
public sector to the private sector, irrespective of the source of its financing' 
[12] 
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ii. Privatisation (alternately 'denationalisation' or 'disinvestment'), according to 
Adam [12], is the transfer of property or responsibility from the public sector 
(government) to the private sector (business). The term can refer to partial 
or complete transfer of any property or responsibility held by government. A 
similar transfer in the opposite direction could be referred to the 
nationalisation or municipalisation of some property or responsibility. 
iii. Ramanadham [3] offers two definitions: 'Privatisation is divestment by state-
o~ned assets to private ownership, whether by sale restitution, give-away or 
liquidation' and the second definition is; privatisation is 'delegation by 
transfer of management and control of state assets or activities to agents 
operating in accordance with market indicators, together with market sector 
managerial autonomy and incentives' (while maintaining state ownership 
and ultimate control). Examples are leases, concessions, opening 
franchises, management contracts, and performance contracts for public 
enterprises and contracts (see sections 4.7.9, 4.8.0 and 4.8.1 for further 
details). Moreover, delegation can also be achieved by the issuance of 
vouchers to users of services by which they can pay providers on a 
predetermined basis for each customer service given (producer subsidy) [3]. 
iv. According to Eftuna [24], privatisation means the sale of shares in 
government of publicly-owned business organisations. 
v. Cook [5] advocates that the limited impact of privatisation in significantly 
shifting the balance between the public and private sector has encouraged 
more attention to be given to public enterprise reform, without a change of 
ownership, as a means of fostering private sector development. 
vi. Pirie [6] states that privatisation may also be defined that the transfer of the 
state activities to the private sector had featured many household names 
[6]. 
vii. According to Parker [7], privatisation is the transfer of ownership of assets 
from the public to the private Sector. 
viii. Bennell [11] describes the following: 'Privatisation is generally used to 
mean, the sale of company shares to private shareholders, Aiming to 
improve industry performance by increasing the role of market forces, many 
other measures can contribute to this, notable freeing of entry to an 
industry, encouraging competition and permitting joint ventures.' 
ix. Estrin [4] defines privatisation as referring to 'the transfers of ownership of 
public corporations from state to private hands, typical by public offering 
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auction, tender and others' [4], i.e. it is the process of transition from a 
socialist to capitalist economy. 
x. Macedonia privatisation agency [25] concludes that, privatisation is 
popularly associated with a change from bureaucratic, sluggish and badly 
managed organisation to one that is dynamic entrepreneurial and customer-
focused. 
xi. According to Hossain [26], 'privatisation involves selling state-owned 
enterprises (SOE) or Government Business Enterprises (GBE) and other 
government activities to the private sector, with the purported aim of the 
process to ensure a GBE operates on a commercial basis or is subject to 
fair competition' [26],[1 OJ. 
To conclude, privatisation is recognised as a technical term that can be 
defined in many ways. Therefore, a sentence to conclude is: privatisation is the 
'transfer of operation or ownership and operation from public hands to private 
individual or organised groups'. This research concludes by adopting the following 
definition by which privatisation can best be defined: the introduction into the public 
sector or what has previously been the public sector, of conditions typifying the 
private sector. It is therefore possible to envisage privatisation taking place even 
though no change in the ownership of public assets takes place, thus public 
enterprise may remain in existence but may be required to adopt a more 
commercial approach. 
6.5.3 Critical Appraisal for Privatisation 
The evidences covered from the discussion in Section 5.3.1 and Section 6.4 
show that privatisation has many different angles in terms of presentation, 
definition, adaptation, as well as implementation; however, the real meaning of 
what is privatisation remains the same: it is a change of existing public style of 
management to strategic system of providing services with clear objectives under 
the management or ownership of private individuals or organised private group. 
The changes are enforced for the purpose of improving a number of areas, namely 
efficiency, productivity, quality and maximisation of profit. The driving forces for 
adopting private water services exist in different ways. 
The DAWASA privatisation was due to a lack of capital funds for water 
development. Similar to Ghana, Senegal, Guinea and many other Sub-Sahara 
Africa countries, as indicated in Section 3.9.3, other factors, including world 
pressures due to industrialisation, globalisation, services improvement, efficiency 
and sustainability in water services, are the driving forces for privatisation. The 
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discussion also indicated that the different types of privatisation discussed 
previously exist to fit different environmental needs of each particular situation. 
As discussed in Section 5.3.4, there are a number of reasons, including the 
rise of water charges, the increase of unemployment, tough conditions of loan for 
privatisation, improper methods of adaptation, forced privatisation, worries on 
losing ownership or control on waters services, and political reasons, that may be 
seen as causes of privatisation failure in Tanzania, Uganda, Ghana and many 
other Sub-Sahara African countries. However, in Senegal, privatisation was 
successful, with great effect on affordability due to higher water charges. Failures 
in privatisation have brought about a new challenge concerned with establishing 
the best approach to fit the requirements. 
In general, the involvement of the private sector in water services has 
contributed to greater changes in a number of areas, including the provision of 
water supply and sanitation services, changes in culture (traditional of higher 
commitment and discipline), efficiency in services, as well as in product value for 
money. On accessing the outcome of private water services in Sub-Sahara Africa, 
. we can say that privatisation has been forced to be accepted (loan condition) 
because the model is foreign in terms of its origin, with a new culture of 
implementation, which has brought about new challenges, particularly when striving 
to evaluate its effects on affordability, profit distribution, culture change, and 
increase in unemployment. This catalyses the conflict between public and private 
style in water services; therefore, privatisation on water services can be adopted as 
a solution for generating capital funds as well as a catalyst for service efficiency, 
however the issue of affordability will still be questionable. 
6.6 Comparison and Evaluation on Water Services Experiences 
The discussion in this section combines and evaluates various water services 
ideas discussed in previous chapters. Evaluating different experiences in the water 
sector is not an easy task as each experience has originated from its own 
environment. Water services experiences from a number of countries-including 
Cote d' Ivore, Gambia, Kenya, Senegal and Uganda-have been compared with 
the objective to evaluate the advantages and disadvantages of their water services 
operating system. The need for comparison is to come up with useful ideas that 
could be adopted in model development. The objective of evaluation is to measure 
similarities and differences, and the effects that could guide the section to 
compromise. The main objective of this comparison and evaluation is to collect 
different ideas and to identify challenges for the possible formulation of sample 
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model in privatisation of water services. According to the objective of this exercise, 
the areas of focus in each case were driving forces for privatisation, operating 
structure and its composition, the adopted method and its suitability, the 
government role, position and role of private operator, and the project financing 
system. The discussion on comparison has been summarised in tabular format as 
follows (see Table 6.1 below). 
Table 6.1: Comparison on water services from different countries 
Areas of 
Comparis Cote d' Ivore Gambia Kenya Senegal Uganda 
on 
Type of Under public Public water Public water Public water . Public water 
method management services, services. Poor Services. services. Pool 
and water More than 40% water services in Poor water revenue 
situation services, poor, UFC Low general (low services collection, 
before water quality, skilled staffs production, 55% (non-payment limited water 
change larger with illiteracy of UFW and low of water bills supply 
consumer (50%) revenue, higher and UFC network, 
were charged Poor Services turbidity in water increase management 
higher chanQe 
Method Private water Private water Commercialisati Private water Private water 
and type services services (MSG) on was adopted services services 
after (SODECI) with with lease as Priority (SONEES) (Gauff 
change lease contract contact, solution for water with lease Inginieure) 
adopted Terminated services in contract then ONDEO 
(NAWEC) Nyewasco (Contract 
performance) 
Reason Serious Poor water Need of reliable To improve Expansion of 
and the financial crisis services due to sustainable and water water services 
driving and poor low quality and affordable water services, win network and 
forces (for (quality and quantity in services to all loan from IDA loan condition 
change) quantity of water services and water policy and the from WB and 
water) chanQe. World Bank IMF 
Sources of Government Euros 37 NO capital funds Loans from Loans of US $ 
capital funds, water million Loan were invested, ADB, IDA, 60 million 
funds charges from ADB transfer of US $ 290 from WB in 
(tariffs infrastructure from the 1990 to 1998 
review), WB and restructuring World Bank 
loan ($ 13.5m) 
Operating Composed of Composed of Composition of Composed of The operating 
service Government, Government, Government, Government, structure was 
structure private private Nyeri municipal, Asset holding Government, 
operator, operator (MSG) operator company Asset holding 
Public grand and Asset Nyewasco and (SONES) and company 
authority(FDE) Holding water board the private (NWSC) and 
Company operator private 
regulating (SDE) operator 
authority (Gauff Ing. 
(PURA) came IONDEO) 
later. 
Governme Policy issues, Policy issues, Policy issues Policy issues, Policy & 
nt role and Public grand Asset holding and water framework to Capital funds, 
responsibili authority and company resources all water 
ties investment investment and stakeholders, sources, 
coordination control of Asset holding 
and regulating resources company 
Role and Operation, General Operation Operation Rehabilitation 
function of maintenance, operation maintenance and of the water 
the private revenue duties (revue and revenue maintenance supply 
operator collection and collection, collection and all of water system, 
all water operations and other water services in operation and 
service duties maintenance) services duties Urban areas maintenance, 
(independent) and revenue 
collection 
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Areas of 
comparison Cote d' Ivore Gambia Kenya Seneaal Uaanda 
Role and During the No Regulator Regulating 
function of the NO regulating private regulating was in place authority was 
regulator authority services authority, all and not in place, the 
regulator regulating therefore, all regulation duties 
was not in duties were regulation were carried by 
place carried by duties were government 
water board executed by tasset holders 
in government 
cooperation 
with Nyeri 
Municipal 
Effects of Water service Earlier Increase in Water Private 
change and improved termination water supply and operators could 
WTP (quality and of private production, sewerage perform as 
quantity) with operator turbidity services was agreed in 
greater effect (power problem has improved, contract. After 
on higher performance been solved, although two years period 
charges ) water water high water was forced to 
services was customer charges was resign 
deteriorating connections also noted 
have (affordability) 
increased, 
water tariffs 
were 
introduced 
Water users Position on the Water users Water users Waters were Water user were 
and structure were were just are only only 
there position services beneficiaries beneficiaries beneficiaries beneficiaries, no 
beneficiaries but after and at the specific role to 
establishme same time perform 
ntof PURA are part of 
water users management 
were part in (the board of 
tariffs management 
regulation is composed 
of water 
users (WTP 
is hiqher. 
6.7 Combined Discussion on Case Studies 
This section brings together the different ideas from various covered case 
studies. The discussion will build the concepts that will be used to formulate a water 
services model. The discussion has been developed to conclude driving forces for 
adoption of private water services, existence of privatisation, private operator's role 
and function, commercialisation, adaptation and suitability of the method and major 
sources for project funding. The discussion is meant to produce a primary sample 
model as a step forward towards developing a permanent solution for Tanzania 
water problems. 
6.7.1 Why Privatisation? 
In the discussion covered in Section 3.9.3, which evidences that privatisation 
was adopted as a solution for capital funds and as a substitute to the operating 
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bureaucratic poor efficient or dormant business services to improve water services, 
privatisation opens up markets for competition, which gives credit to quality 
products and value for money owing to market challenges. The adoption of private 
services develops another question surrounding product value and affordability, 
with the monopolistic existence of politically influenced public water services to be 
challenged, with private services system affordability for all having been 
considered. The discussion also indicated that all three different methods of 
privatisation (full privatisation, partial privatisation, and concession) have similar 
objectives, including efficiency, quality, productivity, and profit-maximisation. The 
discussion also indicated that, in each of the three methods, there are a number of 
differences in approach, adaptation, and implementation procedures. The conflict 
between private and public services seems to continue; although the advantage of 
the conflict is that, it opens new challenges for researching the best water services 
model which should be encouraged for the benefit of water services sector. 
6.7.2 Driving Forces for Privatisation 
The driving forces for the adaptation of private water services are many; 
however, they can be merged into two categories, including external and internal 
driving forces. Internal forces for change are those factors associated with social, 
political and economic considerations, which start within the country with evidence 
that, the available water services are not sufficient and therefore need 
improvement. The system is managed and owned by the government. The owner 
(government) does not have enough funds to invest into infrastructure investment 
or for any other reason (to transfer the capital investment from one asset to 
another). In this situation, the government decides to get out of services 
operations; thus, the government disposes (selling, renting of contracting) its 
assets to private services. 
On the other hand, external drivers are the forces that originate outside of the 
country; it is a decision made not within the government's will, such as when the 
government is desperately looking for assistance or a help to solve a specific 
internal problem. The problem requires large amounts of investment, and the 
government has no such funds. Therefore, the government asks for loans, and the 
loan provider dictates that 'the condition is loan with privatisation'. In most cases, 
the donor's conditions are not limited to the adaptation of private water services 
only; it also involves how privatisation should be adopted and implemented, the 
method and operation type, and the use and control of the loan. 
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The effect of affordability is also reflected in water charges because the water 
costs per unit set will cover actual water production costs, loan recovery, donor and 
private operator costs, and profit. 
The discussion in Chapter Three shows countries including Uganda, Senegal, 
Gambia, Cote d' Ivore, Ghana and Tanzania that are desperately in need of capital 
funds necessary for water and sanitation improvement for economic and social 
needs. However, the World Bank opened loan assistance to these countries with a 
full package of conditions, such as the adaptation of private services, the World 
Bank procurement procedures, and project report for monitoring and its procedure. 
Therefore, Sub-Sahara African countries, without choice, were forced to take on 
loans with this package of conditions. This is a practical example of external driving 
force. The discussion covered in Chapter Four, Section 4.9.4i shows that Tanzania 
was one of the borrowers affected by the aforementioned conditions. The effects 
and criticisms of the World Bank condition to borrowers has been discussed in 
Chapter Four, Section 4.9.4.' In practice, privatisation has induced greater 
contribution on services improvement owing to efficiency. In other ways, however, 
loans provided by the World Bank look as if they are there for and fulfil the donor's 
commercial interest. Therefore, if this is the situation, this may then be perceived 
as one of the major causes for private water services in Sub-Sahara African 
countries to be of an unacceptable standard. 
6.7.3 Adaptation of Method and Approach 
The covered discussion indicated that all the Sub-Sahara African countries, 
including Gambia, Senegal, Guinea, Cote d' Ivore and Tanzania, adopted similar 
methods of privatisation (10-year lease contract). However, the differences in 
approach brought in different results; some countries were successful whilst some 
failed. Senegal being an example of a successful country in the whole region of 
Sub-Sahara African countries, it started with a 10-year lease contract from 1996. 
Following the end of the first term of the contract, the operator, SDE, was awarded 
with a new contract of 5 years. This came from its good performance in the first 
period of the contract. Therefore, the lessons from Senegal water privatisation were 
noted as follows 
The private operator SDE has been operating in the country for more than 20 
years before taking over the operations of water services. This facilitated the 
operator with good experience through delivering a better understanding of social, 
cultural and traditions concerning the Senegal people. This understanding is very 
important and helpful in terms of managing social services (Water). Therefore, if 
strategies for change-either in water charges or in network operations-are 
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properly implemented, the issue of acceptability to water users then becomes 
easier. This generally has very great impact in private operator's performance. 
A good working relationship, teamwork and trust with other working bodies in the 
sector all have greater contributions in total performance. For example, SDE has 
had a very good working relationship with the asset holder, regulator, as well as 
with the government, which has notably facilitated several successful negotiations 
and compromises in the targets of the contract without resorting to arbitration or 
litigation. 
The participation of all water stakeholders, transparency, good coordination and 
teamwork throughout the course of the project preparation, transfer and 
implementation period facilitated SDE as the adaptation of private services in the 
water sector was executed stage-by-stage and with transparency. 
Realistic performance targets in contract are a motivation to perform the set 
targets, which is one of the reasons behind SDE's success. 
6.7.4 Possible Lessons from Failure 
According to the covered discussion, there are various countries, including Gambia, 
Cote d' Ivore, Guinea, Uganda, Tanzania and Ghana, where the privatisation of 
water services could not work, although the countries adopted a similar method 
(10-year lease contract method), such as Senegal. In this case, there were also 
some lessons to be learnt. 
In Gambia, the absence of regulatory authority during the privatisation process was 
one of the contributing factors to unsuccessful privatisation. One of the regulatory 
duties is coordination (to create balance and fair play between water users and 
services provider). This makes it easy for acceptability of privatisation in the country 
In comparison with the Senegal privatisation, the Gambian private water operator-
the French origin company MSG-had very little experience of the Gambian 
environment. Political instability in the country-especially during the privatisation 
period, when the government was under military control-induced an atmosphere 
that may have contributed in terms of unnecessary worries, alongside a poor 
working environment with the private operator, which may have led to 
underperformance. 
Difficulties in terms of operating old and poor condition water infrastructure created 
an obstacle for private operator performance. Low-skilled employees with illiteracy 
rates of 50% amongst management staff and 90% of the total employee of MSG 
was one of the factors which may have created a number of difficulties in terms of 
the adaptation of new private management style. Such factors may have resulted in 
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the poor performance of the private operator, and thus premature termination of 
lease contract. 
Some countries, including Uganda and Ghana, executed private water 
services in a way different to other countries (Senegal, Guinea, Cote d' Ivore, and 
Gambia), with both adopting management contract method with short periods. 
Ugandans had a two-year management contract with private companies, first Gauff 
Inginieure Consultancy, and afterwards ONDEO, both of which are private 
operators and were not able to work more than two years each owing to 
underperformance. The question subsequently arises: What was the cause of 
underperformance within the two years management contract period? 
German Origin Company Gauff Inginieure and French origin company 
ONDEO are both foreign companies with little experiences in Uganda culture, 
traditions, and military politics; therefore, a two-year operation period was too short 
to achieve maximum delivery against the expectations. However, the higher 
performance target set in the two-year management contract with the ambition of 
the installation of water meters to over 70% of water customers and an increase in 
the revenue collection of up to more than 85% of total water supplied with no 
capital investment, was undoubtedly unrealistic. 
In Uganda, during the adoption of private water services, the regulatory 
authority was not in place; thus, the regulatory authority duties were executed by 
the government. Importantly. the government is not considered independent; ot 
prepares the contact, supervises, and accordingly regulates. Furthermore, the 
. regulator is independent and responsible for monitoring and supervising fair play 
between service providers and other stakeholders (standard, quality and prices). 
The operator not being in place may result in biasness and thus an unfair 
assessment of the private operator. 
In Ghana, there was no trust established between the operators (foreign 
companies) and common water users (local citizens); this was owing to a lack of 
transparency. For example, groups of campaigners organised the protection of 
private water services with the belief that water charges would increase, and the 
profit would be taken out of the country. Even some trusted that foreign private 
companies were building new colonialism in Africa. This kind of demonstration as a 
result of a lack of trust may ultimately create a number of unnecessary obstacles, 
which may subsequently diminish service performance. In this regard, transparency 
and stakeholder participation at each stage in the whole process of adaptation is 
considered the best practice so as to ensure trust and smooth adaptation. 
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6.7.5 Operating Structure of Private Water Entities 
Chapter Three indicated that the practiced privatisation and the adopted 
procedures by each individual country were different from one country to another. 
The differences proved to be significant in terms of the success or failure of each 
privatisation. The most significant differences reflected on uninformed organisation 
structure of the operating entity, as well as the governing policy. The structure, 
power, and duties of each individual organisation are guided by the governing 
policy of each country. In this regard, what matters most is the way in which the 
organisational structure efficiency is recognised in relation and coordination with its 
different Boards within the water sector. The organisation is powered to perform a 
specific function. The case studies indicate that structures adopted by a number of 
countries during the privatisation period comprised government (responsible 
ministry for water), asset-holding company, regulating authority, and the private 
operator. The role and function of each organisation is different from one country to 
another, with components dissimilar . 
. Senegal was an example of the most successful private water services in 
Sub-Sahara African region. They have adopted and practised privatisation without 
having regulatory authority; the regulatory activities were executed directly by the 
government. The organisation components for water services provision were 
Government, utility holding company and private operator. Apart from being the 
most successful private water services, due to absence of regulatory authority. 
However, the complains on higher water charges from water users had spread 
widely. 
In Tanzania during the adoption of private water services the regulatory 
authority was not yet formulated, therefore the ministry of water on behalf of 
Tanzania government was implementing regulation activities. 
Guinea and Gambia with the lease contract methods, still each country had 
different structure and strategies in privatisation approach. The Gambia approach 
was to introduced internally. The performance contract with GUC and then GUC 
board of management was restructure, but yet all these efforts was not productive. 
Then GUC was successfully contracted to MSG for 10 years lease contract. The 
regulatory authority (PURA) came later, but during the process of privatisation 
, 
PURA was not in the place. Therefore, the privatisation for Gambia composed of 
Government (policy issues), Asset holding company (UHC) and the private 
operator (MSG). 
In Guinea the military government was dealing with general supervision, 
policy issues and regulatory activities. SONE, the former operator was changed to 
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asset holding company, operated the transmission pipeline and water treatment 
plant that provided bulk water to the capital Conakry. The company was also in 
charge of investment planning and debt servicing. The comparison indicates that, 
two countries adopted privatisation with differences in style of adoption and 
structure composition. 
The Cote d' Ivore privatisation structure was composed of Government (policy 
issues, contract performance monitoring and approval of change for tariffs), Private 
operator SODECI and the developing funding company FDE. The structure was 
simple but role of regulatory authority was not clearly defined. The regulatory 
authority was not in place during the privatisation 
In Uganda, during the privatisation, regulatory authority was not in place; 
however, the contract management was not successfully performed. The absence 
of a regulator may have contributed to unfair assessment of what has been 
performed by the operator and therefore lead to unnecessarily ending the contract 
within just a short period of two years. The importance of regulatory authority 
should not be in Uganda only, it is obligatory in any private water services. 
The conclusion from this discussion is private water services exist in many 
different structures, and each structure developed to fit specific conditions. The 
adoption processes are also differently, depending on how the changes were 
planned and executed, but adoption of private water services in any country 
depends on acceptability to the structure of the governing policy. However, in any 
form of operation whether private or government the independent operating 
organisation should be in place with full charges in all operations and maintenance 
activities. The privatisation idea was adopted for field test to measure its 
acceptability and how better can it work in Tanzania water services. 
6.7.6 The role and function of regulatory authority 
The discussion covered on this chapter has led the researcher to conclude 
that, regulatory authorities in water services exist as guardians to ensure 
procedures, control of quality and the nature of services are fair and executed 
according to the standards. Regulatory authorities are referees to check and give 
fair play between the service providers and the water users. The proper control on 
fair water charges is stimulant to willingness to pay. A combined implementation 
strategic forces developed by good coordination between the operator and 
regulatory authority with make water user enjoying quality services within fair 
charges, this will accelerate the willingness to pay, and therefore to improve water 
services in general. This strategic stimulation for willingness to pay supported by 
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tariffs review method can justify the objective of generates capital funds from the 
local sources. 
The structure organisation setup discussed in chapter 5 analysing the role 
and functions of the regulatory authority in water services that, the absence of the 
regulator may cut coordination and close communication not only between water 
users and services provider but also the closer link between the government and 
water users. Water services organisation structure which accommodates regulator 
regulatory authorities have greater contributions and participation of all water 
stakeholders, especially in the matters that involve water and the review of water 
charges. The regulator role of providing standards and monitoring the services 
provided by the operator are all subjected to quality assurance which has impact on 
willingness to pay. In other word existence of the regulatory authority in water 
sector has greater impact on services improvement and therefore to accelerate the 
willingness to pay. 
Although in Sub-Sahara African countries water services are monopoly 
provided by just one service provider (no competition) and therefore is in higher 
demand, automatically the product water has direct attraction on the willingness to 
pay._ Therefore, we can say that, the regulatory authority according to its roles and 
functions in any type of services (public or private) is a catalyst for willingness to 
pay. Therefore, the role, function and power of regulator are different from one to 
another. Some regulatory authorities have structured to perform wide range of 
professional duties (Communication, energy, post and water) and some only for 
one specific duty. Depending on governing policy which guides the setup and 
structure performance of the regulating authority, but the common function, role 
and duties of regulating authorities are setting standards, monitoring and evaluating 
the operator's performance for quality assurance, and refereeing the water charges 
to ensure fairness for both services provider and water users. The regulatory 
authority and the public grand authority (owner) with clear boundaries on 
operating duties to each department should be part of model to any adopted 
method of service. This will ensure the quality of services which is independent 
from interference. 
6.7.7 Rol'e and Functions of private operator 
According to the discussion on the role, power and functions of water service 
providers (private operators), it is that difficult to generalise the total picture of the 
responsibilities as each contract differs from another. The governing and financing 
policies proved to have greater influence on the role, power and function of 
operation duties, which governing policy also differs from one another. The 
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discussion indicated that, the major common roles to all private operators (water 
services providers) were billing and revenue collection, leakage control, operation 
and maintenance of water services. The discussion proved that, good working 
environment starts from roles and function that the operator is empowered. 
However, Senegal water operator SDE indicated that, working efficiently within 
properly described roles under good coordination with other sector partners is the 
only way to success. Therefore, the focus will remain that, freedom and clear 
description of role and function of the operator is the guardian to reach successful 
performance. However, good working coordination with other partner organisation 
in the sector is tool to enhance good performance. 
In Senegal the private operating company SDE with total of 90% shares of 
foreign and local individuals gave strong and greater power to commercial mind of 
operation. This originated from greater influence of business mind due to the fact 
that the majority of shares owned by private sector with common language of 
business and profit making. The 10 years lease contract made a picture that water 
services was like a private property in the country. Secondly, the absence of an 
independent regulatory system gave greater advantage to operator on standards, 
reporting and water pricing issues. SDE had a role of equity contribution which was 
converted to a capital investment for water improvement. In Uganda, the private 
operators had very limited power, the operator ONDEO was responsible for general 
common roles (revenue collection and operation and maintenance) his powers 
were limited within the compromise and to fulfil performance targets according to 
the contract agreement. 
In Cote d' Ivore the private operator SODECI apart from common duties 
mentioned above, had a responsibility to supervise the project funding company 
(FDE). In this case, the operator SODECI had full authority of deciding on 
investments and executing them. In Guinea, the water services operator, SEEG in 
comparison with other private operators in the region had fewer responsibilities due 
to the fact that the asset holding company SONEG was the operator of 
transmission pipeline and water treatment plant who provided bulk water to capital 
city of Conakry. While in Kenya under the operator Nyewasco had all 
responsibilities including asset holding, investment and as well general operation 
duties. 
To conclude on standard functions and role of a private operating company is 
not any easy task. The decision is in the hands of responsible government, which is 
formulated to fit local needs. What type of method of privatisation is to be adopted 
may be a big factor to drive functions of each member organ (operator, regulator 
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and owner} responsible in provision of water services. Functions and power of 
operator are set by entity owner (the government) and clearly stipulated in the 
contract of agreement between the operator and the entity owner (government). 
However, the most repeatable functions are noted to be distribution of water 
supply, metering, new water connections, maintenance and repair of water service 
lines, customer care, distribution of water bills, revenue collection, leakage control, 
improvement of water data base; and in some areas, water production and 
treatment. Therefore, setting the role and functions of private operator is a 
government task, depending on the governing policy and sometimes conditions 
accompanied by loan from donors. If the services objectives are ensure quality, 
sustainability and affordability then having independent operator in the model is 
obligatory. 
6.7.8 Performance contract in water services 
The discussion on effectiveness of the contract performance style has been 
covered in section 3.3.2 that, Uganda was the country adopted the style of contract 
performance system during the privatisation of NWSC. The performance contract 
with clear milestones for given period (monthly, quarterly and annually) specifically 
in the areas including water leakage control, customer connection targets, revenue 
collection, development of water services networks, standards for application and 
connections, water meter installation and reading, reporting mechanism and record 
up to dating. The private operator Gauff Inginieure Consultancy completed first 
term of its two years contract in March 2000. According to the contract the 
evaluation for operator's competency was carried and the operator couldn't qualify 
for second term because low performance in revenue collection. Under contract 
performance style private operator ONDEO was contract to provide water services 
in Kampala city for two years period. The operator ONDEO couldn't manage the 
situation. Targets were not met which resulted to poor performance in terms of 
revenue collection, poor water leakage control, and poor water pressure in the 
network. Internal pressure from government to the operator was increased because 
of underperformance and this cause the operator to resign claiming that the targets 
were unfairly raised. Failure of meeting the agreed performance target was one of 
the reasons that forced the termination of DAWASA City water lease contract (see 
section 2.6.2). Therefore, performance contract is a commitment and reference tool 
for performance monitoring and evaluation to operator or implementer in which the 
feedback leads to a certain decision. No measure of performance, no future project 
plan or no proper direction for of implementation and therefore no proper decision 
in project progress. This means, to make water services sustainable, the periodic 
performance monitoring and evaluation is obligatory and therefore any appropriate 
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water service method should be periodically evaluated for the project sustainability. 
The contents in water services performance contract are many with diversity 
depends on project owner's objectives but factors including revenue collection, 
leakage control, customer connection are most common in contracts. However, in 
any performance contract, performance indicators should be clear, measurable and 
should be set fairly. 
6.7.9 Source of finance for the project 
The discussion on sustainable financial sources for water development 
projects indicated that the reliable sources of funds are either loan from financial 
institutions or through adoption of tariffs adjustment. Loans from financial 
institutions have covered greater part of the funding. In all discussed area of Sub-
Sahara Africa countries, water development projects have been funded by loans 
mainly from the World Bank. In Uganda, IMF and the World Bank loans prescribe 
that, the country must privatise its key utilities and market, In Cote d' Ivories, the 
World Bank loan of $ 13.5 million was for supporting operation and the technical 
cell of privatisation. In Guinea capital for water investment were financed by 
financial institutions and the World Bank being -number one, in Senegal water 
privatisation project was funded by the World Bank through IDA and other partners 
including African Development bank and while in Gambia 37 million Euros for water 
development project were financed by African Development bank. Regardless of 
the success or the failure of the project, the World Bank loans remained to be the 
major source of funding water development projects. 
What are the effects of the World Bank loans? The effects of the World Bank 
loans have been critically discussed in chapter 4 section 4.4.2 and their results are 
detailed. However, the effects of the bank loans are generated from conditions of 
the loans; condition of privatisation on water services, condition of interest and 
condition of adopting the World Bank procurement procedures have greater 
effects. The condition of loan for private water services has indicated to have 
serious impact on higher water charges and therefore to create a greater challenge 
on affordability for water users in different countries. Although quality, quantity, 
efficiency in services and production and technology change are the major gains 
and attraction for adaptation of private water services. In higher commercial focus 
analysing the real water costs in private water services can be concluded as a total 
operation costs + estimated profit. Value of total operation costs in private services 
is higher than other services because it consists of very higher wages for the 
foreign employees and experts (special category of employees) those costs are 
reflected on water charges (see section 4.4.2). Furthermore, the total sum of loan 
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recovery is a great burden to water users, because the total amount of any loan 
recovery (pay back) composes the actual amount of loan plus the extra agreed 
amount as a loan interest. This burden reflects into daily customer's water charges 
with higher risk on affordability. The effects of loans from international funding 
institutions have brought in a new challenge for finding alternative sources 
for funding water projects. This research has adopted the challenge, and 
therefore loans from international institutions will be considered as reference 
of challenge and not reliable funding source. 
6.8.0 Commercialisation of water services and tariffs review 
The discussion on commercialising water services has been critically covered 
in chapter 5 section 5.4. that, commercialising water services is taking the operation 
services to be more independent, competitive and the product (water) is sold into 
open market. Ensuring water is available to meet quality and quantity required for 
domestic and other use. In this commercial services water is sold in order to cover 
the actual product costs and some extra amount for services development and 
sustainability. Also noted that, an private services has commercial content in its 
process and approach. The differences between private and commercial services 
has also described that commercial services can operate as non-profitable 
company, this has greater advantage if the method is adopted in government 
owned entities. The experience from Zambia in section 5.5.5 shows that, 
commercialising water services under private operator has created a problem of 
price increase in commodity '(water) value. Commercialisation under private 
operator has affected water tariffs increase in many countries in Sub-Sahara Africa, 
Senegal, Gambia and Cote d' Ivore which are amongst those affected. 
Similarly, commercialisation can be adopted in public owned water entities. 
The experience from Somaria in section 5.6.3 shows that, commercialisation of 
water services not only improved water services in the country but also brought in 
close communication between different groups of stakeholders and government. 
In Kenya as detailed in section 3.4.3 that, commercialisation of water 
services in Nyeri in 1998 has improved water services in the various areas 
including water production of Kamakwa water treatment plant (from 6000m3/day to 
9000m3/day), turbidity problem has been eliminated, new connection for water 
customers has increased and that caused the increase in revenue collection. 
The application of commercial services style in public owned entity has 
greater advantages not only on services improvement but as well on affordability, 
because commercialisation can be operated under non-profitable circumstances. 
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Depending on the nature of the system, in some cases project capital funds can be 
developed within the commercial services. 
Water charges are set to accommodate the need for project development. 
This method is more practical when services are provided commercially and 
independently. The discussion in chapter 3 indicates that, Nyewasco was 
established with zero capital and is an example of commercialisation with no 
capital. The water services company in Kenya was strategically transformed from 
public to commercial water services. Loan for investment was involved, however 
only infrastructures (assets) were transferred to the company and that was the 
capital investment. Therefore, with independent authority of organisation and 
operation the company managed to establish its capital investment through the 
tariffs review method. The effects of adopting the tariffs review method as a source 
for developing costs (capital funds) are directly in the hands of water users; this 
also has a direct effect on water charges. Technically water charges will raise to 
affordable level, the difference of this approach in comparison with private system 
is that commercial operation is not necessarily be profit operating company; it could 
be a non-profitable company. It could be owned by government, whereby the 
interest is affordable services to all. However, if it operates as a profitable company 
still the profit we go to investment and that will reduce the estimation of extra 
amount in tariffs review and that will result to low price, also the operation expenses 
are focused less than the private water services, hence the wages for management 
team and employees are paid according to government scheme of services. or 
experts is reasonably lower than in the case of private sector since the greater part 
of expertise is locally outsourced (see the effects of loan conditions in chapter 4 
section 4.9.2). 
No need of loan or government budget. Therefore, commercialisation of water 
services under public ownership has shown to be an ideal solution for operating 
water services in developing countries, and therefore the researcher concluded to 
adopt the concept for developing appropriate model suitable for managing water 
services in Tanzania. 
6.8.1 Appraisal for combined case studies 
The discussion on combined case studies has brought in special input on 
creating the road map for developing a framework model solution. Some of the 
inputs were taken for the field test to evaluate the acceptability and practicability. 
Other ideas were adopted for further analysiS before adopting the model. In the 
discussion in section 6.7.4, it was highlighted that the concept of privatization of 
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water services has come under doubt in Tanzania and other African developing 
countries, as the method was adopted but not successful. However, the method 
has a number of advantages in service improvement, but the factor of affordability 
has become a major worry with regard to the method. Through questionnaires, the 
privatization idea was field tested to measure the acceptability, applicability and 
practicability. 
With regard to the concept on organizational structure for operating water 
services, as detailed in section 6.7.5, deferent structures exist in water services, 
but every structure is to fit somewhere, the common components are independent 
operator, regulatory authority, asset holding company and entity owner. The 
effectiveness of the model structure depends on the components and function of 
each. Every sector in the structure should have been formulated with clear job 
descriptions detailing duties, role and functions to perform, and this will limit 
interference. The concept of structure components has been adopted for further 
analysis with consideration given to the acceptability to government policy which 
will be adopted as a model structure component. 
The concept of role and function of the regulating authority in the water 
services industries is critically discussed in section 6.7.6, i.e., that the regulating 
authorities are formulated according to the governing policy. Therefore, the area of 
operation, power, functions, duties and responsibilities are different from one 
authority to another. Most sub-Sahara countries have regulating authorities for 
water services. The major common functions of a regulating authority are 
monitoring, control of quality and quantity of water services, control and regulation 
of water charges, and establishing good communication between water users and 
operators. 
With this focus in mind, the existence of regulatory authorities in water 
services leads to good cooperation between water users and operators, which is 
motivation to WTP. The researcher adopted the existence of a regulatory authority 
in the model. 
The role and functions of the (private) operator in water services are different 
from one operator to another depending on what has been agreed in the contract 
between the operator and the owner. However, the most repeatable functions are 
distribution of water supply, new water connection, revenue collection, metering, 
maintenance and repair of water lines, customer care, and distribution of water bills 
and improvement of water data. According to the discussion in section 6.7.7, an 
operating company - whether private, public or commercial- should be independent 
and free from political interference. This has greater assurance in quality and 
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service sustainability, and with that in mind the concept of having an independent 
operator in water services has been adopted in the model development. 
Performance contract in water services was one of the concepts adopted 
directly in the model development. In Uganda, as discussed in section 6.7.8, 
because of a failure in performance contrary to the performance contract targets, 
Gauff Inginieure Consultancy Company was proved not to be qualified for a second 
term contract. ONDEO also was forced to resign because of underperformance 
contrary to the agreed performance contract. In Tanzania (see chapter 2), City 
water company had its contract to perform water services terminated in Dar-es-
Salaam, one of the reasons for this being underperformance contrary to contract. A 
performance contract is an agreement and commitment to perform a specific 
volume of tasks within the agreed time. This periodic assessment gives the 
required focus of implementation which is a base for decision making. . With this in 
focus along with the other advantages described in section 6.7.8, the concept has 
been adopted in the model development. 
Different sources of capital funds for water projects have been discussed in 
section 6.7.9; however, loans from international institutions dominated the 
discussions. The advantages and disadvantages were also detailed and their 
effects were analysed including loan interest, expert's conditions, conditions of 
privatization and condition of ICB which has a significant impact on the actual value 
of loan and its effects (espeCially on higher water charges). Sub-Sahara African 
countries are in a disadvantageous position with regard to loans being granted only 
on the basis of tough repayment conditions, and the challenge was to develop an 
alternative source for capital funds. This research has accepted and adopted the 
challen~e, and therefore local funding sources, including tariff reviews and mass 
contribution methods, were analysed and adopted as alternative capital funding 
sources. 
The commercialization of water services and the tariff reviews method - a 
concept adopted from the discussion in section 6.8.0 - prove that commercialization 
(equally to privatization) will improve services' efficiency and performance. With the 
same efficiency, the method has flexibility in operation and can be adopted in non-
profitable situations as well as by public entities. It can ensure sustainability within 
an affordable range through its natural total cost recovery in comparison with 
. private or public services, which have failed to perform in Tanzania. 
Commercialization has been adopted as a concept in the research solution. 
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6.9.0 The concepts used for the ideal model framework 
The model framework discussed in this section is a combination of ideas that 
were developed from previous chapters and in the combined discussion in section 
6.7. Various cases were discussed, gathered, evaluated and critically analysed for 
developing the cause of water problems and the solution. Lack of capital funds for 
water projects and the absence of an appropriate management model were 
identified as the major obstacles for water development in Tanzania and sub-
Saharan African countries. The need for a sustainable source of capital funds for 
water projects and the appropriate water services management model were the 
driving force behind this study and which solution should be developed. 
Strategically this section is combining the adopted concepts to form a primary 
model framework. Therefore, the concepts included in the ideal model framework 
were developed to fulfil the need for establishing proper sources for funding water 
projects and the requirement of a sustainable management style in water services 
as follows. 
6.9.1 The model 
The adopted strategy for developing the ideal model has been established 
from the critical and systematic discussion covering various water services 
experiences from sub-Saharan African countries including Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, 
Uganda, Ivory Coast, Senegal Gambia and other countries. The concepts were 
established step by step from the driving forces for privatization, process and 
method adoption, organization or operating structure, role and function of the 
private operators, regulating authorities, and existence and function of asset 
holding companies. The sources of failure and success for each case were also 
examined. Thereafter, the ideal water management framework model was 
developed. However, the need for developing the ideal water management model 
was concluded based on evidence from the analysis on what are the causes for the 
failure of private water services in Tanzania as compared with other sub-Saharan 
African countries. 
6.9.2 Composition and operating structure of the model 
The ideal model framework for managing water services in Tanzania (sub-
Saharan African countries) will be composed of four major departments including 
the owner, independent operator, regulating authority and water users. The 
- 144-
organization structure of managing water services will manage and develop water 
services through generating the operation services costs and capital funds from 
local sources. The model framework for services will comprise two major parts 
including management organization structure and sustainable sources for capital 
funds necessary for operations. sustainability and development according to the 
need. 
6.9.3 Existence, function and role of each department 
The importance of each adopted department has been critically discussed in 
section 6.8.1 in that the composition of these departments. each with their own 
clear job descriptions, will form a strong ideal water services model for Tanzania 
(sub-Saharan African countries). In operation. each department depends on one 
another and their relation is cemented based upon the objective of providing 
quality, affordable, reliable and sustainable water services to all. The role. functions 
and the need for each organ has been critically discussed as follows. 
i. Ownership 
There are three major types of ownership of the infrastructures or operating 
entity: government. private and shared ownership. whereby. on services provision 
each ownership type has its basic priorities and objectives. As discussed in chapter 
5 section 2.2. public types of services have greater focus on services to all and 
therefore its operating objectives are driven by priorities that favour water services 
for all. On the other hand. private water services have greater focus on profit gain. 
i.e .• the system has objectives and implementation procedures that are competitive 
and more efficient. but are more focused on profit maximization. 
Furthermore. the evidence provided in chapter 5 section 3.1 shows that 
private or sharing of ownership in the water services sector was not a traditional 
way of managing water services in sub-Saharan African countries. it was brought in 
by the world financial institution (The World Bank) as a major condition for a 
country to qualify for loans. In the same discussion it is indicated that. either for 
political. traditional or for social reasons. sub-Saharan African countries (Tanzania) 
were not ready to lose the ownership of the infrastructures or the operating entities. 
Focusing on the locality situation. consideration was given to the flexibility of capital 
fund sources (government budget. loans with flexible conditions. mass 
contributions. grants and tariff review methods). This study has concluded that. 
under the ideal model framework. the ownership of infrastructure and operating 
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property should remain under government control, and therefore, the owner 
(government) will perform the following responsibilities. 
6.9.4 Role and function of the government 
The government, as owner of the infrastructures and 'operating entity, has the 
following role and functions in this water management model with general 
governance, capital funding and ensuring good cooperation work between the 
departments (operator, regulator and the asset holding company) being the major 
responsibilities. 
i. The government will execute all the policy issues including development and 
amendment of the policy, enforcement of water policy practices, incorporating the 
entity development into a general water master plan for development, evaluating 
and taking the necessary action on performance of the asset holding company and 
regulating authority, and setting the performance contract with the regulator and 
asset holding company. Ministry (government) will create good working 
environments with its affiliated operating organizations to protect water resources 
and license water extraction, and give maximum assistance to its affiliates for the 
assurance of good work performance. 
ii. Sources for capital funding 
The capital funds for water projects consist of a variety of sources including 
loans and grants from external financial institutions and local funds from the 
government budget, water tariffs and other local contributions. Development and 
sustainability of any water services require investments and funds. In some cases 
capital investment does not necessarily need to be in the form of liquid asset. 
Depending on the situation of the infrastructures, if infrastructures are in good 
condition, commercialization can be adopted and the existing infrastructures can be 
transferred to capital investment. This happened in Kenya (see section 6.6.7), 
where Nyeri water services was successful at commercialization without utilizing 
capital funds. 
Depending on the adopted method for water services' improvement and the 
physical situation of the infrastructures, and if the adopted method is 
commercialization and the physical situation of the infrastructure is good, then 
infrastructures can be transferred as a capital investment. Section 6.6.7 of this 
chapter evidenced that commercialization of water services in Kenya was 
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successfully executed without the involvement of· capital funds. This means the 
infrastructure can be one of the capital investments. 
Another source of capital funds for water projects is loans from international 
institutions (The World Bank, ADB, EIB and others). As discussed in section 4.1, 
the conditions that accompany loans are tough and not necessarily appropriate for 
poor sub-Saharan African countries. Therefore, this research was developed with 
one of the main objectives being to find alternative funding sources. 
The local sources for establishing capital funds identified in section 6.8.1 were 
the tariff reviews methods, mass contribution and other government sources. 
Chapters 2 and 3 identified that government budgets cannot sustain water project 
investment, which is why they went for loans. The discussion on section 6.7.1 
identified the potentiality of the tariff reviews method as a sustainable local source 
for establishing capital funds. The factor of WTP has a greater impact in generating 
services costs and capital funds in water services. The importance and contribution 
of willingness to pay has been clearly discussed in chapter 5, section 5.8.4. In any 
structure, stimulation and motivation is needed to increase the willingness to pay 
for such services. The measure is the amount of water payments and higher 
revenue collection indicating good performance. Performance brings better 
customer services. Better customer services are one of stimulants and motivations 
for willingness to pay. Therefore, more revenue collection means more funds for 
capital development, especially if the tariff reviews method is adopted or if the 
project is funded by loans, then that means the ability to pay back loans is 
enhanced. Therefore, an effective working structure should accommodate fairly the 
issue of willingness to pay. 
iii. Funding the project 
The funding sources for establishing projects were identified; the government 
as owner is directly responsible for other sources of funds, i.e., the government will 
be responsible for the work or for ascertaining the different project funding sources. 
This will include grants from international organizations and friendly countries, local 
companies, central government budget and any other official donations and 
contributions. In this case the government is directly obliged to search for project 
funding. According to the covered discussion, if capital funds are raised from the 
government budget (tax payers), then this will automatically have greater influence 
on final consumer water charges and that will make services more affordable. 
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6.9.5 The asset holding company 
Concept of the existence of an asset holding company in the watElr services 
model was initially discussed in chapter 2, section 2.2.6 in that the DAWASA 
privatization structure would be composed of the Ministry of Water (owner), 
DAWASA as asset holding company, City water services as operator and the 
regulator EWURA. The tasks of each department were critically discussed. 
The considerations on the asset holding company were adopted because of 
its role and functions in the model (see section 2.3.1). In this model, the asset 
holding company is an independent operating department with a clear role and 
functions to perform. However, it should be 100% owned by the government. Thus, 
as shown in section 6.8, in a" the private water services structures, the asset 
holding company department was in place. The present DAWASA asset holding 
company is important, especially for sustainability of the water services. Therefore, 
the structure of this model adopted the composition of asset holding company. The 
role and functions of the asset holding company can be defined as follows: the 
asset holding company wi" exist to facilitate good cooperation and coordination 
with other operating organs (operator regulator and government) in the model. 
However, the department's main duties will remain being the asset holders on 
behalf of the government; the asset holders wi" also finance and implement all the 
capital works, developing and review of the master plan for planning and 
implementation. It is also the responsibility of the asset holding company to look for 
capital funds. The asset holding company will monitor the good operation of the 
water infrastructure carried out by the operator and the outcomes wi" be evaluated 
and used as the basis for proper decisions at the end of the contract. According to 
the operational strategy of the model, the immediate supervisor of the operator is 
the asset holder, thus, the asset holding company will have to be flexible and very 
strong to tackle a" problems presented by the operator. It is the responsibility of the 
asset holder to rehabilitate and expand the existing water infrastructure to meet the 
actual required consumption. 
6.9.6 Regulatory authority 
The experience of the discussed case studies evidenced that any 
. successful operating water services require an independent regulatory organ. The 
role and function of the regulator shall be to ensure the standard and quality of 
water services, comparative efficiency and performance, and at the same time, to 
be a referee for creating fair play on water charges. The goal is to protect, not only 
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the interests of water users, but also to be reasonable and to give a fair opportunity 
to water service providers to be heard. Thus, regulatory authority's roles can be 
divided into three groups: authoritative roles, coordination responsibilities and 
management functions. 
i. Authoritative roles 
The evidence on water services reinforced the idea of the authoritative role of 
the regulator, that the regulatory authority should have power to issue and rescind 
licences for water services operations - when and how will depend on the 
performance criteria. The regulator should have power to set and amend the 
standards of services performance and monitoring powers at every stage of the 
services provision. The regulator should have the power of review, approval and 
refusal of new proposals for water charges. 
ii. Coordination responsibilities 
In this role, the regulator is to perform a coordinating role between services 
providers and water users. This allows cost effective solutions to be implemented. 
At the same time, the regulator has to raise awareness levels among water 
consumers through information and educational activities. Furthermore, the 
regulator will in some situations be obligated to assist in settling disputes if they 
arise between the stakeholders. 
iii. Water tariffs control 
The major role of the regulatory authority in water services is the control of 
water tariffs. The whole process involves receiving requests for a tariff review from 
the services provider, evaluating the provided evidence, collecting water users' 
opinions, evaluating all of these and then making a decision. This may involve 
special procedures, but technically different stakeholders are involved at different 
stages of the process. The process of involving stakeholders has a great influence 
on motivating willingness to pay. As detailed in section 6.7, accommodating 
customer opinions during the appraisal of tariff reviews makes water users feel part 
of the system. That makes them feel more respected and that makes them not only 
understand, but also accelerate, the commitment to pay, because of they believe 
the charges are fair. Supervision of the procedure is also the regulator's task. The 
regulatory part is the most important in any water management model and the 
absence of a regulatory authority may led to failure of privatization as indicated in 
the Uganda, Gambia and Guinea case studies (see chapter 3). The regulator 
should be in place before the process of privatization begins; when the structure is 
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agreed, then the first establishment should be the regulator. This will help to guide 
the quality and level of water service standards to be provided by the new operator. 
6.9.7 The services provider (operator) 
The role and function of the services provider in many cases are bounded by 
the owner's objectives for the particular project - what the operator should do and 
the limitations are clearly described in the contract. Depending on the nature of the 
contract, in the DAWASA case (see chapter 2), the operator (services provider) 
was also responsible for contributing a fixed amount as capital funds (equity) every 
year. In the case of Ivory Coast, the operator SODECI was being compensated if 
the amount of water consumed fell below the capacity of the network (see section 
3.5.1). However, in any efficient water services system, the independent services 
operator component is compulsory. Specifically, the duties of the operator are 
described in the agreement between service providers and the asset holding 
company. 
The discussion in section 6.7 identified the duties of the services operator as 
follows. To operate and maintain water infrastructures, water production and 
treatment, water distribution according to the agreed standards, waste water 
services, revenue collection, water connections for new customers, to establish and 
implement the contract between customer and operator, updating the distribution 
network, records keeping (operation, maintenance and development), good 
customer care, water meter installation, leakage control and raising proposals for 
water charges reviews. All the defined work should be described using measurable 
targets and realistic performance indicators (volume of work and time). Another 
obligation of the operator is to coordinate closely with customers in order to 
understand their problems and to give solutions within a short time period. The 
most important matter is that the targets set in the contract should be visible and 
realistic, because the assessment of the operator's performance is based on the 
agreed target performance, therefore, unrealistic targets may lead to an unfair 
assessment of the total target performed by the operator, mainly in favour of the 
asset owner. 
6.9.8 Framework model for field test 
The framework model for field test was established from the concepts 
developed in combined discussion of case studies and the critical analysis of 
privatization. The test was carried out to ascertain the acceptability and applicability 
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in the field, and to gather new ideas with the objective of coming up with the best 
solution for capital funding and appropriate management style for water services. 
How the test was conducted and methods applied have been critically discussed in 
chapter 7, but the concept for the field test was adopted from this framework 
model. The concluded composition structure of the adopted framework model was 
government, regulatory, asset holding company, and private operator and water 
users. This means that the team work and good coordination of all these 
independent departments, with good governing policy and the acceptance of 
people in field, will ensure that the objective is fulfilled. 
The model inter-department coordination, roles and functions of each sector, 
to ensure sustainability in operation, are summarized and presented in diagram 
format in figure no. 6.1 below. 
The Government 
Policy issues, capital funds 
+ + 
Asset Holding Company The Regulator 
Capital investment, project Tariff reviews, standards (quality & quantity 
implementation & supervising private control, licensing to operator & performance 
operator • monitoring) 
, 
• 
The Operator 
Operations and maintenance, revenue collection, 
water production, water control (quality and quantity) 
, 
.. 
I Water Users - Beneficiaries, water users committee I 
Figure no. 6.1 Model framework 
6.9.9 Summary 
The framework model was developed through the systematic challenging of 
ideas covering the water services experience of Tanzania as discussed in chapter 
2 and experiences from other countries in water services in sub-Saharan African 
(see chapter 3). The other knowledge which contributed was developed based on 
experiences gained on capital funds for water projects and critical discussions on 
various water services management methods in chapter 4 and 5. The model has 
been developed purposely for testing in Tanzania. Suitable water services model 
should comply with local environment needs to solve the existing and focused local 
water services problems. 
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Evidence in sections 6.9.4, 6.9.5, 6.9.6 and 6.9.7 showed that each part of 
the model structure is unique. The total performance of the model depends on the 
. performance of each individual part. The failure of one part has a significant impact 
on another part as well as the whole structure. However, the stability of the model 
depends on stable capital funds, either from loans with flexible conditions or capital 
funds developed from local sources. The issue of willingness to pay has occupied 
greater value in this model; hence the economic and financial aspects of this model 
depend on how water users will react to water bills. Therefore, all .kinds of 
motivations (advertisements, discounts for lump sum payments, accurate and 
timely water bills, and different options for payment as well as disconnection for 
non-payers) for water customers, as well as employees, will raise the feeling of 
moral obligation to pay water bills and should be highly encouraged. The field 
results will be adopted for the improvement and the adding of value to the system, 
with the objective of coming up with an appropriate water management model. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: METHODOLOGY 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of how this study was executed. Lewis 
[135] notes that, the central methodology presentation should not only be clear in 
its characteristics but also should indicate why its application as the essential aim 
of the research and why it is view of as the only means of securing adequate 
research control. To retain critics and quality of discussion each structured 
component was examined step by step to answer the questions what? Why? And 
how? This was guidance for developing the research questions and objectives, 
topic of research, research approach, research method, and approach for data 
collection, verification, model development, validation, conclusion and 
recommendation for the research question. 
7.2 General Philosophy of Research 
7.2.1 Reasons for executing research 
According to Sekaran [172] research is 'a systematic and organised effort it is 
a series of steps designed and followed, with the goal of finding answers to the 
issues that are in our working environment' The reasons for doing research are 
many, depending on the nature of the problem intended to be solved. However, in 
most cases the idea of executing research can be driven by criticizing or 
developing the existing idea, theory, belief or law. Brickman [155] adds that, 
research can be carried out just for explanation, or just for understanding. 
Research can also be carried for the purpose of analysing the existing knowledge 
and as phenomena in social science. The other reasons of doing research is 
finding the truth for future use or solving existing problems. However, for good 
reason in doing research, the researcher's main responsibility is to observe 
everything systematically and each observation should be subjected to critical 
analysis. 
7.2.2 Formulation of the Research Topic 
The ideas that facilitated the formulation of this research topic originated from 
the physical water management problems in Tanzania. The experience, causes 
and effects of adapting different styles of water management in the country, 
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necessitated the need for this research for developing solutions for Tanzania water 
services. Poor water services and the need for capital water development under 
public management style forces the country to go for private water services. The 
failure of private water services and the effects left behind in the country 
necessitated the establishing of this research. The knowledge of experience 
covered from literature review (secondary data) guided the formulation of research 
topic on this study. However, the principal idea of the research question has been 
established based on the actual water supply and sewerage problems in Tanzania. 
This is where the research idea was born and defines the originality of this 
research topic 
7.2.3 Nature of research problem and approach for research method 
Proper way of solving the identified research problem depends on 
compatibility of the adopted method to the problem. The right decision on what 
problem to be solved under which method is almost a half way to a solution. 
Creswell [137] argues that, 'the method should match the problem' Adopting an 
inappropriate approach to solve the research problem will always complicate the 
procedure and sometimes lead to incorrect conclusion. Ghuri [133] argues that in 
practice the research approaches are grouped into two major categories; 
deductive and inductive. The inductive approach is based on observed evidence 
and deductive approach is based on logic, beliefs or assumptions. According to 
Laws [139] each approach has its advantages and weakness depending on the 
purpose of research, resources and its compatibility to fit in. In practice, good 
research is a matter of 'horse for courses', where approaches are appropriate for 
specific aspects of investigation and specific kinds of problems. The key decisions 
about the strategy and approach to be adopted are usually planned before the 
research begins. Approaches are selected because they are appropriate for 
specific aspects of investigation and specific kinds of problems. 
According to Kumar [158] 'A research problem identifies the destination' 
Firstly the research problem should be clearly identified then literature knowledge 
will guide to select the method and approach. As indicated in chapter one section 
2.1 the research problem is 'Inadequacy of water supply and sewerage services 
in Tanzania. Thus, the research task is to observe this problem (fact) to come up 
with theory, law or hypothesiS. This is inductive research approach. However, in 
differentiating the two (inductive and deductive) major research approaches 
Denscombe [226] observed that, 'in induction only facts acquired through 
observation lead us to theory, law or hypothesis, while in deduction logical 
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reasoning can accept or reject the hypothesis. Since the research problem has 
been identified and guided the study to conclude the right research approach 
(inductive), then next step is to select the research method to be adopted by this 
study, In order to select the method to be adopted and that which should match 
with the research problem through the approach. 
7.3 The research structure 
According to the nature of the problem the research approach for this study 
has been structured to compose four different stages including Theoretical 
development stage, Field work and documentation stage, and Model building 
stage. Each specific task was focused on development of the next stage and 
coming up with an appropriate solution to the research question. 
7.3.1 Theoretical Development Stage 
The theoretical development stage is the initial stage of this research 
(foundation stage), whereby all theoretical primary ideas (knowledge) are gathered 
and scrutinized to develop a strong project research problem (it is for developing 
the nature of the research problem), Research Topic, Objectives, Research 
method, Research structure and to give primary direction of research (developing 
of research foundation). Ticehurst [232] arguing that, good research solution will 
results from good research preparation and executed carefully following designed 
processes, If the process have been followed then every gathered item of 
information should have purpose, since it will have been gathered to answer 
specific questions. 
The knowledge of water supply and sewerage services in Tanzania during all 
the three different periods (before, during and after privatisation) facilitated the 
development of the research problem. However, the establishment of the study 
questions are explained in chapter one section 1.2 is a foundation for building the 
general theory of the whole research. According to Kumar [264] , theory brings 
clarity, specificity and focus to research problem', The theory of this research has 
been formulated from impact left by public and private water management failures 
in Tanzania and the purpose was to clarify and to give proper direction to the 
research problem as a foundation of research. 
The discussion covered in chapter 2 section 2.6.4 indicated that, private water 
services have failure in Tanzania. Comparing to other water service experiences in 
Sub-Sahara African countries factors including adopted procedure, sources of 
capital funds, driving forces, nature of services provider (private operator) and the 
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performance are the major causes of success and as well failure. The research 
problem was the 'failure of private water services in Tanzania', and therefore the 
study topic was the 'Development of the appropriate privatisation model for water 
services in Tanzania.' 
7.3.2 Field Work and Documentation (Implementation Stage) 
Field work and documentation is the second stage of the research structure. 
Following the theoretical development stage, the research detailed tasks performed 
at this stage including field work data collection, validation, and data analysis and 
model development. According to McNeill [266] 'factors analysis has much in 
common with principal component analysis, the main task is again data reduction 
and interpretation, principal component analysis can be considered as a special 
case of factor analysis'. In this research the field area was Tanzania and the 
primary data were all collected from the selected samples through qualitative and 
quantitative methods including questionnaires and structured interviews. The 
sample areas were DAWASA and DAWASCO employees, customers and 
government officers. The secondary data was captured from various contract 
documents, websites, and government gazettes and government policies. The 
information was gathered and triangulated for analysis and model was developed. 
7.3.3 Documentation Stage 
This is the last stage of the designed research structure, whereby the duties 
performed at this stage are mainly documenting issues including writing of the 
study report (thesis). Denscombe [226] and Creswell [137] argues that, writing up 
involves a blend of interpretation, craft and convention aimed at producing a formal 
record of the research which can be evaluated by others. 
At one and the same time it is a creative enterprise and an activity 
constrained by convention. The report should be concise, with findings and 
arguments presented in a convincing and consistent way. The stage of 
documentation covers the final answer of the research work in this matter this 
research has presented the research answer systematically in a consistent way to 
open chances for criticism, challenges as well as future studies and for the benefit 
of the sector. Conclusions and recommendations are presented with no limitation to 
Tanzania only but can be applied elsewhere within the favourable conditions. 
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7.4 Research Methods and Application 
Research method is a tool to be used as a bridge to find the answer of an 
identified research question. However, according to Creswell [137] a research 
method is a specific approach to data collection and analysis with objective. McNeil 
[266] added that, methods for conducting research are many and 'there is 'no one' 
right direction to take. There are, though, some strategies which are better suited 
than others for tacking specific issues. Therefore, this research has critically 
examined systematically each method. The method which looks compatible to the 
research problem was adopted as a research method to this study. The types of 
research methods are grouped in the following three categories including 
quantitative, qualitative and mixed research methods. 
7.4.1 Quantitative Research Methods 
Quantitative methods are research methods dealing with numbers and 
anything that is measurable. The quantitative research is typically taken to be 
exemplified by the social survey and by experimental investigations. 
Seale [145] argues that, 'quantitative research may facilitate the interpretation 
of relationship between variables. Quantitative research readily allows the 
researcher to establish relationships among variables, but is often weak when it 
comes to exploring the reasons for those relationships. While a qualitative study 
can be used to help on explain the factors underlying the broad relationships that 
are established'. Quantitative measurements regularly depend on qualitative 
assumptions about which constructs are worth measuring and conceptualising. 
Therefore, it is also true that, quantitative research facilitates qualitative meaning, 
quantitative research help with the choice of subjects for a qualitative investigation. 
The research is associated with a number of different approaches to data 
collection, sampling methods and as well as in analysis. The social survey is one of 
the main methods of data collection· which embodies the whole quantitative 
research method. Smith [173] notes that, it is the survey capacity which generates 
quantifiable data on large numbers of the people who are known to be 
representative of the wider population in order to test theories or hypotheses. 
Another major common quantitative research method is the experiment. In an 
experiment method there are two groups which subjects have been randomly 
allocated an experimental and a control group. The logistic of experimental design 
is that the formal group is exposed to independence variability but the control group 
is not. However, the groups are identical in all aspects with only one difference that, 
experimental group is variable while the control group not. 
- 157 -
Survey and experiment are the main methods of quantitative research in 
areas including data collections, counting and measuring. The results of 
quantitative research are in numbers or series of numbers and they are often 
presented in table graphs or other forms of statistics [232]. The presented tables 
and graphs behaviour/trends can be read and interpreted to give the true picture of 
the diagnosed research problem. 
i. Advantages and Disadvantage of the Quantitative Method 
Strategy such as experiments can produce a mountain of data in a short time 
at a fairly low cost. Survey methods lend themselves to quantitative data. Survey 
methods have wide coverage associated with large-scale research covering many 
people or events but, surveys can also be used with small - scale qualitative 
research project. Applying survey research methods have connections associated 
with getting information straight from the horse's mouth, and more than this the 
search is purposeful and structured. In the experimental approach the greater 
advantage is during the process of implementation, you can change testing 
samples with the aim and objective of focusing on special data collection. In this 
method, all data are monitored and collected at one centre point. Generally 
quantitative research facilitates qualitative meaning by helping with choice of 
subjects for qualitative investigation. 
MMU [26] argues that, the disadvantages of the method including 
quantitative implementation approach have character of dealing with breadth when 
it comes to the data that are produced, this consume more time. Quantitative 
analysis results are limited as they provide numerical descriptions rather than 
detailed narrative, and generally provide less elaborate accounts of human 
perception. Through quantitative analysis the additional pre-set answers will not 
necessarily reflect how people really feel about a subject and in some cases might 
just be the closest match. Quantitative approach has emphasis on wide and 
inclusive coverage limits the degree to which research can check accuracy of the 
responses. The use of survey approach does nor prevent the researcher from 
checking on the accuracy or, honesty of the responses. Furthermore, quantitative 
research is often carried out in an unnatural, artificial environment so that a level of 
control can be applied to the exercise; this situation necessitates the availability of 
special equipment's depending on and nature of research and the required 
environment but altogether reflects on higher costs. 
The detailed discussion of just one method alone will not give enough 
evidence for making conclusion on which method should be adopted for this 
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research; therefore the need to discuss other research methods for fair judgment is 
obligatory. 
7.4.2 Qualitative Research Methods 
A qualitative research method is mixture of rational, explorative and inductive 
approaches. Its application relies on the skill and experience of the researcher who 
plays a very important role in the whole process of data collection up to data 
analysis. The required skill to execute qualitative research includes thinking 
abstractly, stepping back and critically analysing situations, recognizing and 
avoiding biases in order to obtain valid and variable information by having 
theoretical and social sensitivity. 
Smith [174] adds that, qualitative research is thus common in social and 
behaviour sciences and among practitioners who want to understand human 
behaviour and functions. Hesse-Biber [170] argues that, 'qualitative research is a 
distinct field of inquiry that encompasses both macro and micro analyses, drawing 
on historical comparative structure including observational and international ways 
of knowing things'. It is multiple epistemological positions, theoretical frame works 
and research methods are included in qualitative research. Qualitative research 
tends to be associated with participant observation and unstructured in-depth 
interviewing. Creswell [137] adds that, 'All perspectives contest for centre stage in 
describing model of investigation called qualitative research'. Case study, action 
research, grounded theory are among of the most common qualitative approach 
methods. However, every method has its advantages and weakness [138]. 
i. Qualitative under grounded theory approach 
According to Punch [242] grounded theory approach is an overall approach to 
research and a set of procedures for developing theory through the analysis of 
data'. Borgatti [243] added that, grounded theory method provides systematic 
procedures for shaping and handling rich qualitative materials although they may 
also be applied to quantitative data. Grounded theory method also allows novices 
and old hands alike to conduct qualitative research efficiently and effectively 
because these methods help in restructuring and gathering and organising data 
and analysis. Punch [242] concludes that, 'grounded theory appeals because it 
concentrates on discovering concepts, hypotheses and theories'. 
Glaser & Strauss [241] urging that, 'a strategic link to formulate and 
developing a formal theory based on data'. Its process and strategy of executing 
grounded theory method has been formulated with explicitly on data collection with 
target amount of unstructured textual from various sources and its analysis. The 
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method provides in-depth systematic scrutiny of the given textual information for 
building theory; therefore it is suitable for studying individual process, interpersonal 
relations and the reciprocal effects between individuals and larger social processes, 
especially if the objective is to develop a theory to fit or to be applied in a specific 
situation. Linden et a/ [244] noted that, the method is more useful for studying 
typical psychosocial topics such as motivation, personal experience, identity, 
attraction, prejudice, and interpersonal cooperation and conflict. 
Grounded theory differs with other research approach because it is explicitly 
emergent, it does not test hypothesis. It sets out find what theory accounts for the 
research situation as it is. Therefore, in this respect it is like action research, 
however the application of the method aims to understand the research situation 
and to discover theory implicitly in the data. The grounded theory has its own 
source of rigour and it is responsive to the situation in which the research is done. It 
is driven by data in such way the final shape of the theory is likely to provide a good 
fit to the situation [247], [248]. 
ii. Qualitative method under case study approach 
The case study approach is used where experience and theory are little 
available to guide the research, therefore study of selected example become very 
useful approach of gaining insight and formulating of hypothesis for further 
research. Ghuri [133] Argues that, case study method is the favourite as a research 
strategy when the question of study is 'how and why', it is also advisable that case 
study approach is used when you want to study a single organization and you want 
to identify factors involved in the same aspects or behaviour of any organization or 
small unity. However, with case study approach it is possible to study number of 
organisations with regard to a set of variables that we have already identified or 
assumed [133]. 
The decision to use a case study approach is a strategiC decision that should 
relate to the scale and scope of an investigation, and it is not least in principle 
dictate which method or methods must be used. Indeed, strength of the case study· 
approach is just that, it allows for the use of varieties of methods depending on the 
circumstances and specific need of the situation. In most cases, case studies are 
done through a review of existing historical materials, records and Interviews, 
however in some cases the approach involved are observation and interaction, but 
in real practical situation case study method is synonymous with qualitative 
research or method [138]. 
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However, special skill and caution are highly required during conducting a 
case study, because the design for data collection is very crucial while the whole 
study depends on data collection. Capability of listening, interpreting, 
understanding, taking the right information, asking the relevant and probing 
questions is highly needed. This forces the researcher in personal to go for data 
collection [133]. 
However, decision on which approach to adopt depends on research 
objectives and nature. of study, given time, availability of funds and researcher's 
willingness. However, both grounded theory and case study approaches with 
differences are all equally good and their follow under qualitative research method. 
iii. The Advantages and Disadvantages of the method 
Qualitative research may help to provide background information on context 
and subjects act as a source of hypotheses. Qualitative research method allows 
the application of multiple methods on data collection and data analysis, especially 
when case study method is adopted. For example, in case study method, during 
the data collection questionnaires and interviews approaches can be used together 
which add value on data quality and verification? Parallel with use of multiple 
methods, the case study approach fastens the use of multiple sources of data. The 
method is suitable especial where the researcher has little control over events, 
because the approach is concerned with investigating phenomena as they naturally 
occur. There is no pressure on the researcher to import controls or to change 
circumstances. Qualitative research has multiple application, which can be adopted 
for theory-building (inductive) and theory- testing (deductive) depending on nature 
of research both can use the case study approach. Qualitative approach can fit in 
well with the needs of a small-scale research through concentrating effort on one 
research site (or just few sites ).for example if you need to study the operation and 
performance of small organisation qualitative methods gives clear perspective on 
methodology and In case of executing ethnographic approach the goal is the 
complete understanding of a particular situation therefore with this approach we are 
able to obtain a more accurate picture. 
The disadvantages of the Qualitative methods in practice tend to favour of 
depth over breadth, which has a direct effect on coverage and time consumption. 
For example, in the case study, the approach most vulnerable to criticism is in 
relations to the credibility of generalizations made from its findings. In general study 
carried though qualitative method may adopt more than one approach, and it has 
higher cost in methodology implementation in comparison with quantitative method. 
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Collection of qualitative data requires more time, more staffs and all these have 
reflection on costs 
Blaikie [227] adds that, the application of qualitative method requires an 
extended and intensive period of involvement, a researcher may become fully 
immersed in the social activities at all levels with personal involvement, this means 
qualitative methods obligates researchers to become insiders to discover the social 
actors, culture and worldviews. In summary, the existence of qualitative research 
methods are mainly for using social actors of view, describing the study, focusing 
on social processes, adapting flexible approaches and developing concepts and 
different theories [227]. 
7.4.3 Appraisal for quantitative and qualitative methods 
The evidence prevailing in section 7.3 of this chapter advocates the principles 
of concluding the appropriate research method. The need for analysing which 
method should be adopted between the two quantitative and qualitative has 
basically focused on the advantages and disadvantages each method, and its 
flexibility on application to fit the study problem. The nature of study problem has 
defined the approach that the study should be executed to develop a sustainable 
solution for water services in Tanzania. This focus has opened another challenge 
of looking for the appropriate approach to organise and develop the idea from zero 
stage to formulate the most appropriate solution for Tanzania water problems. In 
that matter, grounded theory was adopted for critical discussion to evaluate its 
compatibility to the study as follows 
7.6 Mixed Research Method (Triangulation) 
7.6.1 Overview 
Gill [167] argues that mixed research method is a combination of tools study 
of the same problems. However, triangulation can also be defined as 'multi-method 
or convergent validation and for most part shares the notion of complementary 
qualitative and quantitative methodologies'. 
Brannen [144] argues that 'combining research strategies as a means of 
examining the same research problem and hence of enhancing claims concerning 
the validity of the conclusion that could be reached about the data' Mixed research 
method refers to a research strategy that crosses the boundaries of conventional 
standards of research by deliberately combining methods from different traditions 
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with different underlying assumptions. (Mixed method strategy is one that used 
both qualitative and quantitative research methods) 
Denscombe [228] adds that, triangulation involves the practice of viewing 
things from more than one perspective; this means the use of different methods, 
difference source of data or even different researchers within the same study. In 
other treatments triangulation is an application of different research methods 
aiming to solve the same question with basis that, the approach of different 
methods will strengthen the study. 
Troham [158] notes that, 'in quantitative study triangulation has the logic of 
enhancing the validity of findings'. Brannen [144] adds that, 'triangulation method 
does not merely involve methods and data only but it covers investigation as well 
as theories'. 
Romm [143] supported that 'positivism suggests that inductive and deductive 
reasoning operate to ensure science increasingly gathers improved accounts of 
eternal reality'. The available weakness will be eliminated within the process to 
come up with more quality findings. Generally, triangulation gives ways of 
formulating a problem, testing of theories, different ways of sampling and data 
collection, hypothesis testing, casual and social problem analysis [228]. 
7.6.2 Application of the Mixed Research Method 
Mixed research methods can be adopted and executed in any kind of 
research for the purposes of improving accuracy, widening the picture of study, 
compensating strengths and weakness, developing the analysis as well as an aid 
to sampling. 
I. Improving accuracy 
Using different methods to investigate the same subject improves the 
confidence and accuracy of findings because the method provides the researcher 
with the opportunity to check the findings from one method against the findings 
from another. Mixed research method approach seeks convergence, corroboration, 
correspondence of results from the other different method. It is the process of 
different methods the researcher can feel confident in assuming that findings are 
accurate 
ii. Getting a wide picture of the research area 
Adopting more than one method (mixed research method) enhances the 
findings of the research by providing a more wider and complete picture on the 
area of study. (the application of mixed methods facilitates the data produced by 
one method to be complemented by another method and therefore the combined 
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data from different methods of collection can provide alternatives and wider 
perspective ). 
iii. Compensating strength and weakness 
Mixed method offsets any inherent weakness or bias in one method by 
combining it with another different method; this can compensate the weaknesses 
and bias ness 
iv. Development of analysis 
The comparing of findings of the same study collected from different methods 
(mixed methods) can be adopted as means for the analysis of collected data. An 
alternative method is introduced as a way of building on what has been learned 
already through the use of the initial method. Mixed method is also adopted to 
produce more data that might shed light on things. 
7.6.3 Advantages and Disadvantages of Adopting a Mixed Research Method 
Technically mixed research method has more advantages than the weakness 
hence the method formulation is made to facilitate the elimination of weakness 
caused by using a single method (from either qualitative or quantitative methods). 
Qualitative and quantitative approaches when combined, one approach enhances 
another. It may even be the case that such investigations will come to be seen as 
yardstick for good research. Therefore the few major advantages of the method 
are; mixed research approach facilitates production of a wider picture. The findings 
are likely to address a wider range of the question related to how, why, what, who, 
when and how many? However, mixed methods when adopted provide links 
between different methods and different kind of data with different contribution for 
the research. More advantages of the method have been described in qualitative 
and quantitative as discussed in sections 7.3.1 and 7.2.2. The disadvantages of 
mixed research method are generalized to be very few because the methods 
compensate each other to overcome weaknesses from each method. 
Adaptation of mixed research methods has a disadvantage of the increase of 
time because each method needs for its application and therefore having two 
methods means much more time' than using a single method. The application of 
mixed research method requires the researcher to have or to develop skills with 
more than one method. This means the researcher needs to develop and exercise 
skills to cover both qualitative and quantitative approaches [228]. Gill [167] 
concludes that, in comparison with its disadvantage, the method is extremely time -
consuming and costly. 
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7.7 Selection of Research Method 
Selection of the appropriate method to be adopted for this research was not 
an easy job. Babble [134] argues that, 'each research method has its strengths and 
weaknesses, and certain concepts are more appropriately studied through some 
methods than others'. Blumer [136] adds that 'the method selected is determined 
by the nature and content of questions that researcher wish to answer, available 
sources and accessibility of potential subjects'. 
Lewis [135] notes that 'the method to be deployed in the study of social life 
must permit one to establish a relationship between the essential factors involved in 
social change. These relationships must be causal and must apply to the process 
of change. The whole process of selecting the suitable method for adoption it very 
complicated. Boynton [160] argues, 'There is no rule of thumb that tells a 
researcher precisely how to focus a study. The extent to which a research question 
is broad or narrow depends on the purpose, the resources available, the time 
available, and the interests of those involved. In brief, these choices are not 
between good and bad, but choices among alternatives, all of which have merit.' 
[160]. 
However, knowledge and guidance for selecting the appropriate research method 
for this study purely is guided by the literature knowledge (secondary data) and the 
research structure has been developed. Babble [175] indicates that, 'it is useful to 
consider the full range of possibilities for data collection in the study and to select 
the appropriate method against the set objectives, the nature of the project and 
predetermining the nature of the method, their use of closed-ended versus open-
ended questioning and save their focus for numeric data analyses. 
There being no guide for selection of right method for a specific research. 
Maykut [140] argues that 'anybody who wishes to study any aspect of the world 
about them has to decide what methods they are going to use'. Their decision is 
made on the basis of their assumptions about what kind of thing they are studying. 
Scientists who study the natural world, including plants, minerals and animals 
assume that the things they are studying are not aware of their own existence, 
since the causes of their behaviour are outside their control. The guidance based 
on literature arguments that, actual need for study, resources (funds and sources 
of data) and time given are the basic references to guide researcher for selecting 
the appropriate research method. Considering all evidence discussed in this 
section, the researcher concludes and adopts mixed research method 'multiple 
research strategies' commonly known as 'triangulation' as a study method for this 
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research. It is the purpose of strengthening the research quality by error elimination 
focusing on the disadvantages of applying any of the methods (qualitative and 
quantitative) [140]. Therefore adoption of triangulation method to this research will 
not only add value and upgrade the quality of this research but also will give the 
right approach towards the set objectives, and to develop the appropriate answer 
for Tanzania water management problem. The collected data through qualitative 
and quantitative methods were analysed and gathered, and captured concepts 
were adopted for model development. 
7.7.1 Adaptation to Survey Method 
The selection of an appropriate research approach is a critical decision in 
most social research processes. The selection is dependent on the objectives, 
sources of data, environmental conditions and availability of funds. Strategic 
approach for selecting the appropriate research method has been discussed in 
section 7.6 of this chapter. The ideal research method to any study depends on the 
nature of the research problem and approach. Principally, the research problem 
dictates the study approach (inductive or deductive), critically understanding of the 
research problem, the approach and knowing the sample areas, the method for 
data collection can be concluded. However, availability of funds and knowledge of 
the field environment are important factors on concluding the ideal method of 
approach. Therefore, the strategy guided the researcher to match the suitable 
method to the research problem. The research problem is developing of the 
appropriate model for water supply and sewerage services in Tanzania 
(developing countries) with inductive approach the adopted research method is 
survey method. Guided with literature knowledge and the research objectives, the 
researcher used his own judgment to balance the advantages and disadvantages 
of different research methods in order to conclude the appropriate approach for his 
research process. 
Kelly [237] adds that, 'surveys are well suited to descriptive studies, but can 
also be used to explore aspects of a situation or to seek explanation and provide 
data for testing hypothesis'. Nevertheless, the survey approach has the potential to 
provide a lot of information obtained from quite a large sample of individuals, whilst 
the advantage during the interviews is that open-ended questions can be applied 
with greater confidentiality in particular questions of special interest or can be 
executed in-depth, with follow-up questions asked whilst unclear items can be 
explained . 
. Marsh [233] argues that the survey method is a tool which, like any other tool, 
is open to misuse. It can be used to provide evidences for sociological arguments 
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as well as for ideological construction. Therefore, the survey as an inquiry which 
covers the collection of systematic data across a sample of cases is used in the 
case of a social survey in order to collect social facts (data)-not only in ways of 
collecting data but which also comprises the analysis of results. However, there is 
the unique advantage of survey approach, which the research produces data from 
the original source (field) as empirical data 
However, the survey approach in this thesis has been restricted in order to 
have two selected methods, including questionnaires and face-to-face interviews 
with open-ended structured questions. The restriction was for the purpose of wide 
and in-depth coverage on data collection owing to the nature of the two adopted 
methods. The open-ended questions were structured and strengthened following 
pre-tests, whereby the first developed questions were sent to three different people 
in Tanzania for testing in terms of quality, clarity and content verification. Notably, 
the questions were precisely structured and clearly presented, which often dictates 
the range of answers from respondents whereby the aim was to get consistent 
answers to consistent questions. The question is, is the approach developed 
properly to the extent that, the structure of the questions can appropriate measure 
to the required objective?, because ensuring of maximum and quality information 
depends on questions structure and its composition. However, the advantages of 
the questionnaires are its ability to accommodate a large number of people 
(participants) within a short period of time; therefore, the researcher can fix his/her 
finite time span for a project, which can ultimately assist planning and the delivery 
of end results. 
Furthermore, Denscombe [138] adding that, the survey approach is a 
research strategy and not a survey method. Many methods can be incorporated 
with the use of a social survey. The adoption of this strategy allows the use of a 
whole range of methods within the strategy, including questionnaires, interviews 
; 
and observations. Therefore, the researcher choose to adopt a mixed approach for 
data collection, hence is compatible to the method and it opens wide range of 
information coverage. 
7.8 Primary and Secondary data 
7.8.1 Secondary Data 
According to Ghauri [165] secondary data are very useful and can help the 
researcher in the areas including answering research questions, guiding the study, 
solving some or all of the research questions. Helping in problem formulation and 
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or making more concrete and focused research questions, deciding about the 
appropriateness of a certain research method or even suggesting better research 
methods for a particular problem. Secondary data also provides benchmarking 
measures and other findings that can be compared later on with the results of the 
study at hand. Furthermore, scholars recommend that all research should in fact 
start with secondary data. Begin with secondary data and only when secondary 
data are exhausted or show diminishing returns, proceed to primary data. However 
sometimes secondary data provides enough information to answer the research 
questions. In this research the application of secondary data was obligatory for 
formulation of the study methodology and topic (developing finding the appropriate 
model for managing water services) which would not be possible if there were no 
secondary data. The structure of this research has been formulated from 
secondary data. At the final stage of model development some basic references to 
support the model are sourced from secondary data 
In this research the secondary data were gathered from various sources 
including literatures, websites, journals, contracts documents, policies, government 
newspaper magazines and other useful documents from Leeds University and 
Tanzania. Whereby, greater part of secondary data from literature was used as a 
primary tool for formulation, development and guiding the research. However, most 
of the documents were used as evidence building concept towards establishing the 
answers to this research. 
7.8.2 Contribution of secondary data to this research. 
The knowledge acquired from literature review guided the researcher to 
formulate the research problem and develop a broad understanding of it. The 
information from the literature review helped to make a better base from which 
research conclusion has been made. Knowledge adopted from other projects, 
accelerated the researcher's confidence in handling and tackling general research 
problems. For example, the decision to change questionnaire's format of language 
(from English to Swahili) happened in the field, due to the difficulties respondents 
had in understanding English, Basically, the approach and strategy for data 
collection was developed from the literature review. 
However, the review of various documents (contracts, policies, government 
gazette, performance and various project progressive reports) in the field Tanzania, 
has given the researcher special experience on understanding the real challenges 
on water management and operations in the field. Therefore, secondary data had 
significant contribution to this research. 
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7.8.3 Disadvantages of Secondary Data 
Using secondary data as a source of information requires extra care at every 
stage of adoption, because the data have been collected from different studies and 
developed for different purposes. Secondary data are information collected by 
anybody from one of many sources either to be used for a similar or different 
research purpose. Adopting secondary data is a new use of old used data to a 
different study aiming to solve a very different problem, which may not comply with 
previous objectives. 
Secondly, the accuracy of secondary data is in the hands of the researcher, 
which obligates him/her to verify the origins, the process of collection and whole 
analysis in general. However, secondary data are very useful and important to any 
new research project. Ghuri [133] argues 'not matter how correct they are, in 
normal cases secondary data alone cannot lead to the answer for any new 
research project'. Therefore, secondary and as well primary data should all be 
treated with higher priority and therefore it is obligatory to the researcher to 
organise collection of the necessary data for his/her research project. 
7.8.4 Primary data 
The importance of primary data to any research is immeasurable. The nature 
of research problem commands the source(s) and approaches of where and how 
primary data should be collected. Primary data has to be a major source of 
information to this research. The survey method with combined approaches 
including interviews and questionnaires was adopted to this research. Therefore, as 
indicated that the research problem is inefficient water services in Tanzania the 
primary data source to be from the same country. 
Adam and Kamuzora [278] argues that, 'primary data is the data collected by 
the researcher himself/herself or by researcher's assistants from the field for the 
purpose of answering research question/issue' The common ways used for 
collecting primary data were through observation, questionnaire and interviews. 
These tools are also advocated as survey methods, as discussed in section 
n07.5.4. The nature of research problem obligated the researcher to adopt two 
methods (interview and questionnaire) for data collection in Tanzania 
7.8.5 Targeted Information and Sample Sizes (primary data) 
According to the research design and objectives of this study the domain 
primary data were collected form Tanzania in different sources (sampling areas) 
including DAWASA and DAWASCO employees, (as the organisation responsible 
for services provision in the city of Dar-es-salaam and the Coast region), the 
Ministry of water and Irrigation (responsible for water policy matters), Oar-es-
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salaam water consumers (affected service users) and Presidential Sector Reform 
Commission (PSRC) (The supervisors of public sector reform in the country 
including Dar-es-salaam Water Supply and Sewerage Authority (DAWASA) 
privatisation). 
Cooper [229] indicated the 'determination of sample size comes down to 
estimating the minimum size needed to obtain results with an acceptable degree of 
confidence. Calculating the sample size involves evaluating the feasibility of the 
research objectives'. The proportion and nature of information guided by the 
objectives of the study indicated the sample size for this research is 166 people 
performing various roles from different institutions in Tanzania. Therefore this 
research concluded four sample points as follows. 
i. DAWASA and DAWASCO employees 
In this area a total of 74 employees responded to information request. 
Employees were more targeted because they were fully involved in all the three 
different water services provision in the country including public services 
management, private services management and current water services 
management. Given their wide experience they were the right source of raw data. 
Therefore information on changing working conditions, incentives, motivations, 
participation and their involvement in DAWASA privatisation process were the key 
information expected from DAWASA and DAWASCO employees. 
ii. Government sector (Ministry of water and PSRC) 
The information collected from this sample' area represented by three (3) 
senior officers from the ministry of water and irrigation and one senior officer from 
PSRC. The reason of earmarking this area was that it represented the Tanzanian 
government's responsible organisation for water services policy issues, water 
development master plan, funding for water. development projects and controls 
water prices issues. The PSRC has been executing the reform of all government 
policies including transformation of DAWASA to private management. Therefore, 
the information from this source was on policies in the water sector, information on 
DAWASA privatisation and the driving force behind it, expectations on private water 
services, capital funds for water projects and conditions of the World Bank loans. 
iii. Public (water customers) 
Information from the public (water customers) was necessary to this research 
not only for information verification but as also to understanding the different types 
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of service provision including public services, private water services, and current 
water services. The information was collected through structured questionnaire 
forms, which were designed to give detailed information on water services including 
(water quality and quantity, water charges, customer care and sharing of water 
services information) from customer's point of view. 
7.8.6 Sampling and Sample Size 
Sampling in this research was adopted as a process of sorting or selecting 
elements out of many, with the intention of examining, inspecting, testing and 
analysing them. The results of which will represent them all. Sampling methods or 
sampling techniques are many and selection on which to be used depends on the 
nature of the project's objectives, time and funds available for data collection. 
However, statistics and theoretic are the only two types of inference which can be 
applied to achieve external validity. Generally mathematical process, statistical and 
theoretical inferences are the main tools applied to obtain samples from targeted 
population, however, analytical generalization is not always based on mathematical 
or statistical inferences, and it is sometimes concluded from logical reasoning 
especially on focusing on population [151]. Therefore, due to nature of the study 
and subject of research this research obligated to select the discussion of few 
major sampling methods including Judgment sampling method, Random sampling, 
Systematic sampling method, Multistage sampling method and Cluster sampling 
methods. Therefore, for the given reasons researcher was concluded to adopt 
Judgment sampling method. 
i. Judgment sampling method 
The application of this method depends on personal understanding of actual 
situation of the sample areas and its environment. The researcher sets the criteria 
which are more favourable for sample select, whereby in practice this method all 
elements are selected according to precise criteria established by the researcher. 
In normal management research, judgment samples are very popular than 
probability samples, whether the intention is for qualitative or quantitative 
processing. Judgment sampling also allows sample elements to be selected 
extremely precisely, making it easier to guarantee respect for criteria such as 
homogeneity, which is required by certain research designs. Judgment sampling 
does not follow set theoretical criteria, but in order to use it, researchers must have 
good understanding of the place where data are going to be collected and general 
nature of study. 
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ii. Random Sampling method 
The method involves random selection of elements using a random 
procedure, meaning that the procedure which selects one element might not be the 
same for selecting other elements. However, the method is each element of the 
population has the same have the same probability of being selected into the 
sample (equal probability selection). The elements of the sampling frame are 
numbered serially arranged from 1 to N and a table of random numbers is used to 
select them. The method is highly recommended sample collection in the larger 
area. Furthermore, the method can be adopted in the situation with geographically 
diverse elements, which can lead the exercise to be very expensive [151]. 
iii. Systematic sampling method 
Systematic sampling is very closely related to simple random sampling 
method. The only significant difference is that systematic sampling method does 
not require a numbered list of elements for each sampling area. The systematic 
process selects the first element is randomly picked from the sampling frame, and 
then the selection of the following elements is at constant set intervals. However, 
the selection interval is inversely proportional to the sampling ratio of the sample 
size N (for example sampling ratio is 1/100: therefore one element will be selected 
in list of every 100 elements), [142]. 
iv. Multistage sampling 
Multistage sampling makes repeated selections at different levels. The first 
stage corresponds to the selection of elements called primary units. At the second 
stage subsets called secondary units are randomly selected from and within each 
primary unit. The procedure is repeated until the final stage, when the elements 
selected correspond to the units of analysis. A multistage cluster sample is 
probability sampling procedure that allows such geographically dispersed 
population to be adequately covered, while simultaneously saving interviewer time 
and travel costs [174]. 
v: Cluster sampling 
It is sampling techniques which are mainly applicable when natural grouping 
of sample areas is evident to guide presentation. The technique is common 
applicable in research market, however in cluster sampling method sample area is 
divided restrict equally and collectively comprehensive groups (clusters) and 
sample elements are picked from each of those groups (clusters). The required 
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information is absolved from the elements those selected from each group. Burns 
[142] adds that, cluster sampling is particular type of two stages sampling, whereby 
elements are not selected one by one, but from subsets known as clusters. Each 
element of the population belongs to one and only one cluster. At the first stage 
clusters are selected randomly, and secondly elements of the selected cluster are 
included in the sample. 
vi. Setting of sample sizes for primary data collection 
Sample size this is the actual element (people) number picked in each 
selected sample area for the required information. However, calculating the sample 
size involves evaluating the feasibility of the research objectives which can 
sometimes cause modification of the research design. According to Hallway [155], 
determination of sample size really comes down to estimating the minimum size 
needed to obtain the results with an acceptable degree of confidence. In samples 
destined for quantitative data processing, this means determining the size of 
sample that enables the study to the desired degree of precision or significance 
level for qualitative research. It is size that confers an acceptable level of credibility. 
Cooper [149] argues that, 'the larger the sample, the greater the confidence 
in results, whatever type of data processing is used'. However, large samples pose 
problems of practicality in terms of costs and scheduling. Beyond a certain size, 
they can also pose problems in terms of reliability for the single reason that the 
sample is very large. Nevertheless, the larger sample can increase the number of 
collection, recording and encoding errors as well. However, some recommendation 
for sample size setting including sample must be large or it is not representative, A 
sample should bear some proportional relationship to the size of the population 
from which it is drawn, The greater the desired precision of the estimate, the large 
the sample must be, The greater the disperSion or variance within the population, 
the larger the sample must be to provide estimation precision, The narrower the 
interval range, the larger the sample must be and If the calculated sample exceeds 
5% of the population, sample size may be reduced. 
7.8.7 Approach for secondary data collection 
Strategically all secondary data were collected from two major sources 
including literature and field area (Tanzania). Literature captured at Leeds 
University was sourced from journals, tapes, magazines, newspapers and internet 
Secondary data were outsourced from number of public and non-public 
official documents including water policy, Acts, Government water development 
plan, government gazette, Millennium goals, Ministry of water 2008/2009 budget, 
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Documents for basket funding, DAWASAJ City Water lease contract, World Bank 
procurement procedure, The World Bank loans conditions, The World Bank and 
EIB procurement procedure, DAWASA NWSC partnership contract, DAWASCO 
performance report, Construction supervisor reports, Performance monitoring 
reports, revenue collection reports and Technical Audit reports were all critically 
reviewed. 
Each document was separately critically reviewed and all substances related 
to process of DAWASA privatisation, water services acts in Tanzania, role and 
duties of various players in water sectors, World Bank condition for loans, contract 
performance details, targets in contracts were gathered for assessment. Similar 
items were combined and analysed. However, data adopted in form of text were 
analysed by using Content Analysis Method (TCAM). However, numerical data 
such as daily revenue collections, tariffs, number of customers, amount of water 
production and water consumption rates were analysed by Statistical Package for 
the Social Sciences (SPSS) methods. 
i. Expected information from each sample group for analysis 
Strategically, the structured questionnaires and interviews were designed to 
accommodate the collection of all the necessary information to fulfil the study 
objectives. Each sample group had necessary and specific information to bring in 
for analysis. However, presentation of different groups of samples was obligatory 
not only for data verification but also unsure wide and in-depth coverage of the field 
information. However, in general the expected and targeted information was to 
have a detail and picture on Tanzania water services ranging from governing policy 
to operations issues during the whole the three periods (before, during and after 
privatisation). Therefore, each of the four (water users, DAWASA, DAWASCO and 
government officers) sample group areas was strategically earmarked to bring up 
specific information, whereby the concepts were merged to formulate a common 
solution. In this case, the selected sample areas and targeted information from 
each sample group can be summarised and presented in table form, please see 
table no 7.1 below. 
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Table 7.1 Information targeted for analysis 
SN AREAS OF PARTICIPANTS TARGETED INFORMATION 
TARGET 
Government Sector L Ministry of Water Policy issues, water services 
1 iLPSRC background before, during and after privatisation 
L Management Contractual issues, project 
2 DAWASA iLCommon implementation, targets in 
employees performance, project monitoring 
and planning 
Operations, maintenance, water 
3 DAWASCO 
L Management production and services issues iLCommon 
employees and revenue collection (billing) 
management issues and 
4 . Public (Water Big and Small water Change in water services and 
users) customers the effects 
7.8.8 Strategic approach for Primary data collection 
The field work in Tanzania executed to collect primary data through 
systematic structured format of questions (questionnaires) and interviews for 
specific people. The need for executing mixed method for executing mixed method 
for field work was concluded from the nature of study objectives, with greater focus 
on easiest way of collecting maximum required information within the designed 
period of time. The approach and content was designed to meet the required 
information for the research objectives, while each question has specific 
information to be extracted. The time given for completion and return was seven 
days. This approach did not work and it was only after a follow up of the researcher 
himself that 136 completed forms were collected for analysis. 
The face to face interviews were structured with similar questions. The 
implementation was carried by distributing structured interview questions to 
selected officers through their personal secretaries. The request for face to face 
interviews was made, and open end structured interview was executed to almost 
83.3% of all targeted officers. Kumar [157] adds that, 'open-ended questions 
provide in depth information if used in an interview by an experienced interviewer. 
In questionnaire, open-ended questions can provide wealth information provided 
respondents feel comfortable about expressing their opinions and are fluent in the 
language used. 
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i. DAWASA 
Focusing on getting information form common employees, with the 
permission from DAWASA chief executive officer, 40 questionnaire forms were 
randomly distributed to member of staffs (not management) from different 
departments. 
Within the same period appointments were made and three senior officers 
(management team) were interviewed including Director of Finance, Director of 
quality assurance and Planning and studies Manager. The interviews were carried 
with structured questions. The answers were recorded at the same time were notes 
in writing were taken. However, immediately after the interviews the captured 
information from these two means (written and recorder) were compared for quality 
and correction. This was information .adopted as management general views. 
ii. DAWASCO 
The approach for data collection in DAWASCO was different in comparison 
with the process applied for DAWASA. At DAWASCO 65 questionnaire forms were 
officially handled to Chief Human Resources officer and through her official status 
these questionnaire forms were distributed to 8 sub branches offices. The Sub 
branch managers were responsible to randomly pick 8 employees within their areas 
for completing the questionnaires. The period of one week was fixed to return the 
completed forms. At the end of my field study 50 completed questionnaire forms 
were collected for analysis. 
The interviews with DAWASCO management team were with the Chief 
Human Resources, Chief Commercial Operations, Technical Auditors and 
Customer services manager. The same structured questions with management 
focus on DAWASA privatisation, process adopted during the privatisation of 
DAWASA, capital funds from loans and conditions, failure of DAWASA privatisation 
and the effects and sources of funds for water projects were adopted during the 
interviews. 
iii. Water Customers 
The permission was granted by DAWASCO Chief Executive officer, the 
researcher distributed 10 customer questionnaire forms to large consumer services 
manager, 10 forms to Public relations Managers and 5 questionnaires to each of 
six water operation zone areas, The customers who came to settle their water bills 
or any water complains were requested to fill those forms. The questions were 
designed to give feedback on quality and quantity of water supplied during the 
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three different periods before during and after privatisation of DAWASA, value for 
money, customer care, position and participation of customer in general water 
services, water billing process and what do they think should be. All complete forms 
were collected on day to day bases for analysis and further action. At the end of 
field work period the researcher collected 46 completed customer questionnaire 
forms and from those questionnaires the information was adopted for analysis. 
iv. Ministry of Water and Irrigation 
The face to face interviews with three senior officers including the Assistant 
director for urban water services, resources planning and ministry chief lawyer, all 
from ministry of water and irrigation were conducted. The interviews were 
conducted under special arrangement with the permission of assistant ministry 
permanent secretary. The open end interview questions were systematically and 
purposely structured to fulfil the research objectives. Therefore questions were 
developed in considering what information is needed and will be collected from 
management team (decision markers). It is information from those who participated 
full in DAWASA privatisation. The study has to have clear picture of whole 
privatisation transactions and the effects specifically from government officer's 
views. This was a necessary part of information for formulation a practical answer 
of the research. The targeted information were on government water policies, 
source and driving forces for DAWASA privatisation, effects of DAWASA 
privatisation, process adopted, funds for water development, conditions and effects 
of the world bank loans, water customer's reaction on privatisation, experiences on 
different water management services (private and public) and expectation on future 
water services in the country. The same procedure was applied during the interview 
with PSRC officers. Finally all collected information was gathered and analysed. 
7.8.9 Responses on Data Collection Compared to Targets 
According to the targets on required information as detailed in section 6.5.1, 
total of 155 questionnaire forms were distributed to the targeted groups and out of 
those only 136 questionnaires were filled and collected for analysis. However, three 
forms were not correctly filled or completed. The response was about 77.8% of the 
expectation. Regarding on the interviews, the executed interviews from all planned 
sources were 10 out of 12 predicted senior officers. However, again this is 83% 
performance out of expectations. That makes the total response in primary data 
collection to be 78% of the designed volume of data required for this study. The 
verification of data from individual information or groups of people is automatically 
compensated in this coverage. The 78% achievement for data collection was 
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sufficient for next step of the research process. Nevertheless, the process of data 
collection was executed by one person researcher himself and in detail the 
response on each area was as follows. 
i. DAWASA employees were the first targeted sample group and as 
explained in section 7.8.5 with permission from chief executive officer 40 
questionnaires were randomly distributed to all level employees by the researcher, 
whereby the collected filled forms were 24, this is 60% of all targeted responses 
and therefore the information from 24 people was adopted for analysis being 
representative of the sample group of DAWASA employees 
ii. DAWASCO employees this was a second sample group targeted to give 
information from 65 employees, with assistance from DAWASCO head of human 
resources officer the questionnaire was distributed and after a week 50 percent 
completed were collected. This is 77% of total targeted information from this group. 
Therefore, the information from 50 collected forms were adopted for analysis being 
representing DAWASCO employees group. 
iii. DAWASCO water customers 
This was the third targeted group for data collection through the 
questionnaires method. Total of 50 questionnaire forms were distributed to large 
and small customers form more detail (see chapter 6 section 6.7.3iii) and out of 
. that 46 forms were correctly completed and collected, this is 92% achievement of 
total targeted information from the group of water consumers 
iv. Government officers 
The information collected from this group was through the face to face 
interviews which were conducted by the researcher from 12/5/2008 to 20105/2008. 
The target was to interview 12 senior officers (Three senior officers from the 
ministry of water, 3 from PSRC, 3 directors from DAWASA and 3 directors from 
DAWASCO). Unfortunately we managed to complete only 10 interviews making 
83.3% achievement of all targeted interviews. The information collected was 
basically policy issues, decision making, plans for future, involvement on DAWASA 
privatisation, loans condition, alternatives sources for capital funds and water 
management in general. The information from 10 interviews was adopted for 
analysis to represent the whole group of officers. Nevertheless, the whole picture of 
the responses from all targeted areas of 167 respondents is 130 people, this is 
78% achievement. This achievement gives confidence and strength that the 
methods adopted for data collection were appropriate. The summary picture of 
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achievement on data collection can be presented in table form as follows (see 
Table 7.2 below) 
Table 7.2: The response areas for primary data 
SAMPLE AREAS ESTIMATED ACTUAL ACHIVEMENT IN 
RESPONSE RESPONSE PERCENTAGE 
DAWASA 40 24 60% 
Employees 
DAWASCO 65 50 77% 
Employees 
Water Customers 50 46 92% 
Government 12 11 83.3% 
officials 
Total Response 167 130 78% 
7.9 The interview structure and contents 
The adoption of interview method to this research was based on the data 
collected through questionnaires having coverage in width (quantitative) and not in 
depth. The adoption of interview method will automatically compensate the gap of 
coverage left by the questionnaire and therefore to create more quality data 
necessary for analysis. 
Bryman [264] comments that, the future of an interview is in eliciting 
information by the interviewer from the interviewee under the operation of rules of 
varying degrees of formality or explicitness concerning the conduct of interview. 
Therefore, the method of structured interviews for data collection was obligatory not 
only for in depth data collection but also for promoting standardisation of both 
asking of questions and as well the recording of answers. 
i. The Structure of Interview 
The semi structured interview questions were designed to be open ended to 
give a wider scope of information collected from respondents. However, also the 12 
interview questions were structured with focus on who the interviewees were and 
what kind of information is expected from them. The 10 interviewees from 
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DAWASA, DAWASCO, MNISTRY of WATER and Presidential Sector Reform 
Commission were the people for all information regarding the whole of the water 
services in the country. In particular, the adaptation, procedure, implementation 
and effects of private water services, conditions of the World Bank loans and their 
effects from DAWASA experience and other possible sources for funding water 
supply projects. 
The reason to interview senior officers is that, they are and were part and 
decision makers during the privatisation takeover and also it was the only way of 
getting them involved. Traditionally senior officers are not very interested on filling 
of questionnaires (writing) so interviews were the better strategy. Interviews were 
carried the day afterwards the notes and recorded information were compared for 
verification before returning to interviewees for approval and verification. 
7.9.1 The questionnaire structure and content 
Questionnaire is a set of questions set or asked by an interviewer who 
records the answers for his/her specific use. The structure and composition of 
questionnaires for this study was developed to fulfil the need of collecting maximum 
information as required for research objectives. The development of a survey 
questionnaire for this study was based on three major factors including aim and 
study objective, type of information required for the study and easiest way of 
collecting quality data. The contents were adopted from the model framework 
developed for field test (see chapter 6 section 6.8.7). Greco [261] argued that, 
before the questions can be designed it is necessary to have a clear idea of what is 
being investigated, when the domain is clearly defined and then the researcher 
may proceed to formulate the questions. However, domain usually defines the 
information to be gathered and their relevant sources. 
i. Questionnaires structure 
McNamara [263] saying that, in collecting data for an study 'questions are 
developed to find out what people know, feel and think' Therefore, designing of 
questions for data collection can be structured into two different types including 
open end and closed questions. The differences between the two are, in closed 
type the questions are designed with sets of alternative choices of answers from 
which the respondent can choose from among of the given answers. In open ended 
the questions are designed to give no options answers to respondent, in this case 
the respondents provides their own answers in their own words. This research 
adopted both closed and structured open ended type questions with a greater 
- 180-
focus on source and type of data to be collected and the area of contribution of the 
respondents' free ideas. 
Kumar [264] argues that, 'It is important that questions are clear 
understandable, also the layout of a questionnaire should be such that it is easy 
read and present to the eye and the sequence of the questions should be easy to 
follow. This situation obliged the researcher to translate the questions from English 
to local national language (Swahili). This was the easiest and faster way of 
communication. 
Therefore, from question number 1 to number 9 of the DAWASA employee's 
questionnaire form all questions were multiple choice closed questions and the last 
question no.10 was open end question with no limit on contribution. However, the 
questionnaire form for water users were also dominated with 16 closed multiple 
choice questions with only one last question (no.17) open ended. In whole structure 
each question was designed with very simple clear sentences, while the three 
optional answers were given to every closed question. Respondents were restricted 
to select only one the most appropriate answer out of the three given answers. 
Fraenkel [235] adds that, for every question that needs answering on the 
basis of survey data, we have to ask ourselves whether or not an examination of 
some sort will be involved, and whether or not the comparison will be possible from 
the data planning to be collected. The comparison is to ensure that the sample 
groups exist on the same basis so that they can be validly compared. 
However, according to Bryman [173] research questions must have clear 
social scientific angle and if research questions are not specified clearly, there is 
greater risk that, the research will b.e unfocused, unclear of what research is about 
and what is data collection for. Therefore, questions were designed clearly to give 
back the real and meaningful information necessary for this research (see the 
questionnaire in appendix M in the CD). However, the information collected was to 
cover periods before, during and after privatisation in Tanzania. The collected 
information were combined and scrutinised for analysis and concept adaptation. 
7.9.2 Data Analysis and the Adopted Concepts 
Data analysis for this research was on accordance to variables which 
originated from local Tanzania data and the analysis was carried carefully and 
effectively. 
Dunsmuir [146] states the 'analysis is the process of organising information 
that you have collected'. Data analysis is the act of transforming data with aim of 
extracting useful information with aim of coming up with conclusion. 
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Breakwell [163] argues that, 'it is not surprising that data analysis has number 
of very different ways of proceeding methodology'. Teahurst [161] comments that, 
data analysis may be simple and straight forward and may follow fairly logically 
from the collection technique to be used. However the analysis of data may be 
complex and thought needs to be given to the time and the skill which are required 
to undertake the analysis. More consideration should be given to the format of 
collection of data two (2). The collected quantitative and qualitative data analysis 
procedure potentially allows the researcher to develop the theory from the data. 
Therefore, information from primary data sources through interviews and 
questionnaires covered in a greater part of this research, and mainly were in the 
text form. Therefore, the transcript content analysis (TCA) method was applied. 
Secondary data were also collected in text composition form and this factor of the 
collected data being text composition suggested the adoption of qualitative analysis 
method, while SPSS method was adopted for analysing some quantitative data 
collected through interviews and secondary data. 
i. Analysis of data from interviews 
The information collected through interviews from 3 DAWASA and 4 
DAWASCO senior management officers, 3 directors from ministry of water and one 
officer from PSRC. The information were gathered and analysed to represent the 
group idea. The contribution from this group has special importance in this 
research; it gives the real picture of water management in the country which helps 
to understand the system and its weaknesses from decision makers, with objective 
of developing the appropriate and sustainable solution for Tanzania water 
problems. The researcher adopted the TCAM for interview data analysis. The 
information were collected fairly, with open mind and without bias ness. Then 
reviewed critically, the information covered from areas including process and 
adaptation of private water services, project implementation, role and duties of 
each organisation in water services sector, conditions of loans and contracts, 
services performance, targets against performance were gathered for scrutiny. The 
systematic analysis was carried as follows. 
Process of analysis started immediately after the interviews. Whereby, the 
answers during the interviews were directly compared with the information captured 
on tape recorder. It was a primary verification, to ensure the clarity, quality and 
control of data from each of the groups. The concept captured from each group 
was adopted as contribution towards development of sustainable solutions for 
water problems in Tanzania. 
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The information from each group were scrutinised the most sensitive 
statements were transcribed separately. From this information on each group the 
indicated most sensitive statements was transcribed separately. The statements 
with similar meaning were combined to form few paragraphs with common 
meaning. The substantive statements were sorted from each group and categories 
according to the similarities. After comparison, the statements with similar category 
were combined to form a group of similar meaning. To ensure no specific message 
left, in-depth checking for all information of each group was carried. And finally the 
analysed messages with similar presentation were adopted to form group 
substantive statement to represent the individual group message. The 
interpretation was done in each group and this was carried as an official meaning 
of each group. Concepts from each group were adopted for scrutiny as a 
contribution for development of appropriate solution for water management in 
Tanzania. 
7.9.3 Analysis of quantitative data (questionnaires) 
The structured open ended questions were developed with the target of 
maximising information on water problems and the challenges. Total of 140 
questionnaires were distributed and 136 were competed and collected including 50 
from water customers, 46 from DAWASCO employees and 40 from DAWASA 
employees. The information collected through questionnaire was interpreted in text 
form and content analysis method was adopted for analysis. The data were first 
converted and presented in graphs and table format. The information those were in 
form of numbers (numerical), for example amount of water production per month, 
amount of revenue collection per month and expenditures per month were 
developed in a spread sheets and with help of SPSS different behaviours were 
analysed and interpreted. For example, the comparison on how much funds was 
collected during the three different periods (before, during and after privatisation). 
Concepts from quantitative and quantitative methods of data analysis were 
triangulated (see diagram nO.7.5) and adopted for developing the appropriate 
solution for Tanzania water management problems. The primary and secondary 
data were critically analysed through both qualitative and quantitative methods and 
combined concepts were adopted to develop the conclusion of the study as follows. 
Each of the categorised groups (numerical and textual data) was analysed 
separately according to the nature of the data under the following major steps 
i. Firstly, all numerical data were clearly developed in spread sheet 
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ii. Secondary, using SPSS different characters were developed in form of 
table and graphs 
iii. To get the meaning the developed characters were interpreted into text 
format and the concepts were adopted 
For, the qualitative data as detailed in section 7.9.2 that, hence the collected 
information were in text format, therefore the researcher adopted method for 
analysis was Transcript Content Analysis (TCAM) as easy analysing the data in for 
of text (qualitative data). 
7.9.4 Triangulation in Data collection and analysis 
The concepts adopted from the analysis of questionnaires and interview with 
help of literature knowledge were evaluated for comparison to fit the research 
objectives with focus on developing the appropriate solution for water problems in 
Tanzania. 
Fienberg [147] acknowledges that pooling data on the same topic from 
several sources or examining several studies simultaneously, can be an effective 
vehicle for better understanding of the topic, through technical problems can be 
severe. 
Laws [36] argued that, In application of qualitative and quantitative methods, 
'qualitative research aims to collect facts and figures using the methods like 
questionnaires or formal interview (social survey) while quantitative aims to gain 
more in depth understanding of a situation by involving informal interviews in 
participant observation or analysis of personal diaries' Therefore, multi-methods 
approach adopted during the primary data collection and after triangulation was 
ensuring in-depth and wide coverage of available information and as well to help 
counterchecking the solidity of the provided data. How data were collected, 
gathered, analysed and combined for concepts adaptation is clearly discussed in 
sections 7.B. Therefore the whole process of triangulation in data collection can be 
summarised and presented as shown in figure 7.1 below 
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Figure 7.1 Triangulation methods data Collection and Analysis 
7.9.5 The adaptation Concepts and Model development. 
The Ideal model for this research was developed from the concepts adopted 
from experience based on literature review and the field information. As discussed 
in chapter 6 section 6.8.6 that, different water services experiences from Sub-
Sahara African countries including Uganda, Kenya, Ghana, Senegal, Guinea, 
Gambia, Zambia, Somali and Cote d' Ivoire were critically discussed and analysed 
(literature contribution). And from the discussion the concept were gathered to form 
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model frame work (see section 6.8.9). In section 7.9.1 of this chapter indicated that, 
the contents of the questionnaires and interviews were adopted from this 
developed model frame work. Therefore, the questionnaire survey and interviews 
conducted in the field Tanzania were transporting the adopted experience from 
literature knowledge to be tested in the field. Therefore, from field results the 
concepts were developed and with additional literature knowledge the Ideal model 
for water management in Tanzania was established. 
7.9.6 Model Development procedure 
The executed procedure for developing the ideal water services model for 
Tanzania composed of three different stages including development, field work and 
the model development stage. These stages were structured to fulfil the objectives 
of the research and that the procedure will ensure quality and appropriateness of 
the solution. Each stage was structured with specific duties to perform of which 
each stage in the structure depends on another (see figure 7.2). 
As discussed in the research structure at section 7.3.1 that, development 
stage is foundation of the research and therefore it guides whole implementation 
and procedure of the research. The task of literature review is main duty of this 
stage, which necessary for establishing research plan, the research problem, 
followed by aim and objectives, methodology and the developing frame work model 
and questionnaire for field test. The strategy was established and information from 
various sources including literatures, website, magazine and journals were 
gathered and concepts were developed and adopted to build model for field work. 
And from model frame work concept were adopted to develop questionnaires (see 
section 7.9.1) that taken to the field test. 
The tasks implemented in the field work stage were data collection, analysis, 
verification and validation. Data were strategic collected with help of other tools 
including tape recorder, note pads and camera during validation period. Various 
sources including water customers, DAWASA and DAWASCO employees and 
government officers were involved. Using questionnaire and interviews the task 
was carried and the collected data were analysed (by using TCAM and SPSS) to 
develop POCO. 
According to the structure of research, through interview method validation 
was carried in seven regional water authorities including Iringa, Mbeya, Mwanza, 
Arusha, Tanga, Morogoro and Moshi. Various contributions were collected and 
analysed. 
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The last stage designed to document the whole research process, 
development of abstract, acknowledgement, conclusion and recommendation for 
future researches, the ~bjective is come up with quality thesis. Therefore 
systematically and stage by stage with good floor of material contents the thesis 
was detailed documented to form a volume of 300 pages. 
The adopted research procedure with three major component theoretical 
development', field work and development and model building can also be 
presented in form of diagram as shown below see figure 7.2 
Water management Problems in 
Tanzania 
• 
Literature Review, Question of 
study and Methodology Development Stage 
.. 
, Testing of 
Field k Privatisation Model Documentation formulation of 
Interviews and questionnaires I 
Stage , 
I Field Work - Data collection r 
, 
I Development of New Model - POCO I 
... 
} Model Developm Field Work - Validation of 
New Model 
, , 
ent 
I Fundina Model II Manaaement Model I 
+ , I Conclusions and Recommendations 
Figure 7.2: Adopted Research Approach 
7.9.1 Summary 
Methodology of this study has been structured to guide the whole procedure 
of research implementation aiming to ensure the objectives have been reached. 
Knowledge and guidance for selecting the appropriate research method for this 
study purely is guided by literature knowledge. The process involves challenges 
and not easy task due to· its complicity in considering the objectives of the study. As 
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discussed in section 7.7 of this chapter that, the complicity of the research question 
and the set objectives forced the implementation process to adopt a combination of 
methods (multiple stage strategies). The method has facilitated with successful 
results the adoption of questionnaires and interviews in the field Tanzania. Only 
one approach of qualitative data (questionnaire) collection would have not been 
easier for Tanzania because traditionally most of the officers do not like much 
paper work, therefore the use of questionnaires alone could have limited the 
percentage of responses. On other side organising interviews for all employees 
being the only source of information could have been impossible due to time 
limitation for feed work. Therefore, we can say that application of mixed method 
was necessary not only for the purpose of quality but for situation like Tanzania 
data collection would not be possible without application of mixed method. 
Furthermore, the initial verification of corrected data was carried in the field through 
comparison of the same information collected by different tools; however also 
similar questions were given to big number of despondences checking with 
comparison was adopted as one of verification tool. Validation of the developed 
solution was carried through interview in different local selected areas, where the 
model is expected to be applied however, the comments and challenges were 
adopted for quality assurance and model strengthening. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: FIELD RESULTS AND MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the empirical findings, from the field work and other 
experiences within the Sub-Sahara African countries. Systematic data analysis and 
detailed procedure for developing the (solution - POCO) new model for water 
services in Tanzania has been discussed. 
8.1.1 The purpose and content reflect to this chapter 
According to the objective of the study and the structure of this thesis (see 
chapter 1 section 1.6.8, this chapter is structured to evidence the origin, source and 
the detailed procedure used to develop the research solution for the concluded 
water services problems (capital funds and management model) in Tanzania. It is a 
stage last for development the answer for the research question. Chapter six (6) 
has evaluated and concluded the major problems on water services in Tanzania 
and other covered sub-Sahara developing countries developed previously during 
the discussions in chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5. In chapter 3 section 3.9.3 was concluded 
that, realistic answer for the research question should able to solve the two crucial 
and fundamental problems including the appropriate management model and 
availability of sustainable, unconditional capital funds for water development. 
This chapter was developed to cover systematic analysis of the field data from 
each sampled area. The concepts adopted from field data with knowledge of 
guidance form literatures made possible formulation of this research solution. 
The field work approach has contributed good knowledge of local ideas which 
improved the value of model in strength and as well in local acceptability. This 
would have been not possible if the adoption of concept from field data couldn't 
have taken in consideration. The process, the developed contents and the adopted 
concepts to formulate the model has clearly indicated where the research solution 
is originating. This has indicating that, the developed research solution has greater 
contribution of local ideas, the place where the problem is. The diagram no. 8.1 
below shows the flow of the process for model development from the analysis of 
field data, concepts from previous discussions, model development, testing and the 
solution POCO. 
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Data analvsis and model development 
Previous discussions concluded in 
chapter 6 (literature knowledge) 
Validation of the Model 
(Field work) 
Diagram nO.8.1 main inputs for POCO development 
8.2 Section 1: Systematic analysis to each sample group 
8.2.1 Detail process of primary data analysis 
Sources for data collection, method for analysis and the adopted procedure 
for collection and analysis have been clearly discussed in previous chapter (see 
chapter 7 section 7.7.6 and in table no. 7.1). Therefore, the analysis is as follows. 
8.2.2 DAWASCO Employees 
The information gathered from 50 DAWASCO employees, regarding water 
privatisation experiences. The answer was 45 employees out of 50 are not in 
favour with private water services because, they note that private water 
management brought in different treatment among the employees, (while classes 
/categorisation and grouping the under different classes for treatment - in salaries, 
benefits and even in working coordination among them were increasing). Job' 
security was not present due to introduction of new structure of working rules with 
more focus on maximisation profit. Privatisation brought in a gap between low class 
employees and management. The low paid employees remained inferior and less 
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confident with feeling that, the new system have neglected them and they were 
value less, this situation has greater effect in relation to employee's performance 
(demoralised). It is discourages working performance and also may be adopted as 
one of the evidence that led private water services to be not accepted. 
i. The process of DAWASA privatisation 
41 respondents out of 50 collected forms indicate that, from preparation, 
implementation pr9cess up to termination of privatisation was confidentially 
planned, supervised and implemented by the government. Even the ending of 
privatisation was just officially announced by government and, employees were not 
involved in any process. This indicates that, Ideas and opinions from employees 
were not included in the whole process of DAWASA privatisation, they were taken 
by surprised without knowledge of change, without knowing what next, this might 
have caused unacceptability of privatisation. 
ii. Expectation of private management practice in water services 
Views from 46 responses indicated that, employees expectation were good 
working environment (modern working tools and equipment's), attractive salaries 
and bonuses, open chances for skills development (training), recognition and 
award for good performance. There concluded that very few of these things were 
practiced and almost all were not in place. This shows that, employees were not 
enough motivated and lack of motivation in provision of services may reflect to poor 
performance. 
iii. Opinion for future management for DAWASA 
65 questionnaires were collected from DAWASA and DAWASCO employees. 
The summary presented was that, water services in Dar-es-salaam should be kept 
under local citizen management. It should be structured according to the actual 
local needs. Any foreign structure or model of management will be difficult to be 
adopted as it was not developed or oriented with local traditions and culture. 
Therefore the interpretation is private management of water services is a foreign 
developed water management style. This suggests that, the appropriate and 
practical water management style for Tanzania should be developed in the country 
based on local environment needs and managed by local people 
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iv. Dividing operational area into small size operating sub zones 
60 respondents out of 71 distributed forms collected from 
DAWASAIDAWASCO employees indicated that, the DAWASA operation area is 
too big. The idea of dividing water services area into sub branches is appropriate 
and will improve water services. It is closer to customers. Customer's information's 
and water services behaviour can be easily monitored in a small area. Revenue 
collection and leakage control will be more effective under branch management. A 
more effective DAWASA organisation structure should have sizeable small water 
operational branches. 
v. Was DAWASA privatisation successful? 
The 62 DAWASA and DAWASCO employees answered that DAWASA 
privatisation was not successful for different reasons including. 39 employees' 
referred to the government declaration that, water services are still poor. The 
government has also declared that private operator city water services have failed. 
15 employees states, privatisation was not successful because there were not 
treated well. 60 workers indicated that, were taken to privatisation by surprise 
(there were no information; everything was handled confidentially, not well 
prepared for change). Seven employees expressed that, the new roles introduced 
by private operator were not accepted by employees and this caused motivation 
drop down and poor relationships. From these factors, the message here is 
privatisation was not successful because, employees were not prepared for 
adopting the change, and the introduction of new rules was not accepted by 
employees. These altogether were the causes of unacceptability which led to 
privatisation failure. 
vi. The views on government decision of terminating the private operator's 
contract 
66 DAWASA and DAWASCO employees supported the government decision 
of terminating DAWASA City Water lease contract for City water services for not 
performing as agreed in the contract. 
The failure of City Water discouraged privatisation in the country. In 
comparison the current system of water services under DAWASCO seems to be 
supported by the majority of DAWASCO employees. The currently organising 
structure was locally established as a quick substitute to cover the gap left by the 
private operator (DAWASCO was temporary solution for a government to fill the 
gap of city water services). However, 12 employees' note that, communication 
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among workers has been now improved, because all workers are treated equally 
and now workers are friendlier than before (team work). Majority supported the 
termination of private operator and now under temporary structure of operation 
(DAWASCO) employees indicated they satisfaction. The message here is 
employees there are in favour with local developed model, and local management 
team. 
vi. The assessment of the cause of DAWASA privatisation failure? 
DAWASA and DAWASCO (68) employees mentioned that, lack of 
participation, poor cooperation between management team and common 
employees, lack of transparency, lack of motivation for good performance and the 
private operator having poor experience in field of privatisation or limited knowledge 
of the operating area were the mains causes of the failure. Meaning that, 
employees were not involved in process of DAWASA privatisation (participation). 
the government handled it confidentially (lack of transparency). However, the 
government was forced to go for private water services without having experience 
in the area and caused poor preparation of the whole privatisation process 
including neglecting the employee's participation. Private operator had poor 
experience of the area (culture, traditional of local people) introducing new rules in 
this situation might have caused a morally conflict. 
Workers adds that, private operator concentrated highly in empowerment of 
new technology to meet the designed private operator's targets (that has 
accelerated the costs of operations) which seem to be different from DAWASA 
privatisation objectives (Conflict of interest). Private operator interest was on higher 
profit making (priority for those who can pay fast), while the government interest 
was services first and best services to all. Therefore from employee point of view 
the causes of failure were lack of transparency on the whole privatisation process, 
lack of participation, poor cooperation and low experience of private operator on 
local culture and traditional. 
vii. Compare the three different style of water management (public water 
services, private under city water and current DAWASCO?j 
DAWASCO (46) employees commented that, privatisation made services 
worse, increasing of water problems and water price rise. Employees indicated 
that, the services that were provided under public management before privatisation 
was far better than the services provided by private operator, water rationing was 
less and charges were low. 
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Employees indicated the current DAWASCO water management style, that 
current water services are much better than during the period of the private 
operator. The improved areas are control of water leakages, workers motivations 
and incentives and general management relationship to common employees. 
Table 8.2 presenting the summary of comparison in different areas according 
to the information collected in the field from 70 DAWASA and DAWASCO 
employees. The purpose of comparison is to identify the weaknesses and success 
in each period. The concepts will adopted for developing the most efficient and 
acceptable management style suitable for Tanzania needs. The comparison based 
on assessment of various areas of performance as captured from the 
questionnaires categorised into three different periods including DAWASA period 
(before privatisation), City water (privatisation period) and DAWASCO period (after 
privatisation). Therefore the table of comparison structure was limited to measure 
availability and effectiveness of drivers of performance including motivation to 
employees, general working atmosphere, availability of tools and equipment and 
salaries and incentives. In chapter 2 section 2.6.4 indicated that, termination of the 
DAWASA City water lease contract was caused by operator's poor performance, 
therefore the indicators were developed to find out what was the cause of the 
performance failure? The results will be adopted to improve the solution model. 
Generally all the given factors (motivation to employees, general working 
atmosphere, availability of tools and equipment and salaries and incentives) are 
stimulant or motivation to accelerate the work performance. Therefore availability of 
these factors in working place will make the performance successful. Each factor 
has specific role to drive individual performance. The better the performance, the 
better on productivity which gives sufficient water to all and also motivation for 
willingness to pay. Comparison in all mentioned areas will give a good picture of 
performance necessary for further step of model development. The summary of 
comparison presented as follows (Table 8.1 below) 
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Table 8.1: Comparison of working environment 
DESCRIPTION CITY WATER DAWASCO 
OF ITERMS DAWASA PERIOD PERIOD PERIOD 
Team work Good team work No team work Moderate 
Type of management Good cooperative New management Little Coordination 
management with new rules 
Motivation Highly motivated Low motivation Zero motivation 
toemployes 
Working condition Good atmosphere Serious In Not bad working 
everything atmosphere 
Tools and Equipment Very old Modem New working tools 
equipment's and equipment 
period 
Salaries and incentive Low salaries with Government scale Government 
motivation salaries without salaries without 
incentives incentives 
8.2.3 Summary from the table no.8.1 
From the information available in the table the following things can be 
concluded 
i. The DAWASA and DAWASCO employees more happy and good working 
condition during the period before privatisation although salaries were low and tools 
and equipment were few and old, they were highly motivated because of good 
cooperation with management team 
ii. The period during privatisation (City water services) (DAWASA and 
DAWASCO) employees were less motivated because of little coordination with 
management' team due to introduction of new management rules and less 
incentives with government scale salaries, however new and modern working tools 
were available 
iii. The current period under DAWASCO the employees indicated that, the 
cooperation between management team and employees has started to build up, 
new working tools and equipments are available, although salaries are still in 
government scale without any incentives 
Does these three different situations have any effect in performance? the 
answer is YES; The comparison in performance discussion in chapter 2 section 
2.6.1 that, evaluated the annual performance within these three period indicates 
that, the performance during the period before privatisation was higher and better 
than privatisation period (City water services) although after privatisation period 
(DAWASCO) the performance has raised up again. The comparison in 
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performance has been summarised under one major indicator revenue collection 
and that during the period before privatisation the revenue collection was Tsh. 
14,087 million during the privatisation period dropped to Tsh,12,903 million and 
after privatisation period raised up again to Tsh. 17,776 million {see table no. 2.2}. 
Considering that, tariffs were reviewed just after privatisation started. Therefore, 
good coordination, team work and transparency have greater effect is 
performance. (Motivation is the factor). 
8.2.3 Summary on DAWASA and DAWASCO employee's concepts 
The following summarised are the key findings 
i. The preparation for change from public management to private services 
{from DAWASA to City water Services} was planned and executed by government 
of Tanzania confidentially. Employees were not involved in any part of process 
which resulted in the employees to having very little knowledge on the objectives 
and the whole process of change to privatisation. 
During the privatisation process new working rules were introduced by the 
private operator. This abruptly change resulted in discouragement of the 
employees work performance. This may be one of the major causes of privatisation 
failure in the country. This can be summarized and presented in diagram as shown 
below see figure no. 8.2 
Employees 
Ignored in the 
whole 
privatisation 
process r. Discouragement, Poor 
.. 
Failure of 
Disintegration and ~ performance privatisation 
Change of r. no team work 
management 
and 
introduction of 
new rules 
Figure 8.2: Major causes of privatisation failure. 
During the process of DAWASA privatisation, the government overlooked 
equal participation of DAWASCO and DAWASA workers. They were not given the 
opportunity of contribution and participation in the whole process of privatisation. 
This mistake may be o'ne of reasons why the DAWASA privatisation couldn't work. 
The private operator was so fast to introduce new rules which were not accepted by 
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employees. This caused motivation drop down and poor relationship with employer 
The research suggests that, this approach to privatisation would not work. 
ii. The change of management organisation structure during the private water 
services and the introduction of new rules were some of the major factors, for 
failure employment security to be not reliable during the private services period. 
Employees had feeling that new rules were neglecting them and they thought that 
the rules were introduced make them redundant. . 
iii. The operational area for DAWASA services should be divided into sma" 
reasonable sub branches this wi" ensure efficiency in services by being so closer to 
customers.' This wi" facilitate close follow up and quick attempt of customer 
problems, good management of water distribution network especial on leakage 
repair and control. 
8.2.4 Results from Customer Survey 
The information targeted from DAWASCO water customers was to enable to 
the provision of water services in the three (Public, private and current DAWASCO) 
different periods to be evaluated. This assessment was needed as guidance to 
practical solution for existing Tanzania water management problems. Comparison 
on quality of water services provided during these three periods is challenging 
because there are some common factors (similarities) and as we" differences, 
whereby the concepts are developed from both similarities and differences. 
Customer's information is feedback on the actual situation in the field. This 
research considered the information from DAWASCO water customers to have a 
higher value. It is important tool for screening the provision of water services in 
those three different periods. The quality information from water users will 
encourage and accelerate the development of a solution for the users themselves 
and government. Therefore the information from 46 despondences which is 92% of 
the target was collected for analysis as follows. 
i. Questions; As Customer, did you knew that, DAWASA is going to be 
privatised? Do you support privatisation? 
Water customers (45) agreed that, privatisation of DAWASA was known to 
them before the implementation. Their also accepted that them being customers 
were not involved in any part of privatisation process, because the government was 
handling it confidentially. The concept here is on water users' position of the whole 
process of DAWASA privatisation. Changes (public to private) not being 
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transparency to water users made them feel isolated, not recognised this may have 
been cause of unacceptability of private water services to customers. 
This means water users went to private water services without awareness or 
by push. Unknowingly taking water consumers from public water service to private 
system may cause resistance to which revenue collections may drop down. 
Resistance and unacceptability may all account to privatisation failure. Therefore 
there is a need for finding an appropriate solution which is acceptable, practical and 
clear to all. Regarding on privatisation support or not customers were divided, 24 
costumers were against privatisation because of worries on high water charges, 
and 23 water users were in support for private water services because of expecting 
better water services. 
ii. Opinion, was DAWASA privatisation Successful? 
Water users (41) commented that, water services under private operator was 
not successful, increase of water shortage and higher water charges were the 
many reasons. Customers expected that, private water services will improve the 
water flow, quality of water will be higher, a reliable billing system and fair water 
charges. All these didn't work out. Water services under the private operator were 
more difficult than before. According to this analysis the privatisation was not 
successful and there were better without privatisation. This is a challenge that an 
appropriate water management style is needed in the country for better water 
services. 
iii. Expectation from best water services provider? 
The summary of their answers were priorities, starting from the most 
important as follows. 
1. Receiving clean and safe water all the time 
2. Receiving the required amount of water with good pressure all the time 
3. Reasonable water charges (fair water charges) 
4. Water for domestic use and extra for other commercial purpose 
5. Good customer care 
Focusing on the customer's analysis indicated there should be appropriate services 
to cover the custor:ner expectations 
iv. Importance of services performance monitoring in water sector? 
Water consumers (33) indicated that, performance monitoring is a very 
important factor ensures the quality and progress of the project implementation. 
And it should be a part in any good management model. 
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In analysing private water services customers indicated that, the private 
operator City water services and as well during the public water services. 
Monitoring of work performance was not serious issue. That's why water leakage 
were main, customer water bills were not good and it was a permanent problem, 
records were not kept. In this discussion customers indicated that performance 
monitory is a driver for better services in water industry and therefore it should be 
available in any good structure of water management.:, 
v. The Questions. On opinion regarding comparison of services provided 
during privatisation period, before and after 
The analysis (40) customers' note that, water supply services provided by 
private operator was not as good as expected; It was poorer service than DAWASA 
and the current DAWASCO services. People couldn't get enough water and water 
rationing increased. Water supplied was always with a low pressure, frequently 
interrupted either by power cuts or burst pipes. Water charges were rising up 
concurrently. The other 6 customers admitted that, currently water supply services 
under DAWASCO management are more stable and better than during the period 
of privatisation. There are still some problems which existing serious including 
water shortages and in a greater part of Dar-es-salaam. Water is supplied by 
rationing with low pressure and interruption of services due to power cuts and pipe 
repairs still exist. There are some improvements than during the City Water period. 
The analysis from water customer's comments has evidenced unsatisfactory on 
water services provided by private operator, and therefore the concept adopted 
here is private water services under city water company didn't perform well to 
customer satisfaction in both areas including water services and as well water 
prices. And that the adaptation of private water services in the country caused 
unaffordable higher water prices. 
vi. Question: How can you assess the government commitment in the whole 
issue of DAWASA privatisation? 
48 customers attempted the question and all agreed that, although there 
were not consulted, the government was highly committed to implementation of 
DAWASA privatisation. Customers note that, it was the government obligation to 
maximum commitment for assuring the success of DAWASA privatisation. The 
government invested more commitment on the preparation stage but with lack of 
experience at implementation stage the commitment was not much. The question 
intended to capture the evidences of whether the commitment of government has 
an impact on changes especially on ensuring the successful introduction of new 
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water management style. Therefore the concept from this analysis is government 
commitment can accelerate the speed to change and as well play great role on 
acceptability and facilitation. 
vi. Question: Cause for DAWASA privatisation failure? 
The customer's 24 forms were analysed and indicated that the government 
taken it so fast without having enough experience of privatisation in the country. 
The importance of this question was to evaluate the reason and causes of the 
failure for the future improvement. Tanzania went for water privatisation without 
enough preparation. Water customers and as well DAWASA employees were not 
prepared for privatisation. However, the new experts (management team) from 
operator's side took over City water operations without having enough knowledge 
of local environment, culture and social behaviours of employees. The confusions 
from both sides made an unsuccessful privatisation. The process of change in 
water management services needs enough time for preparation and a good 
strategic approach. However also understanding of local environmental for practice 
will add value on the whole process of implementation and acceptability. 
Vii. Question: Privatisation of water services has greater contribution in 
provision of quality and reliable services in this country? 
The consumer's 28 forms were analysed and interpretation that, private water 
services in Tanzania has not achieved the objective of providing quality and reliable 
water services. From their experience private water services (City water services) 
created more difficulties in the country. Their insisted that, privatisation won't work 
here anymore. Their said, with reference from City Water Services experience we 
want no more privatisation, the situation before was far better than during 
privatisation period, the need is to improve the previous style of water services 
under local management. They believe that, local developed model under local 
management is more effective than any other way. Hence the local developed 
model will have contributed with some local ideas. Acceptability and applicability will 
be there and therefore, quality and reliable water services will be guaranteed. 
viii. Question: Value for money in water services? 
49 customers answered that, value for money in water services was not 
existed. Services provided were not reliable, because of absence in quality and 
quantity. However, the term 'value for money' at this situation presented the 
evaluation on economy, efficiency and effectiveness of services in the field. 
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The available small amount of water was not possible to serve all. Therefore 
the understanding of water value for money to customers is where the quality, 
quantity reliable and affordability are met; this concludes that, the true model for 
solving water problems in Tanzania should have to cover value for water according 
to the customer's definition. 
ix. Question: How do you value the termination of DAWASAI City water 
Company contract before the time? 
The collected information from 46 customers out of all 50 completed the 
forms, were analysed to answer if the government did the right thing to terminate 
the contract because the private operator city water services. Actually this decision 
should have been taken earlier so water services destruction could be at minimum. 
This shows the termination of the contract was also supported by customers. The 
government had economic reasons for termination (government income was 
dropping down because of poor revenue collection by City water services. The 
lesson here is ideal water management style should accommodate the customer 
and as well government interest. 
8.2.5 Summary of Customers Contribution 
The analysis covered in this section has scrutinized the customer answers. 
The analysis from customers will be adopted in development of the 
appropriate solution for water services in the country. The conclusion from 
customers can be as follows 
i. During the privatisation of DAWASA customers were not involved or were 
not considered as important stakeholders. Understanding through participation 
makes it easy for acceptability while uniformed customers may cause resistance. 
This was one of the process failures noted from customers. 
ii. DAWASCO water customer's opinions on accepting private water services 
were divided on the sense notes that, 24 customers were against of water 
privatisation with worrying that, private services is always costly and therefore 
focusing on that water supply services we will not be affordable to all. On other 
hand 23 water customers were happily supporting water privatisation with higher 
expectation that, water problems will be no more, availability of quality and quantity 
water with best customer care will be in place. However, when private operation 
was implemented the second group of customers those had high expectation of 
better services were more frustrated because they couldn't get enough water to 
meet there expectation, this forced all two groups of customers to unite under one 
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tone of rejecting private water services. Therefore DAWASCO customers rejected 
private water services because of its poor services. 
iii. The lessons adopted in summary analysis on questions vi, vii, viii and ix 
guided the research to concluded that mitigation to future reliable and affordable 
water services in the country will only be possible through development of local 
water management style under professional committed leaders and privatisation 
will work no more. However, a good knowledge from the failure of private services 
should be adopted as challenge for coming up with better solution. 
iv. According to the summary analysis customer's opinion on failure of private 
water services in Tanzania can be concluded that, the failure was due to under 
quality performance of city water services. However, the failure h~s left behind a 
good challenge of researching the appropriate water services management model 
acceptable for Tanzania needs. 
8.2.6 Findings from the senior government and Parastatal Officers 
The study had interviewed 10 decision maker officers from government 
offices. The interviews were structured to come up with information on the specific 
areas including policies and government involvement on water business. On the 
other side the interview questions were made to examine the government role and 
partiCipation in water development, handling of private water management process, 
general management of water services, sources of funding water development 
projects, conditions of loans and its effects in the water sector. The a'nalysis and 
adoption of concept was executed as follows 
i. Question: What do you understand DAWASA privatisation? 
A total of 4 DAWASCO and 3 DAWASA officers admitted that, they were not 
informed of anything on DAWASA privatisation. They insisted none of them was 
involved in the process. The process was executed confidentially by the 
government because the government was worrying and feared demonstrations and 
resistances from DAWASA employees and other people. This situation of senior 
officers being not aware on DAWASA privatisation indicates the communication 
gap between government and DAWASA officers. The barrier on flow of information 
may jeopardise efficiency in performance and may also create misunderstandings 
and break down of team work. The 3 ministry officers and 1from PSRC indicted 
that DAWASA privatisation didn't come accidentally was strategically planned, The 
adoption was planned and strategically executed under three major steps of 
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implementation including policy amendments, legal steps and technical 
implementation steps. Also they admitted to be fully involved in DAWASA 
privatisation process. They knew and they participated in the whole process from 
preparation stage. The lesson here is the government executed DAWASA 
privatisation confidentially. All water services employees were not involved except 
few responsible officers from ministry of water and PSRC who executed the whole 
process of privatisation. 
ii. Question; what was driving force for DAWASA privatisat;on? 
The 3 water ministry, PSRC and 3 DAWASO officers indicated that, It was the 
urgent need of funds for repair and rehabilitation of the existing old water 
infrastructures that forced Tanzania to request a loan from the World Bank. The 
World Bank granted $ 165 million loan with condition of privatising DAWASA. The 
privatisation of DAWASA was part of the World Bank loan's condition to the 
Government of Tanzania. The government aim of implementing this condition was 
earning a loan from the World Bank. The original objectives of the request was for 
capital funds to improve and develop sustainable water infrastructure for Dar-es-
salaam water services 
iii. Question b: Why Tanzania went for World Bank and no other financial 
institutions? 
The answers analysed from all 10 officers was that, the government of Tanzania 
was forced to go for only a World Bank loan because no any other international 
institution was ready to assist the project. The World Bank indicated a willingness 
to help as the amount required for the project was very big so other financiers were 
hesitating to assist. The World Bank offer was grant inclusive and loan settlement 
period was comparatively longer than other financial institutions (15-20 years). The 
existing aged DAWASA infrastructure was discouraging new investors. The World 
Bank motivation of giving loan plus small% of grant convinced the government to 
accept the loan. Motivation to help should be widely examined, because it could 
have impact in total loan payback, especial with interest of 15% of the total loan 
amount. This indicates that, the World Bank initial sign of willingness to assist plus 
grant was a lobbying to make business,(the World Bank is operating as private 
business financial institution). The loan goes with 15% interest. Unless the 
conditions are favourable but loans from international institution should be 
discouraged. The challenge here is to find out the alternatives funding sources 
favourable to our needs. 
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iv. Question: What was the government commitment in the whole water 
privatisation issue? 
The 3 ministries and PSRC officers answered that, the government was highly 
committed to privatising water services because it was believed that, this was the 
only solution for Tanzania water problems. Evidence shows that, the government 
installed the water policy Act. 2002 for DAWASA privatisation covers other various 
private activities including private security services, consultants, contractors and 
many others. In 1994 the Government of Tanzania signed a special agreement with 
United Kingdom to guarantee the safety and protection for all foreign investors 
called Investment Promotion and Protection Treaties (IPPT). The agreement 
objectives were ensuring safety and security for various private investors and extra 
offers of Tax relief to any new private business. These were the few examples of 
the government commitment on private operations in the country. The question 
was designed to understand how much the government commitment can contribute 
to changes when a new style of water management is adopted. The lesson here is 
government has greater position to influence changes once the commitment is 
invested, this fact should be considered during the development of any new model 
for water management. 
v. Question: Why lease contract method was adopted for DAWASA 
privatisation? 
The 4 government officers (PSRC, and Ministry) answered that, the DAWASA 
privatisation method (lease contract) was adopted from the analysis of the following 
factors: The Government was not ready to lose ownership of DAWASA. The 
Government of Tanzania desperately needed capital funds (for repair and 
rehabilitation for existing old aged infrastructures). PSRC officers add that, the 
nature of the service was very sensitive to the public with greater attraction in 
government political repetition. The government couldn't let it go. The service is for 
all people and therefore leaving such a sensitive issue on hands of private foreign 
contract alone is risk. 
At the same time DAWASA assets (infrastructure) was very old and to not 
attractive for share selling to generate capital funds. Therefore the Government 
was to repair and rehabilitate first and capital for that was not available. 
The information analysed from these interviews, concludes that, the government 
decision on which privatisation method to be adopted has been greatly influenced 
by political interests. The position of government was not to lose the DAWASA 
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ownership while at the same time, wanted DAWASA to be operated privately. The 
government wanted to have a strategic influence on the water sector because of its 
higher capital investment in water projects, and water touches all and has political 
sensitivity. On other side the government was looking for capital funds for 
rehabilitation of DAWASA infrastructure. These factors proving the possibility of 
political bias during the decision and process of privatisation, which may be the 
cause for adoption of lease contract method. The political decision of privatising 
DAWASA was not the government's origin idea. The government for political 
reasons was not ready to lose the ownership of DAWASA all what they wanted was 
capital funds for rehabilitation, however to secure DAWASA ownership and for loan 
qualification the government went for lease contract method. 
vi. Question: How was the risks focused in DAWASA privatisation? 
The 5 government officers answered that, all possible DAWASA privatisation risks 
and their avoidance has been taken care in DAWASAlCity Water lease Contract. 
Has been covered in areas including equity contribution, Guarantee from parent 
company and Indemnity (water quality, water quantity and work performance per 
given time). Duties and responsibility of DAWASA and City water was clearly 
explained and punishment or penalties for not performing or underperformance are 
also stipulated clearly in the lease contract. Therefore all risks including 
performance risks caused by force majeure and many others were well covered in 
the contract. The direct concept to adopt here is focusing on possible risks and how 
protect is an idea to be adopted during development of any water management 
model. 
vii. Question: What was the reason for termination of DAWASA / City Water 
contract? 
The collective answers from 4 ministry senior officers, 1 from PSRC and 3 
DAWASA were, the reasons for termination of DAWASAlCity Water contract 
privatisation contract was due to material breach of contract, 
a. The private operator (City water) was not contributing its equity as agreed 
b. Performance guarantee of US dollars 8.5 million was not replaced 
c. Non-paying of rental fees 
d. Poor performance of works: due to Poor revenue collection, Poor water meter 
installation, Poor water leakage control. The termination for DAWASAlCity Water 
lease contract was for those reasons. The City Water Services could not fulfil 
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contract obligations and therefore the government of Tanzania was forced to 
terminate the DAWASA City water Lease contract. 
viii. Question: Do you think, was DAWASA privatisation successful? 
The general answer from all three (3) senior officers and supported by 4 
DAWASCO officers was, DAWASA privatisation was not successful due to the fact 
that objective set was not met. However the transfer of property was carried 
smoothly and successful but the actual implementation was not done accordingly. 
This indicates that, private water services under city water services was not 
successful 
ix. Question: What are the lessons (experience) gained from the failure of 
DAWASA privatisation, which can possible adopted for future use? 
The collective answers from all seven officers were as follows 
a. Evaluation of bidders for privatisation tender should be more serious and 
critically to cover in wide the bidder's background, history of experiences of the 
bidders in the region and the tender should be more competitive to involve not less 
than three bidders. (not like it was for DAWASA tender); In case where the number 
of bidders is less than three the advert should be repeated to call for bidders. 
b. Independent regulator should be in place before the nomination of private 
operator (contractor), this will ensure good services control from very beginning. 
c. Critical inspection of proves and evidences to satisfy that bidders have enough 
capital, skills, professional members and good experience in the particular area. 
The effects and implication of evaluating one bidder as happened to DAWASA 
privatisation tender may always lead to select incompetent and unqualified 
contractors, like what happen to nomination of City water Company. The approved 
contractor City Water couldn't afford paying contractor equity and had not ability of 
proper skill of managing to perform according to the contract. This facilitates poor 
image of the whole exercise. The ability and experience of the bidders should be 
critically evaluated to not allow coming up with weak and inexperienced contractors. 
However, also selection of incompetent contractor may leady to weak performance 
of duties. Therefore City water services may be was incompetent from very 
beginning and that resulted to contract poor performance with unnecessary cost 
impact for Tanzania due reorganisation and judicial process for termination. 
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ix. Question: What are the benefits of DAWASA privatisation? 
According to eight public officers contributions the analysis indicated that, 
achievement of capital loan from the World Bank was one of the major benefits of 
DAWASA privatisation. 
The private operator introduced new ideas of commercial focus in water 
management this was also noted benefit of privatisation. Private operator 
introduced new management rules which were good for security and discipline in 
any working place. Private operator brought in new tools, equipments and new 
skills of managing the equipments. 
The example of benefit from new equipments and technology brought in by 
private operator was underground water system construction by using tube turner 
ring instead of excavating the whole bigger space which could have caused many 
inconveniences, long time and cost more. The concept here is, any change has its 
advantages and disadvantages and therefore any change should be acknowledge 
by analysing what has contributed to the community. Regardless the failure of 
DAWASA privatisation, but privatisation in the country has opened number of 
challenges including management change of culture, change of water managing 
style and focus of services in commercial aspect which brought in commercial 
sensitive in water services, Introduction of safety issues and techniques for good 
customer care. Whereby, the noted changes were adopted as challenging 
contribution towards realist solution for Tanzania water problems. 
x. Question: What was the customer's reaction on privatisation? 
This question was answered by all 4 DAWASCO senior offices that, within the 
project implementation period customers have different reactions. At the very 
beginning of the project most of the customers had higher expectations that with a 
private operator no more would exist. The majority supported and welcomed private 
water services. After period of time when customer realize that there is no service 
improvement as per there expectation, and instead water rates were rising rapidly. 
Those who supported private water' services were disappointed and they turned to 
be the greater opposes of privatisation. The whole idea of the question was not 
only measure the customer's reaction on privatisation but also to measure private 
water service in terms of services and costs during the period. The question was 
structured to capture some input from customer's reactions and relation to private 
operator. This analysis of government officials indicating that water users are not in 
favour with private water services 
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xi. Question: What do you know about World Bank conditions for loan? 
The answers form 3 ministry officers and 4 DAWASCO officers were that, the 
World Bank loans conditions were divided into three different parts. The first was 
loan qualification conditions in which DAWASA privatisation was obligatory. Second 
condition was Tanzania government contribution (Local contribution) of Tshs.750 
million to cover counterpart contribution. A third condition was implementation 
procedures in which the World Bank procurement procedures, control and project 
supervision was to be followed. All procurement should follow the World Bank 
procedure and final decisions are made by the bank. The condition of adopting the 
Word Bank experts, who are highly paid, was also from the loan. The conditions 
were designed to fulfil the commercial and business purposes of the bank. 
The test on effects of the World Bank conditions in Tanzania from 
government official's information was indicated that, DAWASA. privatisation was 
forced by the World .Bank, under 'no privatisation no loan' condition. The Tanzania 
government was only looking for funds (loan) necessary for repair and rehabilitation 
of water infrastructures and not privatisation. The major effect of the World Bank 
loan was privatisation of DAWASA. The failure of privatisation has left behind 
number of different effects including chaos in employees system of wages, water 
leakages was above 40% of total water production, no funds left in operation 
account, big debts for electricity bills and quick restructuring of Dar-es-salaam 
water services to form DAWASCO as replacement for City water. 
The lesson here is having no capital funds was a bottom cause of DAWASA 
privatisation, therefore two recommendations are adopted from this situation, Firstly 
the World Bank procedures for assistances (loans) should allow flexibility of its 
condition according to actual existing borrower local circumstances. Secondary the 
World Bank first considers building capacity of local contractors to prepare them to 
compete with international contractors if the condition is IBC. However, concept 
here is development of local capital funds from local sources is the only way to 
avoid such heavy unnecessary damaging World Bank conditions. 
8.2.7 Summary From the interviews answers 
.The answers of the senior government and parastatal officers were analysed and 
summarised as follows. 
i. The discussions indicated that, private water services are no longer trusted 
by DAWASAIDAWASCO employees (section B.1.5vii), water customers and 
government officer in Tanzania. Government of Tanzania being not ready to lose 
the DAWASA ownership and the combined effects of bad experience left behind by 
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the failure of DAWASA privatisation. The privatisation is no longer accepted by 
anyone in the country. The ideal solution for water services in Tanzania should not 
be privatisation, because it will not be accepted and therefore it won't work. 
ii. Tanzania adopted privatisation only as a step to qualify for the World Bank 
loan necessary for rehabilitation and repair of DAWASA water services system. To 
avoid to be forced or be free from foreign external conditions Tanzania should 
come up with its local capital funding method as a solution for water development 
capital funds. This would be an alternative from the World Bank loans with difficult 
conditions. 
iii. The World Bank should be advised to be flexible on its conditions to 
borrowers, especially the effects of the loan conditions to developing country 
especially on the conditions that limits and obstruct government borrowers 
development for example condition of International Competitive Bidding that does 
not give chance to local contractors to win the tender due to poor capital, condition 
of providing sometimes less needed experts with higher salaries from the loaned 
amount. Therefore to come out of all these new solution for water capital funds 
should be developed from possible local sources in order to get out of unnecessary 
loans conditions which favours the donor's objectives. 
iv. Evidences from analysis shows that, provision of water services under 
public management has been not successful due to diminishing of water and 
sewerage services in the country. This obliged the government go for the World 
Bank loan. These facts obliged the researcher to conclude that, the practical and 
compromiSing style for water supply and sewerage services in Tanzania should not 
be private or public water services, but good lessons from private and public 
services should be adopted in the solution. 
v. Privatisation of water services has good contribution in terms of skills and 
technology development, which when evaluated properly can be adopted in any 
model for better water services. 
vi. Adoption of private water services has been proved to be one the factors 
for loan qualification according to the World Bank rules. Therefore, privatisation can 
be used as tool for loan (capital investment) qualification or any other means of 
capital fund generation. This gives bad emerge of privatisation, because 
privatisation can still work better without ICB and other conditions. 
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vii. Approval for successful or failure of private water services should be 
measured by evaluating the services provided by the private operator in certain 
fixed period of time after privatisation this should be compared to the actual 
situation before privatisation against the objectives on agreement for privatisation . 
. In this case the transfer of property from public to private hands is just one step of 
privatisation and in older to justify the full successful privatisation the evaluation 
should consider the objectives of the privatisation. 
viii. From the discussion evidenced that, bid evaluation for selection of private 
contractor to provide best water services should be concluded from number of 
competitive and not only with competitor, one bidder evaluation system should not 
be used, and hence one (company) bid like what happened in DAWASA may result 
to favour the available contractor which may not necessarily be the competent. 
ix. From analysis of government official's comments noted that, for social and 
political reasons the government was not ready to lose the DAWASA ownership, 
that's why government went for lease contact with City water services. The concept 
here is development of ideal water services solution should take in consideration 
this government interest. 
8.3 Part 2: Concepts adopted from secondary data (Covered discussion) 
According to the discussion covered in section B.1 that, the solution for water 
problems in Tanzania should be formulated with concepts developed from primary 
data (field in Tanzania) where the problems are to be solved: and as well the 
concepts developed from other experiences (Sub-Sahara developing countries) as 
discussed in chapter 6 section 6.B. The key concepts adopted from the literature 
and surveys are laid out in following sections. 
8.3.1 Commercialisation of water services 
The concept of commercialising water services was developed and adopted 
from analysis of commercial water ~ervices in Sub-Sahara African countries 
including Zambia, Somalia and Kenya as discussed in chapter 3, 5 and 6 ( 3.4, 
5.4.3) 
Commercialising water services was as one of the management style 
alternatives for sustainable and affordable water services. The adoption of 
commercial water services will make the country out of loans. Produced water is 
sold at a calculated price to cover the actual operation costs and is affordable to 
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focus on development. The commercialisation of Nyeri water services covered in 
chapter 3 also evidenced that, under commercialisation reliable, affordable and 
quality water services can be achievable. As discussed in chapter 5 (5.6.5) private 
services has commercial in nature, but commercialisation can be adopted in public 
sector. Whereby, a public owned entity can be commercially operated. In this 
situation where government objectives is better water services to all, commercial 
water tariffs are designed with consideration of affordability to all. 
8.3.2 Management by performance contract 
The performance contract style of management is also a concept adopted 
from the discussion covered in chapter 6 and 7 during the comparison of different 
management styles in water services. This concept was initially developed from 
Uganda case study under services provided by NWSC as detailed in chapter 3 
section 3.3.5 The idea of a contract performance was initially developed from the 
data collected in the field in Tanzania. In a contract performance management, 
periodiC evaluation of work done against target is possible. This gives opportunity 
to review targets, process and assessment of project implementation plan. 
Individual performance can also be measure and evaluated for necessary action. 
On other way performance contract with clear set milestones pushes the individual 
or group moral of performance to reach the set target. In this case performance 
contract is motivation for efficiency. However, good performance contract should 
compose clear, realistic and measurable targets. In adoption to new model, the 
performance contract will be between government and services provider and 
internal periodiC performance contract between the operator and employees. 
8.3.3 Sources of funds for water development 
The discussion covered in chapter 6 (6.8.2), concluded that, Depending on 
loans from international financial institutions as the only source of capital funds in 
water projects has forced most of Sub-Sahara developing countries to go for 
privatisation and other difficult conditions (ICB, foreign experts with higher wages 
and others) This has affected the objective of water services to all due to increase 
of water changes against poor economy situation in the region. In this situation the 
loan's with tough conditions does not allow real water development in the region. 
The source of capital for water development in Sub-Sahara African countries 
(Tanzania) can be developed from local sources. Capital funds can be generated 
from tariffs review method, local contribution and local or international loans with 
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soft conditions. Based on these facts the study focus is that, good management of 
small available capital funds from local sources is a sustainable platform towards 
real water services development. The use of regulatory authority in ensuring the 
fairness of water charges and transparency on tariff review will meet the 
affordability needs through the stakeholder participation. The tariffs review method 
is an appropriate way to start for capital fund generation. 
8.3.4 Existence, Role and Function of Regulatory Authority 
The discussion in chapter 5 (5.7) emphasized the position and functions of 
regulating author in water services that, in water services organisation structure 
regulating authority has to be in place. The power, role, existence and functions of 
the regulator should be clearly defined. The basic duties of the regulator is focused 
on providing assistance and faCilitating other water sector bodies to perform. Water 
regulatory authority is a water tariffs controller and therefore its function is to stand 
for fairness between services provider and water user. This regulator position will 
benefit both services provider as well water users because of no overcharging for 
water users. Water tariffs will be based in actual production costs to balance the 
actual water costs (operations and maintenance) and as well future development 
(services improvement and expansion) if has been considered during the tariffs set. 
Therefore, existence of regulatory authority in provision of water services is 
an opportunity for opening and faCilitating transparency to allow direct discussion 
between water users and the services provider. Recommendations for tariff 
changes, advices and new plans can be easily accepted and flexibly implemented. 
In other hand regulatory authority is monitoring the quality of water and services, 
under the set standards therefore improvement on services and quality is 
guaranteed. This is what will be measure from customer satisfaction. However, 
facilitation of willingness to pay will be a key indicator for customer satisfaction and 
affordability 
8.3.5 Structure and composition of the services provider. 
The organisation structure and responsibilities of water services providers are 
covered in chapter 6. Has evidenced that, the sustainable organisation structure 
should have clear defined responsibilities, boundaries and coordination between 
and among the stakeholders. Structure composition should be systematically 
arranged with clear objectives of each department involved in the structure. The 
functions link between one section to another and one department to another 
should ensure the compatibility, strength and collaboration of the whole structure. 
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The structure should compose clear participation of all stakeholders (water users, 
operator, regulator, government and asset holding authority). Good structure 
composition has greater impact on services performance. For assurance of quality, 
quantity and affordability services regulatory authority provides close coordination 
among the stakeholders which has greater impact on WTP. The government 
position in the structure should also be clearly defined; the responsibilities and 
duties should be clearly articulated. The discussion also indicated that, for easy 
monitoring, good customer care, better managing of water network (maintenance 
and repair) and water leakage control the structure of operation, should allow 
division of the total services provided area into small reasonable operational 
branches. 
8.3.6 Conclusions 
The discussion covered in section 8.2.3 has concluded that, adaptation of 
new water services style (from public to private) needs preparation strategy and 
during the implementation participation of water users should be encouraged. 
Water users are the water bills payers and only from their payments can water 
services be sustainable. Seriously working with customer's opinions will enhance 
the provision of water services to all. 
The private water services is not a solution to every country, the Tanzania 
experience of failure of City water services left people less trusting of any kind of 
private water services. 
The discussion covered in sections 8.2 and 8.3 indicated where the research 
question is coming from. The concepts on structure and components for 
developing ideal solution for water services in Tanzania has been detailed in 
sections (8.3.1 to 8.3.5) and as well summarised in diagram no. 8.1 of this chapter. 
Therefore, the solution has been formulated from concepts developed in the field 
Tanzania and the adopted from other experiences. 
However, the need and the guidance for developing an appropriate and 
sustainable solution for capital funding and good system of management was the 
first concept adopted from discussion and critical analysis on Tanzania water 
management system in chapter 2 and as well concluded in critical discussion on 
various Sub-Sahara African countries water management experiences covered in 
chapters 3, 5 and 6 of this thesis. In analysis the all mentioned chapters has 
evidenced that, poor water services in Sub-Sahara African countries and especially 
Tanzania is caused by lacking of capital funds for investing in water development 
projects. The only reliable major source of funding water projects is loans from the 
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International financial Institutions (the World Bank). They have tough conditions 
with interest on favour of donor. Following the analysis on advantages and 
disadvantages of the World Bank loans in chapter 4, the research indicated that, 
loans with such tough conditions are a burden to borrowing countries. The need to 
find alternative source for water projects was is required. Having an appropriate 
source for funding for water projects is a half solution and therefore it cannot solve 
water problems without sustainable and appropriate structure of management style. 
This required an examination of the major methods of water management including 
public, private and commercialisation of water services as analysed in chapter 5. 
The conclusion was each method has its uniqueness but the environment of the 
application is the commending factor. The evidence from data analysis collected in 
Tanzania which is advocated what style of water management is appropriate for 
Tanzania water services. The solution for water problems in Tanzania is 
consideration of the local environment needs (acceptability, sustainability and 
affordability). 
In chapter 6 and in section 8.3.1 discussed that, commercialisation in water 
services has an objectives of providing quality and quantity products with good 
services, the product that can compete in the market and be sold. The product is 
sold to cover the actual production cost and extra expenses. In this situation the 
operating mechanism (regulator) to control quality of services and water charges 
for the benefit of services provider and as well water users should be in place. This 
will ensure the affordability. However, the boundaries in role, functions and 
responsibilities of each department member in the sector should be set clearly to 
avoid interference and confusion during the implementation. Setting clear 
performance targets which are measurable, clear roles, clear functions and clear 
responsibilities is a motivation to accelerate work performance. 
8.4 Part 3: Solution for water management in Tanzania 
8.4.1 Background 
This section is a product of the theoretical solution for the research problem. 
Thomas [144] argues that gathering solution of a study for advocacy on the face of 
it seems rather straight forward, but is very often messy and complex because it 
involves serious issues of legitimacy and power of relations, however, by only 
critically evaluating the data that support for a particular approach and data that 
alternative approaches can build up and gain support for the appropriate solution. 
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The section is about the discussion of an appropriate solution for water problems in 
Tanzania (Sub-Sahara African countries). 
Conclusion from the discussion in chapter 3 (3.9.3) that, the water problems 
in Tanzania (Sub-Sahara African countries) are cause by two major problems 
including funds for capital development and sustainable water services 
management model. Therefore, the appropriate solution for this study has to solve 
the capital funds and sustainable water management problems. be develop solve to 
the concluded two major problems 
The frame work privatisation water services model developed in chapter 6 
(6.8.1) structured with role and functions of all department including government 
position, asset holding company, regulator, private operator and water users was 
adopted for field test in Tanzania. The field results were critically analysed and as 
shown in sections 8.2 and 8.3 that, new concepts were adopted, and with additional 
of literature knowledge the Ideal model POCO was developed. To fulfil the 
research needs (capital funds and management for water services), the solution 
POCO has developed with composition of two different parts including potential 
capital funds for services development and sustainable water services 
management style as follows 
8.5 POCO 
8.5.1 Definition; Public Ownership Commercial Operation (POCO) is a 
practical water management model developed locally to solve water services 
problems in Tanzania (developing countries) 
8.5.2 Originality and Structure composition 
The POCO structure composed of two major parts including organisation 
management structure and commercial sustainability of the model. The 
management part of the model is formulated to deal with various activities, roles 
and responsibilities performed by each organisation. The boundaries and activities 
performance measure is also clearly stipulated. However, the commercial part of 
model is structured and to provide the financial capability of the model to cover its 
operational costs and capital necessary for sustainability and development. 
The organisation management structure POCO clearly identifies the 
responsibilities,activities and boundaries of each component. The success of each 
component depends on another, starting from ministry of water and irrigation as the 
owner of the water entities to operator DAWASA. The structure boundaries of 
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POCO creates a division of management power with clear responsibility to each 
component and from government to DAWASA. This will enhance DAWASA 
performance and especially on accountability. The government role will remain as 
property owner, chief policy makers and overall system evaluator on services 
performance. The POCO structure of dividing total working area into zones with 
reasonable size of operating area will increase the quality of services operation by 
giving fast closer services to the customers. This will impact control and recording 
on water leakages. It will provide greater accountability. Furthermore, POCO 
structure of performance the ministry is again responsible to measure and access 
the performance of DAWASA operations periodically. However, recognition for 
good performance and various motivations adopted as the major ways for 
performance to improve 
8.5.3 Part one: Ownership and management structure of POCO 
The composition of management structure of POCO can be pictured and 
presented into three divided major groups. The groups are formulated according to 
nature of activities of each group. Policy issues, structure of organisation, 
management, and implementation strategy were the bases for categorising the 
functions of each individual group. 
The combination of all activities performed by each group is what determines 
the POCO structure. The assurance on quality performance in POCO management 
model has been guaranteed with clarity of role and functions of each organisation. 
The composition of contract performance in the structure will be a catalyst to raise 
motivation for better performance; hence the targets will be measured and 
evaluated periodically. First performance contract is the performance agreement 
between the government (ministry) and DAWASA, the second performance 
contract is between DAWASA management team and Sub branch offices. In this 
internal performance contract each individual performance target will be clearly 
described and performance indicators will be set measurable. Therefore POCO has 
formulated with coordination, relationship and combination of different role and 
functions from different departments in water sector. However, the mode structure 
has been summarised and here below presented in diagram form (see figure 8.2). 
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Figure no. 8.3 The POCO operation structure 
i. Government (Ministry of water and Irrigation) 
The government will own the entity by 100% and therefore, the government 
will be fully responsible for policy issues and capital Investment. 
Why DAWASA should remain a parastatal organisation (a government owned 
entity)? 
For political reasons Tanzania government was not ready to surrender the 
DAWASA ownership. Furthermore, DAWASA being government property will 
easier implementation of government policy especially the government objectives 
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of water services to all, rather than being a private entity which in many cases the 
services objectives are referred to the profit gain. Assurance of services to all is 
greater because as a government services provider the actual cost of services can 
also subsided. Capital investment responsibility will be the government task this will 
allow DAWASA to concentrate more on services issues. Furthermore, capital for 
funding water projects can also be sourced from government budget. The POCO 
model indicated that DAWASA will remain to be government owned. 
According to POCO ministry of water (the owner) structured with two management 
and control components (ministry top management team and department of water 
supply and sewerage).The ministry top management team will be mainly the 
decision makers, with other responsibilities including sourcing funds for capital 
investment and supervising the distribution, reviewing national water master plan 
and development of new policies and other management duties. 
While the department of water supply and sewerage will perform the following 
responsibilities including supervision for implementation (contract), planning and 
supervising national water master plan, monitoring DAWASA performance and 
evaluation according to the contract obligation, sourcing capital Investment for 
water development, contract terms and operation criteria, setting contract period, 
with no objection from ministry management team awarding the contract to 
qualified operator. Setting the standards for performance with clear indicators, 
reviewing the operator's terms of contract and contracting and providing advices 
and support to DAWASA without interference. 
All duties are implemented at first as proposal, the proposals are taken to ministry 
top management team for decision, after decision the department is taken to 
operator for implementation. We can conclude that the department of water supply 
and sewerage is working with strategy of implementation and project supervision. 
The binding relation between the Government (ministry) and DAWASA (the 
operator) is Competitive Performance Contract (CPC) in the contract all the 
responsibilities of two parts the owner (ministry) and the implementer (DAWASA) 
should be clearly described. Among of the important things which contract should 
compose are terms of contract, performance indicators, evaluation procedures, 
time schedule, quality and measured standards. 
ii. Position or regulatory authority (relationship, duties and control) 
according to POCO 
In the structure of POCO recognises the full responsibilities of the creation of 
an independent regulatory authority, and that, duties including standards control of 
the quality, quantity, services performance and control of water charges to create 
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balance and fairness in water pricing between service provider and the consumer 
are all performed by the regulatory authority. 
In this case the regulatory authority is issuing the licence of operation and the 
guidance of standards for services to services provider. The regulator will provide 
structure, procedure and timetable that will allow two parts water users and 
services provider to dialog on water charges (water tariffs change) before the 
decision is reached. Moreover, the regulator is obligated to chair the debate and 
collecting the opinion on the request for tariffs review. Whereby, the regulator and 
service provider will have an opportunity for monitoring the willingness to pay 
(WTP). In this case the regulator will also take the advisory role to services provider 
according to the matter ascends in conversation. Therefore, in this model 
regulatory authority in greater part is exist to assist the performance required from 
services provider. 
iii. DAWASA (the Implementer) according to POCO structure 
The formulation of new DAWASA responsibilities under POCO has been 
adopted from analysed discussion developed from DAWASA employees, 
parastatal senior officers and customer information collected in the field Tanzania .. 
However, the concepts had greater focus on services improvement under good 
working environment necessary for existing and future needs. Under the POCO 
structure the new DAWASA under 100% local management team with new 
incentives will remain to be an operating organ or services provider under 100% of 
government ownership. The new DAWASA responsibilities will remain to is the 
major water services provider (operator) contracted by the owner to perform all 
water services operations including repair and rehabilitation of water 
infrastructures, services expansion, water network control, water meter installation, 
billing and revenue collection and protection of water sources. Under these 
responsibilities DAWASA management structure has to reorganise to become 
more strategic to ensure the responsibilities implemented according to the contract 
needs. 
The DAWASA operating structure is composed of two major operating 
sections including DAWASA head management team and field implementers 
(branches/zones) each group has integrated responsibilities however in totality they 
all perform according to Ministry/ DAWASA agreed performance contract. 
DAWASA head management team has formulated with administrative and as 
well implementation responsibilities. This department in main dealing with 
supervision to all activities performed by branches including providing them better 
training, advice and support, providing them necessary tools, equipment and 
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manpower, monitoring of internal competitive performance contract, evaluation of 
branches performances and performance target setting and review {the internal 
performance contract between DAWASA head team and branches}, setting of 
motivation, incentives and as well punishment for poor performance, establishing of 
new branch/zones, proper managing of revenue collection, preparations of periodic 
performance report to be submitted to dep~rtment of water supply and sewerage 
periodically are also main duties of DAWASA head office. 
Capital development projects are centrally implemented under special unity 
(planning and project implementation) under DAWASA head team, the unit tasks 
includes water production, water network rehabilitation and treatment, because 
project implementation requires high professional skill of finance and technical 
matters in organisation, supervision and implementation. According to POCO major 
source for capital funds will be generated from daily revenue collection and other 
local sources, the monthly generated amount will be deposited in a special account 
monitored and controlled by project implementation unity a section of DAWASA 
head management team. And annually the amount will be taken for project 
development. 
iv. Zones water providers (The implementers) 
Zone offices are the sub set of the DAWASA operating area. The total 
DAWASA operating area should be divided into zones depending on number of 
customers and size of area for operation. The major reasons of the zone divisions 
is improving of services performance to customers, by bringing services closer to 
customers and therefore to improve customer care. 
In this structure zonal managers are responsible to manage, supervise and 
monitor all the zonal activities and reporting back to DAWASA head office. 
The number of staff in each zone will depend on the size of the operation 
.. 
area, number of costumers, tools and equipment available. For individual 
performance monitoring each employee has its defined and measurable duties to 
perform. Duties are divided according to the size of zone and number of customers. 
The tasks to be performed in each zone includes meter reading, bills preparation 
and distribution, new connection and records, water meter installation, leaks 
repairs, sewerage services, water rationing if necessary and attending daily 
customer problems. 
The implementers described under this model are daily operator's group of 
people dealing with customers. In this case, the zone areas which are the subset of 
the DAWASA geographical operating area. Zones have to be developed and 
structured with good management teams. The zonal manager's duties are focused 
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on providing better services to water users and revenue collection according to the 
internal performance contract with self-explanatory targets and performance 
indicators between DAWASA head office and zonal areas. In this case employees 
have to perform to meet their targets. The designed task to be performed at this 
stage includes directly dealing with all water customers problems in the offices and 
on the field. Workers are highly motivated to compete each other for recognition 
and awards which definitely each individual performance is monitored closely. The 
performance report is send back to DAWASA periodically, for review comments 
and other necessary action if needed. 
v. Contract of performance in POCO 
Contract performance in POCO has been developed as a measuring unit, 
reference for performance evaluation and as well motivation in project 
implementation. Individual or group duties and responsibilities will be measured for 
accountability. The agreed performance contract with clear indicators and 
milestones becomes the driving force for performance to meet the set target. The 
performance monitoring contract in water services has much focus in services 
efficiency, which will improve productivity meaning quality and quantity in the 
market. Improvement in quality and quantity will make water users happy and 
therefore their will pay more (it is motivation for WTP). The objectives of efficiency 
in productivity and services are one of commercial principals in water services 
which have more focus on customer satisfaction. Meeting customer satisfaction 
meaning stimulating/motivating her/his willingness to be able to pay water charges 
accordingly. This will have greater impact in operation and services because the 
POCO operations and development costs has been designed to be established 
from water charges and other local sources. The performance contract will be 
formulated with number of performance indicators, schedule of activities with time, 
quality and standards and targets and periodically the contract the performance will 
be reviewed. The performance evaluation is based on the set contract indicators. 
This is important and special motivation for performance. Therefore POCO 
structure adopted performance contract motoring and review approach for 
efficiency in providing services and stimulation of WTP. 
vi Coordination and relationship of deferent components in the structure 
In POCO structure each component is operating independently with clear role 
and functions of performance. The demarcations in performance responsibilities 
were clearly established to avoid interference and collision during the operation. 
However, the model goal is achieved when each model component has performed 
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successfully. In this case we can say the total success depends from successful 
performance of each component in the model and each component depends from 
another. Therefore should be an existing relationship between the components as 
follows. 
vii. The relationship between government (ministry of water) and DAWASA. 
Government is the property (DAWASA) owner. This means that the 
ownership relation between government and DAWASA is there. The performance 
contract relationship between the owner (government) and the operator (DAWASA) 
makes close coordination between the two because the operator has to report the 
performance periodically and the owner has to evaluate for necessary decision. 
Providing good working environment, providing capital funds these are major areas 
of coordination and relationship that each department depend on another. 
Relationship between government and regulator is in policy issues and good 
communication in professional matters because regulation authority exists 
constitutional to implement government policy, the regulator performance and 
assessment of operator performance are all reported by regulator to ministry. In 
this case ministry is constitutionally supervising and monitory the regulator. 
However, the relationship and coordination between the regulator and 
operator is existing widely such that, may be seen as regulator is supervising the 
operator, because the operational licence is issued by regulator, this means he 
should be satisfied with operator performance. Water charges are controlled and 
regulated by the regulator, so the operator should submit the proposal of change to 
regulator, standards of performance in water services are set and reviewed by 
authority, and therefore periodic reporting mechanism of the performance of 
operator to regulator has greater builds greater coordination with frequently 
communication between operator and regulator. 
Coordination and relation between regulator and water users, is where. the 
water charges are reviewed, regulator coordinates the comments and the ideas of 
water users for fair consideration on water charges. The relationship between the 
two is specifically of fair ground for water charges. The coordination and relation 
between service provider (DAWASA) and water users the relation between the two 
is very wider and closer because the services provider DAWASA is working for 
water users to ensure water users are comfortable with services and they pay 
accordingly. This makes them to meet every day with number of discussion 
especially where the services is not available or is in unstable condition. Therefore 
the services provider (DAWASA) and water consumers they have wider 
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coordination and relation each one depends on another in everyday activities. The 
coordination and relation of each department in water services is necessary if the 
objectives is to provide better services. and affordable, because is only through 
coordination and combining effort of each department that objective can be 
achieved. Therefore POCO has formulated with coordination, relationship with 
combination of different role and functions of different composed departments in 
structure. 
8.5.4 Part two: Commercial sustainability of POCO 
Commercial part in POCO structure is its ability to developing local capital 
funds for its operation costs and projects development. The need to find stable 
sources for funding total operation costs and new water projects was identified from 
data collected in Tanzania. Developing capital funds from internal local sources is a 
big challenge, which mostly depends on the political stability of the country. The 
advantage of establishing capital funds from local sources is a catalyst towards 
building a stable economy and self-dependent vital to true national development. 
This will ensure the sustainability of the DAWASA. This research has come up with 
a capital funds development model from the local Tanzania sources to ensure the 
practicability of POCO as follows. 
The methods for developing capital funds from local sources for water 
projects in coved in this section. Three different methods are covered including 
Tariffs review, Local contribution and Basket funding. Each of these methods have 
previously practiced in the country. They have been adopted with a different 
approach and different objectives. The approach covered in this discussion has 
been developed from the data collected from the field in Tanzania. 
i. Major sources for capital funds in water projects 
The major sources for capital funds can be categorized in to external sources 
and local sources. The external sources are formulated by two elements including 
Loans and Grants from International financial Institutions (World Bank, African 
Development Bank, UNIDO EIB and others) while local sources includes sources 
from government budget, local contributions and property self-generating capital 
funds (tariffs review methods and other methods). Local sources for funding water 
projects have different process for funds generation. Focusing on objective of 
coming up with sustainable, reliable, affordable and condition free sources for 
capital fund in water projects. The discussion covered in this section is generation 
of capital funds from local sources. Establishing capital funds from local sources 
will make the government free from external funding conditions (loan interest and 
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others) and will also empower the government with full decision on fund usage and 
managing. No external conditions, therefore flexibility for better use is possible. 
Thinking of alternative funding methods for water development projects as a 
substitute to loans from international financiers was developed from scrutiny of the 
loans and conditions to country borrowers (see section 4.9.5 for more detail). The 
big interest rate of each loan, short period of payback and extra implementation 
conditions from financiers were some of the analysed characters. Disadvantages of 
the World Bank conditions as detailed in section (4.9.2) and the experience of the 
World Bank loan's conditions on the effects of DAWASA privatisation as indicated 
in (Appendix Q) were the reasons for this conclusion. 
On considering the possible local sources, methods including the tariffs 
review, mass contribution and government funding were critically discussed to be 
concluded as a substitute solution for loans with tough conditions. The methods are 
all local in origin and supervised by local personal therefore acceptability, 
affordability and adoptability for implementation will be easier. The conditions of 
funds will be set locally and therefore to allow quick and easier consultation if 
needed and therefore to allow flexibility for good use. No investment required for 
setting this process. Water projects funded with local developed funding system will 
be a reliable substitute for the World Bank loans with burden conditions. 
The discussion in this section is about the generation of capital funds for 
water development projects from internal local sources. The summary of major 
sources for capital funds in water development projects can be presented as shown 
below in figure no.8.4 
Loans 
(Financiers) 
Sources for capital funds 
Grants 
(AsSistance) 
Tariffs 
Review 
Mass 
Contribution 
Caoital funds for water develooment 
Figure 8.4: Sources for capital funds 
Government 
Budget 
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8.5.5 Capital funds from daily water operation business 
Tariffs review approach is one of the local capital fund generation. Tariffs are 
basically determined from detailed information specified in respect of generation, 
transmission and distribution costs and sometimes focusing on capital for 
development. The guiding principle of a tariff setting is to enhance efficiency, 
quality and economy in use of resources and ensure financial visibility of the utility. 
It is for the interest of customers in considering that the water supply, production 
and distribution cannot be maintained unless the total service charges are 
adequately levied in the existing water tariffs [178]. 
This method is adopted were the water cost break down is made up from 1 
m3 volume of water. 
This approach can be adopted in Tanzania (Sub-Sahara African countries) 
provided the objective is to improve water services with focus on sustainability, 
affordability and capital establishment. The approach of breaking down the total 
water cost in 1 m3 value plus extra percentage for development can be adopted for 
generating special basket funds, purposely for capital water development. 
In this case water charges can be reviewed and adjusted. The increase from 
the adjustment will be accumulated to build independent local capital funds for 
Tanzania water supply development projects. The currently DAWASA low water 
charges can be used as a stepping stone and advantage for introducing the 
changes aiming to accumulating capital funds for water development in the 
country[179]. 
f. The Justification for adopting tariffs review method 
The justification for adopting the tariff review method in countries with poor 
economy and difficulties in water supply services especial Sub-Sahara Africa 
countries is more focused on affordability and then establishing a progressive 
funding mechanism from available local water services. The challenge to generate 
capital funds for water projects. The method can be adopted as stepping stone for 
generating sustainable capital funds for development of water projects at any 
scope of application. Countries like Tanzania had bad experiences from the effects 
of loans with difficult conditions from International financial Institutions (World Bank, 
EIB, ADB and others). The tariffs review method is justified as an alternative 
against unaffordable loans from international donors. The application of this 
approach is straight forward and needs no capital for establishment. This involves 
only reasonable restructuring of existing water tariffs with a goal of establishing an 
estimated amount for sustainability of water services. The government policy to 
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acknowledge the change is priority thing; however it will be easy for policy change 
because the entity DAWASA is a government owned. In this situation the method is 
more justifiable. 
ii. Generation of Capital funds from Tariff Review Approach 
In the DAWASA case the practice of tariff review adjustments it is practical, 
realistic and it is an appropriate alternative solution against loans with tough 
conditions from International financial Institutions. The tariffs review approach 
should be introduced on basis of actual volumetric water sold and not in basis of 
production capacity. The difference between production and real water sold is 
unaccounted for water (leakages and other wastages) which has been estimated to 
be 35% of total water production. This percentage will be decreasing to less than 
10% within a period of 5yrs due to the implementation of DWSSP. The exercise of 
generating capital funds for water development in Tanzania will be implemented 
stage by stage from establishing production and sol~ water quantities, examining 
the current water charges, reviewing the existing water tariffs and calculating the 
amount to establish a capital fund for sustainability and services development. The 
governing principal of capital fund generation is an accumulation amount from a 
difference of total revenue collection and actual expenditures. This generates the 
practice as follows. 
iii. Approach for calculating the cumulative Funds in a given period P; 
Starting with considering the quantity of water sold (total amount of water 
production - unaccounted for) a given period of time (P). The reviewed tariffs are 
considered to be constant for all the given time (P = 5 years) period. The period of 
5years has been selected because of target set for implementation of DWSSP. 
The principal is, the total revenue collection minus actual expenditures = 
Cumulative funds (Fe). This can be adopted for calculating cumulative and the 
amount generated as capital funds for water projects. The process can be 
summarized and transformed into mathematical formula and presented as follows; 
Fe= (Cvx T - Cvx E, + (Ecc - Ex)) Pt 
p 
Where; 
C = Volume of sold water in m 3, however, the amount of sold water will 
v 
change timely depending on of new supply connections and amount of 
consumption 
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T p = Revised water tariff per cubic meter (m 3) or new estimated water tariffs 
(see table no. 8.4). 
E I =The existing DAWASCO water tariff per cubic meter (m 3 )-(see 
sectionno.8.5.6) 
Ecc = Current DAWASCO revenue collection (see table no. 8.3) 
Ex = Current DAWASO expenditure (see table no. 8.3) 
Pt = Five years (DWSSP implementation period) 
Therefore, through tariffs method the existing water rates and by using the 
given formula capital funds for water development can be generate as per 
designed objectives. 
;. Calculating the cumulative capital funds through tariffs review 
method 
The process of calculating how much funds can be generated from 
DAWASCO daily water sells is one of proves that this method is practical, and also 
it is an indicator for reliability and in-house affordability. This proves that, the 
approach is appropriate solution for generating capital funds, and it is practical 
alternative for loans with tough conditions from International financial institutions. 
The adopted process has formulated with systematic calculation based on amount 
of water production, existing water rates, reviewed rates, sells, comparison on 
affordability and analysis of the differences. The amount to establish as capital 
funds will be from the differences between the total revenue collection and 
expenditures as follows. 
;. Water production from DAWASA sources 
Water served by DAWASCO are from four different sources including 
underground water Bore holes and three major treatment plants (Upper Ruvu, 
Lower Ruvu and Mtoni treatment plants) after being rehabilitated under Dar-es-
salaam Water Supply and sanitation project (DWSSP) to raise its production ability 
to the designed origin capacity is as follows 
The current water production from three water treatment plants and ground 
water sources (bore holes) are Lower Ruvu with production capacity of 41 million 
litres per day, Upper Ruvu with production capacity of 18 million litres per day and 
Mtoni treatment plant with capacity of 5million litres per day and 19,OOOm3 per day 
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from ground water. According to the detail calculation of the total water production 
as attached in (appendix T), accumulating the four sources of water production, the 
total water quantity will be; 
64,564,963+24,288,369+2,106,386+6,840,000 = 97,799,718 m3. 
However, according to Kulwizila [185] Unaccounted for water and other water 
losses is 30% of the total production, therefore the consumed water is only 70% of 
the total production (68,459,802.6 m 3 ) per annum. Noted that, implementation of 
DWSSP combined all the leakage control, plants rehabilitation, repairs, installation 
of water meters and all necessary expansion for distribution network. It is therefore 
assumed that the expenditures within a period of project will not increase. In case 
of any extra expenditure then will be absolved by extra income from the covered 
repairs and maintenances. According to Midalla [189] DAWASA has set a goal to 
reduce water losses (unaccounted for water) up to less than 10% of total 
production. The DWSSP which includes total leakage control, water meter 
installation, up to dating data base, improvement billing system, rehabilitation of 
treatment plants, reservoirs, improvement of buster stations and combating all 
those with illegal water supply connection this will increase the volume of total sold 
water to all categories of costumers. 
Furthermore, the implementation of DWSSP will have impact on increasing 
DAWASCO revenue collection time to time. The DAWASA goal is to reach less 
than 10% of total water losses within five years of DWSSP, considering that, the 
present total water losses is 30% therefore; there will be an water increase of 4% 
annually due to losses recovery. This water increases will also increase the total 
sales which will automatically increase the revenue in old and new tariffs. This will 
make the total annual collection as revenue gain to build the estimated capital as 
follows; 
The attached (appendix T in the CD) shows the detail calculations on how the 
capital funds will be generated that, Total sells with new rate - Total sells with old 
rates + 4% annual increase from reduction of losses + normal saving between 
existing collection and expenditures. And total expected amount from all three 
developed local methods were detailed. 
8.5.6 Existing DAWASCO water charges 
The existing DAWASCO water tariffs has been structured into three different 
groups of water consumption, All DAWASCO customers have been systematically 
classified into three different categories of water tariffs. These categories have 
been structured with different water charges based on nature of water use and 
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consumption capacity [1B6]. The categories includes tariffs for Domestic customers 
with consumption not more than 5 m 3 per month, domestic customers with 
consumption above 5m 3 per month and the tariff for commercial costumers.{see 
table no.B.2 below) 
Table B.2: Existing Water Tariffs [B]. 
Unit Volume 
Sn. Description 3 Rate per Unit Rate in GBP (£) m 
1 Non Domestic users 1 Ths.725.00 0.36 
2 Domestic Users 
(0-5m3) 1 Tsh.4BB.OO 0.24 
Domestic Users above 
3 5m3 1 Tsh.654.00 0.32 
i. Current revenue col/ection 
The revenue collection report for year 2006/2007 and 2007/200B gives the 
picture of how much funds and collected from water charges, operational costs and 
what is the balance from the total expenditure [9]. Also from this report we can also 
picture the total income when focusing on the sustainability of provided services, in 
considering the local internal sources. The expenditure is an indicator for sensing 
the real need to sustain the existing services by understanding the expenditure. We 
can set targets focusing on accumulation of local income as a product of difference 
between collection and expenditure. Expenditure is a milestone for setting extra 
needs for income collection. These are clear evidences that through tariffs 
adjustment and balancing of expenditure DAWASA can generate and save funds 
for its capital projects. Development of the required local capital funds will be from 
differences between the total collected revenue and the expenditures. However, 
funds good management with commitment is necessary. 
Table no.B.3 below shows the DAWASCO performance of revenue collection 
and the expenditure for the year 2007/200B in TSH. 
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Table 8.3: DAWASCO Revenue collection for year 2007/2008 
FINANCIAL YEAR 2007/2008 IN Tsh. 
YEAR MONTH COLLECTIONS EXPENDICTURES 
2007 JULY 1,638,468,019.02 1,338,169,900.48 
2007 AUGUST 1,651,347,067.13 795,003,002.52 
2007 SEPTEMBER 1,544,144,953.32 1,675,758,027.37 
2007 OCTOBER 1,714,617,412.15 1,192,713,649.51 
2007 NOVEMBER 1,603,344,266.00 1,006,971,579.96 
2007 DECEMBER 1,428,928,402.43 1,228,420,788.28 
2008 JANUARY 2,145,119,422.79 1,247,543,382.80 
2008 FEBRUARY 1,906,292,553.96 1,694,886,189.92 
2008 MARCH 1,464,993,473.28 1,274,986,490.63 
2008 APRIL 1,719,199,557.44 875,471,924.44 
2008 MAY 2,015,758,024.03 1,472,908,981.89 
2008 JUNE 2,078,358,928.86 2,142,561,481.19 
TOTAL(Tsh.) 20,909,672,081.01 15,945,395,398.99 
ii. Calculation of savings under tariff review approach 
The whole set up is a mathematical calculation and figures are the amount of 
water production, water rates and sold quantity of water. Considering the total 
losses our working figure will be 70% of the total production which is 68,459,802.6 
m 3 per annum. According to Modella [187] the amount of water sold by 
DAWASCO per annum is only 63,003,000.00m3• This sold water necessitates the 
calculations for establishing capital funds to be considered as a bottom line for total 
revenue generation from DAWASCO sources. This focus will make the calculation 
more prospective and positive because the increase in water sells due to DWSSP 
impact on leakage control will raise the total revenue collection step by step. The 
estimation (calculation) will base on the actual volume of water sold in each 
category and therefore the tariff will be reviewed systematically according to the 
categories customers. 
According to Julius [11] DAWASCO have three categories of water tariffs 
shares the total volume of sold water as follows 
1. Domestic Category One (DCO), customers with consumption not above 
than 5m 3 per month they cover about 14% of total sold water 
2. Domestic Category Two (DCT), all customers with consumption above than 
5m J per month they are consuming about 77.2% of total sold water and 
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3. Commercial Category Costumers (CCC) supplied approximately 8.8% of 
the volume of total sold water (see figure no.8.S) 
Commercial 
Domestic 
Costumers Two, 
77.20% 
Domestic 
Costumer One, 
14% 
Figure no.8.S: Categories of Customers and consumption 
Based on the evidences of DAWASCO water tariffs as shown in table no 8.2 
and the objective of establishing capital funds from tariffs review method, the 
adjustments were systematically executed. Each consumer category was critically 
reviewed with considering the affordability the tariffs were analysed and adjusted. 
The new tariffs with detail breakdown were designed and presented in summary 
sized table for more clarity as shown in the table 8.4 below. 
Table 8.4: Combination of existing and reviewed water tariffs 
Consumed Existing Adds New Old New 
Sn. Description water in 3 amount rate Amount Amount 
rate/m 
3 3 in £ In £ In £ m IAnnual In£ p/m In £ 
1 Domestic users 
3 
up to 5m per 8,832,414 0.24 0.20 0.44 2,119,779.L 3,886,262.22 month 
2 Domestic users 
above 5m 3 p/m 48,666,328 0.32 0.30 0.62 15,573,225 30,173,123.4 
Commercial 
3 customers 5,504,258 0.36 0.50 0.86 1 ,981 , 532.~ 4,733,661 .9 
4 TOTAL 63,003,000 19,674,537 38,793,047.5 
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According to the table 8.4 above the adjusted water charges in each category will 
be as follows. 
For domestic uses not more than Sm per month with current rate of £ 0.24 per 
cubic meter, the new rate will be £ 0.44 per cubic meter 
The domestic customers with consumption above Sm per month holding the 
current rate of £ 0.32 per cubic meter there rate will change to £ 0.62 per cubic 
meter and for non-domestic customers with current of £ 0, 36 per meter cubic there 
new rate will be £ 0.86 per cubic meter, The adjustment were adopted for 
calculation to give mathematical indication on how much the revenue will rise from 
this first adjustment and the impact especially the affordability. 
8.5.7 Coverage of affordability during the tariffs adjustment 
The new water rates review was carried based on existing water tariffs in 
each customer's water category and with objective for establish water capital funds 
from local sources. Mathematical calculation was based on water sells per annual. 
Calculation for adjustment was focused on nature of consumption on each 
category. The final adjustment was set with greater focus on the income of low 
class people with maximum of their consumption to cover the affordability. The 
evidences of protecting the affordability have been covered into two areas including 
consideration of the low people and national income per capital against other water 
rates practices in neighbour Sub-Sahara African countries with low income per 
capital than Tanzania. 
As discussed in POCO structure chapter 8 (8.S.3 vi) the relationship and 
coordination between the operator and regulator, between regulator and water 
users). The affordability is also controlled through normal government process of 
screening new water rates for approval through Energy Water Utility Regulatory 
Authority (EWURA). 
8.5.8 Affordability in comparison with neighbourhood country Uganda 
Relevance of comparison with Uganda comes from the point that, National 
Water Supply Corporation of Uganda has contract official working relationship with 
DAWASA. Whereby the two public organisations, they assist each other and 
sometimes working together in some technical areas hence Tanzania and Uganda 
are boarded in one region of East Africa, and people of these country in greater% 
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shares similar culture. Uganda water supply and sewerage services are under 
management of National Water Supply Corporation of Uganda. Moreover, the 
existing system for water charges in Uganda depends on frequently information 
from meter reading of individual customer and estimation from unmetered 
customers, which is quiet similar with Tanzania water system. The Uganda water 
charges has been formulated under two deferent categorizes, the groups including 
Domestic and Commercial rates which designed to the following composition of 
water tariffs. 
8.5.9 Evidences of the comparison on affordability 
Affordability on reviewed water tariffs can also be justified by comparing the 
differences in water charges within the neighbouring countries those have similar 
level in economy. According the discussion covered in chapter 3 section 3.3.4 the 
Uganda currently water charges for domestic use is 1 m3 = GBP 0.462, while the 
designed new expected domestic water tariffs for Tanzania will be cheaper than by 
GBP 0.24 per every cubic meter volume. However, according to Atlas Method 
2007, the Tanzania Gross National Income per Capital (GNIC) is ranked higher 
than Uganda by 24% money value, while the Tanzania purchasing power is 57% 
higher than Uganda. Therefore, the comparison has been detailed as follows; 
a. Uganda water charges comparing to Tanzania 
i. Domestic water supply; 1 m 3 = Ush.1, 341.00 and sewerage is 75% of it 
ii. Commercial water supply; 1 m 3 = Ush.2, 085 and sewerage is 75% of water 
supplied. 
Notes that, in billing all two tariffs category has to go with tax (VAT) of 
additional extra amount of 18% [10). (Conversation of currencies as per 16th 
Sept.2008; 1 GBP = UGsh.2, 889.00; Therefore considering that, Uganda water for 
domestic use is, 1m 3= GBP 0.4642; (1USD = UGsh.1, 635.00 and 1Tsh. = UG sh. 
1.41436). 
The new reviewed water charges for domestic usage in Tanzania (see table 
8.4 in section 8.5.6) will be 1m3 = GBP 0.44. Therefore Uganda water charges is 
expensive than Tanzania new reviewed water rates by 0.4642 - 0.44 = GBP (£) 
0.0242 per every cubic meter 
The minimum cost of 1m 3 water for domestic consumption in Tanzania is 
GBP 0.24 while in Uganda the same volume of water will cost GBP 0.464 
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b. Comparison on Capital Income and purchasing power 
Income per capital (Tanzania Vs Uganda) in considering, the Gross National 
Income per Capital (GNIC) for the year 2007, the Atlas Method (AM) and 
Purchasing Power parity (PPP) [11]. The positions of these countries were ranked 
as follows. a. Atlas Method -2007 
Table 8.5: Gross National Income per Capital 
SN COUNTRY RANK US Dallas 
1 Tanzania 184 1,200 
2 Uganda 192 920 
b. Ranking on Purchasing Power Parity-2007 
Table 8.6: Purchasing Power Parity 
SN COUNTRY Rank US Dallas 
1 Tanzania 187 920 
2 Uganda 340 400 
This evidencing that, the POCO first time reviewed tariffs is affordable hence 
is even less cheap than the existing Ugandans water charges, furthermore POCO 
is a 100% government owned property implementing the set Tanzania water policy 
which is mainly quality, quantity and affordability to all. And in some cases if needs 
arise government can still subsidise the costs hence service provision is 
government owned. The regulating authority in the POCO structure is also for 
quality, quantity affordability assurance. Therefore, through all these tools POCO 
method of tariffs review has guarantee in affordability. 
8.6.0 Acceptability of Tariff review method 
To answer how this method can be accepted and adopted in the poor country 
like Tanzania is not a straight thing. However, the possible right answer should be a 
locally developed method with greater inputs from the field. Nevertheless, natural 
formulation of the model and process of adoption is to facilitate the application of 
POCO management style, therefore tariff review method is more appreciated 
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i. Origination and composition of tariff review method 
The method has been developed from information collected in the field 
Tanzania where this solution is expected to be applied. This alone has greater 
influence that, the local existing problems obligated the development of this new 
method being the appropriate solution, from bounded relationship between the 
method and local people mind hence it has delivered from their own information. 
Furthermore, the method is more easier to applied when POCO is the place 
because the two things shares the same originality 
ii. Similarities with existing water charges system 
Tariff review method has greater similarities with existing method of raising 
funds for new domestic water supply connection. However, the existing method is 
designed to generate funds through water charges purposely for new domestic 
water connections, whereby the tariffs review method is developed to generate 
funds from water charges for water projects development as substitute for loans 
with condition from International financers,. This has been evidenced in DAWASA 
DAWASCO lease contract, that similar method for fund generation was practiced. 
Funds were collected for special task 'new domestic water connection' whereby 
under the title First Time new Domestic Water Supply Connection Fund 
(FTNDWSF). Article 37 of DAWASN City water lease contract says 'the operator 
shall levy the First Time New Domestic Water Supply Connection on all its water 
supply consumers (including all domestic and all industrial and other 
consumers}.To allow the operator to establish and maintain the first time new 
domestic water supply connection and shall pay all amounts received by way of 
First Time New Domestic water Supply Connection tariff into the First Time New 
Domestic Water Connection Fund. The operator should ensure that this fund held 
in special account and shall not use this funds (FTWDWCF) for any purpose other 
than the set programme [148}. The First Time New Domestic Water Connection 
Fund shall be subjected to a separate accounting and independent audit. 
Misapplication of the fund by the operator may lead to a penalty of a particular 
agreed amount. The First Time Domestic Water Supply Connection Fee indexation 
formula was 
Where 
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L t is the index for labour published by the National Construction Council at 
Time 'T, i.e. the date of application of the formula 
Lo is the index for labour as published by the National Construction Council at 
Time '0' from data of bid submission 
P I is the Index for pipes and fittings (flexible) # as published by the UK 
Department of Trade and Industry at Time 't', i.e. the data application of formula 
Po is the index for Pipes and fittings (flexible) # as published by the UK 
Department of Trade arid Industry at Time '0', the base date i.e. 28 days before bid 
submission 
F I is the UK pound sterling foreign exchange rate against the Tanzanian 
Shilling at Time 't' i.e. the date of application of the formula 
F 0 is the UK pound sterling foreign exchange rate against the Tanzanian 
Shilling at Time '0', the base date i.e. 28 days before bid submission, 
• Is the multiplier 
8.6.1 Appraisal of the method 
This system of Levy out of water services has been adopted during the 
DAWASAICity water lease contract can be adopted by DAWASA to raise its own 
capital for sustainability and development of water services. Application of tariffs 
review in POCO method is quite similar to the method used to develop funds for 
First Time Domestic Water Supply Connection Fee (FTDWSCF). The method can 
be improved and adopted to generate Capital funds, for water development. In this 
case water charges are reviewed and adjusted, and the increases from adjustment 
can be accumulated to build an independent local capital funds for water supply 
development projects. Application of tariffs review method is compatible to the 
currently DAWASA act for water charges and that can be used as a stepping stone 
and advantage for facilitating the changes towards accumulating sustainable 
capital for water development in the country. Tariffs review and FTDWSCF they are 
similar in approach with difference in objectives that, tariffs review in POCO is a 
tool for establishing capital funds while in FTDWSCF is also a tool for establishing 
funds specifically for new customer connection. This means the system self-fund 
development is existing in Tanzania water services. In other words we can say 
POCO's tariffs review method is modernisation of FTDWSCF to solve capital fund 
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problem for water development. Is just like taking old part away and replacing a 
new similar part in the same engine. Therefore with similarities in approach, 
adoption and implementation procedure tariffs review method indicates to work 
better than FTDWSCF and because of its objectives being bigger than FTDWSCF 
tariffs review approach evidencing to be more acceptable in the country. 
8.7 Capital funds from Mass Contribution 
8.7.1 Overview 
This section is designed to consider how fine mass contribution approach can 
be used to raise capital funds from local sources for various project developments. 
This approach has been adopted from traditional practices as a social behaviour of 
Tanzanians. Originally, local people from villages and small town used to share all 
kind of development activities, whereby all community development activities were 
grouped and organised. Different families used to work together (contributing their 
own energy through physical participation) or by donating a certain affordable 
amount and the contribution were collected to form capital for projects. In towns 
and cities where majority of the people are employed, their organise special 
deduction direct from their salaries to give for the community development projects. 
A practical example, of mass contribution executed recently by the Dar-es-
salaam local citizens under the organisation of regional commissioner Mr. Abbass 
Kandoro [198] were citizens contributed more than Tsh.5 billion for schools 
construction and education development in the city. Similarly, such an approach 
can adopted to generate funds for water development projects. 
I. Process adopted and approach 
On May 2007, the Dar-es-salaam regional commissioner organised a special 
fund raising meetings for class's construction in the region, due to inadequate 
education facilities in the region. The participants were all regional executive offices 
including three district commissioners from Kinondoni, lIala and Temeke, 
municipals chairpersons, municipals executive directors and regional members of 
parliament._Regional taskforce team and three district executive committees were 
formed under the chairmanship of regional commissioner at regional level, while at 
district level the taskforce team was chaired by district commissioners and regional 
Administrative Secretary was the regional committee secretary. The structure of the 
- 237-
operation was focusing on how to collecting more of the targeted amount of at least 
Tsh. 4 billion from different group of people including workers, business people and 
as well peasants in the region for a 5 month period. This process of implementation 
can be presented in summary form in figure no.8.6 here below 
I Regional Taskforce 
rI l ,'" 
lIala District Kinondoni T emeke District Taskforce District Taskforce Taskforce , 
+ , 
Tools and Equipments adopted OfficialleUers, TVs, 
Radios, News Papers, Posters and Variety of meetings 
, 
Targeted points for collections, 
Employees, Business companies and 
+ 
Public r.. Private ~ Common offices Companies individuals 
• + • [ Total mass contributions 
.I 
Figure no. 8.6: Mass Contributions Method 
According to figure 8.5, three district level committees were formed. Under 
the chairmanship of district commissioners each district committee was 
transformed to task force and major task was to strategise the contribution exercise 
within local environment. How much per personal, for how long and means of 
collection were jointly discussed and agreed with workers union. Target areas for 
collection were set (Employees, business companies and volunteers) and strategic 
plan for funds collection involved tools and equipments including official letters, _ 
TVs, Newspapers, Radios, Posters and meetings. The implementation started by 
opening four different bank accounts whereby each district had one. The exercise 
implemented at district level by advertising, writing official letters, conducting 
seminars, meeting and face to face interactions- and through street chairperson's 
local people were contributing and official government receipt were given. All 
collections were sent to district bank accounts and after to the regional central bank 
account. 
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ii. Implementation at regional level 
Regional central task force was supervising the whole implementation 
process in the regional (the three districts). Main duties were preparation of 
regional strategic plan and targets, project performance monitoring, to support 
district committee by providing necessary tools and advices, public information and 
control of total regional collections and ensuring fair distribution according to each 
district needs. The implementation strategy at regional level mainly is through 
meetings with selected donors. A list of business companies was prepared by 
district task forces (municipals) and sent to regional commissioner who followed by 
inviting to a meeting those short listed business companies. Regional task force 
under regional commissioner was also responsible for organising meetings with 
workers unions. This was on how much each employee was contribute and method 
of direct debit from their salaries. This regional committee has special schedule 
meetings held every two weeks for checking and reviewing the implementation 
progress. 
iii. Supporting tools during the implementation 
The major working tool was a bank account which was opened for this special 
task. The account was under the control of the regional project commander and it 
was named Katibu Tawala wa Mkoa (Regional administrative Secretary) No. 16:40. 
The account was restricted only for crediting. All the collected funds were directed 
to this central account as a collection centre and weekly collection was publicly 
reported but the distribution of funds (expenditure) was under the whole executive 
committee (all taskforce members) for their information and contribution. 
The account is still operating. The contribution was still open for all individual 
and groups. The account is now for general regional development. During the 
implementation number of tools including TV, radio, official letters, newspapers and 
posters were used. Special TV and radio donation programmes were the main 
strategic tools for motivating contributions. The government official receipts were 
issued to contributors. These were special receipts in which has accompanied with 
10% discount of import taxes for the personal belongings. 
> Approach of collection workers Contribution 
The exercise of collecting employee's contribution was carried at institutional 
or ministerial level supervised by ministries permanent secretaries and institutional 
heads. The official letters from the Dar-es-salaam regional commissioner were 
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written to all the institute heads (ministries permanent secretaries) addressing the 
whole process clearly. The contribution was deducted from worker's salaries 
according to standard set and each employee was given government official 
receipt. The collected funds were gathered and categorised as a particular 
institutional contribution with proper records then banked into account no. 16:40. 
;. Process of Contribution 
The contribution was in money and as well school construction materials. The 
whole process involves competition for the three municipals contesting the best 
collector award. The process is still going on with the situation as follows. The total 
collection up to 26th May 2008 was as follows 
Cash amount collected in was in Tsh. 1,863,420,753.00 and Construction 
Materials worth in Tsh. 373,440,000.00. Total amount of contribution was Tsh. 
2,236,420, 753.00 equivalents to about USD 2, 005, 020.00. The whole exercise 
was planned to last for five months only from 26th May 2007 to November 2007. For 
a period of only five month the collected amount was US $ 2,005,020.00. If the 
exercise will be carried for 12 months (1 year) continuously, the amount will rise to 
approximately US $ 5,000,000.00 the exercise was specifically set with specific 
objectives. 
The adoption of a similar approach for establishing water capital funds with 
improvements especial if setting of required period will focus on reality. Then, 
generation of more than US $ 5,000,000.00 per annum is possible. Therefore this 
is a practical example of establishing local capital sources from mass contribution 
approach. 
8.7.2 Capital funds from government sources 
The other commercial aspect of POCO is its ability to develop capital funds 
from government organised basket funding system. The contributions from 
international financial institutions and country friends are organised specifically for 
water development projects. The contribution is normally for a specific period under 
structured government control aiming to establish enough funds for water 
development projects. This is one of the practical substitutes for loans from big 
financial institution. The push for coming up with special basket fund originated 
from the difficulties of loan's conditions as in the discussion covered in chapter four 
section 4.9.4. The immediately need of appropriate and sustainable capital funds 
for water development project forces this research to consider the government 
basket funding method as one of the alternative for sustainable capital funds. The 
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government basket funding method for establishing capital for water development 
projects have two groups including sources from central government budget and 
cumulative basket funding. However, funds from the government budget are not 
stable due to the poor economy. This necessitates shaping our focus on how 
basket funding is more effective, and what are currently donor's commitments and 
the future structure of water development in the country. 
According to government Millennium Development Goals Vision 2025 that, 
Ministry of Water and Irrigation (MWI) will lead the role in facilitating and 
implementation of the Urban Water Supply and Sewerage (UWSS) in the country. 
Had formulated UWSS to comprised three major SUb-components including 
capital investment for Dar-es-salaam Water and Sewerage Authority (DAWASA) 
and other Urban Water Supply Authorities(UWASAs) in the country, Management 
and operational support at UWASAs level, and capacity building at national and 
UWASA levels. The requirements include refurbishment, upgrading and extension 
to existing were supply systems including source development, sewerage facilities 
and in some treatment plants. The ministry tasks will specifically involve areas of 
infrastructure development and improvement. The priority will be given to the cities 
and town areas that require assistance to upgrade their water supply and sanitation 
systems. 
i. Funding for Urban Water Supply and Sewerage 
In respect of funding Water Supply Development Projects (WSDP) the 
government of Tanzania has established a Water Sector Basket Funding (WSBF) 
as one of the key capital sources for programme implementation. International and 
local government partners depositing funds into special water development 
account. Partners they pledge and deposit their contributions on a six (6) months 
basis. The deposit is financing the activities in the sector for at list first six months 
of the Tanzania financial year of budget. 
ii. Process of Depositing and Transfer 
The process is if development partners are depositing funds, they are require 
to inform the ministry of finance and ministry of water in writing. The communication 
must provide detail of the 'account number, name of the sub project or programme 
and any other relevant details'. Then the Bank of Tanzania issues a Bank Credit 
Advice (BCA) to the Ministry of Finance to notify the bank has credited the Water 
Sector Development Account. Funds that received from countries development 
partners and all bank credit advices of these files are maintained by the ministry of 
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finance on receipt of the bank credit advice. The ministry of finance issues the 
receipt voucher which is also used to update the cash book. 
iii. Basket funds flow chart 
The basket funds were designed for development and sustainability of urban 
water and sewerage authorities (UWSAs), Local Government authorities (LGAs), 
Water Basin Offices (BWos) and Ministry of Water (MoW). The structure of basket 
funding flow chart has been designed to the actual need focusing on three major 
components including sources of funds, holder and controller and project 
Implementation. Each part has its important function for securing and safety of the 
funds in the country and as well as to ensure repartition to the donor. 
iv. Sources of Funds (Donors) and transfer to users 
There are three categories of different funding sources (donors) including 
those who are earmarked as permanent and stable donors, unpredictable donor 
and donation from local government budget. Those described as earmarking 
development partners are International Development Agency (IDA), African 
Development Bank, US-Millennium Challenge, Netherlands Government, Japan, 
European Union, GTZ, France, SECO and EIB these are officially committed that, 
within five years (2006-2011) period they will contribute a specific amount annually, 
Second category of donors are called Pooling Developed, the donors that are those 
they come over at any time to contribute, no pledges no official contracts no 
specific amount declared countries and any organisation they come and make 
donation any time with any amount. And the last group is Government of Tanzania; 
the government must contribute a declared percentage out of annual budget. 
Whereby all donations from these different sources are gathered and saved under 
the Exchequer accounts. 
The Exchequer Accounts is key play in the whole process of fund transaction 
from receiving to distributing point. The major responsibilities of the exchequer 
accounts are to collect all funds from donors for control, safety and distribution. The 
control is a major function of the bank which includes setting of special account 
designed for every donor, special account of every recipient and monitoring the 
funds flow. Therefore to make this practical there are forms purposely for 
monitoring, distribution and control of funds 
For control and good management, funds transfer to water authorities (fund 
users) has to go through the following process. The process is the water authorities 
(fund users) have to prepare detailed request to parent ministry (Ministry of water) 
is forwarded to Exchequer for scrutiny. 
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Ministry of Water prepares a quarterly cash flow; normally it is one month 
before the commencement of the next quarter with reference to work plan and cash 
flow for the preceding quarter and the consolidated cash flow forecasts to the water 
supply will be submitted to group financial committee for review and approval. Then 
ministry of water (MoW) requests the ministry of finance (MoF) to transfer funds 
from the water and sanitation development project (WSDP) holding account by 
special forms called TFN 358. After review the form is passed to the Accountant 
General to transfer funds from holding account to exchequer accounts. When the 
transfers have been affected, the BoT issues the MoF with debit advise finally the 
MoF credits each WSDPs cash book. Thereafter, MoF sends Exchequer 
notification issue to ministry of Water for notification of transfer. The whole process 
from the source (donors) and internal transfers to fund users can be summaries 
and presented as flow charts please see figure no.B.7 below. 
Eannarking 
Pooling Developed Government Develop 
Partners Partners of Tanzania 
• 1 
, 
Designed Designed Designed GOT 
llolding Holding Account in Vote TZSh. 
Account in US 
.. ~ 
Exchequer Accounts 
, ,. ~ 
LGAs Utilities BWos MOW 
LGCDG 
Account I ~ , ~ Executive 
UWASAs UWASA Ministry Agencies 
Regions I District 
DAWASA 
Figure no. 8.7 Flow chart for basket funding 
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8.7.3 Current position of basket funds 
The government of Tanzania has allocated funds for its facial year 2008/2009 
budget to the Ministry of Water and Irrigation (MOWI), Local Government Authority 
(LGA) and regional secretaries to ensure water developed in the whole country 
including urban, pere urban and rural areas, The basket funds allocation for this 
year were as follows (Summary of FT 2008/2009, Budget allocations to MOWL, 
LGA and RSs Votes Source: MOWI and regional MTEF 2008/2009). The table 
no.8.5 below describes the actual funds allocation to each sector for the year 
budget (2008/2009). 
Table 8.7: 200812009 Government Budget allocation for MOWI 
SUMMARY 
Budget Allocation Budget FY 2008/2009 (Tshs) 
Local Foreign Total 
MOWI (Vote 49) for 
WSDP ~5,463,379,OOO 91,305,914,700 126,769,293,700 
MOWI (Vote 49) 
for ASDP -Irrigation 13,185,574,000 
11,000,000,000 2,0,185,57400 
Sub-total - MOWI 
(vote 49) 46,463,379,000 93,491,488,700 139,954,867,700 
Sub - Total-Regional 
Votes (LGAs & RSs) 0 62,686,934,000 62,686,934,000 
GRAND TOTAL 
(WSDP & ASDP) ~6,463,379,OOO 156,178,422,70 202,641,801,700 
i. Basket fund donors 
Many External Support Agencies (ESAs) used to prefer bilateral financing of 
individual projects under a myriad of policies and implementation arrangements 
instead of a more consolidated approach. However, some of the donor funding 
projects has already made progress towards financial harmonization and general 
budget support mechanisms. Budget sources and donor financing need to be 
substantially expanded to reach the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and 
Vision 2025 targets for water resources management and water supply and 
sanitation coverage. Basket fund donors for water supply development projects in 
the period of five years (2006 - 2011) are including IDA, African Development 
Bank, US-Millennium Challenge, Netherlands Government, Japan, European 
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Union, GTZ, SECO, France and EIB. Tanzania government is also contributing 
almost a quarter of the total budget for the project. Therefore for the period up to 
2011 a total amount of US $ 951,000,000 is expected to be collected from the 
named donors. Any others who will come forward it will be a top up. Each donor 
and the commitment for contribution can be summaries and presented in the 
following table 8.6 below 
Table 8.8: Current donors of Basket for basket funding: (Source: MOWI and 
regional MTEF, 2008/2009) 
Source 
Government (URT) 
WSDP Financing Share/Ratio of 
Plan (2006 - 2011) Contribution 
US$ 
251,000,000 26.4% 
. ' :." ,', " I . 
. . 
• ~. .. • • ., I 
21.0% 
African Development 
Bank 
US-Millennium 
Challenge Account· 
Expected contribution 
from other DPs (Japan, EU, 
GTZ, SECO, France, EIB, etc) 
WSDP 2006-2011 
ii. Priority in fund distribution 
80,000,000 8.4% 
66,000,000 6.9% 
13.7% 
224,000,000 23.6% 
951,000,000 100.0% 
The collected amount will be distributed to various water projects in the whole 
country. According to the strategy set by the distribution committee the priority 
areas are protection and management of water sources, rural water supply and 
Urban, Management support utilities and new project investment for water supply 
structures and sewerage system. However, the whole project funds distribution 
plan has been described in number of components and presented in the table 
structure. (Please see appendix R in the CD). 
Iii. DAWASA position on basket funds 
DAWASA as a largest water services authority in the country with more than 
600 employees situated in the former capital and commercial city of Tanzania 
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serving more than 3.5 million people. According to MOWI structure DAWASA fund 
allocation is under the component of Urban Water Supply and Sewerage (UWSS). 
The total allocation for the period from 2006 - 2010 is US $ 510,875,000' [193]. 
The authority is spending almost 25% of the total UWSS allocation, because 
of its geographical location, functions, area of services and number of people 
saving. However, how much funds will be located to DAWASA depends on 
DAWASA request according to its strategic development plan (maintenance and 
development). However, according to the available estimates DAWASA will be 
funded 25% of the total allocation for UWSS. Then DAWASA will be allocated 
about US $ 31,929,688 per annum. However, basket funds depends on available 
donated funds normally it is not reliable depends on number of factors sometimes 
donors might withdraw or they cannot fulfil the promise. Therefore this study 
considered the source as one time capital fund (not long term source). 
8.7.4 Appraisal for POCO capital funding methods 
The three discussed POCO methods for capital funds (tariffs review, mass 
contribution and basket funding) have been established from local sources. Each 
method has its advantages and disadvantages. Any of these methods can be 
applied separately or combined. 
The tariffs review method is applicable only when water charges are reviewed 
with additional percentage for sustainability and development. However, change for 
water charges necessitates the approval of the regulatory authority. According to 
POCO the regulatory authority and operator are all independent organisation 
owned by government. The major role of regulatory authority is to ensure water 
charges are set to sustain and develop the existing services and at the same time 
the charges are affordable. POCO developed with greater consideration on 
affordability therefore, tariffs review method under POCO is acceptable in 
Tanzania. The tariffs review method is common in many countries in the World. 
The amount to be generated under this method normal depends on the size of the 
water distribution network and number of existing water customers. The greater the 
number of water customers, the greater the amount of collection. Depending on the 
design and objective set the method can be executed permanently of for specific 
period. If the affordable issue was not considered during the preparation 
(calculation) estimation time the new proposed charges will create difficulties in the 
process during the approval, then the new higher water charges will be the cause 
of conflict between the services provider and water users. Mass contribution 
method has indicated to be an appropriate local solution for capital fund 
development. . 
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The method involves use of tools and number of different approaches for 
funds collection (discussed in section 7.5.8). The implementation process is difficult 
and very discouraging because it necessitates closely follow up on each action and 
each step to make the project effective. Furthermore, the application of the method 
need time and higher commitment because it involves meeting with number of 
people and groups, legal procedures, involves number of implementers, 
organisation and frequently evaluation, and sometimes training is necessary. The 
overall process of implementation is long and difficult. Therefore, mass contribution 
method can be adopted once and for specific period. 
The method of basket funding is also appropriate solution for capital funds, 
no conditions for payback and no profit generating however, it depends more on 
how much funds are available in the basket and various promises of donor's 
commitment. Funds in the basket are not flowing constant, they are cases where 
donors are paying the whole commitment at once and there some cases they pay 
quarterly and there are as well some cases they cancel the commitments due to 
political reasons. In other way the government contribution is small according to the 
government income therefore funds in this pocket are not constant and how much 
to be contributed it depends on donor's willingness. The research has adopted this 
method with those cautions and that, the method used to establish one time capital 
fund for specific period, will not be continuously it is not reliable. Therefore, the 
most stable and more reliable source among the three is tariff review method which 
has been approved and adopted as a major source of local capital funds to this 
research. 
8.7.5 Effects of the model POCO in Practice 
Application of POCO will have impact on both managerial and financial 
change, that POCO will bring in new style of managerial practice with objectives of 
providing better and affordable water services to all. The effects and impacts can 
be measured on POCO acceptability to government, operator and water users. Will 
it be willingly acceptable? 
i. Management impact 
In practice POCO change the existing management organisation structure to 
bring in greater focus on commercial operations. This will affect the nature of 
operations by being more independent and free of interruption from government. 
On other side government giving away its traditional freedom of interruption in 
water services may not be so easy and this may become one of the reasons which 
may lead POCO to be not accepted. POCO management structure brings positive 
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changes in existing water services and that, POCO improves coordination among 
of the water stakeholders by introducing the commercial focus in production and 
operations. This makes performance monitoring and control to be more effective 
and more competitive with benefit to both customers and as well operator. 
ii. Financial Impact 
Adoption of new model POCO will make better water services in Tanzania, 
and improves the amount of water sells, the higher the sells the greater the 
revenue collection and the higher the sells the greater the government income 
through tax collection. Water services will improve because of POCO structural and 
ability of establishing reliable and sustainable capital funds from local sources. 
Sustainable capital without conditions and local strategic plans under contractual 
performance monitoring are the POCO major tools that, will give positive impact the 
financial status in water services. However, the tariffs review method is the a 
catalyst for fund raising, however, the strategy has an impact on increase of water 
charges with direct effecUtouch to water users. Worries on affordability due to 
increase of water tariffs can be used as a tool to influence the resistance against 
POCO. Still this situation can easy be tacked through education in transparency 
and direct participation of all kind of water users. 
8.7.6 Uniqueness of the POCO 
POCO has unique extra values and special contribution in many ways 
including composition, origination, adoption and its sustainability. The adoption of 
POCO for practice in its local area has so many uniqueness including 
i. Originality 
POCO has originated from local challenges on what to do next after the 
failures of public and private water services in the country. Even the research topic 
was formulated to solve the existing local problem. The model developed from 
analysis of local data where the problems are to be solved that's why it has been 
concluded that has local origin which is not similar to any model. The concepts 
formulated POCO were from the contributions of all Tanzania water stakeholders 
(customers, employees in water sectors and government people) who were 
organised to contribute independent opinions to this study. It was local ideas from 
stakeholder's participation, that what makes uniqueness. POCO is a local solution 
easier with almost no cost on adoption and implementation. The combination of all 
these local ideas from various stakeholders to come up with one appropriate 
solution covering the interest of all focusing on acceptability and adaptation 
necessary for actual local need. 
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ii. Composition emblem 
Structure is other uniqueness the model (POCO). The model has two major 
components including ownership and commercial operations. The ownership 
component is 100% government ownership of a public entity which is not 
necessarily publicly managed. Under the POCO structure the entity is 
independently managed. Policy issues are on the hands of the owner 
(government). The other part of POCO is commercial operations. The commercial 
part of model facilitates the generation of necessary funds for services 
sustainability and its development. The entity is operated commercially to cover all 
its necessary operation costs. The entity owned by government and managed 
independently and commercially. POCO have both public and commercial 
operation interests. 
iii. Application 
The model has uniqueness in application that, once adopted is already a 
solution of management for water services and as well capital fund generation 
method. POCO satisfy government needs (ownership) and also satisfy water users 
(affordability) this makes the model easier acceptable to all and that makes easier 
in application. 
8.7.7 Appraisal ofthe model POCO 
The differences between POCO and other model (public and privatisation) is 
that POCO has adopted some useful factors from all the two models. Concepts of 
efficiency and performance monitoring are the major factors in privatisation. 
Concepts of the public ownership and services to all are major goals of public 
services. As discussed in section 8.5.3. POCO will be easy accepted and 
applicable in the country because it has developed from the failure of private water 
services. The differences in functions and structure between POCO and 
privatisation is what will make POCO to reduce water charges because POCO has 
local sources for generating capital funds and greater consideration on affordability. 
However, this will improve the revenue collection and reduction of water loses. The 
uniqueness and originality of the model as discussed in section 8.7.6 has indicated 
greater acceptability in its application which therefore brought new hope of 
affordable water services to all. However, detail appraisal of the model can be 
clearly presented on discussing the model advantages and disadvantages as 
follows. 
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8.7.8 Advantages 
i. Better water services for all 
The POCO implementation structure indicates that the DAWASA operation 
area will divided into reasonable zone sizes depending on number of customers or 
geographical distribution water network of the area. Each zone or sub branch area 
will be well equipped with necessary tools, equipment and skilled labour. This will 
ensure faster and sustainable services for customers due to services being closer 
to water users. Good services to water user's means closer supervision of water 
distribution to customers; this includes closer control of water leakages, reduction 
of water leakages and increasing of water supply in distribution network. Services 
will improvement to customers because of increase in water quantity and pressure. 
The POCO implementation structure with the approach of commercial operations 
will open and encourage closer service relationship between the services provider 
and customers. The customer complains will be handled and solved within short 
time because of closeness of services to customers 
ii. Commercial sustainable 
The field data shows that, the DAWASA privatisation was due to a lack of 
funds for repair and rehabilitation of old aged DAWASA water infrastructures. This 
forced the Tanzania government to go for a World Bank loan with condition of 
privatisation. The commercial component in POCO is a designed ensuring the 
entity is stable for its operational costs and for services development. The product 
(water) will be served commercially to cover its total operational costs and extras 
will be invested as capital development for better water services. This will make 
DAWASA more sustainable and self-reliable on commercial aspects. POCO allows 
flexibility when it comes to commercial aspects. 
iii. Satisfaction to the Government and acceptability 
The aim of the government was to qualify for the World Bank loan and not to 
lose the DAWASA ownership through privatisation. For the similar reasons during 
the privatisation the government wanted to not lose the ownership of DAWASA. 
The government was not ready to lose the DAWASA ownership because of 
mainly political reasons. POCO has structured to retain the DAWASA ownership. 
However, government properties qualifies for government subsidies for 
development of public services which may reduce water charges with better 
monitoring and control to ensure the service is affordable to all. POCO was 
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developed with greater inputs from the local field data gathered from all water 
stakeholders, the place where the problem of water services management is 
existing. POCO process and approach for adoption covers a wide range of different 
participants at preparation stage. This allows the transfer of knowledge among the 
participants and the project host and therefore to make POCO acceptable and 
adoptable easier 
iv. Environmental friendly 
Availability of plenty water through adoption of POCO will make water 
sufficient for domestic use and as well for another usage including irrigation for 
gardening and plantation in general. This will decorate the earth surface to make 
attractive and friendlier for human use 
v. Increase of the land value 
POCO will make more water available, the availability of safe water will make 
land greenish and fertile this automatically will encourage and attract all kind of 
investors, this will stimulate the competition for investment and therefore land value 
will increase 
vi. Enhancement of Efficiency and Commitment 
The problem of inefficiency and bureaucracy in DAWASA services has been 
evidenced by 72% of DAWASA water customers as analysed in section 8.2 The 
performance contract that covers close monitoring and periodic performance 
review in POCO is one of the motivation for efficiency that, eliminates any 
bureaucratic process. This means any performed work is measured and evaluated 
for decision. 
The group or individual performances will be accessed and rewarded 
accordingly. The periodic performance targets to each described duty will be a 
special motivation to enhance services performance. The implementer swill work 
hard to achieve the targets. This will accelerate total commitment and therefore to 
improve services efficiency. Application of POCO necessitates improvement of 
data base. Records are important tool for various uses including evaluation and 
review for development of new targets and a well as for research use and from 
target review focus water services will be improved with minimum bureaucratic to 
maximum efficiency. 
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vii. Relationship and good coordination 
The application of POCO will improve and reinforce working relationship and 
communication between the government and services providers. The structured 
performance services report is provided periodically by the operator (DAWASA) to 
the government, and government reviews the report for action accordingly. This 
makes government closer to operator and sharing water problems closely and 
possibly it opens space for providing quick solutions. The government water policy 
is easier to implement. The government and operator will work under one objective 
better water services for all. 
8.7.9 Disadvantages of the POCO 
i. Application of POCO requires training for understanding its structure in 
areas including labour and power divisions and implementation procedures. In 
practice, the risk of interferences from political decision is high because the entity 
(DAWASA) is owned by the government and in government system decision 
makers are politicians. DAWASA management is installed by government mainly to 
fulfil government interest. Depending on the nature of decision most political 
decisions are an obstruction to professional practice. 
ii. Adoption of POCO will introduce new management rules especially when 
service provisions are managed under performance contract. At beginning this may 
cause some difficulties to employees those have been working under a different 
management style. This will result in resistance with effect on work performance. 
iii. For the purpose of water leakage control and proper monitoring of the 
distribution network POCO will urgently need to install large number of water 
meters which requires higher capital investment at very initial stage 
. iv. Application of POCO involves a lot of records keeping, systematically 
stage by stage and especial on up to dating customer records, network behaviour, 
water quality and production. It is important for activities monitoring and targets 
review. Record keeping may look too much. 
v. Adopting POCO involves organisation restructuring. The DAWASA 
operating areas is divided into reasonable size operation zones depending on 
number of customers and geographical distribution of water system. This requires 
training and development of new standards of performance criteria with targets, 
extra motivations, periodic review and modality of reporting. All these requires 
funds for mobilization, good skill and requires change. 
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8.8.0 Summary 
The information gathered from water stakeholders in the field and literature 
knowledge developed and concluded POCO as a solution for Tanzania (Sub-
Sahara African Countries) water problems. The POCO managerial structure 
compo,ses number of different organisations with major tool contract on 
performance. The work efficiency and control on project performance is through the 
periodic evaluation of the performed tasks. This allows the review of project 
strategies to shape the quality of work within the designed implementation period 
and therefore guarantee of quality in performance and efficiency in greater. The 
discussion in section 8.6.4 indicated that, the existing working relationships 
between different stakeholders in POCO structure is a driver of model performance 
to ensure that, the project objectives are achieved with common focus of all 
stakeholders. In this case partiCipation for common decision and fair consideration 
of water users and service provider ideas are met. This indicates that, the model 
system has made with team work approach which is motivation for WTP. Varieties 
of capital funds establishing approaches (tariffs review, mass contribution and 
government funds) in the model indicating that, model can be adopted with 
flexibility depending on circumstance of which approach is favourite to that 
particular environment. One or all approaches can be adopted at once or 
systematically depending on project strategy and field environment. This flexibility 
of model in application makes POCO possible to be adopted in flexible conditions 
and therefore to be a solution for other Sub-Sahara African countries. The 
discussed advantage and disadvantages of the model has opened a window for 
general analysis on acceptability, adoption and application the method that, 
analysis from these factors with focus on the new project objectives can be best 
way on concluding how POCO can be adopted. However, adoption of POCO 
method will solve water services and funding problems to make water services 
affordable to all. 
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CHAPTER NINE: VALIDATION OF THE NEW MODEL (POCO) 
9.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the external review of the new water services model 
POCO. The exercise was executed in Tanzania with aim of examining the model 
POCO on its applicability, acceptability and appropriateness. The theoretical and 
practical value of the model is examined later in this chapter. 
9.1.1 Approach to Validation of Model 
Focusing on the study objectives, information control and verification, a 
structured interview approach was the appropriate validation strategy to this 
research. Senior Tanzania officers have unlikely to respond to questionnaires; 
therefore the option of using questionnaire approach would not be appropriate. 
The, interview questions were structured in an open ended style to allow in-depth 
and wider coverage of the interviewees' comments on the model. The aim was to 
test the acceptability, applicability and adoptability of the POCO in the place where 
the model will be applied. The structure of questions was strategically developed to 
test the strengths and weakness of the model, see the interview question in 
appendix M in the CD. 
The validation was carried out in Tanzania for a period of one month from Mid 
July 2009. Aiming for quality contributions (positive and negative) staff 
management knowledge, professional practice and experience in water services, 
current holding position in water services sector, and personal ability and 
willingness on discussing new ideas were the key factors for selecting the POCO 
valuators. Senior officers (grade A) from local water authorities in Tanzania were 
selected for the interview. The officers were responsible for decision making in their 
authorities including chief executive and other senior officers from Mwanza, Tanga, 
Morogoro, Iringa, Mbeya, Arusha and Moshi regions. Please see (appendix S in the 
CD) for details of each interview. 
The validation of the model brought in some significant changes to the model 
and adds value by strengthening the contents. 
The exercise brought forward a number of challenges evidenced this wider 
range of practical experiences. All the seven interviewees were local professional 
engineers with managerial experience of not less than 15 years in water sector. 
The validation was executed strategically to involve local Tanzanians professional 
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and responsible people. The collected comments. criticism and new ideas were 
from local professional people those who are in the field practising water services 
with long experience in management. 
9.1.2 Summary of the validation interviews 
The mostly discussed areas were summarised into three groups. the 
composition of POCO structure and its functions. acceptability and adaptation of 
POCO. and development of capital funds. How POCO performances will was also 
analysed and presented as follows. 
i. Composition of POCO and functions 
The comments from MUWASA. AUWASA. MOUWASA. TAUWASA. 
MORUWASA. IRUWASA and Mbeya water authority senior executive officers was 
that. POCO organisation structure can be a solution for Tanzania water services 
because it is local origin and its composition allows close control and monitoring at 
every stage of implementation. The strategic organisation process on control and 
balancing water charges for the benefit of both water users and as well services 
provider makes the model structure more acceptable. The implementation phase 
should have close monitoring place. Other support services including security and 
professional duties should be implemented through competition by private 
companies and it will enhance the total performance. 
The interviewees added that. within the POCO designed structure the 
individual and total working performance will be controlled and measured in the 
performance contract. Therefore the provision of water supply and sewerage 
services will improve due to this structural contract control style. 
The POCO structure grant 100% government ownership. The interviewees 
commented that. water services should be owned by the public. It is proper 
because the government makes policies for water. controls the resources and is 
responsible for water capital investment. The government looks after human 
. development and water is a base of life and development. However. they cautioned 
clear boundaries should be in place to prevent political interference on daily water 
services activities. 
The interviewees indicated that. the commercialisation structural component 
in POCO should be seriously implemented in all water services sector if the idea of 
self-capital development is the goal. 
POCO should define in detail the boundaries and interrelation between 
member organisation. whereby roles. duties. responsibilities and power of each 
organisation should be clear. The interviewees were concerned with the strategic 
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implementation of POCO indicating that, the performance responsibilities should be 
divided into two categories monitoring and implementation. The practice should 
take place after short and long term training. 
ii. Acceptability of POCO 
Comments on acceptability was all the interviewees indicated that, POCO will 
be easier accepted in the country because it has origin concepts of local ideas 
including culture and traditional that, has greater impact on acceptability to local 
people and especially being developed purposely to solve Tanzania water 
problems. Considering the history of water problems in the country that, from 1961 
after independence water sector has been under restructuring and change of 
management from public to private then parastatal, but no study was carried out to 
come up with appropriate solution for the problem except POCO. This promises 
greater acceptability. The POCO component of considering the affordability and 
participation of all stakeholders for decision on water charge will not only motivate 
the WTP but also will make the model acceptable and practicable 
POCO is compatible to government water policy, while the POCO structure 
justifies the necessity of government ownership in water services. These factors 
have extra acceptability because the government will have no objection to the 
model adoption. It covers the major government interest (ownership). The Mwanza 
water commercial manager Manyema [204] added that, a model, formula or 
method can be adopted either for testing, improvement or as permanent solution. 
Therefore POCO is more acceptable and can be adopted not only as a solution for 
Tanzania water problems but as well as testing or improvement 
The government will not only accept POCO because of ownership but will 
support POCO because of its ability of developing capital funds from local sources 
that will make the government free from borrowing loans from international funding 
institutions and therefore free from donor's unnecessarily tough conditions. 
iii. POCO methods for Capital funds development 
The need for alternative and sustainable source for capital funds was 100% 
accepted by all the interviewees that, It is important at this time when loan 
conditions are not favourable to the borrowers. POCO methods for generating 
capital funds were also agreed. The three alternative including tariffs review, 
individual fund contribution and basket funding are technically sound with following 
comments. 
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Iv. Challenges on tariffs review method 
The tariffs review method being the major source for generating capital was 
accepted. Worries that, tariffs review will raise a specific amount for capital 
development will cause higher water charges for those with low incomes. This will 
increase illegal water supply connections and vandalism in the existing water 
supply network. The issue of using unsafe water for poor people will rise and 
therefore water borne diseases will spread. Mtaita [208], Shushu [206] and 
Mgeyekwa [205] indicated there worries on how the regulator will react at first time 
because, EWURA seems to bias and not easily accepting review of water rates 
with good reason that they are protecting people from higher water charges. On the 
other side Mfugale [203], [204], [207] and [208] insisted that, with detail analytical 
evidences EWURA would definitely approve the review for water rates provided the 
vision and objectives are clear. The concept adopts but not to be included in POCO 
because should be detailed in its objectives and strategy of implementation. 
v. Capital funds from local Institutions 
Mgeyekwa [205], Mfugale [203], Swai [209] and Halima [207] suggested that, 
loans from local financial institution should also be included in POCO as one of the 
sources for generating capital funds. The loan's conditions from the local financial 
institution are locally set with greater possibility of flexible and they may not be 
stronger than the ones from the foreign because local funding institutions and as 
well DAWASA are all existing under local Tanzania policy and they are made to 
serve Tanzanians. These new comments were analysed and the concepts were 
adopted as reinforcement to POCO. 
vi. Contract performance in POCO 
All seven interviewees were in favour of performance style contract, however 
they indicated that, the contract period should fixed and if possible should not be 
more than 2 years, (first year of big contract or projects is the observation period 
but second year is implementation time). Periodically review of contract within short 
time makes it easy for any adjustments or collections if necessary. Improvement of 
contract terms according to the real situation every two years period is reasonable. 
They added that, contract terms should be realistic and measurable. Contracts 
should have room of open competition between the performer and its set targets 
and as well among the employees themselves. The best performer should be 
awarded and worse performer should be answerable. 
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9.1.3 Summary of concepts from validation exercise 
The summary indication of the validation exercise is that, POCO with clear 
objectives and clear procedure of implementation was accepted as a sustainable 
solution for Tanzania water problems. However, there are some concepts adopted 
for the model reinforcements as follows 
i. Training (Clear understanding of POCO) 
The model should have special training program before and during the 
adoption to ensure good transaction and clear understanding of what is POCO and 
its objectives. This means clear understanding of model and its objectives will 
make it acceptable, adoptable and assurance of trust to all stakeholders. Therefore 
the position of training should be first in the structure and actually is and continues 
process until model it is in full capacity in practice. This means that, preparation 
time is obligatory and during that time one of the important activities training should 
be conducted. Whereby the structure should allow the fixed period for training to all 
stake holders and the training effects should be measured before POCO is kept in 
practice. 
ii. Capital funds from local institutions 
The interviewees raised new concept that, POCO can have a component of 
establishing capital funds from local institutions. Their insisted that, loans from local 
financial institutions are soft, with fewer conditions than those from international 
donors, because local institutions are registered under the local government policy 
for the benefits of Tanzanians. The idea was accepted but not adopted in POCO 
because it is completely out of POCO objectives. This concept necessitates 
establishing of a special study to ensure the security and capability of the local 
institutions. However, the local financiers conditions should be measured and 
evaluated to ensure its acceptability, applicability and without having affects to 
water services. 
However, one of the research objectives was to develop alternative capital 
funding sources as a solution from loans with tough conditions. Therefore, concept 
was fit to the POCO objectives and that, make it not adopted in the model and 
therefore was included to the research recommendations. 
iii. Restructuring of the DAWASA operating area 
The concept was raised earlier by six interviewees, that to make services 
more efficient the DAWASA operating area should be divided into small sub 
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operating areas. The new sub-branch zones will have full power on water 
connection and reconnection for non-payers. The implementation requires initial 
capital investment, for establishing sub-offices, organisation, equipment, tools and 
other necessary requirements. This needs special preparation plan with capital 
funds and as well training. The concept was adopted in model. 
iv. Transparency during the adoption 
The adoption of the model should be executed in transparent manner and at 
every stage all stakeholders should be granted full participation. This concept came 
from ,all seven interviewees. The important period is during the arranging and 
dividing sub areas/ zones for operation and especially before adoption of POCO. 
However, also before commencing of individual contracts 'performance contract' 
exercise the employee's involvement is obligatory. The employees should clearly 
understand what are the contract and their contents 
v. Free from interference 
POCO should be free from higher authority interference on its programs and 
activities. In the developed model it was just assumed that, POCO will 
accommodate full freedom. This views worries that, POCO is hundred% owned by 
government and therefore, it is possible to be used as a political platform Factor of 
operating boundaries, role and functions with clear demarcation should be 
articulated in the performance contract. 
The performance contract between government (ministry of water) and 
DAWASA will be as a tool for guiding responsibilities and boundaries of each part, 
whereby protection of internal and external interference is guaranteed. However 
legislation of legal existence which every organisation has clearly declared its 
function and duties to perform is also protecting the interference of government to 
DAWASA. 
iv. Private operation in POCO 
The idea of accommodating private services in POCO was firstly raised 
during the model test in the field Tanzania. Five interviewees recommended that, 
participation of private services in selected areas especially in sophisticated 
professional equipments and duties such as plants rehabilitation, designs, 
construction of big structure, security services, communication duties and others is 
necessary. Engaging of private services in those areas will enhance the quality of 
production through competition and therefore to rise the POCO performance. The 
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idea was adopted and that, to ensure quality, competency, professional, time and 
money saving in executing POCO some of selected tasks should be contracted to 
private operators. A shown in diagram nO.9.1 below that POCO organisation 
structure under project implementation unit contracts for private operation will be 
executed. The selected special and professional tasks will be contracted to 
professional private services provider. The concept of providing private services in 
the model is to allow competition and technology improvement for better quality. 
According to POCO structure the section of project implementation will supervise 
and review the performance of all services provided by private contractors. Private 
participation in POCO can be summarised and presented as shown in diagram no. 
9.1 below. 
DAWASA, the service provider 
Supervision and 
Performance monitoring 
Diagram 9.1: Private services in POCO structure 
9.3 Validation on POCO financial part. 
The validation for the financial model was a component of the research 
necessary for cross checking the relevance and its practicability in the field. This 
research concludes the solution for funds problem by developing the sustainable 
fund model from local sources, as proves of practicability the two new developed 
funds methods including (Tariff review and Mass contribution methods) were tested 
as follows 
i. Validation of tariff review method 
The implementation validation on practicality for capital fund rising was part of 
the designed study strategy to ensure the strength of POCO and its applicability. 
Whereby, the commercial part of POCO has been structured to cover the operation 
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costs for water services and generation for capital funds. therefore its application 
was also validated to conclude the cumulative funds as follows. The idea is that. 
total collection with reviewed rate - Total existing collection + 4% annual increase 
from reduction of water losses + normal serving between the existing collection and 
expenditure (annually for five years) for estimated period of implementation. 
Considering that. during the 4 years of DWSSP implementation almost 60% water 
leakages will be controlled and reduced the effect will be increasing of water supply 
by 5% of total production per annual. Considering the existing DAWASCO 
consumption ratio. the increased water volume has been distributed to all three 
water categories (domestic categories one and two. and commercial category) and 
therefore to effect the total water sells as follows 
• Domestic category one with consumption not above 5 m3 which is 14% of 
total consumption will have an increase of 684.597.99 m3 per annum 
• Domestic category two with consumption above 5m3 which has domination of 
77.2% in total consumption will have an increase of 3.775.068.9.1m3 per 
annum and 
• Commercial category which is occupying 8.8% of total consumption will have 
increase of 430. 318.7m3 per annum 
In order to be precise. realistic and accurate this mathematical validation has 
adopted to work with DAWASCO amount of sold water per annum. Therefore Sold 
water = total consumed water - consumed unpaid water. While consumed water = 
total water production - all wastage (leakages. illegal connections and others). 
Considering that. within four years of DWSSP implementation period gradually 
water consumption will increase from 68.459.802.8m3 to 83.213.317m3• Similarly 
the sold water amount will increase to 82.562.934m3 which is about 90.8% of 
current total plants production. It has been estimated that. water production will 
increase by 5% due to plants repair and rehabilitation under DWSSP. The details 
on this can be presented in table no.9.1 
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Table 9.1: Systematic and volumetric increase of water sells 
Categories of 
Consumption Current 1St Year 2nd Year 3rd Year 4th Year 
Domestic 
Consumer 8,820,420 9,505.017.9 10,189,615 10,874,212 11,558,809 
One (14%) 
Domestic 
Consumer 48,638,316 52,413,384 56,188,452 59,963,520 63,738,588 
Two (77.2%) 
Commercial 
Category 
(8.8°/~) 
5,544,264 5,974,582 6,404,901.4 6,835,218.7 7,265,537.4 
Total (100%) 63,003,000 67,892,983 72,782,968 77,672,950 82,562,934 
The revenue collection will increase gradually due to increase on water sells 
which has been cause by water supply increase as the result of DWSSP project 
and increase on new connections. According to the discussion in section 8.5.6 and 
mathematical calculations in section 8.5.7 indicating that, the increase in sales will 
increase the DAWASCO revenue to the target. Increase of water volume has to 
multiply with existing water rates for revenue gain. Therefore annual revenue 
increase at every customer category has been calculated to indicate how much 
annual increase for the whole DWSSP implementation period. The calculation 
summary can be presented in table format as shown in table 9.2 below 
Table 9.2 Annual revenue increase due to volumetric water increase 
Categories of 
1St Year 2nd Year 3rd Year 4th Year Consumption Current 
Domestic 
Category 2,116,900.8 2,281,204.2 2,445,507.6 2,609,810.8 2,774,114.1 
One (14%) 
Domestic 
Category 15,564,261 16,772,282 17,980,304 19,188,326 20,396,348 
Two (77.2%) 
Commercial 
Category 1,995,935 2,150,849.5 2,305,764.5 4,456,614.2 6,762,378.6 
(8.8%) 
Total (100%) 19,677,096 21,204,335. 22,731,575 26,254,750 29,932,840 
The revenue increase has been calculated in conSidering the new reviewed 
water tariffs on each category as stipulated in section B.5.7 and water volumetric 
increase as indicated in table no 9.2. The calculation based on new set water rates 
per one cubic meter on each category as follows; 
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For domestic category one is £ = 0.44, domestic category two is £ = 0.62 per cubic 
meter and commercial reviewed rate is £ = 0.86 per cubic meter. 
Calculation has been made with consideration that, the reviewed water tariffs will 
remain consistence (no review again) for five years period. Therefore, with 
reviewed rate mathematical workings has been executed, to come up with focused 
amount to be generated. The table no 9.3 below indicates the summary calculation 
of annual revenue generation for the period of four years. It is a capital amount 
established from tariffs review and increase of water sells 
Table 9.3: Annual revenue collection with reviewed tariffs 
Category of Current 
consumer charges 1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year 4th Year 
Domestic 
Category 3,660,984.8 4,182,207.8 4,483,406.0 4,784,653.2 5,065,875.9 
One (14%) 
Domestic 
Category 30,155,755.0 32,496,298.0 34,836,840.0 37,177,382. 39,517,924. 
Two 
(77.2%) 
Commercia 
I Category 4,768,067.0 5,138,140.5 5,508,215.2 5,878,288 6,248,362,1 
(8.8%) 
Total 
(100%) 38,804,806.0 41,816,645.0 44,828,861.0 47,840,323 50,852,161.0 
Considering the revenue established due to volumetric water increase as 
indicated in table no. 9.2 and revenue established from tariffs review in each 
category as shown in table no.9.3. The calculation for total capital funds to be 
established will be as follows. 
Domestic tariff one: will increase £ 301,223.00 every year x 4 = £ 1,204,892.00 
Domestic tariff two: will increase £2,340,450 every year x 4 = £ 9,361,800.00 
Commercial category: will increase £ 370,072 every year x 4 = £ 1,460,288.00 
And therefore total collection will be 
i. Domestic customers with category one tariffs = 
3,660,984.8 +4,182,207.8 +4,483,406 +4,784,653.2 +5,085,875.9 =22,197,127.7 
ii. Domestic customers with category two tariffs = 
30,155, 755+32,496,298.0+34,836,840.00+37,177 ,382+39,517,924 =174,184,199 
iii. Customers with commercial category = 
4,768,067+5,138,140.5+5,508,215.2+5,878,288.0+6,248,362 = 27,541,072.7 
Therefore, the total revenue collection for the whole period of 4 years will be: SP 
(£) = 223,922,399.4 
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Iv. Expenditures 
According to 2007/2008 DAWASCO annual report (see table 8.3). The 
DAWASCO total annual expenditure was Tsh. 15, 945,395,398.99. Considering 
that, due to unstable economy the inflation will affect the expenditure with 
assumption that expenditure will increasing by 7% annually in four years period. 
Therefore, the total expenditure by the end of four years period will be STP (£) = 
37,097,163, The detail calculation of increase on annual expenditure has been 
summaries and presented in table format see the table no. 9.4 below. 
Conversion rate to STP (£) (sept.2008): 1 GBP = Tsh.2042 
Table 9.4 Annual increases in expenditure 
Current 
expenditure 1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year 4th Year Total 
in STP (£) 
7,808,715 8,355,325 8,940,197 9,566,011 10,235,631 37,097,163 
v. Total fund established from tariff review approach 
The total amount to be raised within the estimated period of four years will be, 
the total revenue collected after the tariffs review which includes extra sold water 
increased due to leakage control. Considering the expenditures, the amount to be 
served as a capital investment will be: 223,922,399.4 - 37,097,163 = SP (£) 
186,825,236.4 
This is the new evince that, application of POCO under tariffs review method 
is an appropriate approach for generating funds from local sources, Therefore only 
within four years period DAWASCO will manage to establish BST (£) 
186,825,236.4 as capital for development in water services. 
Evaluation on periodic (weekly, monthly and annually) increase of revenue 
collection is the major indicator to give proper direction of project success and 
failure. Therefore, systematic change on increase of the sold volumetric water and 
increase due to revenue collection can be monitored and analysed statistically 
through mathematical calculation. For easy evaluation and analysis the calculation 
has been summarised and transferred to graph presentation (see graph no. 9.1) 
below. 
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Currently 1st Year 2nd Year 3rd Year 4th Year 5th Year 
Graph No.9.1: Volumetric increase of sold water with effect on increase of revenue 
9.3.2 Summary 
Applications of tariffs review method as approach for establish capital funds 
have indicated that is reliable, sustainable and acceptable in local environment. 
The whole calculation and discussion in section 9.3, evidenced that the method has 
ability of establishing funds up to or more than SST (£) 186,825,236.4 within the 
short period of four years. This will make water services sustainable and self 
funding. The detail on how this will be generated has shown in section and 
summarised in table 9.2, 9.3, and 9.4. However, graph no. 9.1 gives detail 
character of increase of revenue collection and increase of sold water for same 
period. Therefore the method is appropriate and affordable for Tanzania water 
services. 
9.4 Validation on Mass Contribution method 
9.4.1. Workers contribution from the salaries 
Mass contribution method is common and has been very successful in 
Tanzania. It has been adopted for fund generation in several areas including 
education sector, health and also can possibly adopted in water sector as follows. 
Focusing on targeted amount to be collected, the contribution per person was 
set by regional executive committee (tusk force) and agreed with workers union 
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whereby, attention and greater consideration was for low income people, and 
therefore the structure for contribution was developed balanced to cover all public 
employees in detail matriculated as follows. In public institutions including 
ministries, government agencies and parastatal organisations the contribution was 
from Tsh.S, 000.00 to Tsh.1 00, 000.00 divided into five months period per person 
and however those who contributed more than Tsh.30, 000.00 were given special 
relief on tax payment for their personal property (were offered special tax relief 
certificate).Therefore the contribution formula for all classes of employees was as 
follows 
Table 9.5: Employee contributions as per Income 
Deduction per Total Amount of 
Salary per month (Tsh.) month (Tsh.) period of contribution in 
deduction (Tsh) 
Amounting To 
from 
100,000.00 199,999.00 1,000.00 5 5,000.00 
200,001.00 499,999.00 2,000.00 5 10,000.00 
500,000.00 999,999.00 4,000.00 5 20,000.00 
1,000,000.00 1,500,000.00 10,000.00 5 50,000.00 
1,500,001.00 Up ward 20,000.00 5 100,000.00 
Therefore, . with this affordable minimum amount of contribution mass 
contribution method was executed for only one year period from 26th May 2007 
while the total amount of US $ 5,000,000.00 was collected. Table no. 9.5 indicating 
the mathematical detail of the worker's categories of contribution. This evidencing 
that, provided the organisation has been set properly people contribution can raise 
some amount reasonable for capital investment. In this situation the exercise was 
conducted for only one year, that means if would have been carried for 4 years 
period the contribution would have raised for four times = US $ 20,000,000.00, 
which is approximately UK £ 11,753,183.15. 
This validation indicating that, the mass contribution method is also accepted 
as source of capital funds in the country. However the amount collected is less that 
tariffs review method but if the method organised well with greater number of 
participants the collection will increase. 
This calculation indicating that, if these two methods (tariffs review and mass 
contribution) were combined applied for a period of four years will generate total 
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capital funds amounting to SSP (£); 186,825,236.4 + 11,753,183.15 = 
197,579,419.55 approximately £ = 200,000,000.00. 
9.4.2 Summary of validation in commercial sustainability of POCO 
Sources for capital funds for water projects in Tanzania and Sub-Sahara 
African countries were to be the obstacle for water development in the region. 
POCO has developed a solution for the capital fund problem. Therefore testing it 
was necessary to ensure the value of the model and trust for application. Validation 
on commercial part of POCO under tariffs review and mass contribution methods 
evidenced that, POCO is a practical model for local capital fund establishment. 
Capital funds can be organised from local sources by reasonably reviewing water 
tariffs as discussed in sections 8.5.5 and 8.5.7 of chapter 8. Mathematical 
calculations of DAWASA existing water tariffs, estimated tariffs and increase of 
water supply can build up the DAWASA revenue collection to formulate a stable 
capital for water development. Under ownership of the government POCO capital 
funds generation is easier to facilitate the changes because the entity is 
government property within the available local sources local people ideas. In 
relation to the validation of POCO capital fund rising, all senior officers approved 
the method. The general comments of POCO challenges from the validation were 
as follows. 
i. Loans from International financial Institution should not be neglected 
because of its difficult conditions because it has its own contribution towards the 
general development. 
ii. Other sources for capital funds should be from local financial institutions, 
because local institutions are under local common policies and therefore their 
conditions won't be as the international financial institutions 
iii. Four senior officers from Arusha, Morogoro, Mbeya and Iringa water 
authorities expressed their deep worries on restructuring of water tariffs. If it is not 
well designed with clear evidence then it would not be approved by the regulator 
EWURA. 
iv. Acceptability of POCO in commercial aspects was that POCO is local and 
practical solution for capital development in water sector. Proper implementation of 
the model POCO will remake the problem of capital funds for water development. 
They worried to satisfy the regulator for sanctioning the tariffs review. 
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9.4.3 Concepts adopted directly to POCO 
All the validation information were critically analysed and after is where the 
concepts adopted to strengthen the model or for recommendation. The concepts 
adopted with direct contribution to POCO be as follows. 
i. Answerability and good funds management 
The control and good funds management was the idea brought by six 
interviewees that, the funds generated for capital should be well kept with proper 
control so as should not be diverted to any other use. This was referred to the 
traditional experience of misdirecting funds contrary to origin plan. That all the 
collected water sells should be well managed under good plan for expenditure, also 
noted that, finance management is one of few problems in a exiting local water 
services management. The concept was adopted in POCO that all professional, 
skilled and competent people should in place while technical and financial audit 
should part of POCO structure. Time to time training will be provided. However, any 
type of corruption will be combated with all the forces. This will ensure the good use 
of the little available funds for services sustainability. This concept was adopted in 
POCO and that in POCO professional decisions are made by professions under 
existing discipline system. 
ii. Acceptability of tariffs review method as DAWASA major source for capital 
funds 
Worries on acceptability of tariffs review method on being the source for 
capital funds through full cost recovery and capital development, that, the public 
regulatory authority EWURA will not accept. This research has worked on the 
concept and therefore, special training of introduction to POCO has been 
introduced in preparation stage whereby in this training detail discussion on POCO 
functions and advantages of adopting tariffs review method will be covered. 
Evidences on affordability will be provided. Technical detailed on services 
sustainability and development according to the requirement. Advantages and 
evidences of tariff review method in comparison to loans from international donors. 
However, with greater advantage of its compatibility and acceptability to water Act. 
2009 has been a special contribution to advocate its acceptability in the country. 
This water Act, is advocating self-dependent in establishing capital funds for water 
development projects. Comparisons of POCO to water policy will be a critical 
example area on the training. However, this special training will be not only for 
EWURA management team but also to ministry, DAWASA, consumers and all 
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other water stakeholders. The training for adaptation of POCO will involve open 
discussion and clear evidences will be provided. This has been directly adopted as 
part of POCO at preparation stage (The term training here use as a way of 
educating Itransferring knowledge of POCO to stakeholders with focus on 
acceptability). 
9.5 The revised POCO model 
All the gathered contributions and adopted concepts through validation 
process in the field Tanzania has strengthened and reinforced the model POCO 
by adding greater value in the existing designed model structure. 
Therefore, new concepts adopted from validation has strengthened the 
model to sustain the field requirements in the following areas 
i. Control of generated capital funds under DAWASA 
Under this revision on funds control and management, DAWASA will 
manage and control all the capital funds, and that all designed capital funds 
established through tariffs review, mass contribution and government contribution 
each source will have separate control and operating accounts. The authorised 
expenditure will only be for capital investment within and not the outside of the 
entity agreed development plan. In this case all major procurements will be 
executed by DAWASA head office, Implementation and Capital Project Unit 
(ICPU) and sub branch offices will be empowered to purchase only some special 
items but under the control of DAWASA head office. Funds control is centred in 
DAWASA head office to ensure annual flow funds expenditure and its value in 
equivalence to annual investment is tarrying. This is POCO funds control in its 
operation. However, ICPU is responsible for implementation of all capital project 
while sub branches offices will be executing all the daily operation duties as 
explained in section (8.5.3iv). The process and responsibilities for project funds 
control, procurements and all other expenditures in relation to fund users 
(implementers) can be summarised and presented as shown in the diagram 9.2 
below. 
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Figure no. 9.2 Planning and control of local capital funds 
ii. Special training to all stakeholders 
One of the core functions of implementation will be training for POCO 
introduction._This professional training will cover the detail discussion of the model 
functions including the advantages and the disadvantages. The areas for training 
have been discussed in section (9.4.3ii). Strategically the training will involve 
government leaders (ministry of water), Regulatory Authority (EWURA), 
DAWASA, DAWASCO and water customers. 
iii. Special training will be conducted with DAWASA 
The training will involve strategy identification and priority areas for 
investment. Water services are huge sector and altogether requires big amount of 
investment. The capital generated amount might not be enough for all works 
(plants and structure for water production, main pipes, reservoirs, busting 
stations, distribution lines, domestic lines, water meters, equipment and tools, and 
general control of unaccounted for water) at once. Strategic plan for identify the 
priority areas necessary for investment within the whole entity operating area is 
necessary. Spotting the priority areas for investment plan requires detail analysis 
of the area cost for investment (affordable or not) and the impact after investment 
(returns) in terms of better quality and funds. The objective here is determining 
which area to be invested first with maximum effectiveness. However, the capital 
funds from tariffs review method is generated staidly and increasingly yearly, 
therefore the whole process necessitates good understanding on how much is 
available and where to put the first generated small capital for the maximum 
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effectiveness. Therefore the second year generated capital with consideration on 
impact on previous investment can better used for next investment. Under good 
monitoring this is continuously process of investment and therefore it is 
continuously process of water service improvement. This requires professional 
training to ensure good use of the local developed capital funds for sustainable 
water services in the field. 
9.5.1 Noted concepts but not adopted in POCO 
i. Loans from financial Institution being sources for capital funds 
The noted concept from six interviewees is 'loans from international funding 
institutions should also be included in POCO as source of capital funds for water 
projects'. Arguing that, the international sources bring in new technology, new 
technical and management skill and sometimes higher skilled and competent 
employees which are basics tools for efficiency in water services. 
This research has appreciated that, sources of fund from International 
financial institutions has greater contribution in local water services development, 
but the difficult conditions accompanied with loans has negative impact on the 
whole meaning of water services to all. As discussed in chapter 4, unless the loan's 
difficult conditions are more flexible and give fair opportunity to all borrowers and 
donors. This research has been developed to come up with realistic and 
sustainable capital funds source as an alternative of loans from international 
institution. The current set conditions for loans makes more difficulties for water 
development in sub-Sahara African countries. POCO has been developed to solve 
capital funds problems and as well a substitute for donor loan's difficult conditions. 
Developing of the appropriate funding model for water projects was one of the 
research objectives and the research evidenced that loans from international 
funding institution is not the appropriate source for capital funds (see chapter 3 
section 3.9.3 and chapter 4 section 4.9.5). Therefore, this study adopted the idea 
for comment and advice. 
ii. Establishing capital funds from local financial institution 
Capital funds to be sources from local financial institution this was also a 
contribution during the validation of commercial sustainability of POCO. The idea is 
good but it completely out of this research structure. POCO was developed to solve 
capital funds problems and as an alternative for loans with difficult conditions. Any 
loan has conditions; as well local donors have their conditions too. The loan 
common condition is interest (profit), because any commercial business institution 
is operating for profit. The interest for loan has to be reflected and covered in 
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customer water charges, this has an effect of increasing water charges because of 
loan + interest (profit). POCO has developed with consideration of people with low 
income (affordability). Any element which will be reflected and impact on increasing 
water charges is not compatible to POCO. POCO is fighting loans for affordability 
of water services (to make service cheaper). It is the objective of this research to 
come up with sustainable, affordable, quality and efficient solution for water 
services in Tanzania. Adopting local financial institution as source for capital funds 
needs study to identify the stability, conditions and the effects. For that reasons the 
idea of local financial institution being a source for capital funds cannot be 
combined with POCO. Therefore the idea was adopted for recommendation in 
future studies. 
9.5.3 Discussion on new water management model 
The discussion in this section involves comparison between POCO and 
other models (privatisation and public water services) that, have been 
implemented in the country. This gives opportunity to screen the characters of 
POCO when adapted to the field. Basically each model developed with specific 
objectives to be adopted somewhere. However, analysis of general characters of 
the model for assessing its compatibility to field in necessary. 
a. Practical differences between POCO and Privatisation 
POCO and private water services has great similarities on services 
improvement. However, every model has developed to fit somewhere, and no one 
can fit everywhere, this is because of the existing differences from one model to 
another. Therefore practical differences between POCO and privatisation 
discussed in this section has been focused on compatibility of the model to solve 
water services problem in Tanzania. Therefore the discussed areas are 
compatibility to Tanzania water Act, localisation of the model, driving forces of the 
model, generated profit, local management staffs and affordability in providing 
water services. 
i. POCO's Compatibility to objectives of the Tanzania water Act. 
Objectives of water Act.2009 are to promote and ensure the right of every 
Tanzanian to have access, efficient, effective and sustainable water supply and 
sanitation services through 
,. Ensuring that water supply and sanitation authorities (DAWASA) are 
financially and administratively autonomous and sustainable 
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> Establishing mechanisms to ensure that communities meet the costs for 
operation and maintenance of their water supply systems and contribute to 
the capital costs thereof. Furthermore, minister of water has power to 
declarer any government water entity to be financial autonomous depending 
on its commercial viability of providing water and sewerage services. 
This justifies the acceptability of POCO in the country because POCO has 
been developed to solve water problems through self-affordability (capital funds 
that develops from water services), which are main objectives of water Act 2009. 
Therefore, POCO will be accepted easily because POCO is not only advocating but 
it is also a Tanzania water Act practice. In comparison with privatisation, that 
private system was just forced to be practiced because of being the condition for 
the loan. 
ii. POCO's locality 
POCO has developed from local problems with greater contribution of local 
people ideas. The POCO structure recognises local water users as fundamental 
part of the model and therefore they have given special task to perform on model 
organisation structure. Review of water tariffs is not possible without water users' 
participation. That means the regulator cannot make decision without discussion 
and consultation with local water users. This make them feel that, they are part and 
parcel of the POCO and that the model is there are local method to solve their 
water problems. While privatisation is external developed model, was brought in the 
country as a condition for loan. 
iii. Differences in driving forces 
Driving forces for developing and adopting POCO is affordable, sustainable 
water and sanitation services to all Tanzanians (Own willingness to solve water 
problems). Nevertheless, the driving forces for adapting private water services were 
a need for capital funds (loan) from the World Bank. This is also a justification that 
POCO is Ideal model for Tanzania water problems. Therefore, definitely its 
application will ensure the availability of domestic water with affordable water 
charges because no extra amount in the water rates to cover the loan and interest. 
iv. Generated profit 
The net generated profit from water sells is case of the POCO is taken back 
as a capital investment to the same water development project, while in private 
system according to number of shares of each member the generated profit is 
distributed within the shareholders. In the case where shareholders are foreigners 
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then the generated profit is taken outside of the country. The new model (POCO) 
will speed up the development of water services in the country, because the whole 
generated profit is used back as capital. The process of reusing profit as new 
capital will expand the network and number of customers will increase. Within 
reasonable period of time application of POCO will facilitate internal establishment 
of capital funds. 
v. Local management staffs 
POCO management differ with private services in structure and organisation 
in general whereby POCO occupies full local management team, therefore final 
decisions of any level are made locally and faster. Local management team with 
greater understanding of social, culture and local traditional will improve 
relationship between management and common employees to form good team 
work. This will rise the working attitude with commitment and accountability 
whereby, directly will improve working discipline to increase productivity. This is due 
to experience and better understanding of local environment, culture, traditional 
and social life of the people whom they are working with them. Private system with 
top foreign management team had less knowledge on local culture and traditional. 
Foreign management team they are fast to bring in new rules to abolish some local 
working style and sometimes even the introduction of foreign culture may be a 
cause of conflict and misunderstanding. Those things were noted in DAWASA 
privatisation were the obstacles and the major causes of privatisation failure. 
vi. POCO developed with greater focus on affordability 
In comparison with private water services POCO has been developed with 
greater focus on providing services to all, with major consideration for low income 
people. Therefore, through the whole process of model development the issue of 
affordability has been covered. The affordability has never twisted original 
objectives of developing a practical solution for capital funds generation and for 
development and sustainability of water services. Funds generated from 
difference between total water sells and total expenditures (profit) are directly 
accumulated as capital to develop the same entity. The same generated funds 
(profits) under private services are distributed to shareholders. POCO retains 
public ownership while a private water service is owned by private individuals or 
groups. Private water services are mainly driven by profit maximisation, while 
POCO has focus on services expansion, affordability and sustainability. 
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b. Differences between POCO and Public water services 
The discussion covered on sections (5.2.4) and (9.4) on role and functions 
of public water services and POCO. Indicated that, both models are under public 
ownership with focus on services to all, but the two models have number of 
differences in structures, operations, chain of command, decision making and as 
well in control on performance. As discussed in section 9.4.2 that, POCO is an 
independent commercial operating model and therefore services under POCO 
has more clear targets and plans, control, close performance monitoring and 
detail estimation on amount to be generated as a capita/. Public water services in 
not full independent with interference during the operation which in many cases 
resulted to bureaucratic. The commercial focus in POCO to generate its own 
capital funds are that, what brings up major differences between the two different 
models. Public water management style has greater focus on affordability and 
services to all, the sources for capital funds is a government task (central budget, 
grants or loans), whereby in some cases service costs are subsidised by 
government, therefore the model is not self-sustainable. 
The driving forces for developing POCO was to water services problem 
which was not solved by public and as well private style of water services in the 
country, although POCO has some digestive components of both public and 
private style but the model organisation structure is different from neither public 
no private services style. 
POCO is a solution for both generating of capital fund and appropriate water 
management model. POCO has developed from existing local problems to solve 
water problems for Tanzanians. POCO is an appropriate solution because it 
composes capital fund generation and water management structure both 
solutions are necessary for future betterment of water services in Tanzania. 
Public water services were not successful because of absence of capital for 
investment in water development projects. As described in chapter 2, this 
situation forces the government to go for loan and the conditions for loan brought 
in private water services. 
POCO is formulated with two main methods (tariffs review and mass 
contribution) for establishing capital funds from local sources. As discussed in 
chapter 8 section 8.5.5ii. Tariffs review methods means, water charges covers 
actual water production and general services costs. A specific% of money 
focused to cover services sustainability and estimated amount for services 
development according to needs. Therefore, water users have to pay the amount 
of water cost per every meter cubic. POCO structure formulated with greater 
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participation of water users (see section 6.8.9 and figure no 6.1). This makes 
water users feel that, water is for users to pay and water services is for them and 
they own the service, while in public style of water services customer's tents to 
see it as a public property with less attention. 
9.5.4 Challenges faCing POCO 
The adoption of the POCO for use in relation to Tanzanian water services, as 
with any other model, has focused on the following challenges: 
i. One of the major challenges facing the POCO in Tanzania is that total 
water production from the three water treatment plants, including other sources 
such as bore holes and shallow wells, serves only 70% of total urban demand while 
requests for water connections is increasing by 4% per year and consumption is 
also increasing due to building developments, population increase and economic 
development. Therefore, demand is higher than supply. 
ii. Less than 50% of DAWASCO customers are covered by water meter 
connections, and the majority of domestic water consumers are assessed and 
categorized according to flat rate water charges - this presents a challenge in terms 
of the control of actual water consumption and has a significant effect on actual 
water charges. 
iii. In Tanzania, other challenges facing the POCO include how to deal with 
illegal water connections, since people used to steal water by cutting pipes and re-
connecting them secretly underground. It is very difficult to control this type of water 
theft, especial in squatter and slum areas. At the same time, there are those people 
who change the use of water from domestic to commercial without official 
authorization. Underground water leakages and general water leakage control 
presents a major challenge. Therefore, such unaccounted for water, combined with 
an old distribution network, marks a serious challenge to the POCO because the 
commercial sustainability of the model depends on water sales - the lower the 
leakage and the greater the water supplied, along more water sales, the greater 
the income for the POCO. 
iv. Another major challenge for the POCO concerns how to sound initial 
investment decisions. The POCO self-system of generating capital funds is limited 
to BSP (£) 31,604, 330.25 as the cumulating amount for the first year, depending 
upon the number of customers served with water and the size of the water 
distribution network. Water service infrastructures are very large and expensive. 
- 276-
The generated capital initially will not be sufficient to cover the whole of the 
required investment. A master plan with details as to the priority areas investment 
should be put in place, but the question is raised as to where the any such 
investment should go in such a way that the invested areas may immediately start 
generating an income. Should it go to increase water production, water quality 
improvement, the expansion of the network, water metering and control or 
increasing customer connections? All of these areas have an equal role in 
increasing income, but which should be first and how much is investment is 
required? These are important technical challenges facing the implementation of 
the POCO. 
v. The acceptability of the model can also present a challenging issue, 
especially for stakeholders who believe in public and private styles of water 
services. They may be willing to accept POCO, but commitment and 
implementation may not be easy (obstacle to POCO), especially for the decision 
makers who have personal interests (political, corruption and others) in private and 
public water services. 
9.5.6 Discussion of the concepts developed in the model 
The discussion covers a number of concepts developed during the whole 
process of the research implementation. The discussion has critically analysed the 
concepts developed and their contribution in formulating the ideal solution for the 
water services problems in Tanzania (sub-Sahara African countries). However, the 
areas including public ownership in water services, funding methods from local 
sources, localization and sustainability of POCO, efficiency in performance and 
monitoring, and suitability of POCO in comparison to private and public water 
services have also been critically reviewed and evaluated. However, to strengthen 
the discussion of the impact of the regulating authority and the importance of the 
WTP, the under-performance of contracts has also been assessed. 
i. The causes of water problems 
The concept of the diagnosis of the causes of water problems in Tanzania 
(and sub-Saharan African countries in general) was the first and most fundamental 
research focus of this study. The objectives were to understand and evaluate the 
actual problems facing the designing of a proper approach for identifying the ideal 
research solution. However, the implementation required the collection of a wide 
range of information from different sources within Tanzania and other sub-Saharan 
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African countries, as detailed in chapter 3 of this thesis. The experience of water 
services in Tanzania - from the independence of the country - and covering public 
water services, private water services, the failure and success of such methods and 
the impact of their practices have been critically discussed (see chapter 2). 
However, the information collected from the field through the mixed research 
method (as detailed in chapter 7), pushed the study to come up with the 
identification on what the major problems are. Furthermore, knowledge of the 
experience of water services from other sub-Saharan African countries including 
Kenya, Uganda, Ghana, Zambia, Somalia, Cote d' Ivoire, Senegal and Guinea 
were collectively analysed and compared with that of Tanzania, leading to the 
conclusion that there are generic major water problems in sub-Saharan African 
countries. The study identified two major causes, including the unavailability of 
sustainable capital funds for investing in water development projects due to 
economic problems in the region, which forces poor sub-Saharan African countries 
to depend on loans with tough conditions from the World Bank and other 
International funding institutions. The second indicated major cause for water 
problems in the region is the absence of an appropriate water service management 
model, which has to be acceptable and practical so as to suit regional 
environmental, culture and social requirements. However, the availability of capital 
funds alone cannot solve regional water problems without an appropriate 
management model being in place. Each needs the other, and funds need sound 
management just as sound management needs funds - funds require proper 
management. Therefore, a meaningful solution should solve capital funding 
problems and justify its potential in water service management according to 
regional needs. 
ii. The concept of public ownership as a solution for managing water services 
The concept of the public ownership of water services in this research was 
developed from the water management challenges established from information 
collected in the field compared with experiences from other sub-Saharan African 
countries. The objective was to develop an appropriate solution for water 
management in Tanzania. However, the concept of public ownership in this 
research is different from that of normal public water services which is common in 
most of other sub-Saharan African countries, and did not prove to be successful 
due to bureaucratic and political decisions and continual interference in day-to-day 
activities. The concept is that the entities responsible for the provision of water 
services should be 100% public-owned but that operations should be independent 
- 278 -
and far removed from interference. This is possible because the working relation 
between the government (responsible ministry) and the service provider will be 
bound by a performance contract in which the performance targets, duties and 
responsibilities of each part will be clearly stipulated. The performance targets set 
are periodically reviewed for decision-making and determining the necessary 
action. However, within the division of labour, the government retains the role of 
financing capital development and policy issues; this allows for a wide range of 
different sources of capital investment, including government budgets, grants, 
loans and contributions from friends. Meanwhile, the funding of private services are 
limited to loans with interest or else directly generated from water charges which 
has an effect on higher water charges as a return. With regard to the concept of 
public ownership, investment does not focus on the maximization of profit in terms 
of money (rather, it has a focus on the provision of services to all) - sometimes, 
services costs include subsidies for accommodating low income people, and in this 
sense the services provided under public ownership have a greater focus on 
affordability. 
By way of contrast, for private services any profit generated from service 
provision is taken back as a part of capital investment in the same service. This has 
the impact of reducing costs for water charges to customers. 
Another tool that protects the independence of the public operating entity 
under public ownership is the presence of a regulating authority - an independent 
regulating authority with the responsibility of setting service standards and the 
quality of any operation. This increases the independence of operators and places 
a greater focus on the standards set by regulator because in instances of failure 
the regulator will refuse to issue an operating licence. The independent public 
owned entity (the operator) will speed up the development of water services to all, 
and hence capital funds are provided from the government sources with the 
operating entity working under a contract with detailed performance targets. The 
milestones provided are realistic and measurable, and the concept of an internal 
performance contract provides a catalyst for performance because any stipulated 
tasks are given a specific time of completion. Furthermore, the public operator is 
supervised (Le., controlled) by the independent regulator under the condition that 
water services should meet the standards set by the regulator. Therefore, concept 
of public ownership is not motivated by political reasons - rather it aims to speed up 
the provision of affordable, quality and reliable water services to all, and so it 
should result in applications that will lead to that goal. Public ownership can be 
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adopted as a better way of concluding a sustainable solution for the management 
of water services in Tanzania (and other sub-Saharan African countries). 
iii. Local sources for funds as an alternative to World Bank loans 
The idea of developing sustainable capital funding sources for water projects 
as an alternative to loans with tough conditions from the World Bank and other 
international financial institutions was initially developed following the analysis of 
the effects of World Bank loans on water projects in African and developing 
countries (see chapter 4). The various challenges, as to how to qualify for a loan, 
the mode of payment and the procedure to follow, the bank interest on any loan, 
the decision as to how to use and fund management controls, procedures and their 
impact on society were among the factors that led the research to seek the best 
alternative funding methods as a substitute to World Bank loans. The need for 
reliable sources for funding water development projects was obligatory, because 
poor water supplies and sewerage services in the greater part of sub-Saharan 
African countries is caused by a lack of sustainable capital funds. The countries in 
the region suffer from significant poverty which makes them totally dependent on 
loans from rich international financial institutions. As discussed in chapter 4, such 
loans are provided with conditions that mostly favour the donors and have the 
effect of delaying the implementation of the projects due to the lengthy and strict 
system behind the funding process. This is especially so where every small stage 
of implementation is approved centrally under the donor's set criteria (whereby 
there is no objection) before the approval of any subsequent funds. Such 
conditions include ICB in relation to water projects, funds for experts and the 
requirement of privatization. These have a significant impact on raising water 
prices, work redundancies and the loss of government power in the provision of 
water services management and, therefore, make water unaffordable for those on 
low incomes. 
Alternative local sources for generating capital funds, a tariff review method 
and mass contribution will to insure the sustainability of the development of water 
projects and free sub-Saharan African countries from loans with tough conditions. 
Moreover, the speed of decision-making and the reallocation of funds will be 
increased according to local needs. This in turn will hasten such projects' 
implementation and lower water prices since the total water price will be formulated 
less in the interests of donors and private operators. Therefore, water services will 
become much more affordable for all. 
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However, the adoption of the tariffs review method for generating capital 
funds is possible only where a unit volume of water is sold to cover the total actual 
production costs plus any reasonable extra amount calculated for the development 
of future water services (capital investment). Mass contribution methods are 
applicable only when the governing policy agrees; in some countries, sourcing the 
capital investment for the community and social (public) development is solely the 
government's responsibility and individuals are not allowed to organize any 
contribution related to capital funds for public services. The amount generated is 
invested into the planned and earmarked priority areas, with a focus such that the 
selected priority areas will be able to generate a certain amount of funds within a 
specific period of time for the next round of investment. 
However, the success of local approaches (tariffs and mass contribution) for 
the generation of capital funds requires an in-depth assessment of the motivations 
of the WTP. Generally, the relevant factors including fair and affordable water 
charges, good customer care, the availability of quality water in quantity, timely 
charging, transparency for water users through their participation in the review of 
water tariffs and easy methods for payments will all have act as an encouragement 
on water users' willingness to pay. Therefore, the notion of a willingness to pay is a 
part and parcel of the success of the whole when local methods (the review of 
tariffs and mass contributions) for generating capital funds for water projects. 
Furthermore, the contract between water users and service providers, with 
conditions stipulating penalties and even the disconnection of water services for 
non-payment may serve as a tool for motivating customers' willingness to pay. 
Therefore, the WTP is a special tool to increase the collection of revenue in water 
development projects. 
iv. The local style of the management of water services 
As a concept of a local style for the management of water services in 
Tanzania (and sub-Saharan African countries), the POCO was concluded from the 
analysis adopted after testing the theoretical model in the field. The framework 
model was developed from various concepts gathered from different cases in 
Tanzania and other countries within the sub-Saharan African region, as detailed in 
chapter 6. The framework model was used to develop questionnaires and, 
thorough survey methods, the field information was gathered and analysed so as to 
develop the theoretical model. This in turn was tested in the field in order to 
examine its acceptability, sustainability and adoptability. The feedback from the test 
suggested a number of local contributions for strengthening the model, and with 
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this focus on localization was adopted into the POCO. The catalyst for this process 
was the absence of a sustainable water management model in Tanzania (and sub-
Saharan African countries in general) which was indicated earlier as one of the 
major problems obstructing the development of water services in the region. 
The absence of a sustainable local water services model in the region was 
also noted as a cause and catalyst for importing privatization into the region. 
Tanzania - and many other countries in the sub-Saharan region adopted a foreign 
model of private water services as a loan package with the hope that privatization 
would be a reliable solution for solving water problems in the region, and thus the 
focus shifted from a concept of public water services to one of private water 
services. However, in some countries within the region, private water services were 
rejected, such that in some countries they were adopted permanently while in 
others only temporarily. In assessing the overall performance and effects of 
privatization in the region - as a foreign means of managing water services in the 
region - has made both positive and negative contributions to the provision of water 
in sub-Saharan African countries. Privatization works better in the first world, which 
has a stable and strong economy and where the issue of affordability does not 
really exist. Where the model is transferred to peoples with a different level of 
income and distinct cultures, social norms, traditions and lifestyles the majority of 
people will never afford the private water services. 
As discussed in chapter 5, privatization is not a tool that can automatically 
turn poor water services into good water services that are affordable to all. 
Therefore, its application risks creating a gap between classes of people, namely 
those who can afford to pay for water services and those - the poor - who cannot 
afford them. Accordingly, because of the poor and unstable economy of the sub-
Saharan African region, such a situation may cause crisis and misunderstanding, 
whereby the majority of local people will be without safe water and, therefore, the 
region will become a hotbed of waterborne diseases and poor development. 
Nonetheless, privatization has made significant and positive contributions to 
the development of a local and sustainable model for the region. This research has 
developed a local model (the POCO) as a solution for managing water services in 
the region and through a survey method the model has been tested in the field and 
its sustainability proven. Insofar as the model's structure allows the division of the 
total operating area into small manageable zones according to the local geography 
and the number of consumers available, it has made a greater contribution to the 
assurance of quality water in quantity in each area focused upon. The local 
component of an independent regulatory authority represented in the model makes 
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a significant contribution to the role of monitoring and controlling water quality and 
service standards. The regulating organization protects local low income water 
users against higher water charges, which may - for many reasons - result from 
the influence of the operator. 
In practice, and under the chairmanship of the regulator, water users have 
opportunities to contribute to the provision of their service and complain where it 
fails to meet their expectations, and especially during the water charges review 
process. The water user's participation in decision-making enables people to 
understand the value of the services provided and, therefore, generates a feeling of 
personal responsibility which serves as a stimulant to the WTP. It marks a special 
means of encouraging local people to assess their service and become a part of 
the decision-making process governing their own water services, under 
professional guidance. The POCO was developed from various local contributions 
and seeks to solve local problems of water provision by placing them under the 
management of local people. This localism of the POCO accommodates greater 
acceptability and simplicity in practice and, therefore, speeds up the 
implementation process of the intended objectives. The whole process of water 
users' participation in the model ensures the better protection of a standard of 
affordability when the issue of water charges comes around; this is the motivation 
of the WTP. 
v. The control of performance and its monitoring (the appropriate model) 
The concept of performance control and service monitoring established in this 
research was the outcome of the analysis of the causes of failures in providing of 
water services under a public management style in comparison with private water 
services in the sub-Saharan African region. The objective was to come up with an 
appropriate strong model (POCO) so as to eliminate the existing local water 
management problems, including bureaucracy, poor performance and a lack of 
commitment, as well as to encourage the better use of available resources to 
ensure decent work performance. However, the process necessitated the review 
and evaluation of different styles of water services, including public and private 
services as well commercialized water services in developing African countries. 
The experiences countries such as Kenya, Zambia and Somalia have made 
contributions of significant value towards the building of the appropriate 
management model. 
It was noted in chapter 3 that most sub-Saharan African countries under a 
public water management style suffering from persistent poor water supply and 
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sewerage services because of a lack of commitment, political interference and poor 
performance monitoring of the available small water services system. Furthermore, 
under public water services, the performance targets have been set to fulfil political 
goals. 
The countries in the region were - and some still are - suffering losses of 
more than 40% of their water production. This unaccounted for water was due to 
poor control and monitoring and has had a significant impact on the providers' 
water services plans and revenue collection and, therefore, affecting any progress 
made in water development. Furthermore, water bills tend not to be fully paid due 
to the number of unsolved water problems which discourage the customers' WTP. 
Performance monitoring and control measures under a system involving 
contracts for performance bring some of the important factors established and 
ensure the appropriateness of the model advocated by this research. They form the 
drivers of working performance when the POCO model is adopted and in turn 
secure the model's sustainability in relation to work quality and time control. 
However, the internal performance contract between government (the owner) 
and the services provider (the operator), as detailed by clear targets for 
performance over a period of time, will periodically reviewed so as to evaluate the 
work performed in terms of quality, quantity, value and time taken. The outcomes 
will be adopted as a base for decision-making and determining any necessary 
actions. However, the set targets should measurable and realistic, since unrealistic 
targets will give the wrong evaluation results and, therefore, lead to the wrong 
conclusions and bad decisions. 
In periodic performance contracts a risk is incurred as to the total 
implementation of any work to be done because the service provider must account 
for any delays; furthermore, the component involving charges for failures in the 
contract can be assessed as a source of income for one side (the owner). 
However, on the operator side this is reflected (differently) as a point of reference 
for caution so as to ensure that there is inefficiency - this counts as a positive 
impact on the evaluation of the total work performed. This is in contrast with a 
public style of water services, where operational duties are mainly influenced or 
interrupted by political decisions, resulting in a situation where no-one is 
accountable for any failures or scandals, thereby creating a more bureaucratic 
attitude to performance which may lead to corruption. The contract performance 
style of the POCO guarantees the ability to control quality and efficiency over a 
defined period. The contract performance style can be adopted in a number of 
ways, depending upon objectives to be fulfilled. In order to create a more serious 
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commitment in settling water bills. A special contract as commitment to payments 
for the provided water services should be signed between the service provider and 
water users. The contract details the agreed responsibilities of each part in 
sustaining services. This contractual commitment is a driver for the WTP from the 
water user's side and, at the same time, from the services provider's side serves to 
push for decent service delivery. To ensure the best services for the customer, a 
performance contract can be introduced between management and employees, 
whereby each individual employee has to perform a measurable amount of work 
within a specified period of time. As such, the work done is periodically measured 
and evaluated and thus the necessary action may be taken to ensure quantity, 
quality and efficiency. 
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CHAPTER TEN: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
10.1 Conclusions 
This research was designed and carried out with the aim of developing the 
appropriate solution to water management problems in Tanzania. The focus of the 
thesis was on the eight primary objectives developed in chapter 1. The 
(methodology) detailed in chapter 7 guided the researcher to execute this task by 
establishing a theory of study, a section on method, data collection, sample points, 
the verification of data, data analysis, model development, validation discussion 
and conclusions. However, the research focus was on water services in sub-
Saharan African countries because the study aim was to develop an appropriate 
water management solution that is suitable for the countries within that region 
alone (see the detailed explanation in chapter 3). According to the research 
objectives, this research established the following conclusions 
10.1.1 Review and identify the water problems in Tanzania 
The review carried out on the Tanzanian water management system identified 
the following major problems. 
The Tanzanian government had no funds for the repair and rehabilitation of 
the infrastructure. The need for funds for repair forced the Tanzanian government 
to opt for loans with privatization conditions. Water services have been under 
private management since February 2003; however, private water management 
could not deliver the performance required. Water services were diminishing. The 
causes were identified as poor performance due to poor revenue collection, 
increases in water leakages and a lack of team work between the top management 
team and the majority common employees (see section 2.6.2). 
The government went for water privatization without making enough 
preparation or collecting enough information. Their approach harmed the 
acceptance and implementation of private water services. The adoption of any new 
method in the water services sector requires preparation, including the further 
understanding of the method, planning, implementation and the participation of all 
stakeholders. This practice will ensure acceptance, adoption and good 
performance in practice. Therefore, any transfer or changes with the objective of 
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improving water services should include preparation in order to measure the 
coverage of those factors before implementation. 
10.1.2 The delivery of water services in sub-Saharan African countries 
The review of the water services in the region indicated that almost all sub-
Saharan African countries were facing water supply and sanitation problems and, in 
fact, most among the worst in the world, whereby almost 2 in every 5 people suffer 
from a shortage of safe water. Those countries with poor water services experience 
poverty caused by a poor economic background and they can neither afford nor 
develop sufficient funds for capital water projects. This research indicated that a 
lack of capital funds for water development was one of the major reasons for water 
privatization in the region. Furthermore, the unavailability of a proper water 
management system to fit the actual local environment was seen as the second 
major cause of water problems in the region. Most of the existing water 
management systems were copied from developed countries and as such, in one 
way or another, experience numerous difficulties due to gaps between their 
cultures, social norms, traditions and economies. Therefore, it is concluded that 
capital funds for the development of water projects and an appropriate water 
management model constitute a universal problem for all sub-Saharan African 
countries. Accordingly, if the requirement is to obtain sustainable, affordable, 
reliable and quality water services for all, then a role for private finance is likely 
form a key component. 
10.1.3 The evaluation of funding methods for water development projects 
One of the research objectives is the evaluation of different funding methods 
for water supply services. The evaluation concluded that the countries in the sub-
Saharan African region cannot afford to raise their own capital for the development 
of water projects due to the poverty caused by poor economies of the region. The 
only major source of capital for water development projects are loans from the 
various international financial institutions (such as the World Bank). 
Capital for water development projects in the form of loans from international 
financial institutions has always been accompanied with difficult conditions, 
including the requirement of privatization, and which have significant effects on 
public citizens (employees) and as well governments. Employees become worried 
about losing their jobs due to new private organizational structures with new 
management rules. Depending upon the nature of privatization, the government is 
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normally affected through either the loss of ownership of the entity or else the loss 
of power, control and direct management of the entity. 
Guidance on procurement procedure as a condition for World Bank loans has 
a greater effect on local contractors, especially when bidding for ICB tenders. The 
open ICB invites various international large-scale bidders with a higher level of 
experience, technology, skills, equipment and tools. Local contractors from 
developing countries with poor economies have very little capital available to use 
for modern, technology, equipment and tools. Therefore, local contractors cannot 
compete fairly and all of the big contracts end up in hands of these international 
contractors. Moreover, as to approval through no objection as one of the conditions 
for a loan, this has a significant effect on prolonging the implementation procedure 
whereby every element of the project during its implementation should have 
systematic approval from the World Bank. It is a frequently routine job and without 
this approval funds cannot be released. As a condition, the provision of technical 
and financial experts (which, sometimes, borrowers do not need) increases 
unnecessary project expenses. High levels of interest and strict conditions for 
payments have a major effect on poor borrowing countries. The conditions not only 
affect water charges but also have a significant impact on the actual amount that is 
utilized by the project and the total loan payback. 
This creates difficulties for acceptability, practice and affordability in such 
borrower countries. Therefore, to overcome these difficulties, this research 
concluded that the local methods of tariffs review and mass contribution in the 
POCO is a solution for sustainable capital funds with no conditions. 
However, the adoption of these methods depends upon the flexibility of 
existing water policies in each country. In cases where the tariffs review method 
has been adopted, it has to be structured with a greater focus on services to all 
rather than for profit making. The affordable water charges which have been 
designed will raise capital funds from differences between total 
operation/production costs and total water sales. This is an immediate driven 
capital development (tariffs review for establishing capital funds); the generated 
funds and profit do not go to individual of groups of private shareholders or others. 
Rather, the established amount goes back to sustain (Le., improve) existing water 
services. However, the WTP plays greater role in the sustainability of this method. 
People should be willing to and active in paying their monthly water charges. 
Therefore, special motivations such as good customer care, affordable and fair 
water charges, easy methods of payment and quality services to stimulate the 
WTP should be put in place. Good water services and customer care, proper and 
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fair water charges, customer participation in setting water charges and easy 
methods of payment are a few of the recommendations in the POCO for motivating 
the WTP. The POCO indicated that affordable water charges can be one of the 
major catalysts for the WTP. Therefore, before the implementation of any new 
water charges, affordability should be critically analysed for the benefit of low 
income people and, if possible, water users should participate fully in the whole 
process of review. In doing so, this will transfer both knowledge and an 
understanding of the sustainability of water services and, therefore, will stimulate 
the WTP. The POCO has covered all of this, and tariffs review method is 
appropriate for the Tanzanian (and sub-Saharan African) people. 
This research also concluded that the adoption of the local method of mass 
contribution for establishing capital funds depends upon government policy, since 
in some countries people are not allowed to contribute to public development 
projects and it is a purely governmental task to find the capital. In Tanzania the 
mass contribution method is compatible with the governing policy and POCO has 
evidence that it is sustainable, safe and that it can be adopted. This method can be 
adopted once with a special targeted amount and within a designed period of time, 
as discussed in chapter 8. After the targeted funds have been collected, they 
should be taken as capital investment for water projects as this will further generate 
future capital. The mass contribution method has no effect on water charges, which 
is why the method has been recommended in POCO. The mass contribution 
method can be applied separately without the review of tariffs or else it can be 
combined. As a new sustainable solution, this research has concluded the two local 
funding methods to be reliable and affordable local sources for generating capital 
funds. 
10.1.4 The assessment of the potential value of different water management 
systems 
The evaluation and assessment of the potential value of different water 
management systems was one of the main objectives of this thesis. The aim was to 
collect more ideas in water services from different experiences, and it was a 
necessary procedure for covering enough inputs in developing an appropriate 
research solution. 
The findings indicate that the public water services style was the most 
practised water management model worldwide. As appraised in section (5.2.5), 
public water services have the potential in terms of security and services· and more 
consideration should be paid on whether they can be made affordable to all and 
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people's willingness to pay (in terms of subsidies and fee capital from public funds). 
However the method has a weakness in terms of efficiency due to the natural 
bureaucratic cause of the domination of political decisions and interference. Such 
services are publicly owned and managed by individuals nominated by political 
leaders in order to fulfil special or political goals. In this case, political leaders are 
more powerful and, sometimes, political decisions end up governing water services; 
public water management failed in Tanzania and in most sub-Saharan African 
countries and it was the failure of public water management which forced 
privatization to come in. 
In the sub-Saharan African region, private water services constituted a foreign 
water management model brought in as a substitute for the failure of public water 
management. In chapter 5, private water services were shown to have greater 
potential in terms of efficiency, competitiveness and quality. However, the 
weakness of the model was stipulated in terms of the coverage of services, with 
their expansion being based on increases in income, since the nature of any private 
business will have an impact on income per product sale, especially when 
considering higher profit margins. This has an effect on higher water charges (Le., 
affordability). Furthermore, in private services the profit generated is distributed to 
private individuals or to a group of a few shareholders - the profit is not taken back 
for capital investment and if it is then it constitutes a very small percentage. In the 
sense, the provision of services is more focused on those who can pay (see the 
appraisal in section 5.3.8). 'Services for profit-making' is the motto of private water 
services - they have indicated a significant weakness with an increase of 
unemployment due to the introduction of new management structures and the 
adoption of new technology. This forces the termination of employees for the 
maximization of profit under the cover of economic reasons. These were concluded 
to be the major causes of the failure of private water services in the sub-Saharan 
region of African countries. 
Examining the potential value of commercialization in water services was 
stipulated as one of the objectives of this thesis. Various experiences of 
commercialization in water services - including those of Somalia, Kenya and 
Zambia - have been successfully implemented. The focus on commercializing 
water services was adopted as a sustainable way of providing quality water 
services. As to product costs, the price of a certain measured volume is sold to 
cover total product costs for service sustainability and the calculated percentage for 
the development of services. The potential differences between commercialization 
and privatization were identified in the structure of organizations, in that private 
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entities make private structural decisions based on the maximization of profit, which 
are distributed to private shareholders, whereas with governmental commercial 
services the minimum raised profit is taken back as capital investment in a similar 
entity. However, the issue of profit-making may not necessarily be focused in terms 
of money - rather, under public commercial services the profit gain may be 
assessed in terms of service coverage (Le., services for all as a goal). Therefore, 
this research has concluded the first commercial approach in water services by 
using a combination of concepts from experiences in public and private water 
services models. This will be practiced within sub-Saharan African countries. 
10.1.5 The development of a theoretical model and its testing 
The objective of developing a theoretical model and testing it constituted the 
research's strategic approach towards coming up with an appropriate, checked, 
approved and strengthened research solution. The approach involved gathering, 
evaluating and reviewing different water service models - including privatization, 
public and commercial models - from sub-Saharan African countries. The field 
information collected from Tanzania made a key contribution in developing the 
theoretical model. The findings indicated that structural formulations are different 
between one model and another; however, the operating models were governed by 
water policies, which also differ from one country to another (e.g., in Uganda the 
water services model has no regulator and regulating activities are executed by the 
government). In some areas, the asset holding company's activities - including 
investment - are carried out by government, but in Tanzania DAWASA is the asset 
holding company rather than the government. Equally, in Senegal the operator (Le., 
the services provider) is not responsible for capital investment in some areas as the 
operator has to pay a certain agreed amount for capital investment. 
The strategy was to develop a detailed sustainable organizational structure 
with clear responsibility delineated for each component involved so as to form one 
unit model. The collected information was analysed and the theoretical model - with 
components including the owner, the regulatory authority, independent operators, 
water users and sources of capital funds - was developed for field testing, whereby 
the function and role of each component was developed (see section 6.8.3). 
However, with the need for adoptability, acceptability, affordability and sustainability 
being the core measure for the model in determining an appropriate and reliable 
solution in application, this necessitated the development of a theoretical model to 
be taken for the field test. This testing procedure was a strategy for strengthening 
the theoretical model through a survey method. 
- 291 -
The test successfully generated a number of challenges, such as the 
adoption of local funding institutions, projects funds control measures, water 
charges control and priority areas for initial investment. The contributions were 
adopted for analysis and the concepts used to localize the theoretical model 
(POCO). This research concluded that with the objectives of strengthening to meet 
local requirements, any new water services model would have to be tested before 
adoption and the results from the test should be analysed with the objective of the 
model's improvement. The executed test (i.e., its validation) concluded that, an 
initially developed model (the POCO) was sustainable, reliable and affordable and, 
therefore, was an appropriate solution for the water problems in Tanzania (and 
sub-Saharan African countries in general). 
10.1.6 The development of an appropriate solution for Tanzanian water 
services 
Development of a sustainable, reliable and appropriate solution for 
Tanzania's water problems was the core objective of this research. As a research 
strategy, the water services in Tanzania were critically evaluated in order to 
conclude their problems were. The unavailability of capital funds for water 
development and the absence of an appropriate management model for water 
services were identified as major problems in the country. In order to strengthen 
the researcher's knowledge and experience of water services, a number of different 
cases from sub-Saharan African countries were examined. The findings indicated 
that all sub-Saharan African countries suffer water problems because of a lack of 
funds for the development of water and, therefore, are permanently dependant on 
loans from the World Bank. It was also noted that the absence of an appropriate 
water management model is a uniform problem in the region. The research 
developed a new strategy to solve capital funds and management problems with 
consideration paid to affordability. 
Through a mixed survey approach, the designed information was collected for 
analysis and, therefore, an appropriate solution (the POCO) for solving 
management and capital funding problems was developed. 
Accordingly, this research concluded the POCO as an appropriate practical 
solution for water problems in Tanzania (and sub-Saharan African countries) and 
confidently suggested that its application protects all stakeholders' interests 
because its commercial composition facilitates efficiency, quality and affordability. 
Furthermore, the combination of public ownership and commercial operations in the 
POCO indicates its uniqueness in terms of the competitiveness of its services to 
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ensure the sustainability, efficiency and affordability of water supply and sewerage 
services. As such, the reliability and potential of the model is greatly focused on the 
sustainability of any capital funds that are generated from local sources and as well 
as from government sources. In this case, the model provided principals for 
adopting local contributions which are maintained and so the POCO can be 
adopted anywhere in the sub-Saharan African region. However, the adoption of 
local concepts should also be placed under professional guidance so as to come 
up with independent professional decisions - this will ensure the value of 
localization in practice. Furthermore, the adoption of the POCO will make Tanzania 
(and sub-Saharan African countries) free from loans subject to conditions and allow 
for speedy and independent decision-making, which in turn will speed up water 
development in the region. Therefore, this research developed and concluded that 
the POCO is an appropriate solution for Tanzania (and sub-Saharan African 
countries in general). 
10.2 Original research contribution 
Scientifically, this research successfully developed a unique and ideal solution 
in the POCO that is not only an answer to the designed research question but also 
provides an appropriate solution for managing water supply and sewerage services 
in Tanzania and other sub-Saharan African countries. However, this research 
focused the contribution of the POCO in the following areas. 
10.2.1 The theoretical contribution of the POCO 
The POCO (the Public Ownership Commercial Operation) is a new approach in the 
water management sector and, therefore, has added a value in the sector and 
opened new challenges for future research. 
The POCO was developed to solve local Tanzanian (and sub-Saharan African) 
water problems, which are caused by problems with capital funds and the 
unavailability of appropriate water management styles. This research provided 
evidence that the adoption of the POCO will free Tanzania (and sub-Saharan 
African countries) from water problems. It has developed a new vision with 
confidence that sub-Saharan African countries can sort out capital funds problems 
without looking to external donors. The funds for capital investment in water 
projects can be established from local sources. Sub-Saharan African countries can 
develop their own local water management model to solve their local water 
problems. The POCO brought in new challenges for sub-Saharan African countries 
to find and come up with appropriate regional local solutions to solve the existing 
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water problems of each country. However, where the local components in the 
POCO originate from the local lifestyles of people, their cultures, traditions and 
beliefs, it will have greater acceptability in the field. Therefore, the POCO has 
opened a way whereby an acceptable and appropriate water management model 
should also satisfy the existing local environmental culture and the local peoples' 
lifestyles. 
The POCO, as a new water management model, has introduced a new structure of 
management in water services where competency in terms of performance is 
closely monitored through internal periodic contracts. The composition of an 
internal contract with measurable targets in the model aims to ensure higher 
working performance by eliminating the bureaucratic behaviour left following the 
provision of public water services. The internal performance contract, with its clear 
goals within the model, will raise employees' commitment to better performance in 
providing water services with the result of encouraging a willingness to pay which 
will raise the DAWASA's income and that of the government as a whole. The 
POCO was developed and justified as an appropriate solution for capital funding for 
water development projects for Tanzania (and sub-Saharan African countries in 
general). In provision of water services, the tariffs review approach has been 
justified as a reliable source for establishing capital funds for water development 
provided that the reviewed unit cost of the water to be sold consists of the actual 
production and operation costs plus any extra affordable calculated amount which 
would be direct saved as a capital fund. Through this strategy, the POCO has 
shown its capability in establishing water capital funds from local sources. This has 
opened a new platform for economic stability in the water sector, the development 
of social services and zero dependency on loans. Therefore, the POCO has 
opened a new, stronger sense of confidence and boosted the trust and self-
confidence of poor sub-Saharan African countries such that the development of 
water services in the region and the dream of affordable water services to all is 
possible without loans from the World Bank. 
The POCO has contributed to a theoretical assessment of the affordability of water 
charges which has made a significant contribution to accelerating a willingness to 
pay (WTP). POCO's approaches for accessing affordability were undertaken by 
comparing the regional member countries' minimum water charges per unit volume 
against the income per capital of each country. Furthermore, during the process of 
tariff review, under the guidance and chairmanship of the regulatory water 
authority, users participated fully, contributing their ideas at every stage before the 
approval of new water charges. This has demonstrated the greater participation of 
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water users, as a part of the management in their own water services. The result is 
the motivation of the WTP with effects on increasing revenues. The practice has 
also covered the affordability in water charges because water users can defend 
increases in charges. Therefore, in practice the POCO is a unit measure of 
affordability and quality of service which has controlled for value for money against 
the service provided. 
The POCO, through the structure of its operation, has developed greater diversity 
in terms of performance monitoring and its strategic approach of dividing operating 
areas into small manageable sub-branches, the close monitoring and control and 
the existing chart of communication. This is a new way of thinking in the field of 
water management, and the developed structure has opened a platform that can 
be adopted as a challenge to develop something suitable in both Tanzania and 
elsewhere in sub-Saharan African countries. The POCO findings can be adopted 
as references or else as secondary data for other researchers. 
The POCO has brought in a new way of thinking that in Tanzania (and other sub-
Saharan African countries) water services can be provided commercially under the 
ownership of the government and, through this style of management, both 
performance efficiency and better services can be achieved. 
i. The POCO has widened the focus of thinking from the idea that water services 
can be only be provided by just two methods: private service or public services 
alone. As such, it has brought in a challenge for studying other ways for 
providing better water services. 
ii. The POCO process of implementation has come up with a new way of thinking 
whereby customers are the best assessors of the provided water services and 
that attending closely to customers' problems is not only a better way of 
improving services but also provides a special motivation for a willingness to 
pay. This is a core value of funds' sustainability in water services. 
iii. The POCO has contributed sound theoretical knowledge of the water service 
sector which can be used as a reference (secondary data) or as a stepping 
stone for developing other studies both within and outside of the water sector. 
10.3.2 The practical contribution of the POCO 
i. Adoption of the POCO will bring in more water for domestic and other 
commercial uses and the POCO will, through its ability to generating capital funds 
itself, be able to expand, sustain and develop water services within its operating 
area. However, the availability of more water for all uses (both domestic and 
commercial) means that the land will be more fertile and give it a higher value. 
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since green land is a catalyst for human development activities and an attraction for 
investors. Therefore, agriculture development will be in place to generate income 
for both the government and individuals. Gardens, trees and other plantations will 
grow and so make the area more environmentally attractive and friendly. The 
geographical view of the country will change to a greenish hue because, naturally, 
water is the decorator to the earth. Therefore, the application ot'the POCO makes 
the environment more attractive and friendly. 
The availability of enough water for domestic use will cause the government's 
income to grow because many people will be served tap water with charges and, 
therefore, increase the government's income through taxes on water bills. In 
another way, the availability of enough commercial water will encourage the growth 
of industrial activities which will not only raise the country's economy but also 
increase employment 
The availability of enough water for domestic use through the adoption of the 
POCO will ensure that all Tanzanians are able to use safe tap water and, therefore, 
that all water borne diseases will be eradicated so as to make Tanzanians happier 
and free from many diseases. 
ii. The adoption of the POCO will make the country free from loans subject to 
conditions because the POCO has mathematically and statically proven that, 
through systematic water tariffs, the adjustment in water services is a possible 
source for establishing capital funds from local sources, and that the availability of 
stable capital funds from local sources will improve investment in the sector and, 
therefore, speed up the provision of affordable water services to all since the actual 
water changes will cover less profit. This will make water prices low and affordable 
in comparison with privatization because the cost per cubic meter in private 
services includes actual production costs, services costs and loan recovery plus 
profit, while in the POCO the water cost break down does not include loan cost 
recovery plus profit. Therefore, the POCO actual water charges per cubic meter will 
be cheaper and affordable. This encourages water users to pay their water bills 
accordingly. 
Iii. One of the practical contributions of the POCO is that when the model is 
adopted it gives a guarantee in terms of quality, safety and service efficiency, 
because it developed with the systematic counterchecking of its implementation 
process. For the purpose of review and monitoring, all activities are measured and 
evaluated periodically. This gives a detailed picture of the project's implementation 
process in every activity in a timely manner which is necessary for decisions to 
guide the project. The POCO's periodiC performance contract with clear targets 
between the operator and owner, as well as operator visas implementers, is one of 
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the tools for counterchecking performance in quality and efficiency during the 
POCO's implementation. Therefore, when the POCO is adopted it gives quality, 
efficiency and security in work. 
iv. The POCO includes training programs for employees and other 
stakeholders so as to provide a good understanding of the method for its better 
implementation, and this will raise the skill of employees by giving them any new 
and useful knowledge necessary for their working environment, the outcome being 
an increase in efficiency and productivity. The concept of training was developed 
during the model's validation whereby it is obligatory for the POCO to have a 
training programme for improving understanding, acceptability and good 
implementation. Therefore, the POCO contributes additional knowledge the 
practice of water services provision. 
v. In Tanzania, the adoption of the POCO will effectively clear the tension and 
existing confusion as to which management style is appropriate for water services 
in the country. The private and public styles have failed to solve the water problems 
in Tanzania; the effect of such failures has left a permanent sense of confusion 
with a number of different arguments taking place in the country. 
The discussion covered in chapter 2, sections 2.2.1 and 2.7 ii on the history of 
water management in Tanzania, has critically analysed the failure of each methods 
- private and public - and concluded that the conflict between the supporters of 
private and public water services is yet to be solved because each has resulted in 
certain failures and some success in other areas. Therefore, the POCO, as a 
practical solution, will take all of the effects left behind from the failure of private 
and public water services in Tanzania. 
vi. The discovery of the POCO has opened up new areas of research for the 
benefit of the water sector whereby new studies can be carried to comment, 
criticize, reinforce and challenge the POCO as to its existence or else its 
application. 
10.3.3 Appraisal of the POCO's contribution 
The discussion covering the contribution of the model interpreted the potential of 
the POCO in terms of both theoretical and practical approaches. This justifies the 
assertion that the POCO is an appropriate solution for water problems in Tanzania 
(and sub-Saharan African countries). The ability of the POCO for establishing 
capital funds from local sources marks the unique contribution of the model which 
is fundamental to the provision of change and a new vision of better water services 
for all. As seen in sections 10.2.1 and 10.2.2, the availability of capital funds for 
water development will not only speed up affordable water services to all but will 
- 297-
also make sub-Saharan African countries independent and free from loans with 
conditions. Furthermore, the POCO's ability to raise water project investment 
internally will improve the quality of services so as to make enough water available 
for domestic and commercial use; the availability of tap water for all will eradicate 
the existing periodic water borne diseases in Tanzania. Excess agricultural water 
will not only make plenty of food available but will also improve soil fertility so as to 
make a greenish environmental which is attractive for investment and which will 
increase the land's value. The POCO eliminates water borne diseases, provides for 
more food and increases the land's value, all of which together make a great 
contribution to improving the economy. Moreover, the growth of commercial 
activities due to the availability of good water services under the POCO will 
increase employment for Tanzanian people. Altogether, encourages the growth of 
government income through tax collection on water charges and all other 
commercial activities. Therefore, the POCO is an appropriate solution not only for 
water problems but also in making a significant contribution to boosting the public 
and private economies. 
10.4 Recommendations for future Research 
The competence of one study alone is not enough for the concluding what is 
the appropriate solution for water supply and sewerage service problems in all 
developing countries. Countries differ from one another and, therefore, the results 
from one study can be adopted as references (secondary data), challenges or else 
as a starting point (the end of the old is a beginning for the new) for developing 
other, new, studies both in and outside the sector. The author has identified a 
number of areas for further research with potential value for this research as well 
as others, as follows. 
1. This research did not cover the generation of funds from local financial 
institutions. Therefore, this area is worth researching so as to see how much these 
local loans can be made affordable to consumers without affecting public 
ownership. 
2. This research recommends the provision of training before and during the 
changes from one water management style to another; hence, stakeholders are 
required to understand and accept the various changes and only through that 
successful transaction can meeting the objectives be assured. 
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3. The control and monitoring of performance and implementation are vital 
functions in water services management. For review and evaluation, the POCO 
was structured with a periodic contract of performance. Therefore, for future plans 
and decisions, this research recommends that the periodic evaluation of 
implemented work should be a part of any efficient water management model. 
4. The block water tariffs system should be studied and this should not only 
be taken as a way of controlling the good use of treated water but also it could be 
adopted as a potential method for generating capital funds. Hence, the method 
does not need capital investment. 
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